

GOVERNMENT AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND THE
RESPONSES OF FARMERS IN ZIMBABWE

By

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To

Naana Afia Apomasu (Asantewaa) who lies permanently at peace interred on December 19, 1986, at Sawua, Asante Region of Ghana, West Africa, among her royal Oyoko ancestors.

"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!"

Wo nana Kofi Kwabi, mebaa asuogya se mere bepe biribiri aba fie de abehye wo anuonyam naanso owuo koronfoo aama maanhu wo bio. Ei! Eye nokware, Nananom kaa se,

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"Apomasu damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe! Damirifa duwe!"

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By

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Major Department: Anthropology

This dissertation is based on fieldwork carried out in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and also among farmers in Zimbabwe, Southern Africa. It examines (1) the resettlement policy formulated and implemented by the government since independence in 1980 and (2) employs Fortes' concept of developmental cycle in domestic groups to study aspects of the responses of the country's farmers towards the policy and its programs.

The on-going project seeks to resettle 162,000 landless African families on European-owned lands which were either abandoned or are currently underutilized. In the government's view the program is necessary to redress years of forced removals of Africans from their ancestral lands onto marginal agricultural areas by Rhodesian settler administrations, a problem that resulted in nearly a decade of a bitterly fought liberation war. The government hopes also to ensure a broad based economic growth by integrating the existing dualistic African subsistence-oriented and the European commercialized sectors of the country's political economy. Critics of the program cite a dialectical contradiction between greater equity on the one hand and sustained economic growth on the other to argue that Zimbabwe may lose on both the growth and the equity fronts.

The research examined the program implementation through (1) the study of official records of development inputs and outcomes, (2) direct observation and (3) regional case study survey interviews of 630 farmers across the existing farming systems, namely, the (i) Large-Scale (European) Commercial, (ii) Small-Scale (elite African) Commercial, (iii) Communal Area (African peasant), (iv) resettlement Model A individual households and (v) the resettlement Model B Producer Cooperatives sectors.

The study found that (1) the government is making tremendous progress with the provision of the basic needs of these rural people; (2) the great majority of peasant farmers especially the Model A resettled families are agriculturally quite productive; (3) there are macro-level problems, however, such as low membership in the Model B cooperative schemes which seriously affect their performance and productivity; (4) contrary to the critics' predictions resettlement has not impacted negatively on commercial agriculture and economic growth; and (5) contrary to the government's developmental assumptions resettlement is not reducing but rather it is accentuating, at the micro-level, the already existing socioeconomic differentiation within and between these rural societies.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

The Background to the Research Problem

Rural and agricultural development in Zimbabwe, the most recent of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa to attain political independence, is an epitome of the variety of problems, the challenges and the strategies of nation-building and economic development that confront the continent. The mobilization by African countries of their predominantly rural-based human, institutional, material and other resources for economic growth and development is a monumental task. Of crucial concern presently and in the long-run is the ability of these countries to successfully motivate and sustain the capacity of the rural sector to produce adequate quantities of agricultural and other materials to meet both their subsistence and market demands.

The period since the late 1960s has been particularly devastating for the political economies of many the countries. Generally, progress has been made in various fields of endeavors such as the provision of basic human needs including health facilities and educational opportunities. However, most countries continue to experience declining per capita food production, low agricultural output and negligible economic growth. The major consequences of this state of affairs include severe hunger, starvation, malnutrition and deaths in some places.

Indeed, countries of widely differing political and developmental ideologies, historical backgrounds, geographic sizes and economic resource bases are all equally afflicted with one or the other dimension of this

problem. The African food crisis, as the problem has come to be conceptualized in the international community, is real. It relates in the broadest contexts to questions of development policy, strategies and outcomes.

The seriousness and the global implications of the crisis are emphasized succinctly by John Lewis who writes:

For several years now, much of the international community's time for the discussion of development has been preempted by Sub-Saharan Africa. The news there is nearly all bad. In a region where independent governments have been pursuing explicit, often formally planned, development efforts for a quarter-century, where dozens of aid donors have been at work for much of that time, and where both investment and aid per capita have been fairly high by Third World standards for many years, average per capita incomes are actually lower than they were fifteen years ago . . . By and large, the continent has become one great composite case of development not working. (Lewis 1986:17)

Students and analysts of African development and underdevelopment offer various explanations to account for the lack of economic growth and the consequent developmental crisis that engulf the continent.¹

One major area of criticism, which is very well articulated in the literature, concerns the development policies pursued by these countries. Recently, for instance, Robert Bates (1984a) has charged that many African governments follow policies that foster agricultural decline. The World Bank's (1981) policy paper Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Agenda for Action, echoes a similar view that blames Africa's "overextended public sector" for the crisis. Benno Ndulu (1986), writing about governance and economic management in Africa, takes up this point. He argues that too much preoccupation by these governments to participate in every area of development endeavor has created situations where the available expertise and

resources are spread thin thus making it difficult to set their priorities right.

There is also the other school of thought which, while recognizing the primacy of the state, however, dwells on the forces and relations of production. Goran Hyden (1983) argues its case when he suggests that several economies in Africa are grinding to a halt because it is both risky and costly to operate a modern state on precapitalist modes of production and organization.

Yet other critics perceive the problem at the micro-level. Uma Lele (1975), for instance, attributes the lack of success in African development to inadequate knowledge of local technical possibilities, small-farmer constraints and local institutions.²

At any rate, the state has become a hypertrophic institution in Africa. Given its developmental apparatus, policies and particular ideological bent, it has increasingly assumed the controlling role over every aspect of development. Therefore, in any attempt to evaluate the climate and environment for agricultural and related development or the lack of it in Africa one needs to approach the state, perhaps, as the most important of all the phenomena to understand.

Equally significant is the role that farmers' institutions play in the overall process of change and development. Since these institutions, especially the social organization of the forces and relations of production, are primarily expressed through household dynamics, one needs also to understand the structures, processes and variations within and between households.

Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia, became independent in April 1980 after a decade of liberation war. This fact is important for at least two reasons.

First, the birth of the country coincided with the most grim period when all of Africa faced a severe economic development crisis. Second, as the literature reviewed in Chapter III below indicates the documented experiences with specific policies and of countries which have trod the development path much longer are voluminous. Zimbabwe can therefore learn and draw important lessons from these cases in the process of formulating or adapting appropriate and workable policies to suit its needs and aspirations.

In summary then Zimbabwe represents both a challenge and an opportunity especially in terms of development choice and practice in Africa.³ The question arises, however, as to what outcome observers of the country's contemporary development scenario must expect in the future. Nevertheless, the policies that are being formulated and implemented today will shape at least the results which are likely to be realized principally in the short-term and perhaps in the long-run.

At independence, the government set out to tackle its problems of nation-building and economic development through the use, among others, of a rural development strategy that centers on planned resettlement schemes. This is part of the Lancaster House agreement which worked out an independence constitution for African majority rule in the country. In line with the agreement the government of the United Kingdom partly financed the initial purchase by the Zimbabwean government of 1.1 million hectares of abandoned or underutilized European-owned lands to resettle 18,000 African farm families (Harbeson 1980). It was projected then that by 1985 a total of 162,000 such families would be resettled at the cost of about \$400 million.

Bill Kinsey (1982:92) points out that the resettlement is the major rural development activity and the only sustained public sector program in Zimbabwe that has the potential to affect fairly immediately and

significantly the economic welfare of large numbers of rural dwellers.

This dissertation seeks therefore to examine the policy dimensions and the socioeconomic aspects of the implementation of the resettlement. It will also discuss how Zimbabwean farmers view the entire resettlement exercise in the general context of the country's agriculture along with their opinions about the problems and prospects associated with it.

The Research Problem

The on-going resettlement of 162,000 farm families on new agricultural lands is a massive egalitarian commitment on the part of the government. Like all other public sector development programs in the country the parameters of resettlement are set in the ideological context of socialism. As numerous other experiences bear out this fact has significant implications for the nature of state policies and involvement relating to the means and the ends of development (see for instance, Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kenya 1965; Nyerere 1968; Samoff 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ellman 1981; Munslow 1983).

Specifically, the government of Zimbabwe seeks through policy changes to effect structural and other needed transformations in the distribution of the country's agricultural land resources. This is to achieve stated policy objectives. Among them is the rehabilitation of the landless and the unemployed on abandoned and underutilized land as a way of ensuring full economic production and improving rural living standards (Zimbabwe 1981a:2).

Part of the government's rationale for embarking on a resettlement-based rural development policy is also provided by the then Prime Minister and now President Robert Mugabe. In his address to nations and international aid

organizations at the 1981 Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development he reiterated that his

Government clearly cannot accept a state of affairs in which millions of our people are condemned to a life, nay a mere existence, characterised by stagnation, hopelessness and desperation. Our struggle for national liberation--protracted, incalculably costly and herculean as it was--would lose meaning were we, in the moment of victory and the era of peace, to allow millions of our people to wallow in poverty and degradation as victims of forces beyond their control. (Zimbabwe 1981c:31)

Given the historical background of the political economy of previous land distribution policies in the country, the postindependence agrarian reforms and resettlement have met with popular support from the great majority of the people. This support emanates largely from the populace which clamors for social or redistributive justice. There are others, however, who are disappointed with resettlement for various reasons. These fall into two different social classes.

In the first category are a number of effectively landless, prospective applicants and others who are on waiting lists for resettlement. Many of these people lament the slow pace of current resettlement. Some in particular are even shocked at the inaction of the government to expropriate all European farms. As one informant quipped, "the government owes us a duty to confiscate and distribute the vast hectares of our ancestral lands which were previously stolen and are currently being held by so-called European owners." Such critics either impatiently or justifiably accuse the government of softness, breach of promises made during the liberation war and even for condoning the status quo in so far as racial inequities in land distribution are concerned.

The disappointments of these critics were first articulated by Andre

Astrow (1983) and more recently in a publication edited by Ibbo Mandaza (1986). In the latter Sam Moyo (1986) argues that contrary to state propaganda and widespread publicity abroad less than 20 percent of the peasantry have profited from the so-called success story of Zimbabwe's agriculture, particularly in terms of the land redistribution program.

On the other hand there are some European and African commercial farmers who oppose resettlement. Their argument is that resettlement is likely to be detrimental to the conservation of the fragile natural resource base of the country. They charge that overstocking, uncontrolled land use and poor agricultural practices are a characteristic of "inexperience" farmers such as the resettled. Thus, they predict resettlement will surely lead to the underdevelopment of the country's agriculture. In their view resettlement is nothing more or less than the mere extension of the pitiful human and ecological conditions that are found in the so-called communal or African rural areas into the Intensive Cultivation Areas (ICAs) or the commercial farm lands.

These views were re-echoed in June 27, 1985, by a former leading opposition politician in the country, Joshua Nkomo now Zimbabwe's Second Vice-President. In response to questions about resettlement in a Face to Face interview on Zimbabwe television, Nkomo, then President of the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe All Peoples Union (PF-ZAPU), had this to say: (1) The ZANU-PF government's resettlement program was destructive; (2) it was turning rich fertile farm land into deserts; (3) it was wasting millions of acres; (4) taking two thousand people from the communal [African rural] areas and settling them on a farm which used to be managed by one man was turning the resettlement areas into communal areas and (5) that the whole country needed resettlement and not only a few.⁴

The central focus of the anti-resettlement criticism has also been related to a series of substantive issues that, in summary, question the efficacy of resettlement as the correct strategy to achieve stated developmental objectives. This criticism is built upon the theoretical and conceptual arguments in the rural development literature. It asserts that there is a dialectical contradiction between greater political and social equity on one hand and sustained economic growth on the other.

Bill Kinsey (1982:93), articulates this viewpoint cogently with a prediction that the Zimbabwean "society may lose on both the growth and equity fronts." Specifically, he (Kinsey 1982) raises the following additional concerns, arguing that

1. resettlement as an instrument for the implementation of a policy of egalitarianism cannot be operated consistently in terms of its own objectives without at the same time reducing to unacceptable levels commercial agriculture's important contribution to the national economy;
2. resettlement on the scale now envisaged may do severe damage in the short run to the economic growth potential of the agricultural sector as a whole, thereby reducing the resources available to the government for future investment in promotion of development;
3. resettlement on an individual basis will create powerful class interests that will be more difficult to reform in the future than is the conflict between black and white interests at present.

Some of these views are shared, for instance, by other critics including Malcolm Blackie (1982) and the Whitsun Foundation (Whitsun 1983).

These matters contested by the various observers have important ramifications for evaluation research. Of particular interest are (1) the issues that governmental policy about agriculture, resettlement and rural development seeks to address, (2) the outcomes of such policy, in terms of

its intended and unintended consequences and (3) the attitudes and responses that the implementation of such policy is likely to generate among the supposed beneficiaries.

The research problem then is essentially an evaluative one. It is organized around the state on the one hand and individual rural households on the other. This study is mindful of the nature and levels of the interactional network which links the two major actors in the development arena. The choice of actors reflects the reality which obtains in Africa. It also accords active rather than passive roles to the state and households. The respective and mutual capacities of both the state and households to create innovative opportunities and to provide the necessary and sufficient supportive or participatory conditions for development are immense.

The state in Africa is the principal, if not the exclusive initiator and executor of development policy. Even where private or voluntary and non-governmental organizations are an important agency for development it so happens that the framework for their operations are set and are closely monitored also by respective governments. More importantly, the state is the provider of most of the public or collective goods which are used for rural development. That is the case in Zimbabwe where in undertaking resettlement and rural development the state makes available, free of charge or at below market prices, resources that range from land through social and physical infrastructures to production incentives.

Similarly, the cumulative socioeconomic activities of African farm households often make a lot of difference between the success and failure of government's induced rural development programs such as resettlement.⁵ In rural Zimbabwe co-residing composite households living in homesteads which dot the spatial scene of the African and Communal Areas are recognizable

decision-making, production, consumption and reproduction units that development planners and executors have to deal with.

On the basis of the foregoing facts one can deduce from the agricultural resettlement policy of the government that it is being implemented in the national interest and for the benefit of the rural people. By providing land and other basic needs to the rural poor the government hopes to facilitate equity and justice as a way of ensuring productivity, economic growth and development.

Farm households and rural dwellers in general are hardly consulted and they do not participate in the formulation of policy nor in the identification of projects that may be essential to their welfare. Surprisingly however, they are often openly supportive of the rural development objectives of governments. They welcome whatever production resources and incentives which are made available to them. This does not mean that these individuals behave and act according to development planning projections. As individuals or even groups of like-minded persons they have their respective and different development agendas or goals. Indeed, in the case of households these are individually differentiated as it is most often the case by such factors as (1) demographic characteristics, (2) risk averseness, innovativeness and attitudinal profiles and (3) access to production assets. Their decision-making calculi, expectations and behaviors within the government created developmental environment are also guided by differential altruism and self interests. These concerns are in many cases not necessarily congruent with the somewhat ideal projections which are made by government planners.

Thus, it is theoretically possible for the state to use incentive or reward systems such as the provision of basic human needs and public goods to

positively influence rural households and thereby achieve stated developmental goals. It is important to recognize, however, that since different households perceive such influence differently and invariably even respond differently to the same stimuli there is always the possibility of the occurrence of other scenarios in developmental expectation. For example, the internal dynamics within and between households as well as any disagreements in the agendas of households and that of the government may change the outcomes of policy goals and result in diverse and differential impacts among the beneficiaries.

This hypothesis will be elucidated and empirically examined in rural Zimbabwe. The study will therefore be concerned with the gathering, analysis and use of relevant qualitative and quantitative information to facilitate the following:

1. assessment of the means and ends of the agricultural resettlement policy, articulated by the government since 1980, against the backdrop of the historical evolution and the political economy impacts of the country's racial patterns of land distribution;
2. examination of how the resettlement policy is being implemented, both at the national, provincial and selected individual scheme levels;
3. eliciting the respective responses of farmers, in terms both of their attitudes and perceptions as well as the constraints and the performance outcomes that characterize their farming systems;
4. evaluation of the discernible socioeconomic and political impacts of aspects of the resettlement which have been implemented so far in terms of any differences in opportunity or incentive systems, access and control over development assets as well as in quality of life.

Eight years into Zimbabwe's independence and egalitarian resettlement and rural development it will be interesting to observe how different household structures and organizations are faring in terms of the following

proxy indices of social formation: (1) ownership of i.) cattle, which is a major attribute of a "good life" (upenyu hwakanaka), ii.) selected household items such as radios, watches and beds and iii.) selected capital assets such as ox-carts, plows, sprayers and cultivators; (2) intensity of land use; (3) household labor productivity for the two major crops, namely, maize and cotton; (4) farm net cash flow; and (5) the quantity of maize retained for household consumption.

Following the lines used in the pioneer work by Hadley Cantril (1963) about peoples' concerns and aspirations in the context of socioeconomic gratification and quality of life this study will also examine the Shona concept of "upenyu hwakanaka" (good life) in much detail. Similar studies in Africa done, for instance, by Jean Due (1980) in rural Kenya show that an individual's estimation of his or her present situation on the basis of recollection of the past and perception of the future has significant implications for development. Equally important for this study is the work done by Robbins and Thompson (1974) on gratification orientations and individual modernization in rural Buganda in Uganda (see also Thompson 1975).

Using a "self-anchoring" scale in the form of a three step stairway representing upenyu hwakanaka-upenyu hwakaoma (good life-bad life) continuum Zimbabwe farmers will be asked to objectify their life situations for the periods before independence in 1980, then 1985 and for 1990. In addition, they will be asked to (1) define what to them is the essence of development or the attributes of a good life and (2) to specify what they will do with an amount of \$1,000.

A systematic field study along these lines may generate the needed relevant data to shed light on some of the questions that at least bear on the short term dimensions of the research problem.

Analytical and Conceptual Frameworks

The Zimbabwean resettlement experience provides an almost ideal substantive environment to isolate and study the critical variables that relate to the performance of policy programs and social theories in real situations of change. It is reflected in the chapter on literature review below that far too little attention is paid by anthropologists to how development policy decisions initiated by governments get or fail to get transformed into impacts. This problem is underscored by Fernea and Kennedy (1966:349) who point out that very few studies have been made of processes of change as they happen. Consequently, theories of development are yet to fully benefit from all dimensions of the intriguing grassroots dynamics that characterize the behavior and actions of individuals and their institutional relationships with forces of change and development.

An important aspect of social theory bearing on the research problem which is vital for anthropological enquiry into development is the link between policy, the environment for its implementation and the kinds of responses that are generated in development programs. This issue is particularly germane, for instance, in studying agricultural resettlement or any development programs which involve human relocations. That is so because the anthropological literature on relocation, in general, is critical of such programs viewing them as being disruptive of peoples lives.

Notwithstanding the fact that such a view may be true, it raises serious methodological problems as to what dynamics of change lead to which outcomes and in what situations. It is legitimate to assume here that only some and not all relocations or resettlements worsen the quality of life of the

affected people. If this is true, then anthropological research design for evaluating such programs has to do more by specifying what determinants and relationships facilitate or inhibit particular processes of development in given circumstances or situations. An analytical model or a conceptual formulation that addresses such methodological deficiencies in evaluation studies will aid in a better understanding of the issues at play.

For example, Cleveland (1971) states that under favorable conditions there is high achievement rate for implementing expressed policy. Similarly, it is argued by others that value-based actions of policy makers may be most determinative of ultimate policy and that articulated goals exert significant influence upon behavior (Dolbeare and Hammond 1971; Brewer and Brunner 1975). In the same vein, Ronald Havelock (1979) demonstrates that awareness and interest are important correlates of acceptance and adoption of particular innovations by individuals as well as groups.

Granting that these assumptions hold there is no reason why the rather informative anthropological and other studies of resettlement should not be able to utilize them to provide the kinds of useful theoretical insights and concepts that explain success or failure of grassroots development.

Development as a concept may either be an end in itself or a process to an end. This study, being an anthropological evaluation of an on-going development program, approaches resettlement as a special kind of a social organization process that seeks to achieve desirable ends for rural Zimbabweans. The process is viewed as multifaceted in nature. Its end or policy objectives may only materialize given a particular constellation of factors and environments. In order for the resettlement to achieve any identifiable impacts or outcomes it is necessary that the clearly distinct components or clusters of variables which characterize it have to be

manipulated, harmoniously integrated and mutually sustained. These components are (1) policy, (2) implementation, (3) intervening conditions and (4) the beneficiaries.

A simplified analytical framework is introduced here in the form of a resettlement and rural development model. This framework uses the four independent or determining variables to provide the broad parameters of the organizational structures and relationships that initially conceptualize the nature of the development process under study (Figure 1-1). The model provides for the following: (1) program inputs in the form of the government's policy objectives, resources and implementing structures which are considered here to be a necessary condition for development; (2) policy beneficiaries who respond to program incentives or inputs in the context of their own respective interpretations or conceptions of what development objectives are; (3) the effects and reactions to intervening political, social and economic conditions both by the government and the policy beneficiaries alike; and (4) the creation of intended or unintended impacts or development outcomes. These compartmentalized entities may be seen as constituting program inputs, the bridging outputs or the proximate and ultimate goals of development. The analytical specifications of this model conform to those recognised by many policy and evaluation studies.⁶

Ideally, development theory should provide sufficient explanation of how a rural development process based on resettlement programs of this nature is able to transform policy objectives and resources into desirable ends. But there is a paucity of pertinent information on that in the development literature.⁷ One therefore has to look elsewhere beyond the abstract into substantive areas of empirical reality or the contextual rural situation for conceptual guidance.




FIGURE: 1 - 1

ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Given our research problem and the analytical framework proposed for this study, it will be heuristically fruitful to evaluate aspects of the resettlement program in terms of the concept of developmental cycle in domestic groups (Fortes:1971). According to Meyer Fortes (1970:7), domestic groups have no permanent existence through time, in that each group comes into being, grows and expands and finally dissolves (see also Goody 1971).

As already indicated, demographic and social differentiation as well as the structural dynamics within and between households are crucially important in accounting for the success or failure of the formulation, planning, implementation and outcomes of development policy and programs. Household economic performance is the crucially determinant variable in the overall prospects for a successful rural development and resettlement outcome in Zimbabwe. The application of Fortes' paradigm to evaluate such performance will immensely improve our understanding of the role of social organization in development and change. As argued by its proponent, Meyer Fortes (1971:3), the "developmental factor is intrinsic to domestic organization and to ignore it leads to serious misinterpretation of the descriptive facts."

This study conceptualizes the household developmental cycle in rural Zimbabwe into four structurally distinct but sequential phases.⁸ These are (1) establishment, (2) expansion, (3) consolidation and (4) decline. Two special "phases," namely, Single and Other are added (see Appendix A). The application of such dynamic variables as age, conjugal form and gender of the household head, the presence or absence of extended-kinship relations and the structural state of fission of the household makes it possible to duplicate other sub-types of the major phases.⁹ This added flexibility to the framework may facilitate a more comprehensive analysis of the data and a

better understanding of any patterns or variations than would otherwise be the case.¹⁰

Scope of the Study

This introductory chapter defines the research problem, the analytical and conceptual frameworks and the scope of the study. Chapter II reviews the background material on the geography and history of Zimbabwe. It traces the peopling of the country and emphasises the political economy dimensions of the evolution of racial dichotomy in land ownership and land use during the settler period of colonial Rhodesia. It then examines the impacts of various colonial land policies on rural Africans. Finally, it reviews the post-independence development challenges and prospects that confront Zimbabwe.

Chapter III is the review of the literature. It covers (1) the state and agricultural development, (2) state ideology, public choice and the individual, (3) the smallholder and cooperative modes of production, (4) rural development, (5) poverty-focused strategies, (6) land reform, (7) resettlement programs and (8) household dynamics and organization. The emphasis here is to draw out the lessons that these issues raise in either effecting or stifling change and development in Africa and other developing areas. The purpose of such a review also is to provide the theoretical and the substantive contexts for describing the on-going development experimentation within Zimbabwe.

Chapter IV outlines specific aspects of the fieldwork and research methodology. It covers the initial experiences and the kinds of environments within which the study was done. It describes the data sources and collection

techniques, study variables, sample units and analysis.

Chapter V deals with the main dimensions of the government's resettlement policy in terms of its structural and organizational components. These are the objectives of resettlement, land acquisition, planning and implementation models, farmer selection and land allocation and the implementation and administrative set ups for the program. Chapter VI provides contextual background notes about (1) the old farming systems of the country, namely, the large and the small-scale commercial as well as the communal sectors and (2) the newly introduced systems made up of the resettlement sector farms. Of the latter only the two important models, that is, the Model A Normal individual household schemes and the Model B collective schemes are examined. The Chapter provides the prelude to the presentation of farmers' interview responses to the resettlement program.

In Chapter VII the analysis and description of a case study of the responses of Zimbabwean farmers towards the resettlement policy and programs initiated and being implemented by the government are offered. Based on survey interviews, key informants interviews and observations in the Mashonaland Central Province this case study covers farmers in the six major farming systems in the country. The chapter is divided into seven parts to cover (1) the background responses of the so-called commercial farmers, (2) the social and demographic characteristics of farmers and their households, (3) farmers' attitudes and perceptions about their life situations, (4) farmers' assessment of resettlement and aspects of the government's policies on agriculture and rural development, (5) household material resources and capital assets that farmers possess, (6) farm-level problems encountered by farmers and (7) household developmental cycle, micro-level agricultural characteristics and economic performance.

Chapter VIII returns to the resettlement schemes. It presents the economic feasibility or pre-implementation performance expectations of selected schemes and models of the resettlement. A preliminary and general evaluation of the actual performance and the problems associated with the schemes implemented in the three provinces in the Mahonaland Region are given. The achievements and the disappointing outcomes of a contrasting Model A scheme and a Model B scheme chosen from a case study in the Mashonaland Central Province are also presented in this chapter.

Chapter IX is a summary and discussion of the research findings, recommendations and conclusion. It looks at the political economy and social dimensions of macro and micro-level impacts of resettlement in Zimbabwe and also the policy and theoretical implications of the findings for rural development planning and evaluation studies.

Notes

1.) The causes of agricultural underdevelopment in Africa have over the years been an issue of a long shifting debate. It used to be fashionable in the past to cite social attitudes and cultural barriers to efficient and productive resource allocation and utilization by traditional farmers as an impediment to growth. Latter critics then blamed the problem on one or more of these institutional deficiencies: (1) land tenure systems and practices; (2) lack of credit and savings; (3) non-availability of production and marketing incentives; (4) policy bias for state-controlled, large-scale and mechanized production units; (5) urban food subsidies and changing consumer tastes; and (6) industrialization and the consequent neglect of the small-holder rural producer. The current thinking on the issue, apparently is not about the failure of African farmers anymore or the lack of institutions per se but rather the failure of ineffective and perverse agricultural policies formulated and implemented by African governments.

2.) For additional overview of the food problem, an elaboration of the various policy and substantive aspects of it, as well as its impacts on the general economic crisis facing the continent see Bates and Lofchie (1980), USDA (1981), Hyden (1983), Dharam and Radwan (1983), Lofchie and Commings (1984), Delgado and Mellor (1984), Barker (1984), Berry (1984), Custen (1984), Christensen (1984), Rose (1985), Brown and Wolf (1985), Due (1986), Eicher (1986a, 1986b), Hansen and McMillan (1986), Ravenhill (1986), Berg and Whitaker (1986), Mellor (1986), Baker (1987).

3.) Gordon (1984) is right in pointing out that Zimbabwe is a dialectician's dream. Both the Left and the Right, respectively, see the future of the country in antithetical terms. Consequently, the role of Zimbabwe in shaping the particular kind of development ideology that will eventually emerge in Africa is being closely watched. For instance John Iliffe (1983:43) argues that, "[t]he future of Zimbabwe will be a fascinating test of the relative strength in modern Africa of state policy as against inherited objective reality. And the future of Zimbabwe is absolutely vital to the future of capitalism in Africa." To this Rafael Suarez (1984:12) adds that the postindependence record of the country is a mixed one and that if Prime Minister Mugabe continues to talk like Marx and act like Keynes, the country could turn out to be a strong, wealthy and stable place indeed. For other perspectives on this debate see, for example, Bratton (1977, 1978, 1981), Yates (1980), Munslow (1980a, 1983), Ballance (1981), Libby (1984).

4.) In June 1985, prior to Zimbabwe's second general elections, leaders of all the political parties in the country were respectively interviewed about domestic and international issues. Resettlement was an important question that came up among many others. On June 28, 1985, Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Information appeared on national television as the spokesman for the ruling ZANU-PF party. He responded to the assertions made by Nkomo the previous day by saying that Nkomo was not in agreement with land reform and resettlement at the Lancaster House negotiations [in London where an independence constitution for Zimbabwe was worked out] and that he, Nkomo, did not support the policy while serving as a Cabinet Minister in the ZANU-PF government.

5.) Both the colonial and postcolonial state in Africa have used various methods including legislation and even coercive measures to penetrate and manipulate traditional or indigenous systems and institutions. In many instances these systems have been eliminated or altered substantially into becoming mere carbon copies of what they used to be in pre-colonial times. We can mention authority and power structures such as chieftaincy, certain lineage and family rights and obligations in respect of betrothal, marriage, divorce, property transfers, and collective ownership or access to particular resources. Yet, as Goran Hyden (1983) convincingly demonstrates for Tanzania and it is common place throughout Africa, the state is unable successfully to "capture," intrude, coerce, or even bribe the rural people to either eliminate, modify, or "modernize" the indigenous agricultural systems and their related institutions.

6.) For example, Hunter et al. (1976:10) suggest at least four criteria to analyse rural development. These are (1) the technical, ecological and economic situation of the farming community concerned; (2) the attitudes, capacities and needs of the farmers themselves; (3) the nature of the marketing and processing channels; and (4) the administrative resources of the government as the directing agency of change.

7.) Economics has played a dominant role in every attempt at constructing development theories. In this context macroeconomic problems have almost always constituted the key issue in the discipline. In microeconomic thinking development implies some definite change either in the rate of growth, the structure of the economy, or both. But as Lancaster (1973:710-711) points out, "historically, economic development was not the product of conscious economic policy. Modern economics, which grew up with the development of European industrialization over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was on the sidelines explaining what was happening rather than causing it to happen." Subsequently, distinct thoughts in economic history, namely, classical, neo-classical, Keynesian, Marxist, structuralism, modernization and dependency have all been overtly macro-dimensional. As a result they have not been able to successfully account for what causes or does not cause development to occur at the grassroots or at the micro-level in such specific locations as households. (See, for example, Hill's (1986) criticism. For another penetrating assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of micro-economic policy analysis in the area of development see Adelman 1975b; Hirschman 1981; Rhoads 1985; and Hill 1986).

8.) Low (1982a:144) elaborates upon Fortes developmental cycle classifying domestic groups into establishment, expansion, consolidation, fission, decline, and female-headed (see also du Toit 1974:290fn).

9.) Using essentially Low's (1982a) classification derived from Fortes' framework the developmental cycle in rural Zimbabwe is conceptualized to comprise the following phases: (1) single; (2) establishment; (3) expansion; (4) consolidation; (5) decline; and (6) other. Unlike Low I do not see fission and female-headedness as distinct phases because both are conditions that may be associated with any of the six phases delineated here, particularly consolidation and decline. The operational definition of each of my phases are based on the age composition and structural state of the household. For instance, a young adult who is never married and is not a

dependent qualifies as single. A young couple with an only/or without a child is categorised to be in establishment. Spouses still in the prime of reproduction with the last child not more than 4 years of age are in expansion. Spouses with older children the last of which is 5 or more years qualify to be in consolidation.

The decline phase is made up of older people with households where sons and daughters, now grown, have fissioned out. The category "Other" contains all cases that do not fit neatly into any of the five preceding phases. These phases are conceptual states derived from household structure and organization. They reflect the socio-demographic realities of rural Zimbabwe to which they are applied here. The utility of the model is enhanced by building into it additional flexibility using the following information: (1) the gender and marital state of the de facto household head; (2) whether marriage is monogamous or polygynous; (3) the presence or absence of kins and affines; and (4) whether the household is pre-fission, fissioning, or post-fission. See Appendix A for the resultant typology.

10.) Fortes (1949:63-77) first used the developmental cycle frame of analysis among the Tallensi to account for variations in the synchronic constitution of what he called the agnatic joint family. It is apparent that he did not fully utilize the concept as much as he should to elucidate the emergence, growth and decline of Tale households. Indeed, he concentrated on the constant fissioning of homesteads which he blamed on intra-sibling conflicts. Elsewhere (Fortes 1970:vii), he was unable to apply the concept to the Ashanti situation because he found that culture to be "much more complex." Similarly, a recent application of the concept by Sanjek (1983:330-343) to an urban African situation only succeeds in the designation of household residence roles without yielding any insights into how these roles impact on specific developmental processes.

The inability on the part of these and other researchers to successfully apply the concept to situations of change and development stems from the fact that they have essentially conceived it in static terms and consequently impose it on functional structures. They are thus unable to grasp and utilize the essential dynamics of gender, age, conjugal form, and other internal features which are in constant interaction within and between different households at different phases of the cycle. Yet, it is these dynamics rather than the cycle per se which render the concept heuristically useful. A similar criticism applies to many development-oriented and applied studies, particularly in Farming Systems Research and Extension, which use the household as units of analysis. Cases in point include Shaner et al. (1982), Norman (1982), and McMillan (1986).

CHAPTER II BACKGROUND TO ZIMBABWE

Geographic and Agro-ecological Setting

Zimbabwe, with a total area of 390,759 square kilometers, is a landlocked country that is situated in the southern African region. It lies approximately between Latitude $15^{\circ} 30'$ south and Latitude $22^{\circ} 30'$ south and Longitude $25^{\circ} 00'$ east and $33^{\circ} 00'$ east.

The Zambezi river forms a major portion of the northern and western boundaries of the country while the Limpopo river constitutes the southern boundary. In the east and northeast the country shares a border with Mozambique, in the northwest with Zambia, southwest with Botswana and in the south with South Africa. Politically, Zimbabwe is divided into eight administrative provinces. These are Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, Midlands, Masvingo, Matabeleland North and Matabeleland South (Figure 2-1).

The most recent population census conducted in 1982 gives a preliminary total population figure of 7,546,071, of whom less than 200,000 were whites. Harare, the capital city, has an estimated population of 656,011. It is followed by Bulawayo, 413,814 and Chitungwiza, a dormitory suburb of Harare, with 172,556 people. The annual population growth rate averages about 3.1 percent. The corresponding figure for the urban population is about 7.2 percent or more, including rural in-migration (Zimbabwe 1982a). Currently, 80 percent of the entire population live in the rural areas and the majority of these people earn their livelihood directly from agriculture.

Most Zimbabweans, nearly 80 percent of the African population, belong to one or the other Shona or Mashona ethno-linguistic group (Bullock 1928; Gelfand 1965; Bourdillon 1976). The Ndebele or Matabele is the other major cultural group. The rest are the Sena, Tonga, Sotho, Venda and the Hlengwe (Kay 1970:28). All these various societies in Zimbabwe are patrilineally organized. They also inhabit geographically distinct home regions some of which are cut by the country's international boundaries (Figure 2-2). The European population, though numerically less significant, constitutes a distinct economic power in the country.

The topography of Zimbabwe is dominated by the Highveld. This is a large plateau occupying 20 percent of the land area which runs through the center of the country from the southwest to the north. Its general altitude is about 1,200 meters above sea level though it occasionally rises to over 1,700 meters. In the east, along the border with Mozambique, the plateau develops into a ridge of escarpments where the Inyangani reaches a height of almost 2,600 meters above sea level. Of the remaining area of the country, 60 percent has an altitude of between 600 meters and 1,200 meters above sea level and it is termed the Midveld. The third physiographic region of the country is the Lowveld formed by the valleys of the Zambezi in the north and west, the Limpopo in the south and the Sabi-Lundi basin in the south-east. These valleys range in altitudes from between 300 meters to 900 meters above sea level (Fair 1964; Andrews 1964; Kay 1970:13; Whitlow 1982). The geological base of Zimbabwe consists mostly of granites and other igneous and schistose rocks. The soils are predominantly sandy with heavier loams and clays occurring in relatively small local areas (Miller 1982:10).




FIGURE 2 - 2
ZIMBABWE: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF
CULTURAL GROUPS

Source: Kay 1970:27

Although Zimbabwe lies entirely within the tropics most of the country experiences sub-tropical climate. Rainfall is seasonal and extremely variable (Ngara 1983). It ranges on the average from over 1,500 millimeters annually in limited areas of the eastern Manicaland Province to below 300 millimeters in the Lowveld. The rainy season is unimodal and occurs between the summer months of November and April. Generally, the rains are more reliable in the north and less so in the south. Likewise, the seasonal total is also more reliable than the monthly total.

Generally, July is the coolest month and October the warmest. Temperature intensity corresponds closely with altitude. For instance, Harare on the Highveld at a height of about 1,500 meters above sea level has a mean temperature of 14°C in July and 22°C in October. In the low-lying Zambezi valley, however, the respective means are 20°C in July and 30°C in October. A wide diurnal range characterizes the winter months. Night frosts that can occasionally be very destructive are not uncommon on the high plateaus (Kay 1983:945; McNaughton 1983). Most of the Midveld and Lowveld areas carry wooded savanna vegetation. The Highveld, on the other hand, consists of savanna grassland with patches of montane forests particularly in the eastern Manicaland Province.

On the whole, the topography, soils and climate of Zimbabwe do not favor intensive agricultural production (Miller 1982:10). More than 75 percent of the country is subject to conditions that make dryland crop production a risky venture. Drought is a persistent problem (Denny 1983; Gammon 1983). Poorer sandy soils predominate over most of the land thus severely limiting their use for cropping. Only 37 percent of all areas in the country receive more than 700 millimeters annual average of rainfall considered adequate for intensive and semi-intensive farming (Miller 1982:10).

Even then, when soil quality and land capability are taken into consideration, only about 7 to 8 percent of the entire country is suitable for intensive dryland cultivation (Whitsun 1983:12). In sum, Zimbabwe is not as well endowed with inherent agricultural resources as it is often claimed. It is rather its agricultural expertise which has led to past agricultural surpluses, not the resource base (Whitsun 1983:13).

The authoritative survey of the agricultural potential of the country, published by Vincent and Thomas (1960), attests to this fact. Their agro-ecological survey, updated by the Department of Agricultural and Technical Extension (AGRITEX), uses the rainy pentad criteria to delineate Zimbabwe into five Natural Regions (Figure 2-3).¹ These are Region I covering 2 percent of the country, Region II 15 percent, Region III 19 percent, Region IV 38 percent and Region V 27 percent. The regions correlate with potential crop yields and livestock carrying capacities of the land. The regions and associated features are shown in Table 2-1.

Agricultural output patterns also show a spatial distribution that corresponds with enterprise specialization in the various provinces. Thus, among other commodities, Manicaland is noted commercially for tea and deciduous or tropical fruits, Masvingo for sugar and beef, Matabeleland North and South for beef, Midlands for dairy and other livestock products and the three Mashonaland Provinces for maize, tobacco, cotton, soya beans and other crops. For instance, in 1980 Mashonaland produced 90 percent of all maize, 92 percent of the tobacco, 73 percent of the cotton, 63 percent of the wheat, 87 percent of the soya beans, 94 percent of all peanuts and 87 percent of the sorghum making the region Zimbabwe's primary bread basket and source of agricultural exports (Whitsun 1983:51-53).




FIGURE 2 - 3
ZIMBABWE: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS

TABLE 2 - 1
DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL REGIONS, RAINFALL AND RELATED
FARMING SYSTEMS IN RHODESIA

NATURAL REGION	AREA OF COUNTRY (%)	RAINFALL INTENSITY (mm/year)	RELATED FARMING SYSTEM
I	2	High (1,000 or more)	Specialized and Diversified Cropping
IIa & b	15	Moderate (750-1,000)	Intensive Cultivation
III	19	Moderate but Erratic (650-800)	Semi-Intensive Cultivation
IV	38	Low (450-650)	Semi-Extensive (Ranching)
V	27	Low and Erratic (Below 650)	Extensive (Only Ranching)

Sources: Whitsun (1983:6-7); Billing (1985:6-7).

Historical Setting

The past of Zimbabwe is one of large immigrations and settlement shifts. David Beach (1980:4) speculates that from about 30,000 B.C., Late Stone Age hunter and gathering people who spoke one of the Khoisan group of languages had lived on and around the plateau or Highveld. Relying on the available archaeological records Beach (1980:12) identifies that the Early Iron Age which is associated with immigrant Bantu-speakers existed round about A.D. 180. Later Iron Age people who probably included a great many of the Early Iron Age groups first appeared circa A.D. 900. By about 1500 they had become well established as the Shona speakers with dialect clusters such as the Zezuru, Karanga, Kalanga, Korekore, Manyika, Nyanga, Ndaou or Shanga (Beach 1980:14-18).

State formation has also been a feature of Shona polity since the Late Iron Age. Four major precolonial states are delineated by David Beach (1980:36). These are (1) Zimbabwe which flourished in the south of the plateau before about 1500; (2) Torwa which existed around Khambi in the southwest from the late fifteenth to the late seventeenth centuries; (3) its successor, the Changamire state, which lasted until the 1840s; and (4) the northern state of Mutapa which survived in one form or another from at least the fifteenth to the late nineteenth century. Stanlake Samkange (1969:5) argues, therefore, that the Mashona up to the mid-nineteenth century had occupied undisturbed all the land between the Zambezi and the Limpopo rivers stretching eastwards as far as the sea.²

From about 1850 onwards the dominance of the Shona, at least politically, started undergoing profound transformations with the influx of other groups who now form part of the wider Zimbabwean society. For instance,

the Nguni-speaking Ndebele immigrants under Mzilikazi established themselves in the southern part of the plateau north of the Limpopo in 1839-40 (Beach 1980:226). This development was followed almost immediately by the arrival of European settlers. The first of these to make any lasting contacts with the Ndebele were the missionaries of the South African based London Missionary Society who opened a station at Inyati in 1859 (Nelson 1975:16).

In 1888 John Moffat, son of one of the missionaries and the representative of the British government in South Africa to the Ndebele throne, extracted a treaty from King Lobengula. The import of the treaty was to the effect that the Ndebele would not enter into any foreign correspondence, treaties or land alienation without prior consultation with and approval from the British High Commissioner for South Africa. Shortly after this treaty, C. D. Rudd, an agent of Cecil Rhodes a British concession seeker who saw himself as the champion of British values and interests in Africa obtained a concession from Lobengula for metal and mineral rights (Nelson 1975:19).

On the basis of the Rudd Concession the British government in 1889 granted a royal charter to Rhodes and his British South Africa Company. The charter, according to Percy Hone (1909:1), authorised the company "to take over the vast tract of country extending from the Transvaal to Lake Tanganyika. . . . The whole territory was named after the conceiver and founder of this great project, Mr. Cecil Rhodes." In early 1890, Rhodes sent a party of 200 pioneers and 500 mounted mercenaries to claim Ndebele territory as a private estate of the company. The following year the Pioneer Column entered Mashonaland.

The British Order in Council of 1891 also placed the company's territory under the protection of the queen and authorised her high commissioner in

South Africa to "administer justice, collect taxes and promote law and order; but in practice these functions continued to be carried out by the charter company." (Nelson 1975:20). The entry of the Pioneer Column to Mashonaland, Hone points out,

was followed by an influx of white people from the southern colonies and from Great Britain. Some entered this unknown country for the love of adventure, others in the hope of gaining wealth, and a few with the intention of settling permanently on the land and turning their attention to farming. (Hone 1909:13)

In 1893 the Column, under Jameson, the then Company administrator of Mashonaland, entered Bulawayo and militarily occupied Matabeleland. Three years later there was the Matabele uprising which was followed by the more protracted Mashona rebellion of 1896-7 (Tsomondo 1977; Beach 1979).

Both of these early indigenous revolts against settler rule, widely referred to as the first chimurenga or liberation war by Zimbabweans, were ruthlessly quelled and the alleged perpetrators severely punished. In 1898, "regulations for the good government of the natives" were proclaimed by the Company on behalf of the British Crown. As Terrence Ranger (1967:311) asserts, "in many ways [the rebellion] was a watershed; after the risings few things were the same as they had been before. . . . Southern Rhodesia moved steadily towards settler supremacy."

It was not until 1923 that Southern Rhodesia made a direct transition from chartered company rule to a Crown colony status with "responsible self-government" still under the control of European settlers (see Gann 1965). According to Windrich (1975:xvi), union with South Africa was rejected as an alternative and a financial settlement with the British South Africa Company brought an end to nearly thirty-five years of Company rule.

The grant of a self-governing status apart, the next major political development in the history of the colony did not occur until 1954. That year Britain amalgamated Southern Rhodesia with the neighboring colonies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This created the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, also referred to in some of the literature as the Central African Federation. The Federation, strongly opposed by the burgeoning African nationalists of the three colonies, was short-lived and broke up in 1963.

The following year both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland achieved political independence becoming Zambia and Malawi respectively. The colony was also now known simply as Rhodesia. Two years after the dissolution of the Federation, in November 1965, Rhodesia made a "Unilateral Declaration of Independence." This development occurred because its minority white settler regime under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith failed to get Britain to agree to its conditions for independence.

Rhodesia's independence, illegal in the eyes of Britain and the international community, invited worldwide condemnation, non-recognition and the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions. For fourteen years, until the birth of a new Zimbabwe, Rhodesia held on amidst the bitter liberation war waged by the African nationalist armies.

The Evolution of the Land Problem

The annexation of Southern Rhodesia and the grant of self government to the colony by Britain in 1923 turned out to provide the settlers with the carte blanche that enabled them to legislate segregation as the bedrock of minority white supremacy in the country. This act unleashed far-reaching

consequences on later developments in the country. George Kay, in looking at the human geography of the impacts of this colonial policy, indicates that segregation gave

rise to a racial division of land and natural resources which places most of the natural assets of the country in European hands. It has led to geographically separate and distinctive residential zones and social facilities in areas where, for economic reasons, both Europeans and Africans must live in close proximity to common work-places. It has divided employment into African and European jobs. (Kay 1970:330)

Specifically in terms of agriculture and incidentally African interests and livelihood in Southern Rhodesia land was the crucial issue and still remains so. During the colonial period two significant pieces of legislation were promulgated that permanently and differentially altered access to land along racial lines. These were the Land Apportionment Act (1930) and the Land Tenure Act (1969). (See Jordan 1979).

Indeed, even before the enactment of these Acts land apportionment had already begun with the Pioneer Column in the early 1890s. Writing about his impressions of the agricultural potentialities of the country around the same period, Knight, though rather ethnocentric, was quite poetic in his report that

[W]hen one has travelled day after day across the flowerly veldt . . . when one beholds the magnificent crops which reward the lazy Kaffir for a mere scratching of the soil, but a soil inexhaustibly rich . . . one realises that the title of the Promised Land was not altogether wrongly bestowed on this fair region. (Knight 1895:29)

Consequently, with the pioneers' occupation of this apparently fertile territory the rewards of free or cheap lands, that they had been promised,

began in earnest. In the Matabeleland highveld for example, according to Knight's observation,

a large number of farms have already been pegged out. Of these some 700 are 'volunteer farms,' which were granted free to the men who took part in the late expedition. Each volunteer farm is 3,000 morgen (6,000 acres), carrying with it a nominal annual quit rent of ten shillings. . . . Farming rights, entitling the holder to peg out 3,000 acres, can also be bought directly from the Company at eighteenpence an acre. (Knight 1895:30)

Elsewhere in Matabeleland, Knight (1895:34) indicates that "one syndicate alone [possessed] a magnificent estate of 80,000 acres." Similar rewards obtained in Mashonaland where he gives the following account:

Special farming rights were granted to members of the old Pioneer Force. . . . These, like the volunteer rights in Matabeleland, entitle the owner to peg out a farm free of any conditions as to bona fide occupation. These pioneer farms are of 3,000 acres each. (Knight 1895:35)

From the beginning of the 1890s the settlers started creating the "reserves." These consisted of blocks of land set aside under the supervision of traditional or community elders for the use of indigenous Africans. The first of these was demarcated in Matabeleland. By 1902 most of the Reserves in Mashonaland had also been allocated and the African population had been moved into them (Riddell 1978a:7). George Kay (1970:49) notes that a decade later in 1913, there were "no less than 104 Native Reserves . . . established and they ranged from 5,000 acres to 1,500,000 acres." In 1923 the new Southern Rhodesian Constitution which transferred the country from Company rule to a self-governing colony also confirmed the Reserves as a separate socio-economic and political entity.³

The consolidation of settler land holdings was one major activity facilitated by the creation of the Reserves. By 1896, the settlers had

managed to expropriate 15 million acres (Riddell 1978b:5). Five years later they had 19 million acres which they increased to 31 million by 1925. This included "nearly all land over 3000 feet within 25 miles of the railways." (Kay 1970:50). To place this fact in context it should be kept in mind that the total land size of Southern Rhodesia at this time was 96.4 million acres (38.6 million hectares).

Legislative Acts and the Impacts of Settler Land Expropriation Policies

The Land Apportionment Act was introduced in 1929 but enacted the following year and made effective in 1931. The Act did more than merely formalize the on-going institutionalization of the division of land along racial lines as a legal fact (Bannerman 1982). In addition, it implicitly, if not directly, prescribed the concept of "parallel or separate development" as official policy. It also intensified the forced removal of many Africans from their original homes, then declared European areas and their settlement in the Reserves. Elsewhere, Roger Riddell has shown vividly the quantitative dimensions of subsequent removals by stating that

[B]etween 1931 and 1941, 50,000 people were moved [and] between 1945 and 1959 another 85,000 were moved. Since 1964 at least another 88,000 people have been resettled, most being evicted from European land where they were classified as "squatters." . . . The most recent policy of settlement has come about as a consequence of the present war and it is estimated that 500,000 people have been moved into "protected" and "consolidated" villages. (Riddell 1978a:8-9)

Another major development emanating from the Land Apportionment Act was the creation of the so-called Native Purchase Areas. The purchase areas originally covered 3.2 million hectares or nearly 8 percent of the total land

size of the country (Kay 1970:93). For the first time these areas offered the right to freehold tenure to Africans. However, this offer was only to a cream of progressive farmers who, in the words of Roger Riddell (1978a:8), had "proved their farming abilities by obtaining Master Farmer certificates and who have the money to buy the land." (Riddell's emphasis). (The current production levels and aspects of the socio-demographic and agricultural situation of farmers in two former Purchase Areas are dealt with in the case study of farmers' responses which is reported in Chapter VII below. These are Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Commercial Areas in the Mashonaland Central Province).

The segregationist provisions of the Land Apportionment Act were implemented for twenty years without much thought about the negative consequences that increasingly became manifest in the Reserves. The consequences, many of which still persist, included overcrowding, overstocking, deterioration of natural resources, landlessness, unemployment, declining or stagnant per capita incomes and general underdevelopment (Hamilton 1964; Sutcliffe 1971; Mswaka 1974; Phimister 1974; Clarke 1974, 1975, 1977b; Whitlow 1980; Mashiringwani 1983). Though these problems were associated initially with the Reserves, their cumulative repercussions were national in the sense that the "excess" influx of the African population into the urban areas threatened European urban lifestyles and privileges.

To stem this trend, the Native Land Husbandry Act was passed in 1951. It provided, among other things, regulations for enforcing (1) conservation measures, (2) good farming practices, (3) appropriate stocking rates, (4) allocation of grazing rights and (5) the consolidation of arable plots in the Reserves into compact holdings (Pendered and von Memerty 1955; Garbett 1963; Riddell 1978a; Duggan 1980). The Act, however, cannot be said to have

achieved any of its objectives. By 1962 it had already been abandoned. Seven years later, in 1969, as part of the introduction of the Republican Constitution, the forty year old Land Apportionment Act was also updated with the enactment of the Land Tenure Act. The new Act set aside 2.6 million hectares of the total 38.6 million hectare land area of the country as National Land and divided the remaining 36 million hectares equally into African Areas (18 million hectares) and European Areas (18 million hectares).

This in effect generally meant that in absolute terms each African communal area or peasant cultivator held 24 hectares as against 185 hectares owned by each African elite or freehold farmer in the Purchase Area. In further contrast, every European farmer owned nearly 2,300 hectares. On the average therefore Europeans cultivated farms that were about 100 times larger than their counterparts in the peasant sector (Riddell 1980:3). Table 2-2 presents an indication of the distributional pattern of land ownership over the fifty year period up to 1981.

The magnitude of the inequities in the land distribution was not lessened but was rather perpetuated by the Land Tenure Act. The Act also maintained the status quo in respect of the pattern which ensured the better endowed agro-ecological regions for the European settlers (Table 2-3). As Billing (1985:36) points out, 74 percent of the African or Communal Areas lie in the Natural Regions IV and V which are considered unsuitable for crop production. This means that only one-fourth of these Areas are located in the better Natural Regions I, II and III. In contrast, 52 percent of the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farming areas are in the Natural Regions I, II and III. The remaining 48 percent which are found in the poorly endowed Natural Regions IV and V are used mainly as either ranching or irrigation enterprises.

TABLE 2 - 2
PROPORTION OF TOTAL LAND UNDER VARIOUS OWNERSHIP
CATEGORIES IN RHODESIA-ZIMBABWE

	1931	1950	1969	1981	NUMBER HOUSEHOLDS 1981
	%				
Communal Area	22.4	25.5	41.3	43.9	716,500
Small-Scale Commercial	7.7	5.9	3.8	3.8	8,519
Large-Scale Commercial	50.8	49.6	40.1	36.8	4,926
The State	19.1	18.9	14.7	15.5	0

Sources: Data for the respective years comes from the the following

sources: 1931 (Kay 1970:51); 1950 (Dunlop 1972:1); 1969 (Dunlop 1972:1); 1981 (Zimbabwe 1982a:64). The number of households comprising each category is given by the Whitsun Foundation (1983:28).

Note: Communal refers to the African peasant or smallholder unit formerly known as the Reserve or Tribal Trust Land. The Small-Scale Commercial is what used to be called the Native or African Purchase Area. The Large-Scale Commercial is mainly the White or European Area. The State-owned land was previously referred to as National Land and it comprises areas designated as Forest, Undetermined, or Unassigned. In 1981, there were a total of 6,034 Large Commercial Farms some of which were owned and operated as agricultural or ranching estates by local and multi-national companies rather than by farm households (see Chapter VI below for a review of these farming systems).

Notwithstanding the ecological poverty of the lands in the Communal Areas, the size of farm households increased rather than decreased over time doubling about every thirteen years. Given the physical restrictions imposed by the land the coping mechanism applied to accomodate the additional household members was the gradual turn over of the land designated as suitable only for grazing purposes into arable cultivation. This rather extensive land use system had the cyclical effect of accentuating the pasture problems of the African areas (Cleghorn 1950; Floyd 1959; Jordan 1964).

According to Roger Riddell (1978b:9) 50 percent of the grazing land in the Communal Areas in 1965 was classified as either bare or heavily over-grazed, and by 1977 seventeen times as much land in those Areas was being cultivated as was ecologically desirable. Indeed, by 1970 the annual population growth rate in the Communal Areas was 3.4 per cent on the average. At the time over 47 percent of all the men resident there were landless and in the age group under 30 years the percentage was as high as 81 (Weinrich 1975a:8). Male absenteeism was generally high and in many households farming was typically carried out by the older men, the women and the children (Johnson 1971:32).

The state of environmental constraints and population pressure which currently faces the Communal Areas has been calculated by Whitlow (1980) and it is reproduced here in Table 2-4. He shows that two-thirds of these African lands experienced pressure which ranged from "some" to "desperate." The pressure intensity he reports for these areas also varied from a low of 2 to a high of 5 times.

The human dimensions that are manifest in this state of ecological crisis are also brought out starkly in the government commissioned Chavunduka Report. The Commission, which conducted a comprehensive enquiry into

TABLE 2 - 3
PROPORTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP IN ZIMBABWE
BY NATURAL REGIONS, RACE AND FARMING SYSTEM

NATURAL REGION	PROPORTION OF AREA IN REGION		
	AFRICAN/ COMMUNAL	AFRICAN/ COMMERCIAL %	EUROPEAN/ COMMERCIAL
I	1.0	1.0	2.0
II	8.0	18.0	27.0
III	17.0	38.0	22.0
IV	45.0	37.0	26.0
V	29.0	7.0	22.0
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: Billing (1985:36 Table 10) and Riddell (1978a :51 Table 17).

Note: Figures are rounded to the nearest decimal point and so may not add up to exactly 100 percent.

TABLE 2 - 4
POPULATION PRESSURE IN RELATION TO CARRYING
CAPACITY IN THE COMMUNAL AREAS OF RHODESIA

PRESSURE INTENSITY	NATURE OF PRESSURE	PERCENTAGE OF COMMUNAL LAND
Balance or none	-	32.7
2 - times	some	29.8
3 - times	great	12.9
4 - times	extreme	11.7
5 - times	desperate	12.9

Source: Whitlow (1980:178 Table 2).

Zimbabwe's agricultural industry, examined the pitiful conditions which obtain in many of the Communal Areas. It states:

Some 57 percent of the communal and small scale farming areas, with 83 percent of their population, had densities in excess of the critical level. Taken over the country as a whole, the 1969 population was 40 percent in excess of the critical level; by 1972 it was estimated to be 85 percent in excess and was projected to be 210 percent by 1984. (Zimbabwe 1982a:23)

It is not only in the area of land distribution that the negative effects of segregation impacted on Africans. The pricing and marketing policies of the government also limited the entry and full participation of African farmers in the commercial agriculture sector. For instance, legislation notably the Maize Control Act (1931) and the Tobacco Marketing Act (1936) prevented Africans from growing crops that competed in the market with European farm produce (Nelson 1975:283). In the specific case of maize, the major crop cultivated by Africans, the European farmers at various times put pressure on the government to discourage its surplus production on the African farms (Dunlop 1970:11). In the Native Purchase Areas the government imposed a 10 percent levy on all commercial produce (Clarke 1976).

As a consequence of these policies the cash earnings of farmers in the Reserves were low, averaging only \$153 per year (Nicolle 1971:1). The more active males migrated out of these Reserves to provide cheap wage labor on European-owned farms, particularly in flue-cured tobacco production which is notably labor intensive (Duncan 1973:1). In 1971, only 7 percent of the laborers on the tobacco farms earned as much as \$21 a month which constituted the highest wages paid. It needs to be pointed out though that some of these laborers received additional subsidies in the form of maize meal and other rations from their European employers (Chavunduka 1972).

According to Weinrich (1975a:8) per capita income from African lands fell by 50 percent between 1958 and 1970. By 1977 the estimated monthly household income in the Reserves was \$12 as compared with farm workers on European-owned farms who earned \$19, other African employees \$67 and European employees \$513. Thus, the ratio between European earnings and those of African rural households was in the range of 43:1 (Brand 1981:46). In a comparative analysis which examined the distribution of personal income in Rhodesia, Sutcliffe concludes:

The rough indications are that the wealthiest 4 to 6 per cent of the population of Rhodesia have received between 50 and 60 per cent of total personal income. On the face of it, if this is compared with what similar evidence is available for other countries, then personal income seems to be distributed more unequally at least at the top end of the distribution than in any other country for which data are available. (Sutcliffe 1971:38)

The nature of the distribution of personal earnings within Rhodesia over the years is illustrated by Table 2-5 below. For example, in 1968 the Africans who constituted 95.2 percent of the population earned only 43.5 percent of the total personal income. Elsewhere, Good (1974:18) reports that "the overwhelming majority of the population is in a state of increasing poverty and is in no position to contribute to what might otherwise be the development of Rhodesia." He quotes the following statistics reproduced here in Table 2-6 and showing the distribution of cash wages paid to Africans in June 1972 to support his assessment. Writing about the same issue Roger Riddell (1978a:10) also demonstrates that in 1976, when the poverty datum line for a rural family of five was estimated to be \$43.73, some 85 percent of all Africans employed in European agriculture received cash wages of less than \$20 a month.

TABLE 2 - 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME IN RHODESIA

EUROPEAN, ASIAN AND COLORED

	AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION	AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PERSONAL INCOME
1946	3.8	49.4
1950	4.8	58.2
1955	5.4	59.5
1960	6.2	61.2
1965	5.1	58.1
1968	4.8	56.5

Source: Sutcliffe (1971:38 Table 4).

TABLE 2 - 6
DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN CASH WAGES
IN RHODESIA

MONTHLY CASH WAGE (\$)	NUMBER OF WAGE EARNERS
Under 10	245,410
10 - 20	172,610
20 - 50	251,270
50 - 90	63,170
90 - 150	9,270
Over 150	3,800

Source: Good (1974:18).

Detailed elaboration of the extent of these inequities as well as their short and long-term policy implications for the country are given by Duncan Clarke (1977a). His study of income and wealth distribution in Rhodesia for the period 1965-1974 indicates that

[E]uropean income sources have remained very diverse despite reliance on some notable areas of income earning. . . . (They) earn around 62 percent of all cash wages . . . about 44.6 percent of income from unincorporated enterprise and probably in excess of 90 percent of dividend and profits from companies and abroad. Europeans are on average 'well covered' in terms of pensions, medical aid, life assurance and compensation for workmen's accidents. These elements help provide income, stability and security. 'European society' has thus developed as an affluent stratum of the Rhodesian social formation, becoming steadily richer in material terms over time. (Clarke 1977a:15, his emphasis)

Given the substantial irregularities in data sources and from his analysis of African incomes Clarke (1977a:46) arrives at the conclusion that a comparison of average European and African incomes was not a very meaningful exercise. He (Clarke 1977a:46-47) asserts, however, that "Africans have received a diminishing share of disposable incomes since 1967," indicating that in the period 1965-75, the African/European income gap widened substantially.

The problems of the Reserves are synthesized by Cross in the following words:

In recent years the situation in the Tribal Trust Lands has become increasingly serious. While incomes from sales have risen from \$13 per capita in 1965 to \$29 per capita in 1976, the estimated availability of food has deteriorated significantly. The overall result is that standards of nutrition . . . today are well below those for the nation as a whole, and the Tribal Trust Lands have become net importers of food. In addition . . . population pressure in tribal areas have reached a point where a breakdown of society in some areas has begun to take place. Traditional social security systems can no longer meet the requirements of the population simply because the natural resources that are the foundation of the system are no longer adequate to the task. (Cross 1976:185)

While per capita African incomes in the Reserves more than doubled from \$13 to \$29 between 1965 and 1976 (Cross 1976:185) there was only a 40.5 percent rise in the consumer prices for the period 1965 to 1974 (Clarke 1977a:42). Under the normal circumstances this situation should translate into improved standards of consumption and living for rural Africans. All the available evidence, however, indicates the contrary. The most probable conclusion from the information about nutrition is that the increase in Communal Area market sales did not reflect the achievement of surplus output above household subsistence requirements by the Africans.

Many observers note in summary that the African population was cast for the most part in the role of poorly paid laborers, often as migrants, on the white farms or mines or as domestic workers and work-seekers. In that situation they rather precariously lived in "locations" on the edge of the "white" towns or else remained as the family residue eking out a partial living in increasingly overcrowded reserves (Duncan 1973; Harris 1974; Clarke 1974, 1977c). It is this "appalling economic and ecological conditions of the African rural areas," in the words of Dunlop (1974:177), which "undoubtedly [was] the most critical economic problem facing the Rhodesian Government." (An account of the socio-demographic and economic situation relating to the current farming system and agricultural production levels in three Communal Areas are given as part of the case study of farmers' responses in Chapter VII below. These cover a total of eleven subdivisions within Madziwa, Bushu and Kandeya, all in the Mashonaland Central Province).

In contrast to the plight of Africans, particularly those in the rural areas, the following benefits enumerated by Lionel Cliffe (1981:9-10), among others, were all available and preserved predominantly, some exclusively, for whites. These are (1) vast stretches of the best land; (2) mineral

concessions; (3) ownership of the industry that had grown up in the last fifty years; (4) freehold rights in the urban areas; (5) professional, managerial and skilled jobs; and (6) the advantages of a sound basic education.

The case is always made to the effect that the European sector is the goose that lays the golden eggs. While there appears to be no major debate about that fact, there are critics, however, who have viewed that contribution differently. Roger Riddell, for instance, argues that the impressive overall figures for European farm production disguise serious misuse and non-use of large areas of land in the European areas. He (Riddell 1978b:11-13) cites evidence relating to the 1975-76 growing season to show that (1) only 15 percent of approximately 3.6 million hectares of potential arable land in the European areas were being cultivated, (2) 60 percent of the total of 6,682 European-owned farms were not profitable enough to qualify for income tax payments, (3) in the most productive area of the country, the Mazoe Valley area, approximately over a quarter of the land was not being cultivated, (4) in the beef producing areas of the Matebeleland and Midlands Provinces between 40 and 60 percent of the farms were non-viable and they were characterized by serious mismanagement and overstocking leading to serious veld destruction and (5) in 1977 a study by the Rhodesian National Farmers' Union reported 30 percent of all the European-owned farms to be insolvent.

In spite of these, as Riddell observed, inefficient white-owned farms were

able to survive because of a wide range of assistance given, both directly and indirectly, to European agriculture in the form of loans, price supports, capital grants, the low wage structure and 'artificial' land prices. (Riddell 1978b:12)

Elsewhere, Riddell (1978c:16) elaborates this point in specific terms by stating that between 1973 and 1975 the government paid out \$55.2 million for subsidies, losses and assistance in the European agricultural sector, an average of \$8,000 per farming unit.

Good (1974, 1976), in evaluating the economics of settler colonialism in Rhodesia, supports Riddell's (1978a, 1978b) low estimation of most European-owned farms characterizing them as inefficient because the white farmers were mostly propped up by state policy in the form of elaborate subsidies, protections and restraints from competition and reliance on cheap African labor. This issue is very strongly pursued by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972) who points out that settler colonialism rather than being economic is excessively wasteful of human and material capital.⁴ (Aspects of Large-Scale Commercial Farming as well as the responses of European farmers in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area in the Mashonaland Central Province are reported as part of the case study in Chapter VII below).

The African discontent against white minority rule in the country was nurtured in the context of this background of increasing human and other problems in the Reserves (Stanning 1967; Wrathall 1968), racial conflicts (Kinloch 1978), the "deterioration of Rhodesia's white society," (Clements 1969), the impoverishment and proletarianization of the African population (Arrighi 1967:32, 1970; Palmer 1977:241; Palmer and Parsons 1977), the myths about the inherent efficiency of white farmers (Emmanuel 1972; Good 1974, 1976; Riddell 1978b) and the impacts generated by the various settler policies and Legislative Acts relating to the land (Pollack 1975; Rennie 1978) and the politics and general problems of development (Barker and Hume 1977).

Richard Brown, in a summary paper on Zimbabwe's recent history, puts the problem in perspective by arguing it this way:

[L]and shortage and overcrowding, compulsory destocking, and the forcible removal of Africans . . . struck at the roots of both rural and urban life [and] acted as a catalyst for mass nationalism. (Brown 1983:948)

Elsewhere, Barry Munslow makes a similar point asserting that

[T]he land issue was and still remains the central political issue in the country. . . . The long nationalist guerrilla struggle from 1966 to 1980 relied on mobilizing peasant grievances about the land to gain support, and Robert Mugabe's ZANU (PF) party--the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front--swept to power in the 1980 independence elections because the electorate trusted that his party would get back the land. (Munslow 1985:41)

This view is also shared by Terrence Ranger (1985:14) who attributes the deep consciousness and the mass participation of Zimbabwean peasants in the guerrilla war to their "demands for their lost lands."

Beginning with the apparently ineffectual April 1966 "Battle of Chinoyi", waged by guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), what the African population prefer to call the second chimurenga or liberation war started (Kapungu 1974). In an account given by Richard Brown (1983:949), well-attested acts of brutality by the security forces of the white minority settler regime increased internal discontent and ensured a ready and at times overwhelming supply of new recruits for the guerrillas. He argues further that this rather antagonistic situation was exacerbated by (1) the imposition of collective fines, (2) the ill-organized and drastic removal of several thousand rural Africans from their homes into "protected villages" or "strategic resettlements" on suspicion of helping the guerrillas and (3) the shooting of many curfew-breakers.

Anna Weinrich (1977), also looking at the same problem, provides a comprehensive account of the difficulties unleashed by the protected villages policy and mentions (1) the deterioration of health conditions, education and other social services, (2) the imposition of physical hardships especially on women and (3) the disruption of agriculture and family life.

The intensification of the war, amidst mounting civilian casualties and increasing international isolation of Rhodesia, continued until about December 1979. At that time a cease-fire and transitional arrangements for African majority rule were agreed upon at the British-sponsored Lancaster House Conference in London leading to a democratic election in February 1980 and the birth of independent Zimbabwe in April 1980 (Morris-Jones 1980; Dayal 1984).

Post-independence Development Challenges and Prospects

With the formal achievement of independence Zimbabwe entered into a decisive period of social, economic and political transition. The country faced both short-term and long-term challenges. The immediate or short-term concern was the rehabilitation of the war-torn countryside. In the view of the government there was no doubt that "compared to the rest of the country, the rural community experienced the highest degree of human suffering as well as property and physical infrastructure destruction" (Zimbabwe 1981c:50).

Shortly after independence the government solicited for international assistance to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed during the war. This was at the Zimbabwe Conference on Reconstruction and Development organized in Harare in March 1981. There the government listed the following physical damages: (1) 1,830 boreholes; (2) 425 dams and weirs; (3) 1,200 diptanks;

(4) thousands of kilometers of fencing that used to confine infected cattle to limited areas; (5) 70 out of the 120 stock marketing or sale pens; (6) some 2,000 of the approximately 2,500 primary schools; (7) 180 of the 243 rural clinics; and (8) much of the telecommunication equipment in the rural areas (Zimbabwe 1981d:29-33).

Coenraad Brand (1981:49), in turn, documented the human aspects of the destruction. According to him (1) more than 7,000 African civilians were killed, (2) agricultural production was disrupted through harassment and uncertainty, (3) an estimated third of the 3 million head of cattle in the Communal Areas was lost through disease, theft and forced sales or slaughter, (4) half a million people were herded by the government into some 230 fortified "protected" or consolidated villages, (5) thousands fled into the towns and between 100,000 and 150,000 across the borders into neighboring countries, (6) more than 1,600 schools were closed down affecting some 433,000 children, or nearly half of the total normal African enrolment, (7) by mid-1979 36 percent of the rural clinics were no longer operating and there were only three doctors left in the fifty or so mission hospitals across the country, half of which had been closed or had greatly reduced their services, (8) thirteen bus companies operating in rural areas had abandoned 57 percent of their routes and services had been substantially reduced on many others after they had lost a fifth of their fleet in landmine or other incidents and (9) a considerable proportion of small rural business enterprises were boarded up or had been burnt down.

Touching on the long-term the major problem that Zimbabwe faced at independence was the need to redress the socioeconomic imbalances caused by years of separate development along racial lines.⁵ This task called for appropriate development policies and strategies (see Munslow 1980a).

In this, policy makers and planners were presented by interested analysts with what appeared to be mutually exclusive options. Even before independence the lines had been drawn in debates emerging between advocates of evolutionary or reformist policies and those of radical or transformation alternatives (Muvingi et al. 1981; Bratton 1981; Bush and Cliffe 1984; Gordon 1984).⁶ The central premise of the debates focussed on the structures of the political economy created and maintained by the Rhodesian state and inherited by Zimbabwe (Stoneman 1981).

At any rate, while the debate still goes on Zimbabwe appears to have pursued policies that are pragmatic and, at least in the economic sphere, are paying dividends.⁷ For instance, the period since independence can be divided into three phases.

The first phase is the high growth period of 1980 and 1981 when the economic growth rate was 12 percent. The period coincided with good rains, unusually favorable conditions arising from independence, the lifting of international economic sanctions as well as buoyant world demand for the country's exports.

The second phase is the period from 1982 to early 1984 which was characterised by severe drought conditions, the world recession and poor economic performance. During the period the economy registered an annual average decline of almost 3 percent in real terms. There was substantial reduction in agricultural output which necessitated the import of 340,000 tonnes of maize and 120,000 tonnes of wheat in 1984. Between 1982 and 1984 per capita income, in real terms, fell by a total of 4 percent from its 1980 level. There was a balance of payments problem, high rates of inflation which hovered around 15 percent, low investment and high unemployment.

Phase three of Zimbabwe's economic life, starting from 1984-85 to the present, shows the beginnings of a recovery. The period has been characterised by good agriculture, higher agricultural incomes that are boosting domestic demand and by favorable export demand conditions (see Novicki 1983; Zimbabwe 1984a, 1985a, 1986a; The Economist 1986; Green and Kadhani 1986).

The rather impressive economic performance recorded by Zimbabwe is discussed by van Buren (1986:1123-1124) whose account is summarized here. For the first time since 1981 the country's economy started registering positive real growth in 1985 with an estimated real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growing about 7 percent that year. In nominal terms Zimbabwe's GDP grew from \$3,226 million in 1980 to a projected \$7,770 million in 1986. Surpluses in the trade, current-account and overall balance of payments were registered by the economy in 1985. Exports also rose steadily in value from \$999 million in 1982 to an estimate \$1,750 million in 1985. In contrast, the value of imports increased but more slowly from \$1,087 million in 1983 to a projected \$1,450 million in 1985. The country's trade balance also rose from a deficit of \$115 million in 1982 to a surplus which by September 1985 was \$290.4 million. Inflation was less than 10 percent by the middle of 1985 having dropped from a high of 25 percent in 1983.

This is significant because over most of Africa today even the least minimal economic growth is a welcome exception rather than the rule. Of more significance though is the diverse base of this growth. For instance, the non-material production sector grew by almost 3 percent, the material production sector by about 13 percent, distribution by over 12 percent, transport and communications by 6 percent, construction by 6 percent, the value of mineral production by 15 percent and manufacturing by 12 percent.

Of the most specific importance, in the wider African context, is agriculture which contributed the largest share to growth. It recorded in real terms almost 30 percent increase in 1985. In terms of value total crop deliveries to marketing authorities increased by 53 percent during that year compared with 1984 (Zimbabwe 1986a).

It is important to note also that in May 1985 Zimbabwe became the first and only African state to join the international community to provide its own food aid to the famine victims of Ethiopia by sending 25,000 tons of maize. From mid-1985 to early 1986 the following purchases of Zimbabwe grain were made: (1) the European Economic Community (EEC) purchased 25,000 tons of maize for delivery as food aid to Mozambique and Zambia; (2) the United Nations World Food Program purchased and distributed large quantities of maize for drought hit countries of southern Africa; (3) Japan bought 9,000 tons of maize which were supplied to Zambia; (4) the government of the United Kingdom purchased 14,500 tons as donation to Mozambique; (5) Australia bought 30,000 of maize for distribution as food aid in Africa and (6) South Africa also obtained a sizeable portion of its maize requirement from Zimbabwe (van Buren 1986:1124).

According to The Economist (1986:15), 1985 saw a 118 percent rise over 1984 in sales from Communal and Resettlement Areas as compared with 48 percent increase from the commercial farming sector. The relative share of the Communal and Resettlement Areas of the total national marketed output of \$1,077 in 1985 was 21 percent. This is in stark contrast to a share of between 4 and 8 percent until independence. For instance, in maize production the Communal and Resettlement or the so-called subsistence sector sold almost half of the 1.82 million tonnes delivered to the marketing organizations and

performed almost as well in terms of cotton production (The Courier 1986:30).

The African Business has placed this success story in perspective stating:

The ingredients for success are well-known: generous and prompt payment for farmers, rapid expansion of collection and storage facilities, more credit and agricultural advice for peasant farmers. (The African Business 1986:13-17)

Zimbabwe's tremendous success in stimulating small-holder or peasant farmers to grow more food has created massive agricultural surpluses. At the end of 1985 the Grain Marketing Board was sitting on 1.4 million tonnes of maize with the experts estimating that that stockpile could grow to more than 2 million tonnes at the end of the 1986-87 marketing year. That represents over 5 years of domestic consumption needs.

In looking at Zimbabwe's success story and in presenting this rather optimistic assessment of its current situation we need reminding that on the whole the country is not favored for sustained agricultural output. This point and the fact that cyclical drought is a major constraint are clear indication that a much longer-term outlook is called for to evaluate the permanence of the country's apparently impressive agricultural performance so far.

This perspective provides the substantive background for evaluating the literature on land reform and resettlement, poverty and equity, rural development, agriculture and economic growth, the state, household dynamics and organizational forms in terms of their relevance to the government's policies and on-going programs of change in postindependence Zimbabwe.

Notes

- 1.) A rainy pentad is defined as the center of three 5-day periods (pentads) which together receive more than 40 millimeters of rainfall, and two of which receive at least 8 millimeters (Whitsun 1983:6).

- 2.) The history of the early and continuous settlement of Zimbabwe by indigenous Shona populations is very important to many Zimbabwean historians and intellectuals for two main reasons. Firstly, they fastidiously assert that claim of nativism to counteract rival claims by some European settlers and historians of Southern Africa that much of the region was not occupied prior to early European expeditions there in the sixteenth century. Secondly and central to this assertion, is the controversy that used to surround the question as to who the original builders of the Great Zimbabwe acropolis are. As the noted historian Peter Garlake (1973:12) argues "probably no other prehistoric site has given rise to such strong, widespread and often bizzare emotional response." The official policy of the Rhodesian government in respect of the origin of the ruins was that it could have been the work of any builders be they Phoenicians, Arabians, or some central African group. The majority Zimbabweans found the ambiguity created by this policy thinking irksome. Great Zimbabwe is a structure and symbol of immense pride among the Mashona. Consequently, they feel insulted by the "settlers" refusal to acknowledge the genius, heroism and past glory of what they regard as the dominant state-level culture in the region centuries before the advent of the Europeans. (See also Garlake 1974, 1982).

- 3.) From that time until today the Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands have remained physically intact. Though the Communal Land Act of 1982 repealed all the enactments which established the Reserves it legally reconstituted and renamed them as the "Communal Areas." The Act also vested the general administration of all the areas so designated in the newly created District Councils rather than in the chiefs or traditional authorities. The government, through the National Agricultural and Rural Development Coordination Committee (NARDCC), is currently working on an elaborate Communal Lands Development Plan. The objective of the Plan is to rehabilitate the Communal Areas and integrate them fully into the productive and market sector of the country's political economy.

- 4.) This view is shared by Riddell (1978b:12) who supports the argument with figures showing that 72 percent of all European farmers cover only 23 percent of the European land area and produce 21 percent of the total output of that sector, while 5 percent of farms account for 50 percent of the land and produce 48 percent of the output. (See in addition Biermann and Kossler 1980). However, Paul Mosley (1983), in his study of the settler economies of Kenya and Zimbabwe challenges this characterization as stereotypic and overgeneralized. He (Mosley 1983:177) admits, however, apparently in contradiction to his challenge, that "what is truly distinctive of the settler agricultural economy is not so much its low average efficiency as the very wide range of efficiency levels which it managed to contain and the skewness of the distribution within this range, with a minority of highly efficient, frequently foreign-owned concerns counter balancing a majority of inefficient, amateur, farmers who obtained low yields."

5.) In the socio-political sphere the notorious animosities between the majority Shona cultural group, most of whom subscribe to the ruling ZANU-PF party and the minority Ndebele among whom the PF-ZAPU is dominant are the obvious opprobrium which mars the peaceful co-existence of all Zimbabweans and the development of the country. This problem goes back to at least a century with the arrival, conquest and apparent brutal subjugation of the Shona by the Matabele. There is an apparent mutual distrust and suspicions of each other by the leaders of these two societies and their respective political parties.

Joshua Nkomo used to be referred to undisputedly as the "Father of the Nation," for his role in the country's liberation struggle. He teamed up with Robert Mugabe in the final years of the liberation war to present a common "patriotic front," against the forces of the European settlers (see Mugabe *et al.* 1978). After independence Mugabe appointed Nkomo, though a leader of the opposition party in the National Assembly, to a cabinet position in the government. However, when security forces discovered caches of arms and ammunition on PF-ZAPU property Mugabe sacked Nkomo and accused him of planning the violent overthrow of the government.

Thereafter the destructive activities such as killings, rape and burnings committed by bands of so-called Ndebele dissidents in parts of the country started. Many Shonas then saw Nkomo as the "Father of Dissidents." Nkomo, himself a Kalanga (an offshoot of the Karanga sub-division of the Shona) identifies more with the Ndebele from his base in their traditional capital Bulawayo. The activities of the bandits have always been ruthlessly punished by the government's security forces. In both cases many innocent civilians have suffered including a group of foreign tourists allegedly murdered by the dissidents in 1983 and missionaries also killed in late 1987. In the early 1980s the international community focussed its attention on Zimbabwe. The western media highlighted the alleged human rights abuses and atrocities indiscriminately meted out to the Ndebele by the so-called North Korean trained and Shona constituted Fifth Brigade. For a period, Nkomo fled the country in a brief self-imposed exile in Britain accusing the government of attempts to kill him.

From 1985 serious efforts were made by Mugabe and Nkomo and their respective party leaders to strike a reconciliation towards the healing of old wounds. These efforts which were prolonged and broke down many times eventually bore fruit on December 31, 1987 when a settlement was publicly celebrated. That day Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as the first Executive President of the Republic of Zimbabwe while he appointed his old-time opponent Joshua Nkomo as one of the two Vice-Presidents of the country. The country became a one-party state with the absorption of the opposition PF-ZAPU by the ruling ZANU-PF.

Whether or not this second attempt at national reconciliation will last and promote the genuine integration of the interests and aspirations of both the Mashona, the Matabele and the other cultural groups as well as Zimbabweans of European ancestry is an issue which cannot be easily and seriously conjectured upon in this dissertation

6.) In the search for an appropriate development policy or strategy the government has been treading a tightrope of differential trade-offs. Since independence the major preoccupation of most observers appears to be with questions in respect of maintaining the production levels of large-scale commercial agriculture, one of the main sources of foreign exchange. This

invariably means, both in the short-term and the long-run, leaving the European-owned lands more or less untouched.

Such a situation poses immense ethical and ideological dilemmas to the government in view of its explicit commitment to egalitarianism, social justice, and a Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism (see ZANU-PF Election Manifesto 1985, 1980). Even within the government itself, as well as in the ruling ZANU-PF party, there are veiled factional squabbles. One faction, the radicals would want the government to live up to its expectations by ridding the country of such age-old European privileges as land and access to other means of production. The opposing group of pragmatists would rather want a gradual transformation which recognizes and uses the available European expertise and capital stock to generate economic growth (see Libby 1984).

In the midst of all this the postindependence relationships between Africans and Europeans, surprisingly, does not exhibit the kinds of open confrontations that many pessimists predicted. In the urban areas some African workers serve both the European and elite Africans as domestic servants. In the rural areas many Africans continue to work as laborers in European-owned farms. Some Europeans who emigrated before or at independence are said to be returning. So far it appears that the government has succeeded in fostering the workable multi-racial society that it promised to establish. This does not mean that the Africans are content with their living conditions and incomes which are still comparatively minimal by the standards of the European population.

Except perhaps in the classic case of some landless Africans squatting on European-owned lands the general feeling, especially in industrial establishments and other spheres, is that Zimbabwe Africans look to the government to promote egalitarian policies that seek to redress past injustices that they suffered under previous settler administrations.

7.) Obviously not everybody would agree with this seemingly optimistic compliment. For instance, Roger Riddell (1984:463) in an apparently well-balanced analysis of the performance of the economy since independence has come to the following conclusions: (1) that the economy has performed far better than that of Zimbabwe's neighbors but a large part of the reasons for this was due to unique circumstances that no longer exist; (2) many of the gains of equity and the reduction of poverty achieved in the 1980-82 have now been reversed; (3) the prospects for medium to long-term growth are not as good as the economic planners of the country have had us believe although far better than the pessimists would lead us to think; and (4) the transformation of the economy desired by the government has been far slower than expected.

Andre Astrow (1983:1) on the other hand offers a more radical assessment in observing that "after several years of independence, little meaningful change has actually taken place, while significant tensions have emerged between the Mugabe government and the African people. Today the state apparatus has remained virtually intact and the basic economic structure of the country unchanged. While the white settlers have seen most of their privileges preserved, African workers who have gone on strike, and landless African peasants squatting on "white" land, have been repeatedly faced with severe repression by the government. Moreover, not only has the government failed to promote socialism in Zimbabwe, but on the contrary, has successfully worked to strengthen its economic ties with imperialist countries, placing Zimbabwe firmly in the Western camp." (See Ibbo Mandaza (1986) for an additional leftist criticism of the government's performance in the area of resettlement and agrarian reform).

Yet another issue which may be of major concern, apart from the land question and the ethnic conflicts, relates to trends in public expenditure. According to van Buren (1986:1123), there was a decline in the private sector's share of this from 63 percent in 1980 to 60 percent in 1982 and that the country's Five-Year Development Plan, introduced in April 1986 and covering the period 1986-90, forecasts a further decline to an average of 43 percent annually over the Plan period. At least to advocates of minimal government intervention in economic matters this development is undesirable.

CHAPTER III THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The research problem is to evaluate how agricultural resettlement policy, initiated by the government since independence in 1980, is affecting household performance responses and the quality of life in rural Zimbabwe. The government's policy is explicitly expressed in official publications and pronouncements about (1) the redistribution of the country's agricultural land resources, (2) the rehabilitation of the country's poor on these lands and (3) the provision of facilitative services and basic needs to the resettled. The broad objective of this policy is to achieve growth and development and to ensure equity.

The literature that is reviewed here is varied, though it is restricted to the broad parameters of the substantive and theoretical matters which form part of the agricultural dimensions of development. At the macro-level, the issues that the discussion covers relate to aspects of the role that the state plays in development. Specifically, it explores the areas of agricultural policy and implementation, the promotion of the smallholder and the cooperative modes of production and the consequences of these developments so far for the African condition. For the micro-level, the discussion examines household dynamics and organizational forms in the context of change. The systemic linkage between the two levels are reviewed here by examining the literature on rural development, poverty-focused development, land reform and resettlement programs.

Thus the purpose of the review is to provide a general framework within which to assess some of both the macro-interests and the micro-concerns that

dominate on-going debates about agricultural development. This is meant to serve the following objectives: (1) facilitate the selection of background materials about the research problem; (2) guide the placement of the selected materials in the wider developmental and African perspective; and (3) assist in defining and refining the research variables as well as the analytical concepts that are used in the study.

The State and Agricultural Development Policy

Today, economic development places an even more onerous burden on the state as a political institution than in the past. This responsibility ranges from the selection of the most efficacious bundle of economic policies to ensuring a conducive political and administrative framework for development irrespective of particular policies (Sandbrook 1985, 1986). John Lewis (1986:29) extends this observation further by pointing out that governments are essential to (1) establish policy environments, (2) develop the physical and human infrastructure for development and (3) carry out the functions that would never for reasons of scale or externality be adequately initiated by the private sector. In the view of Lewis there is no substitute for the continuing lead that governments must supply to development-promotion effort.

Support for this assessment of the central role of the state in development is given by many experts including John Mellor. Mellor (1986:84) sees such a role as critical to agricultural and employment-oriented strategy of development in the developing world. He argues that because agriculture is organized on a small-scale basis, substantial public sector investment in that sector is needed in the form of transportation, power, communication, research, education and input supplies systems.

Some of the cogent socio-economic rationales that justify government intervention in agriculture are suggested by Joseph Stiglitz (1987:43-44). He lists the following reasons: (1) incomplete markets in insurance futures and credit, (2) public goods and increasing returns, (3) imperfect information, (4) externalities and (5) income distribution. Stiglitz argues the point further that in the real situations of most developing countries the free market's own allocation within this framework is either inefficient or otherwise unacceptable to policy makers thus necessitating the intervention of the state.

Other important policy issues about the agriculture of the developing countries include, for instance, the need to sustain the ecological balance in the natural resources exploitation of these fragile tropical and subtropical environments. Throughout these countries the current major policy concern, however, relates to the possibilities for production increases. Increased farm output is achieved through (1) the expansion of area cultivated, (2) increased yield per unit area, (3) shifts in cropping patterns toward higher-yielding crops and (4) increase of the number of annual harvests. This growth calls for increased inputs of labor, land, water and capital, as well as the introduction of technical innovations (Ruthenberg 1985:1). The issue of how to relate any or all of these investments to possibilities for production increases come under the rubric of agricultural policies.

These and other policy matters continue to dominate the on-going analysis to rethink African agricultural development strategies, particularly the role that the state must play in this endeavor. The dilemma posed for a consensual resolution of the contradictions posed by Africa's policy effort is very well recognized. For instance, Jennifer Whitaker offers a commentary on this paradox by stating:

As usual, the Westerners are drawing sweeping conclusions about what Africa ought to do. And, as usual, the Africans have neither the flexibility nor the wherewithal to either reject the advice totally or follow through on it fully. (Whitaker 1986:1)

Akroyd (1985) recognizes that there is no one best set of policies for agricultural development and that any such policies must reflect the political, economic and socio-cultural aspirations of each nation. He laments (Akroyd 1985:102), however, that there "are countries in Africa where policy guidelines are vague and diffuse, and some where clear policy guidelines and objectives seem not to exist." Other writers appear to be suggesting that policy per se might not be the answer but rather as constituting the problem itself. Heyer et al. (1981), for instance, argue that attempts to develop African agriculture through a network of sophisticated policy instruments implying a manipulable and predictable environment have backfired in virtually all instances.

African governments, by necessity, have to address specific agricultural objectives if they are to move from a state of stagnation or decline into one of growth and development. Currently, some of the most common of the agricultural policy agendas recommended for various countries include such issues as: (1) national and regional food self-sufficiency and food security (OAU 1981; Norman 1984; Asante 1986); (2) combating hunger (Eicher 1986a); (3) diversification of agricultural output and the raising of rural incomes and living standards (Hinderink and Sterkenberg 1983); (4) whether to promote or de-emphasize export-led growth (World Bank 1981; Berg 1986; Green and Allison 1986); (5) conservation of natural resources, equitable distribution of real and money income, and equitable regional development (Akroyd 1985); and (6) the transformation and acceleration of agricultural-based growth into a

cumulative employment generation and industrial-oriented growth (Mellor 1986).

Such policies as these are made within broad frameworks to support, for instance, (1) a smallholder-led farming strategy (Johnston 1986), or (2) socialist agriculture (Munslow 1985), through (3) institution building (Leonard 1986), or (4) the use of a particular problem diagnosis and extension approach such as farming systems (Fresco and Poats 1986) and (5) which may be targeted for a special or neglected group such as women (Spring 1986; Guyer 1986a).

These policy-initiated development activities entail heavy financial, logistical and administrative burdens. This is even more so in such areas as project planning and implementation (Gaitskell 1968). Critics of the state's role in development therefore caution governments to constantly seek ways of transferring such activities as marketing and input distribution to the private sector. From this perspective some adversaries and analysts of the postindependence state in Africa have blamed too much public sector involvement in agricultural pricing, marketing and distribution for the woes of the continent (see World Bank 1981; Bates 1984a; Due 1986; Ndulu 1986).

Other critics, mainly the political scientists on the other hand, have looked at the relationships between the poor performance of African countries and such themes as (1) the dominant ideology of the state (Young 1982), particularly socialism (Isaacman 1979; Munslow 1984); (2) personal rulership (Jackson and Rosberg 1982); (3) clientelist politics (Ravenhill 1986); (4) affection and patronage (Hyden 1986); (5) the "overdeveloped" state (Leys 1976; Saul 1979); and (6) ethnic loyalties (Smock and Bentsi-Enchill 1976).

An articulation of these criticisms of Africa's bad economic policies, political vanity and patronage, premature bureaucratization as well as bureaucratic sclerosis convinces Sandbrook (1986:319) to perceive the state as

"part of the problem of economic stagnation" in much of the continent.

The autopsy of the African state conducted by these critics, however informative as it may be still leaves at least two questions unanswered. If the state is "part" of the problem, what constitutes the other part?. Does it mean then that doing away with the involvement of the state will result in the realization of the development dreams of Africa?. These are important matters that only a holistic perspective on the macro and microdynamics of the development process can help to elucidate.

State Ideology, Public Choice and the Individual in Development

Ever since the colonial days social justice and equality have remained a major issue of concern in the policy agendas concretized in the political manifestos and the pronouncements of African leaders. With political independence most countries flirted with concepts that promoted various brands of egalitarian ideals. These ideals were shaped into what was articulated to be African socialism (Friedland and Rosberg 1964; Kopytoff 1964; Kenya 1965; Babu 1981). Supposedly founded on the customary norms and practices and the ethical principles of traditional Africa this kind of socialism only proved to be theoretically attractive. In practice, it turned out to be woefully inadequate and contextually unsuited to the capitalistic demands of the modern state in so far as economic growth and development were concerned.

Given the essentially precapitalist nature of this tradition-circumscribed socialism and the realization that it is unworkable in Africa's changed socioeconomic and political circumstance some leaders abandoned the pursuit of that normative or nativistic ideal quite early. Yet, others pursued it by importing Marxist-Leninist ideology and conveniently

equating it with African communalism (see for instance, Nkrumah 1965).

Contrary to the belief underlying this thinking the political and economic methods, such as collective production systems associated with imported socialism, are not congruent with the humanistic and social ideals of Africa. For example, there is no empirical support for the view that communal forms of living, consumption and even resource exploitation in traditional Africa are synonymous with the imperatives of collective ownership, accumulation, management and production of goods which characterize Marxism-Leninism. The inability of Tanzanian policy makers to appreciate this fact explains the costly failure of their ujamaa or collective villagization experiment (Hatmann 1981).

Elsewhere in Africa, the promotion by governments of collective and state farms in the 1960s and 1970s, to the complete neglect of individually-owned and managed farms, was based on this erroneous notion that the prevailing social organization of production is collective. The costs of the crises that this wrong policy initiated are documented for such countries as Ghana (Miracle and Siedman 1968a, 1968b) and classically for Tanzania (Coulson 1969; von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; Samoff 1981; Ergas 1982). The case of these failed experiments have raised serious developmental questions as to the relevance and applicability of the Soviet model (Miller 1977) or the Chinese experience (Shillinglaw 1971) and even generally agrarian socialism (Ellman 1981) to the African condition. This does not suggest, however, that the solution is automatically found in capitalist agriculture which system is also fraught with obstacles (see Dickinson and Mann 1978).

Another pertinent issue that is brought up in the context of the foregoing discussion in the area of development has to do with individual effort and rewards as opposed to collective responsibility and welfare. Amity

or kinship communalism persists in contemporary African societies to the extent that it provides a necessary defence mechanism in the external relations of its members to others outside it (see Elias 1962). In such a situation, as the noted ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski (1939:954) rightly points out, "the individual obviously has to become cognizant of [the group] charter [and] to develop the social attitude and personal sentiments in which the bonds of organization consist." However, this fact and the apparent placidity and solidarity, that is internal to group or kinship organization, do not relegate the individual to the status of an unknown quantity when it comes to the question of distribution of rewards and resources.

It is in this perspective that additional conceptual issues such as incentive systems for individual effort and productivity, access to private ownership, popular participation and public choice assume paramount roles in current thinking about development. For instance, advocates of public choice are generally suspicious of interventionist or government-sponsored welfare and redistribution programs. In their view development is facilitated by less government, more market and privately-organized collective initiative. In effect, by conditions where public choice or the spontaneous and voluntary arrangements of the ends and means of development ultimately prevail (see Buchanan 1986).

Public choice proponents recognize the need for equality of access to economic and political resources, that is, to open franchise and full participation in the development process by everybody. But as Buchanan and Tullock show (1962:64) "participation in collective activity is costly to the individual" in terms of externalities and constitutional decision-making. Thus the rational utility-maximizing individual seeking to minimize the imposition of external cost on him, as a consequence of the behavior of others, "may find

it advantageous either to enter into voluntary contracts aimed at eliminating externality or to support constitutional provisions that allow private decisions to be replaced by collective decisions" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:71).

It needs to be noted though that much as public choice holds promise for sustained and democratic effort at development it "has little relevance for a society that is characterized by a sharp cleavage of the population into distinguishable social classes or separate social, religious, or ethnic groupings sufficient to encourage the formation of predictable political coalitions and in which one of these coalitions has a clearly advantageous position at the constitutional stage" (Buchanan and Tullock 1962:80).

Secondly, the logic of collective action, which is basic to the operation of public choice, by its very nature always results in differential benefits or rewards in terms of whether we are dealing with small as opposed to large groups or in market as contrasted with non-market situations. According to Mancur Olson (1965:33) this is so because of the economic facts of suboptimality or inefficiency and the fixidity or limited nature of the benefits of group goals (see Olson 1965:37; Hardin 1982).

These issues about group actions and individual participation and benefits in societal governance and development reflect the same conceptual analysis of organizations by anthropologists who perceive such matters in terms of the "image of limited good." The respective predictions arrived at by public choice analysts and those of limited good, however, appear to be fundamentally at variance.

Public good is limited. In the view of students of public choice the individual would reap the maximum benefit if he or she engages in collective action. On the other hand, George Foster (1965) the originator of the concept

of limited good suggests that the fixed and limited nature of public resources in traditional, peasant societies or static economic systems is an effective check on group mobilization and collective action. Consequently, there is a fear in such societies that if some individual gets more of the limited resources then others will get less ipso facto. Under such circumstance voluntary cooperation is inhibited and extreme individualism becomes preferable to collectivism.

The extent to which effective administrative mechanisms can turn around these problems of development is discussed by various analysts. There are suggestions, for example, that call for emphasis on (1) citizen or community or popular participation (Cook and Frederickson 1977; Cernea 1983; Gould 1985), (2) administrative experimentation (Mosher 1967) or administrative coordination (Leach 1982) and (3) the increased involvement of private voluntary organizations (Gorman 1984) in the planning and management (Garcia-Zamor 1985) of client-centered development (Thomas 1985). These issues cannot be evaluated outside the important on-going policy debate about Africa's appropriate mode of agricultural production, that is, the forces and relations which govern the organization of farm activities and outputs (see Lemarchand 1986).

African governments are concerned about which kinds of agricultural organizations are ideologically or politically preferable to tackle their socio-economic developments. In this context the facts raised in this discussion so far have wider implications for reviewing the two most important arrangements covered extensively in the literature about African agriculture, namely, the smallholder and cooperative farming.

Smallholder Agriculture and Development

Smallholder agriculture, usually also referred to as traditional, peasant, low-resource, family farm, or subsistence production predominates over all of Africa. The literature which deals with the various dimensions of it has been so copiously referenced that it does not require any extensive review here. In the last two decades, however, a number of studies have explicated the dynamism of small farmers and challenged many of the conventional orthodoxies, such as the laziness and irrationality of the farmers who engage in smallholder production.

Today there is an increasing realization among researchers that small farm units are the most feasible and cost-effective means of attaining the multiple objectives of development (Johnston 1986:160). It is now accepted that traditional farmers with access to strategic services and infrastructure such as credit tend to accept risks and adopt extension recommendations such as high yielding technology.

The seminal work on transforming traditional agriculture, published by Theodore Schultz (1964), sets the stage for the theoretical modelling of smallholder farming. Other publications following it take a substantially closer look at aspects of the economics of traditional agriculture such as technological and institutional constraints (Mellor 1966; Hayami and Ruttan 1971; Johnston and Kilby 1975).

Broader analytical perspectives specifically on the African materials are provided by other researchers such as Ruthenberg (1968) and Cleave (1974), just to mention a few. Over the same period, extended empirical studies with the aim to obtaining detailed understanding of present production processes and decision behavior in traditional agriculture were conducted in various

countries. These, for instance, include farm management studies in Northern Nigeria (Norman 1973, 1982; Norman et al. 1979), Sierra Leone (Dunstan 1972; Dunstan and Byerlee 1976, 1977), in colonial Rhodesia (Johnson 1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1970, 1971; Massell and Johnson 1968) and Montague Yudelman's (1964) monumental study covering south central Africa, mainly Rhodesia.

Recent policy interests in the problems and prospects for the transformation of smallholder agriculture have also benefitted from two publications, the first edited by Robert Stevens (1977) and the other written by Hans Ruthenberg (1985). The authors synthesize various micro-level hypotheses generated by earlier studies and have tested and refined them in the light of current developments occurring within agricultural growth of developing countries.

The work by Stevens (1977) comprises a collection of regional field studies which (1) illustrates in depth the nature of the low-income trap of small farmers, (2) provides detailed examples of development strategies that have led to major increases in production and employment on small farms and (3) outlines major thrusts for government policies and programs that will accelerate small-farm income growth.

The theoretical path adopted in Ruthenberg's study places the highest priority on the role of technological and other innovations in the process of agricultural growth. That idea is an apparent incorporation of a paradigm about change which goes back to Homer Barnett's (1956) original proposition that innovation is the basis of culture change. Ruthenberg conveys the optimism that with effort, patience, understanding and care, innovations to improve the incomes of millions of small farmers can be identified, appraised and implemented in ways that are attractive both to farmers and to the wider economy.

Given the corpus of recently assembled empirical evidence in support of the high performance of many traditional farmers around the world, the relative efficiency of smallholder agriculture is no longer questioned. This fact notwithstanding, an agricultural economy which is wholly dependent upon a smallholder system has certain limitations.

Dorner and Kanel (1977:5) discuss at least two of them. First, a highly productive smallholder system requires an elaborate service structure which is both expensive and time-consuming to develop. Consequently, a government cannot deal effectively with such a system until all the necessary infrastructure is in place and markets have begun to function more or less competitively. The second problem is that the smallholder system, dependent upon individuals rather than the collective, can allow great inequalities to develop. Such inequalities may be a function of variations in individual entrepreneurial abilities. Whatever their cause, they can accumulate over time and present serious obstacles to achieving a resolution of problems such as equity and even economic growth.

Yet one other issue that is raised in the literature which has important implications for development is the relationship between smallholder producers and the state. According to Gavin Williams (1976:149), peasants tend to suffer under almost all forms of externally designed strategies of change undertaken in Africa. His contention is that because of the nature of the peasant mode of production in the political economy of the continent (1) the underdevelopment of peasant production is a condition for the development of capitalist and state production and that (2) this condition serves the interests of the state and its beneficiaries rather than promotes the livelihood of the people.

This view of the parasitic and exploitative nature of states' domination over their seemingly helpless smallholder farmers contrasts sharply with Goran

Hyden's (1980) characterization of African peasantries as uncaptured and consequently resistant to the intrusions of the forces and pressures of the state.

Cooperatives and Agricultural Development

Production cooperatives are an option to individually owned and operated smallholder or family farms. The modern cooperative institution denotes a wide range of organizational forms which involve varying activities. In the agricultural sector these include, among others, the more common situations where individual farmers cultivate their own farms while banding together to take advantage of services such as input and credit procurement and marketing. More rarely, and usually at the encouragement or even the coercion of the state, there is also the producer cooperative. At the very advanced phase of this continuum, the ownership of land and other resources as well as the organization of production calls for a substantial element of collectivization as it is found in socialist communes (Galeski 1971, 1977; Francisco et al. 1979).

The role of cooperatives in the development of the developing countries first engaged the attention of the United Nations Organization in the 1950s. Subsequently, towards the end of the 1960s, it commissioned various analytical and case studies into rural cooperative movements (see Carroll et al. 1969; UNRISD 1975), and also covered Africa (see Apthorpe 1972a, 1972b), Asia (see Inayatullah 1972) and Latin America (see Borda 1971). Throughout Africa the colonial administrations in many but not in all cases encouraged the formation of cooperatives as part of the promotion of community development (Widstrand 1970).

To the agricultural societies of rural Africa the idea of cooperation has never been a novel concept. In most places traditional and informal cooperation and reciprocal exchanges, some of which are still performed today, were practiced in the past. These involved the pooling of such scarce resources as labor power oftentimes for the mutual benefit of participants. Subsidiarily also, cooperation on a larger scale was part of festive or competitive community display in various traditional societies (Erasmus 1956; Dore 1971).

Many researchers have studied aspects of this system of customary values exhibited in traditional cooperation. For instance, Moore (1975) has a typology of such cooperation and he has also looked at the economic importance and other advantages that it generates in rural areas. In Africa mention can be made, among others, of Migot-Adholla's (1970) study of traditional society and cooperation and Gulliver's (1971) work about such cooperation among the Ndendeuli of Tanzania.

A major feature of traditional cooperation in rural Africa manifests itself in the form of group participation in various farm tasks. Every peasant society in Africa has a name for such cooperation, which for example is referred to as nnoboa among the Akan of Ghana and nhimbe among the Mashona of Zimbabwe. Moise Mensah (1970) reports about group farming in Dahomey, now Benin while Anthony Ellman (1970) also observes it in Tanzania.

In another setting, Brian du Toit (1969) examines the functioning of informal grassroots cooperation among the Bantu-speaking groups of South Africa. His study traces the problems associated with the transformation of traditional cooperation through rural-urban migrations and networks into the modern cooperative system. He shows also that such revitalized institutions are major avenues for culture change in African urban settings.

The stated objectives and the recognized economic and social advantages of the modern cooperative are quite obvious. Agarwal (1976) discusses many of them and Joy (1971) takes a look at the existing social factors which are favorable to successful cooperatives. Under the capitalist system of production cooperatives render valuable services which range from the economies of scale, enhancement of private property, market competition and the profit motive to the maximization and utilization of scarce resources (Roy 1981:29).

Elsewhere, the Institute of Development Studies (IDS 1982:1) has cited the following advantages that are often sought by socialist countries through the establishment of cooperatives: (1) economically, it speeds the growth of output and incomes by allowing more rational use of land and labor, providing an essential underpinning for the accumulation process, both local and national; (2) socially, collectivization eliminates exploitative class relationships and prevents their reemergence, alleviates absolute poverty by delivering basic welfare services and reduces unacceptably high levels of inequality between households, villages and regions; and (3) politically, it allows the integration of rural producers as active subjects rather than passive victims of the national development process with the collective as both an instrument of state-led mobilization and a framework for democratic participation and grassroots initiative.

In the view of Texier (1974:1) the cooperative still appears to be the most appropriate organization for mobilizing the efforts of the community for agricultural development. The voluminous study by Robert Bideleux (1985) provides additional insights into the successful achievement of many of these goals by various communist countries. Nigel Swain (1985) also documents the success story of cooperative agriculture in Hungary.

In countries such as Israel, with its kibbutz and moshav collective systems of rural settlement and production (Weintraub 1971; Don 1977), and for most of rural Europe and North America cooperatives have been of immense benefit to small farmers. These benefits include, among others, access to extension, credit and input services at substantially reduced costs to the individual members of these cooperatives. Other instances of successful cooperatives are documented for Latin America (Carroll 1971). By and large, however, the modern cooperative, as Schaffer and Lamb (1981) indicate, does well only in economically advanced countries.

Given the foregoing facts one can appreciate the near-dogmatic acceptance of cooperatives and their promotion in the agricultural policy agendas of independent African countries (Widstrand 1970; Bardeleben 1973; King 1981; Ladipo 1981; Okafor 1983; Ahwireng-Obeng 1986). For most African countries, particularly those which have an affinity for agrarian socialism, the modern cooperative seem to have the answers to such pressing problems as the eradication of absolute poverty (Lele 1975) and the promotion of equity (Putterman 1983).

Yet, the literature indicates the overwhelming failure of modern cooperatives and other public sponsored agricultural production schemes throughout the continent. For example, Carl Eicher (1986a) states: "After 25 years of independence, there are no models of agrarian socialism . . . that have produced a reliable agricultural surplus." Earlier, Eicher and Baker (1982:205) alluded to the theoretical and policy implications of the problems of cooperatives by emphasising that failure "has been a common denominator under civilian, military, capitalist, and socialist governments."

Two issues are pertinent to putting this failure in the context of agricultural policy. The first is about the nature of the failure itself. The

second relates to possible explanations and the policy ramifications of the failure. A selective characterization of these aspects of the cooperative failure in Africa may be made from the existing literature.

Invariably, cooperatives have not only failed in terms of economic output but they have not measured up to the hopes and expectations held by their sponsors, and even the majority of the participating members. Goran Hyden studied the management problems of some African cooperatives. According to him (Hyden 1970a:12) they "are not only inefficient, but plagued by dishonesty, misappropriation of funds and favoritism." Similar problems are documented at length in such places as Nigeria (King 1975; Beer 1980; Fabiyi 1983; Okuneye 1984), Ghana (Miracle and Seidman 1968b), Ghana and Uganda (Young et al. 1981), and in Tanzania (Newiger 1968; Cliffe 1970).

In relation to the important policy question of equity, Hyden (1970a:12) has this to say about the cooperatives: "they have so far proved unable to promote the principle of equality." Serious as this finding is it is not unique to Africa in that Orlando Borda (1971:ix) reports a similar situation in Latin America where he concludes that the effect of the cooperatives "in the long run has been to preserve, sometimes even strengthen, the prevailing system of inequality." For Asia, Gunnar Myrdal (1968:1335), likewise, observes: "the notion that cooperation will have an equalizing effect is bound to turn out to be an illusion . . . the net effect is to create more, not less inequality" (see also Munkner 1977).

In explaining the failings of cooperatives Texier (1974:2) takes the stand that cooperation itself is not at fault but rather the way it has been introduced into traditional rural environments. He attributes the problem to cultural contradictions arguing that:

[T]he actual consequences of trying to introduce into a traditional environment the cooperative system which are successfully practised in Europe and in North America under very different circumstances and for the benefit of very different kinds of communities has in fact been to consolidate the traditional system and to encourage further social stratification by creating new opportunities for class exploitation by small privileged groups. (Texier 1974:3)

Internal organization and member commitment and morale are problems mentioned by Dorner and Kanel (1977:8), who argue further: "It is a delusion to expect that group farms have such obvious benefits to members or such decisive economic advantages to make it possible to overcome easily the organizational problems."

The Institute of Development Studies summarizes the forceful criticisms voiced against producer cooperatives. It states (IDS 1982:1) that (1) the heavy hand of the state in collectives negates the potential advantages, wasting valuable economic resources through inefficient planning and irrational constraints on local autonomy, (2) collectives serve as a mystified legitimation for higher-level decisions rather than as a vehicle for true democratic participation and (3) collective forms of agriculture are used as an instrument for state control of the rural areas and procurement of cheap agricultural products rather than as a context for speedy and egalitarian rural development. Obern and Jones (1981) discuss many of these and other critical factors affecting the cooperatives.

Dealing specifically with the African experiences, Paul Collins (1980:288) puts the causes of the failure in perspective pointing out that "a lot of rhetoric about African co-operatives is misleading where it links their organization to aspects of pre-capitalist or 'traditional' village life."

In fact, the notion of traditional cooperation, exchange and communal support systems is a principal feature of social organization throughout

Africa. This truism which is apparently the basis of the policy thinking shared by many African leaders influences their priority preference for the cooperative mode of production (see Nyerere 1968). One thing, however, appears to be amiss here. There is ample evidence from all over Africa showing that the similarities in the perceived and actual objectives notwithstanding the modern cooperative, as it is known in the West (Roy 1981; Sargent 1982) or in the East (Bideleux 1985), does not operate with the same principles as traditional African cooperation.

A similar thesis about the confusion of African norms with collectivism is advanced in a volume on African cooperatives and their efficiency, edited by Carl Widstrand (1972). There the failure of the cooperative movement in most of the continent is attributed to the inability to appreciate the difference between African collective values and the requirements for a formal cooperative.

This same point is poignantly conveyed in another way by Paul Bohannan. Writing about the different issue of exchange and investment in an African society, namely, the Tiv of Nigeria, Bohannan (1955:60) nonetheless argues that "market behavior and kinship behavior are incompatible." George Dalton (1967:78) provides additional support for this view by arguing that "to retain indigenous social organization in the new economies of markets and machines is obviously impossible."

These views reinforce Hyden's (1970a:13) observation that "traditional communalism has turned out to be more of a liability than an asset to modern cooperative development." It was Meyer Fortes (1969) who stressed the primacy of amity to kinship relations, a normative fact which has significant policy implications for the development of cooperatives. However, many analysts who have worked with various African societies will agree with Hamer's (1982)

observation among the Sadama of Ethiopia that rivalry and taking kinsmen for granted, that is, self interest rather than altruism, is a reality of cooperative organization and management (see also Hamer 1981a, 1981b).

Rural Development

The concept of rural development is now a catch-phrase in contemporary Africa. This is understandable because Africa is essentially a rural continent. In terms of population and settlement distribution, location of natural resources, patterns of economic activity and hence the potential or prospective sources of growth and development rural Africa presents dynamic perspectives. The worldwide significance of the need to develop these areas is stressed by the United Nations, which argues:

[R]ural development can help to smooth the transition between rural and urban life, and to narrow the gap between them in living standards, by disseminating urban attitudes, providing job opportunities and introducing education, health and welfare services, public utilities and communal facilities. It can also provide city people with the pleasure of access to the countryside for recreation. (United Nations 1974:59)

Giving high priority to rural development programs would make a lot of sense because of these and other concerns such as their high potential to effect (1) the eradication of poverty (Chambers 1983); (2) improving quality of life (Thomas and Boyazoglu 1978); (3) stemming the tide of rural-urban drift (Chambers 1974); (4) improving land tenure systems (Cohen 1980a); and (5) strengthening the balance of payments, creating mass markets for non-agricultural goods and services and making food available to the growing populations (Daniel et al. 1985).

Indeed, Heyer et al. (1981), looking at the nature and the size of the institutional establishment that services rural development in Africa, suggest rather sarcastically that rural development has become a big business. For one thing, it is in the area of rural development that most people ever come face to face with government officials or experience the benefits that are controlled and distributed by the state. It is safe to assume on the basis of this fact that the ability of the state to reach out and win the confidence and the support of its farm and rural citizens is conditioned largely by the effectiveness of the rural development policies and programs that the government implements.

There are as many different definitions of the concept of rural development as there are interested analysts and practitioners. For example, the World Bank (1975:3) sees it as a means for reducing poverty, increasing production or raising productivity. In the Bank's view rural development "is concerned with the modernisation and monetisation of rural society, and with its transition from its traditional isolation to integration with the national economy." For Uma Lele (1975:20) it means improving living standards of the mass of the low-income population residing in rural areas and making the process of their development self-sustaining.

Jansma (1981:285) takes rural development to involve an overall improvement in the economic and social well-being of rural residents and the institutional and physical environment in which they live. In the view of Eicher and Baker (1982:59 fn2) the distinguishing characteristics of rural development programs include increased rural welfare, agricultural productivity, participation and broadly shared benefits. Robert Chambers (1983) contends that rural development can be redefined to include enabling poor rural people to demand and control more of the benefits of development.

The history of rural development has passed through different phases. Consequently, the concept assumes a plethora of aliases such as (1) community development (Apthorpe 1961; Brokensha and Hodge 1969; Phillips 1969), (2) modernization (Mazrui 1968; Hunter 1969; Shapiro 1975; Uchendu 1978; Agyeman 1981), (3) rural change (Uchendu 1968), (4) social change (Magubane 1971), (5) integrated rural development (Godart 1966), (6) agricultural development (Bates and Lofchie 1980), (7) economic development (Boserup 1970; Due 1980), (8) agrarian change (Boserup 1965; Bates 1984b; Berry 1984) and (9) poverty-focused development (Adelman 1986).

Beginning from the 1950s community development was proposed by the British Colonial Office to help to prepare dependent territories for independence by improving local government and developing them economically. The term spread rapidly to various external donor agencies and organizations, particularly the United Nations. The idea behind it was embraced by governments such as the United States, which provided funding and personnel to promote it. Anglophone Africa became one of the major testing grounds for community development ideals (see Holdcroft 1978). The concept and programs of community development also caught on in Francophone Africa in the 1960s where it was known as animation rurale (Charlick 1980). The community development idea, however, was short-lived.

In his criticism, Manghezi (1976) labelled the strategy of community development as being suspect. He argued, among other things, that its underlying theory placed value on order and stability rather than on conflict and contradiction thus glossing over fundamental class inequalities and antagonisms in Africa.

The view about the failure of the model, shared by Eicher and Staatz (1984:8), is that community development grew out of the cold-war atmosphere of

the 1950s when western foreign assistance programs were searching for a non-revolutionary approach to rural change. Its advocates therefore assumed, rather wrongly, that development can be achieved through the direct transfer of western agricultural technologies and social institutions such as local democracy to the rural areas of the Third World.

With the demise of community development in the 1960s-1970s, integrated rural development became the vogue. Its rise was also in response to such factors as (1) the failure of the so-called green revolution to make any impact in Africa and elsewhere (Eicher and Baker 1982:61) and (2) the realization that isolated or sectoral projects hardly accomplish anything (Hippel and Fischer 1985:11).

A comprehensive evaluation of integrated rural development projects in Eastern, Southern, and West Africa was undertaken by Uma Lele (1975). In it she recommended that because of severe lack of trained manpower it was appropriate for projects to only begin with a few simple interventions aimed at removing critical constraints before any attempt was made to phase in other programs.

Dupriez (1979) conducted a similar review of the European Economic Community (EEC) funded projects in Africa. He found that there was overcentralization which denied the farmers the much needed opportunity to participate in project decision-making. More seriously, he observed that the project administrators ignored social structures and economic and political hierarchies by tending to regard rural communities as undifferentiated masses.

There is very little doubt that integrated rural development as a whole ever measured up to the expectation that it was hoped to generate. According to Robert Chambers (1974:22) the failure of rural development efforts in Africa is due to (1) lack of high-level manpower, (2) poor attitudes among

public servants, (3) a lack of integration and coordination and (4) inappropriate structures. Some of these criticisms of integrated rural developments, are echoed by Ruttan (1975) in his skeptical assessment of such projects.

For his part, Lakshmanan (1982) suggests that given the often mutually inconsistent objectives of rural development any efforts that seek to achieve the conflicting objectives at the same time can lead to further disillusionment. Another analyst, John Mellor (1986:73) supports these findings and argues that (1) almost universally, integrated rural projects failed as a result of excessive complexity and lack of central support services, (2) the projects tended to raid the national institutions of personnel and (3) they were never integrated into the national support structures for agricultural growth.

At the intellectual level, Cohen (1980a) reports major gaps in the literature in terms of formulating a coherent theory and guidelines to facilitate the work of rural development practitioners. This deficiency is perhaps explained by a fact put forward by Azam (1986) that there is a very high turnover in rural development thought. He argues that a preoccupation of the development experts with "new ideas" is prejudicial to the essential process of learning by experience. He attributes the widening gap between development theory and achievement in the field to this preoccupation.

In addition, Azam (1986) makes two important points that are relevant to the future of rural development policy in Africa. He argues that for rural development to be successful it has to be growth-oriented, egalitarian and democratic and that rethinking is needed not for building a new development design but to eliminate faulty thinking accumulated over the years.

Poverty-Focused Development Strategies

The genre of development philosophies which embraces this paradigm comprises such concepts as the Basic Needs Approach (Ghai et al. 1977; Streeten 1981, 1986; Stewart 1985), Growth With Equity (Jegen and Wilber 1979), Redistribution With Growth (Chenery et al. 1974) and Redistribution Before Growth (Adelman 1978, 1986). The central theme underlying this essentially reformist paradigm is poverty eradication.

The need for a new paradigmatic look at the poverty issue arose out of the perceived inability of traditional market-oriented development theories to induce a "trickling-down" of the benefits of growth to the poor (Lele 1984:447).

Poverty is a relative concept that defies any crisp definition. Operationally, however, it relates to the minimum or basic needs of people and their ability to meet those needs. Poverty-focused strategies always make a fundamental distinction between absolute and relative poverty. The extent of inequality in a given situation is a function either of absolute or relative poverty.

According to Van Weigel (1986:1424) absolute poverty is characterized by (1) persistent undernutrition, (2) illiteracy, (3) unsafe drinking water, (4) inadequate sanitation, (5) parasitic disease, (6) severely limited access to health care and (7) bleak prospects for productive employment. Relative poverty on the other hand refers to the extent to which the income share of groups of individuals or households differs from their population share (Ahluwalia 1974:6).

Strategies with anti-poverty focus essentially seek to attack absolute poverty. In the words of one believer and proponent of this school of thought, Irma Adelman (1986:49), the prime objective of economic development assistance should be the reduction in the number of people living in a state of absolute deprivation. In the view of Robert Chambers (1983) the nature of poverty is the result of five interlocking features. These are (1) lack of material assets; (2) physical weakness; (3) isolation from others and from sources of communication; (4) vulnerability in the face of uncertainties and risks; and (5) political powerlessness. Elsewhere, he indicates also that poor rural people are

typically unorganized, inarticulate, often sick, seasonally hungry, and quite frequently dependent on local patrons. They are less educated . . . less likely to use government services. . . . Further, they are relatively invisible, especially the women and children. (Chambers 1978:209)

Leftwich and Sharp (1976:212) contend that poverty is a reality that needs to be studied, understood and appreciated. In this context poverty eradication becomes the central issue in the development agenda. Dudley Seers (1973) who is a champion advocate of this view suggests that the questions to ask about a country's development are

What has been happening to poverty?. What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development," even if per capita income doubled. (Seers 1969:3)

For Africa, varying estimates of the population that may be categorized as poor range from 40 to 60 percent (Bequele and van der Hoeven 1980). But this

is for the period before 1980. Since then the overall trend has been one of increasing deterioration (Daniel et al. 1985).

The Basic Needs Approach was proposed in 1976 as a new development strategy by the World Employment Conference in conjunction with the International Labor Office. In development planning the approach emphasizes social welfare functions as a response to absolute poverty (Hopkins and van der Hoeven 1983). According to Ghai et al. (1977) the basic premise of the approach is that development policies must be formulated to satisfy basic human needs through the alleviation of poverty and reduction of inequality. Some of the major features that distinguish Basic Needs from alternative strategies include its focus on micro-level consumption and the provision for such consumption in the form of public goods by the state (Weigel 1986).

The underlying theory is that the market system does not traditionally cater for the critical needs of the poor. Consequently, such areas as health care, clean water, sanitation and education are better catered for by the government. The political or ideological foundations of the approach in the prioritization of development goals are alluded to by one of its major proponent, Paul Streeten (1981). In his view development projects should be more concerned with directly improving the welfare of the poor rather than concentrating on macro-objectives such as increasing aggregate growth rates. Streeten (1981) goes further to suggest two competing ways of defining a Basic Needs Approach to development. These are (1) to treat it as an all-embracing and exclusive development strategy and (2) to pursue it as a strategy which supplements and complements existing strategies.

Other writers have discussed various dimensions of the issues involved in the Basic Needs Approach. For instance, Weaver (1979) believes that the satisfaction of basic human needs must be the goal of development. From this

premise he examines the relative efficacy of using three broad strategies to facilitate this goal. These are (1) the traditional capital-oriented or growth maximization model, (2) the revolutionary socialist-oriented model and (3) a reformist growth with equity-oriented model. Based on this framework he (Weaver 1979:19-20) also argues for the systematic organization of development thinking and efforts around meeting basic needs of food, safe drinking water, clothing and shelter, medical care and education.

Hopkins and van der Hoeven (1983) take up the issue of how Basic Needs should be incorporated in development planning. Ghai and Alfthan (1977) also examine the conceptual basis of the approach and the empirical work that needs to be accomplished to make it operational. The normative issues raised by the approach are discussed by Lee (1977). At the methodological level, Khan (1977) reviews the problem of production planning for basic needs. He shows why a simple reliance on conventional multi-sector planning model will be inadequate. In his view (Khan 1977) a basic needs plan will have to take into account the close interrelationship among basic needs targets, the production structure and the distribution of income.

By and large, poverty is conceptualized as being essentially a rural problem. Policies for its eradication have therefore focused on agriculture. However, Richard Sandbrook's (1982) treatment of the issue is done purely with an urban perspective. He defines the goals of the Basic Needs Approach to be (1) the redistribution of income, (2) reorientation of production systems and (3) the provision of equitable access to improved public services. Sandbrook criticizes both the Basic Needs approaches advocated by the World Bank (1975) and the International Labor Office (Ghai et al. 1977). In his judgement the former is too conservative to offer any hope for a genuine assault on poverty and the latter is too radical, utopian and unrealistic. Yet, his prescriptive

solution at best is even more controversial. He believes (Sandbrook 1982) that the development strategy of basic needs can be achieved in Africa only through a class struggle that generates a progressive political transformation.

Though economic growth is a necessary condition for sustained development it does not by itself alleviate the problems which afflict the poorest segments of the population. These problems include, among others, the lack of access to education, health care, employment, production resources such as land and equitable income. It is Clower et al. (1966) who did a classic study of Liberia to illustrate that in most developing countries impressive economic growth rates are not necessarily accompanied by socioeconomic development.

Indeed, according to the Kuznets' (1955) divergence-convergence hypothesis the initial phases of the development process correspond with substantial increases in the inequality of income distribution. Though the inequality ultimately improves at later stages of industrialization (see Kuznet 1955; Adelman and Morris 1973; Ahluwalia 1976) it is empirically correct to assume that the poor can suffer from growth in both absolute and relative terms. But whether or not the poor become poorer over time depends upon the kinds of policies that are implemented. In this context Adelman (1986:51) argues that if the share of the income accruing to the poor declines more rapidly than overall income rises, then they are losing from growth.

Like other poverty-focused strategies of development, a principal thesis of the Redistribution Before Growth Approach is that the poor benefit more if policy specifically ensures (1) distribution of assets to cover them, (2) facilitates the institutionalization of their assets accumulation as well as (3) their access to the market. In the view of its chief advocate, Adelman (1986) the approach tackles the poverty problem first to achieve the following

policy targets: (1) increase the quantity of assets owned by the poor, for example, through land reform; (2) increase the volume of their market sales through generating demand for the output of their labor intensive industries; and (3) increase the prices of the services that the poor sell especially through improved terms of trade.

This development model is viewed to be productivity-oriented in that it aims to raise the incomes of the poor by increasing their productivity and their access to productivity enhancing assets. The importance of a systemic and integrated approach to realize the utility of this strategy is clearly underscored by Adelman who argues that

strategies for poverty alleviation are not compatible with just any kind of economic growth. . . . The most effective approaches entail a combination of several elements. . . . The sequence (being) implementing asset-oriented policies and institutional changes designed to give the poor access to high productivity jobs before , not after, shifting development strategies. If that is done, there is no "trade-off" between growth promotion and poverty alleviation. The same development strategy is then optimal for both goals. (Adelman 1986:64-65. Her emphasis)

The Redistribution With Growth approach is based on a philosophy which posits that the objectives of growth and egalitarian income, employment and assets distribution are not necessarily in conflict. More significantly, it points out that the incomes and wealth of the affluent do not have to be reduced as a condition for achieving improved conditions for the poor. It therefore supports policies that seek equitable distribution in ways that do not slow down rates of growth within the economy.

Chenery et al. (1974), the major spokespersons for this approach, advocate for a differential allocation of a larger share of the proceeds of economic growth to assets accumulation by the poor. The rural emphasis of this approach is argued by Ahluwalia (1974:19). His view is that given the scale of

the poverty problem and the limited capacity of other sectors to expand productive employment a viable strategy for raising the incomes of the lowest 40 percent of the population in developing countries must necessarily focus on the agricultural sector. Yoder (1979) even provides a theological perspective on Growth With Equity arguing that it is a Christian imperative and moral obligation to ensure that the poor benefit from growth.

In the African context, Diana Hunt (1975) takes a look at the interplay between growth and equity as they manifest in the distribution of economic status and opportunity in the Mbere area of rural Kenya. Gavin Williams (1982) also reviews the need for the state in Zimbabwe to ensure equity and growth. This work contrasts with another by Bill Kinsey (1982) in which he critically examines the contradictions between equity and growth in Zimbabwe. Bill Kinsey (1984) offers a similar critique of the equity and growth issues in Malawi while Elliot (1983), earlier, observes that the two issues represent unresolved conflicts in the development efforts of Zambia.

These and other critics of the Poverty-Focused Approaches cite a host of flaws that detract from their utility. Higgins (1981), for example, in criticizing Basic Needs mentions the paternalism that it creates and the culture-relativity that is implied in the definition of its key components as major weaknesses. Other problems have been associated with it including the following mentioned by Weigel (1986:1427): (1) the tendency to confuse needs with preferences; (2) the overdrawn hierarchical distinction between material and non-material needs; (3) the high priority that is often assigned to the subjective concept of security in the hierarchy of needs; and (4) the tendency to identify needs in terms of pathologies associated with deprivation of particular goods.

Yet, in the thinking of other critics the whole idea of equity or redistribution which embraces these approaches is bad enough. For instance, Bauer (1981) professes the view that redistributive and welfare policies are a hinderance to productivity and that they produce situations in which the poor might be more equal but worse off than without such policies. For his part Alain de Janvry (1983:258) sees the Basic Needs Approach as nothing more than institutionalized charity. In his view all the poverty-focused strategies address policy issues in an ad hoc way and this is because of their fundamental limitation of theoretical poverty. Ayres (1983:79) also alludes the theoretical deficiency which plagues these approaches pointing out in addition that they give insufficient attention to the factors that generate poverty and only explain poverty in a causal chain that borders on the tautological.

At another level, Denis Goulet (1979) takes a rather philosophical look at the competing theories of needs in relation to the question of values. He makes an important point that the risk of ethnocentrism and bias is inherent in any attempt to analyze fundamental human needs. This issue raises a number of ethical questions which most often do not feature in the calculus of the agenda of development planners and practitioners.

A more articulate response to the critics of the Basic Needs Approach is offered by Weigel, whose argument is that

[T]he controversy surrounding the "Basic Needs Approach" (BNA) to economic development largely stems from the fact that it introduces several anomalies which cannot be resolved by the "received" paradigm of neoclassical economy theory. I suggest that the presence of anomaly is not indicative of the conceptual infeasibility of the BNA, but instead reflects the profound inadequacies of our current stock of interpretive paradigms. Consequently there is an urgent need for us to reexamine some of the core assumptions underlying the economic, political and ethical paradigms which inform our understanding of human life. (Weigel 1986:1423)

With this call Weigel (1986:1423) chides that the issue of Basic Needs in overcoming poverty is one of the few instances in history where rhetoric has given rise to thought.

Land Reform

Land or agrarian reformism in Africa does not have the comparatively long history nor even the kind of regional importance that the phenomenon invokes in the political economy of Latin America. In that part of the world agrarian reform dates back to at least the 1850s in Mexico and to the 1960s in Cuba (de Janvry 1983:197-8). Elsewhere, in the Middle East for instance, the specific impacts of land reform in various countries are elaborated upon by Doreen Warriner (1969). In Africa, the only substantial land reform attempted recently have been in Kenya (see Wasserman 1976) and in Ethiopia (Brietzke 1976; Stahl 1977).

Peter Dorner's (1972) publication, based mainly on his extensive Latin American experience and, to a lesser extent, Asia and Africa provides a major elaboration on the economics of land reform. In this respect, Dorner's work builds upon earlier studies such as Eckstein's (1955) review paper on the subject and Raup's (1967) chapter on the relationship between land reform and agricultural development. Expanding Warriner's (1969) definition, Dorner sees land reform

in a narrow sense [to] refer to measures to redistribute land in favour of peasants and small farmers. More broadly it may be taken to embrace consolidation and registration in areas where customary tenure is prevalent and also land settlement on new lands. (Dorner 1972:11)

Many analysts similarly view such reform and its potentials within the overall requirements of development. Land reform is pursued for its assumed ability to serve a dual developmental purpose, namely, as both a redistributive instrument and a vehicle for achieving increased productivity or growth.

For instance, Dorner (1972:19) believes that "while land reform is not a sufficient measure and needs to be accompanied by many other programmes, it is often essential for providing a stable base for a country's future economic and political development." Likewise, Warriner (1969:50) suggests that "production can only increase if [land reform] is accompanied by investment in the social and economic infrastructure." The theory then is that at least for countries where land issues dominate the rural political economy reform is a necessary condition for growth and development. But in order to enhance growth and development reform policies need to be complimented by the kinds of infrastructure which facilitate productivity (see The World Bank 1975b).

A rather interesting perspective on the long-term prospects of land reform is offered by de Janvry (1983). His critical evaluation of the political, economic and social implications of land reforms leaves him with one conviction. He (de Janvry 1983:221-223) asserts emphatically that once reform policies have succeeded in eliminating "precapitalist social relations in the rural agricultural sector" reform as a tool for development loses its legitimacy and importance. Lehmann who earlier perceived the "death of land reform" argues a similar view stating:

[I]f the problem is poverty and inequality, landlessness and the unequal distribution of land are only partial causes thereof. The strategy for the removal or reduction of inequality and poverty is not adequately formulated in terms of the distribution of land, and must be approached differently. (Lehmann 1978:344)

Yet, Vernon Ruttan (1986), reviewing land reform programs in the context of the Latin American experience, believes that a large number of countries there have been successful in removing some of the most obvious sources of inefficiency and exploitation associated with the traditional hacienda system. At the same time, however, he is skeptical of land reforms arguing that there appear to be relatively few areas where they have been accompanied by the policies needed to sustain productivity growth in the small peasant sector. He (Ruttan 1986:52) adds: "there are even fewer areas where the . . . reforms have succeeded in resolving the problems of equity in the agrarian structure."

The important point to observe about development is that no particular program ever succeeds by itself. Bell and Duloy (1974:16) drives home this message by arguing that "land reform needs to be associated with a rural development strategy to have a really major impact on rural poverty."

Land Resettlement

Conceptually, resettlement or colonization is an aspect of settlement. Settlement is defined by the World Bank (1978:5) as the "planned or spontaneous movement of people to areas of underutilized agricultural potential, both rainfed and irrigated."

Christodoulou (1965) points out that land settlement as a measure for tackling land problems has had an almost universal appeal. There is hardly a country in the world which has not undertaken at one time or another a land settlement program. Consequently, Roeder (1971:14) quoting other sources, indicates that: "Perhaps in no field of agricultural development do there exist so many unsatisfactory projects as in the area of resettlement."

The objectives of land settlement are many and varied and they include, for example, one or more of the following listed by Christodoulou (1965:1): (1) the use of "new" land and water resources; (2) the settlement of unpopulated or underpopulated or frontier areas; (3) the creation of model or new type communities; (4) the modernization of agriculture; (5) the increase or diversification of agricultural production; (6) the employment of unemployed groups; (7) the provision of greater opportunities for underemployed farmers; (8) settlement or resettlement of various groups such as nomads, refugees, war veterans, immigrants, people from depressed or overcrowded areas; (9) the creation of new institutions such as co-operatives, or of new forms of land tenure and farm organization, demonstration farms, training or retraining establishments; and (10) generally a new departure in farming or development in rural areas or regional development.

Land resettlement as a major rural development strategy has been reported upon extensively. Numerous studies, particularly in Africa, have observed the respective experiences of settlers be they refugees or forced or voluntary relocatees (de Wilde 1967; Shaw 1967; Chambers 1969; Scudder and Colson 1979; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982).

The performance of resettlement programs is an issue of immense interest to anthropologists and other social analysts. What accounts for particular performance outcomes and levels are described in various reports without any standardized evaluation criteria (Palmer 1975).

For instance, the following variables are cited among others in the literature to explain the "success" or the "failure" of respective programs: (1) settlers willingness to cooperate and modernize as well as the personality and ideals of program managers (Hutton 1968); (2) the traditional social structures and customary values of settlers (Cosnow 1968); (3) the complexity

of the administrative set up of programs as well as the systematic relationships among managers and settlers within a given socio-political and economic environment (Chambers 1969); (4) the nature of the attention paid in the planning process to local conditions and sensitivities (Lumsden 1973); (5) the macro-level financial costs and the micro-level benefits and profitability (Roider 1971); (6) the availability and suitability of service infrastructure (Lawson 1968) and (7) the stresses experienced by relocatees as well as the strategies that they utilize in the face of particular problems (Scudder and Colson 1982).

The resettlement literature on Africa recounts in almost all instances the failure of such programs, the traumatic experiences of settlers, the unanticipated consequences and the negative impacts that have resulted from many planned resettlements.

Cases in point include Sutton's (1977) account of the Algerian trauma as well as the farm settlements in Nigeria evaluated by Olatunbosun (1967) who suggests several modifications including, for example, the determination of the property and degree of indebtedness of each farmer, retrenchment of excess staff and increased participation in decision-making by farmers.

Similarly, in case studies of smallholder agriculture in Tanzania, underemployment is regarded by Ruthenberg (1968) as the serious problem on resettlement farms. He observes also that farmers are very conservative towards innovations where subsistence crops and livestock are involved. This unwillingness on the part of most settlers to adopt new technology is also mentioned by Reining (1982) in his study of the Zande in southern Sudan.

Likewise, the Gezira scheme in Sudan is dubbed as an illusion in development by Barnett (1977, 1981). He argues further that the organizational structure of the program led to a decline in the quality of life for the

tenants and that the production of cotton, the main crop, offered the tenants little if any return. Thayer Scudder (1973:51), providing a social organizational perspective on resettlement, observes that relocated people behave in their new environment as if society was a closed system.

Arthur Lewis (1964:299-309) also recounts the African experiences with resettlement and labels them as a failure. He explains that government-organized and executed programs generally fail because they do not adequately address issues relating to the choice of suitable land, the right settlers, infrastructure, capital resources, land tenure and acreage and organizational structures to cater for settler activities.

Silberfein's (1977) work supports this contention. She similarly argues that most planned settlements around the continent are a disappointment both from the economic and social points of view. She (Silberfein 1977:19) attributes this problem to overcapitalization and insufficient attention to crops, settlers and equipment.

Elsewhere, James (1983) arrives at the same conclusion stating: "Project-level studies of new agricultural settlements in developing countries indicate privately financed settlement has been almost universally more successful than government-financed schemes in terms of economic efficiency measures such as benefit cost ratios."

Other studies in various Africa situations report the specific dimensions of the failure. Evidence from the following two countries are illustrative. In Kenya, von Haugwitz (1972) recalls the inability of many settlers on smallholder farms to repay their farm loans and credits. In Ghana, the problem is one of settlers being caught up in a dependency and complaining syndrome. This was the case at New Mpamu and other settlement towns built by the government in the 1960s for over 80,000 families inundated as a result of the

Volta River Hydro-electric project (Doodo 1970). At the Damongo Land Development Scheme, undertaken by the British colonial administration in the 1950s, the few families that agreed to be settled were pampered into becoming "spoilt children" through government's provision of "free housing, free medical treatment, free mechanical cultivation of their farm and other baits" (Quansah 1972:22). In the similar case of the Kamba tsetse fly eradication and agricultural resettlement scheme, when subsidies and gift incentives were phased out settlers eventually abandoned and departed from the programs leading to the termination of resettlement operations by the colonial government (Hilton 1959).

The general theoretical feeling with resettlement programs therefore is that they hardly live up to their projected expectation. At best they only succeed in catering for the welfare needs of the poor condemning them subsequently to a life of dependency on free dole. At worse, as Thayer Scudder (1982:12) has forcefully summarized, the "negative costs of relocation, like ripples, spread far beyond their points of origin by demoralising families, breaking up kin groups, and dividing whole communities and regions."

Household Dynamics and Developmental Cycle

In most rural societies very few people live by themselves. In the developing countries, in particular, agricultural households are the main form of socioeconomic organization (Singh et al. 1986:3) in terms of production and consumption (Overholt et al. 1986:21). This is more so in Africa where Moock (1986:1) observes that household-based cropping and herding communities constitute the mainstay of agriculture.

Households in rural Africa have been much studied by anthropologists and other scientists interested in issues such as social structure, development and change (see for instance, Dorjahn 1977; Isaac 1982). Many analysts utilize the household concept in most current studies especially in terms of the dynamics of inter- and intra-household processes. These include (1) Jane Guyer (1986b) who uses an anthropological perspective to apply the household concept and analysis to the problems of farming systems research; (2) Katharine McKee (1986) in a discussion of methodological issues in farming systems research; and (3) Sara Berry (1986) who also takes up the issue of macro-policy implications of research on households and farming systems. The concept has also been used in case study contexts by (1) Christine Jones (1986) in her examination of bargaining processes as a response to the introduction of new crops in North Cameroon; (2) Pauline Peters (1986) in her study of the management of cattle, crops and wage labor in Botswana; and (3) by Della McMillan (1986) in her analysis of production and exchange relations among the Mossi of Burkina Faso.

Many economists have also used households to look at the relationships between social organization and domestic economies (Hill 1975; Shaner et al. 1982; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). Of primary concern to these agricultural economists are a variety of household issues relating to decision-making, resources allocation and participation and management strategies.

The household developmental cycle concept, introduced into the analysis of social structure by Meyer Fortes (1949), provides important heuristic framework for the socioeconomic analysis of traditional or smallholder farming. In a seminal investigation, originally published in 1925, the Soviet economist A. V. Chayanov described peasant agricultural behavior in

post-emancipation European Russia. In this work, the translation of which is authored by Thorner et al. 1966, Chayanov goes beyond the demographic facts of the cycle to articulate the empirical relationships between household structure and production activity. He states:

Since the labour family's basic stimulus to economic activity is the necessity to satisfy the demands of its consumers, and its work hands are the chief means for this, we ought first of all to expect the family's volume of economic activity to quantitatively correspond more or less to the basic elements in family composition. (Thorner 1966:60)

Over the last few years many researchers who are involved with kin-based or domestic household economies have used or tested Chayanov's paradigm (see Sahlins 1971, 1974; Hunt 1979; Low 1982a, 1982b, 1986a, 1986b). The major preoccupation of these studies has been to empirically replicate the apparently tautological thesis, or Chayanov Rule, which states that:

[T]he smaller the relative number of workers the more they must work to assure a given state of domestic well-being, and the greater the proportion the less they work.
(Sahlins 1974:89)

In exploring this thesis many researchers have calculated the household consumer/worker ratio and used it as proxy for an "index of household economic strength." This index embodies a fundamental limitation in analysis in that the ratio is pre-determined, rather incorrectly, by an oversimplified blanket process. Traditionally, the ratio is calculated by simply categorizing the age cohorts up to 15 years and above 64 years to comprise the consumers. Likewise, those in between 15 and 64 years are taken to be the economically active and thus assumed to be the workers.

Such a dichotomous conception of workers and consumers reflects only the reality of western industrial societies where child labor and, to some extent,

old-age labor are not encouraged and economically recognized. It also creates the erroneous impression that households are divided into a mutually exclusive dichotomy of workers who do not consume and of consumers who do not work. Such faulty assumptions are not borne out by the reality of the African situation.

In her classic critiques of the household concept in African studies, Jane Guyer (1980, 1981, 1986b) discounts the upsurge in treating the household as the fundamental unit to data collection and analysis. She makes a valid case by pointing out that

[With] a methodology based on household as a major analytical concept, one cannot look at three critical factors, all of which seem to be changing in Africa today, with very important consequences: the relationship between older and younger men; the relationship between men and women; and the relationship amongst domestic groups in situations where wealth or control of resources vary widely. (Guyer 1981:99)

On the basis of this criticism, Guyer (1981:98) is categorical in her conclusion that the household "model is inaccurate for Africa." Elsewhere, she (Guyer 1986b:95) argues further that, a related concept, namely, "the developmental cycle of domestic groups, also presents problems of definition and understanding."

This criticism does not appear to bother the micro-economists working in the area of household studies. Ignoring the apparent definitional semantics of anthropologists, they have found the household a useful unit the behavior of which they analyze by applying the "utility-maximizing framework" (see Barnum and Squire 1979:26-27).

Given the complexity of the activities engaged in by agricultural households most of the economists who rely on the utility model resort to a conventional approach that makes a number of simplifying assumptions to achieve analytical solutions. Their premise is that the purpose of households

decision-making behavior is to maximize a utility function. The fundamental assumptions of this analytical model are the household's (1) consumption of Z-goods (non-market commodities produced and consumed by the household), (2) leisure, (3) own consumption of agricultural output and (4) consumption of market purchased goods.

Others have used a variety of operational specifications for their models. But there are several limitations with these so-called traditional approaches in economics to explaining household performance (see Singh et al. 1986:22-25). Singh et al. (1986), view the models of the traditional approach as difficult and costly to estimate. They propose instead a solution that considers households as price takers. In their analysis conceptualizing households to be price takers enables the researchers to use the "profit effect" as the convenient proxy motivating household behavior (Singh et al. 1986:9-10).

The use of sophisticated models which incorporate such legitimate and important objectives of economic activity as profit illuminates the decision-making behavior of rural households. There is the strongest likelihood, however, that such models fail to grasp the totality of the crucial objectives that characterize household decision matrices. For example, profit is not necessarily the means nor the end of the "dreams" sought by such households.

In rural Zimbabwe it is definitely not the observed and reported dominant behavioral trait; neither is it the overriding objective in the calculations of the agricultural households studied. Indeed, one can cite normatively satisfying values such as prestige, status enhancement and the need to fulfil cultural obligations as important considerations. Profit maximization is certainly important. Perhaps what is lacking to make it theoretically relevant

to our substantive context is an operational definition to cover these rather primary social objectives of rural households.

This response also returns to the issue of conceptual limitations raised by Jane Guyer (1981, 1986) in relation to the household and the developmental cycle concepts. Her criticism about definition is valid to the extent that many analysts have perceived the units which make up these models as static entities. In the illustrative case of the cycle for example, the crucial structural phases have been defined solely in terms of the age of the household head. Important as the de jure head may be in the general frame of reference, such a restrictive definition does not always contribute to a better understanding of the respective strengths and limitations of the other dynamic forces within the household. This flaw is quite prevalent in households which have de facto female heads.

More significantly, a static conception of developmental cycle cannot be used to explain change. But models as conceptual and analytical tools are constructed to reflect the researcher's perception of the reality that is observed. There is nothing sacrosanct about them.

Low (1986a, 1986b) has recently operationalized Fortes' phases of the cycle for Swaziland. If additional refinement in two areas of the analytical model that the concept generates is done, it can provide analysts with a powerful anthropological tool to explain variations in intra-household economic performance. The first requirement is to define phases of the developmental cycle on the basis of multiple criteria rather than only by the age of a household head. The second is to assign age category weights to all household members and use these to calculate an index of household (1) producer unit and (2) consumer unit.

Indeed, that is what Diana Hunt (1979) does in her study of household resource allocation in Mberere, Eastern Kenya. An index so calculated has obvious explanatory power that is more objective and useful than one which sees each household member exclusively as either a producer or a consumer. Thus, contrary to Guyer's impression, in rural Africa, as in many other places, one can delineate households and their respective developmental cycles and use them to understand the "realities" of development.

Conclusion

Many African states have experimented with a variety of the development strategies discussed in this review. Most of these countries are now under intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund and western donor agencies and countries to shift their development emphasis away from the poverty-focused and equity models on to so-called growth-oriented programs. To most economists this is the call for minimal government or public interventions (Buchanan 1985), or the operation of the free market (Bauer 1981). In Bauer's view the market rewards everybody what he or she deserves.

The arguments proposed in support of this call for radical changes in policy are summarized by Staatz and Eicher (1986:61). These include (1) the realization that an economic base has to be put in place before any investments in basic needs can be financed and sustained and (2) the increasing evidence which shows that it is impossible to achieve any decent living standard for the bulk of the rapidly growing populations simply by redistributing existing assets.

With the publication of the World Bank's (1981) scathing criticism of Africa's "welfare-oriented development policies," the debate about the

appropriate development strategy has shifted from equity issues to economic growth. Eicher (1986a) has written recently about strategic issues to combat hunger and poverty on the continent. According to him many economists now contend that expanded growth and international trade are the key to increasing food security. It is their conviction that the benefits from faster growth will "trickle down" to all members of society, thus enabling them to purchase their food needs (see Eicher 1968a:258).¹

The debate about Africa's development proceeds in a circular fashion. Prior to the 1970s it used to be the vogue to emphasize growth. Welfare issues became important from then to the early 1980s. This was so because of the failure of the benefits of growth to improve the living conditions of the majority rural poor in most of the continent. Now, in the second half of the 1980s, while African governments would prefer to promote both equity and growth at the same time they are being told, in the words of Whitaker (1986:1), "about what [they] ought to do." The impression is created that the African policy makers do not have the answers to their problems; neither do their external financiers, advisors and directors. Development in Africa has thus become a gamble or an experimental process without controls.

In the judgement of this study, however, the contradictions generated by the development literature emphasize a missing link. The question to resolve is how the structural constitution, the social organization and the internal management of agricultural household units combine to respond in particular ways to development incentives that are provided by the state. Anthropology can explicate and use dynamic micro-level concepts such as the household developmental cycle in relation to the macro-contexts of government policies to provide better substantive and theoretical insights into what appears to be the unexplained "parts" of the causes of Africa's economic stagnation.

Note

1.) The argument that growth ever "trickles down" to the poor is discredited in the evaluation of many skeptics. The evidence from many so-called developing countries of growth without development (see Clower et al. 1966) and of the lack of impact of the green revolution (see Cleaver 1972; Griffin 1974) in respect of the poor is overwhelming.

The debate about trade is equally heated. According to Bauer trade acts as a channel for the flow of human and financial resources and for new ideas, methods and crops. For him it also provides a large and diverse source of imports and opens up markets for exports. He is convinced also that it is altogether anomalous or even perverse to suggest that external commercial relations are damaging to development or the living standards of the people of the Third World (see Bauer 1981).

On this issue many skeptics cite protectionism, high tariffs and import costs and other policies which discriminate against developing countries especially African primary exporters in the international market. They see these as negating any likely benefits that accrue to these countries in their bilateral relations with the developed world (Arnold 1980; Asante 1981, 1984).

For a balanced and comprehensive critique of the "market myth" and other pertinent issues that are also raised by the World Bank (1981) in its Agenda for Accelerated Development in Africa and Africa's responses to them see Green and Allison (1986).

CHAPTER IV FIELDWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Background Developments Towards Fieldwork

The decision to undertake dissertation fieldwork in Zimbabwe stems from my long-standing interest in the southern African region as a whole. Around the summer of 1982 I stumbled across a rather sketchy report about efforts underway in that country to resettle returning refugees and the landless. This immediately aroused my curious interest and set me off in search of more material about the resettlement program. I got only a few papers published by Harberson (1980), Bill Kinsey (1982) and a couple of feature articles in the African Report including one written by Frank Ballance (1981).

Having read these papers I was in a position to synthesize a few ideas into preliminary research questions. I had the personal experience and familiarity with West Africa. I felt then that an exposure to another region of the continent, ideally southern Africa, would add a beneficial perspective to my experience. I believed also that such an exposure would facilitate my understanding of the wider regional dimensions of the problems and prospects for African development better.

The African food crisis engaged international attention at the time and I was looking for a policy-oriented dissertation problem that would enable me to observe closely (1) how government policies are implemented in rural Africa and (2) how African farmers respond to such policies in situations of on-going change and development. The implementation of a massive agricultural resettlement and rural development program in Zimbabwe thus offered the opportunities and the challenges which I was looking for.

After over a year of arranging and waiting for the necessary permission to travel and conduct the research I arrived in Zimbabwe in January 1985. The fieldwork was carried out between the months of February and December 1985.

The Extended "Sondeo": Initial Months of Fieldwork

I used the period from early February to the end of March 1985 for preliminary and informal study of and familiarization with various issues relating to resettlement and rural development in the country. The informal or direct observational approach is increasingly being used in applied settings such as project evaluation and farming systems research. It is regarded as an effective initial strategy for the quick probing of research problems within specific geographic locations or fields of interest. Hilderbrand (1981) terms it the "sondeo," while others refer to it variously as rapid assessment or appraisal, diagnostic or exploratory survey and reconnaissance study (see for instance Chambers 1981).

The informal study is defined by Dillion and Hardaker as involving generally

familiarizing oneself with the area or problem, talking to appropriate informants such as farmers, farm workers, storekeepers, moneylenders, officials, religious or social leaders, and seeking out and reviewing such other relevant information as may be available in publications, government or private records. (Dillion and Hardaker 1980:21)

The activities undertaken during the "sondeo" phase consisted of a combination of learning experiences. These were in the form of library research, participation in various workshops, meetings and extensive travels. In Harare, most of my time was devoted to commuting between the then Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the National Archives and the

libraries at the University, the Zimbabwe Institute of Development, the Central Statistical Office and in the Herald House.

At these places I read materials that specifically dealt with the evolution of the land question as well as about the country's agriculture. In the Herald House, where the nation's leading daily newspaper "The Herald" and the weekly "The Sunday Mail" are published, I was fortunate to be allowed access to the library. From the press clippings I got inklings into rather diverse views and concerns about agriculture, the resettlement and rural development issues from the perspectives of the cross-section of Zimbabweans.

In the course of the "sondeo," I also obtained annual reports and pertinent statistical information from the head offices of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) and some farm management data from the offices of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU).

The library research was invaluable for documenting the perspectives that are conveyed in Chapters I and II above. These are in respect of (1) resettlement as a substantive issue of research interest and (2) the evolution of the land problem which necessitated the formulation and implementation of the resettlement policy in postindependence Zimbabwe. The perspectives gained from the readings also linger on throughout the dissertation as they are concretized in various expressions and ideas embodied in the other Chapters.

In early February 1985, I sat in a Farming Systems course organized jointly by CIMMYT, Nairobi, and the Department of Land Management, University of Zimbabwe. This was for participants drawn from a number of African and overseas countries. The course afforded the opportunity for my first exposure to rural Zimbabwe. I participated in a field team diagnostic survey of smallholder farm problems in the Mangwende Communal Area, Murewa District,

Mashonaland East Province (see Figure 4-1). We visited the homesteads and farms. We also conducted extensive informal interviews and observed aspects of the social and economic activities of these rural households. These experiences directly benefited the redesign of my research especially in terms of refining the study items.

After the initial familiarization with the administrative set up and work of the various departments, sections and the staff at the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development I settled down to utilize the materials in the Ministry's small library. This contained mainly unpublished reports and mimeographs relating mostly to the feasibility and planning aspects of individual resettlement schemes throughout the country. I maintained close contact with the Ministry during the entire fieldwork and also participated as an outsider in some of its activities.

For instance, my first visit to a resettlement scheme was made on March 6, 1985. I accompanied a Senior Resettlement Officer in the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) to attend an Area Board Meeting at the Mufurudzi Model A Intensive Resettlement Scheme, Shamva District, Mashonaland Central Province (see Figure 4-1). This meeting or musangano is held every quarter. It is a kind of educational get together. At the meetings various provincial and district heads of government agencies and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with resettlement meet face-to-face with the resettled farmers. The purpose is to discuss and mutually learn about matters affecting the schemes from the perspectives of the officers, the farmers and their chosen representatives who serve on the VIDCOs, WARDCOs and the Area Board.¹

On this first visit, I had the chance to talk both to resettled farmers and various officers. I also toured and observed a number of resettlement




FIGURE 4 - 1
 MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES AND AREAS VISITED
 DURING VARIOUS PHASES OF THE FIELD RESEARCH

villages and farms and saw the set up of the Rural Service Center. Finally, we stopped at the Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme, that being the first of a number of study and social visits I later undertook to the scheme² (see Figure 4-1).

During March 18 and 19, I attended the preliminary sessions of a one-week training course that DERUDE organized for all Resettlement Officers from the Mashonaland Region at the Kentucky Hotel, Harare. The opening address was delivered by the Mashonaland East Provincial Governor, Senator Rwizi Ziyenge. This was followed by speeches from the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development and from the Director, DERUDE.

These respectively dealt with the ideological, bureaucratic and technical aspects of the government's resettlement and rural development policies. There were invited lectures from the representatives of such agencies as AGRITEX, the Natural Resources Board and the Department of Cooperatives (DECODE) which are involved with implementing these policies. Other speakers also presented materials touching on the nature and problems of their work in the resettlement schemes. The contributions from the Chief Resettlement Officer, the Regional Rural Development Officer and the participating Resettlement Officers were extremely relevant and informative for my work in their detail of the grassroots dynamics of development program implementation and impacts.

I left the course to participate in a three-day plenary session on the Elaboration of the Communal Lands Development Plan. This was organized on behalf of the government by the National Agricultural and Rural Development Coordination Committee (NARDCC) at Juliasdale, Nyanga District, Manicaland Province, from March 20 to 22, 1985.

This national workshop was opened with a policy address by the Minister for Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, the Honorable Moven Mahachi.

This was followed by others, including one from the Principal Secretary of the Ministry, which elaborated on specific aspects of resettlement policy. The session also brought together a selection of the country's experts whose duties cover the communal or African rural areas. Among the participants were (1) various provincial governors and administrators; (2) invited faculty from the University and the Zimbabwe Institute of Development; and (3) top officials from the various Ministries, Parastatals and Public Organizations.

Being a meeting of political leaders, academics, bureaucrats and technocrats, the forum was provided to evaluate the engaging issues of the deterioration as well as the possibilities for rehabilitation of the Communal Areas. Resettlement was an important component of the debates. The emergent perspectives of the workshop ranged from the practical, ideologically "down-to-earth," the theoretical to the economically and technically feasible. It thus proved fruitful for my study in facilitating a better conceptualization and focus on the pertinent issues in the relationships between the resettlement programs and the development of the Communal Areas.

By the beginning of April 1985, I had gained substantial amounts of inside knowledge and background information about various aspects of the resettlement and rural development all through the readings, meetings, workshops and travels. I was then in the position to redesign the research to better deal with the dynamics of policy and the contradictions generated by their implementation.

At this point I decided to structure the main aspects of the field research into two parts. The first covered the broad or macro-issues of policy and its implementation. The second related to the processes of rural development and the responses to resettlement at the farmers' or micro-level.

Getting a Closer Look at Resettlement Policy
and Development Implementation

To tackle the first part of the research project it was necessary for me to maintain a base in Harare. My objective for this phase was to get a closer look at resettlement policy and the structures and processes of implementation. This task was confined to DERUDE and other Sections of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development using these as my data sources. DERUDE coordinates at the national level the implementation of the resettlement in all the eight administrative Provinces of the country.

Here I applied a combination of ethnographic and quantitative data gathering techniques within anthropology and policy evaluation frameworks (see Coleman 1975; Cook and Scioli 1975; Johnson 1975; Patton 1980; Casley and Lury 1982; Agar 1986). Specifically, through the use of participant observation, formal and informal discussions, interviewing and the review of records and other documents I was able to obtain the kinds of information which are pertinent to various aspects of the research questions.

After taking a more general look at the problems, the achievements and prospects of implementation at this highest level I concentrated on the three Provinces in the Mashonaland Region. These are Mashonaland East, Central and West (see Figure 2-1). They are all managed from one central office in Harare under a Regional Rural Development Officer and three assisting Senior Resettlement Officers.

In collecting data about these Provinces I continued to use some of the methods which I applied during the "sondeo" phase. For example, at various times in April and May 1985 I again participated in travels accompanying senior officers of DERUDE on their routine visits to individual schemes. In the process of these rather short trips I was able to monitor aspects of

program implementation such as farmers' access to and use of resettlement infrastructures. I also continued to observe more closely variations in farmers' responses and problems as they expressed them to government officials.

One of these trips was on April 3 and 4. In the company of Senator Mudhomeni Chivende, the Provincial Governor of Mashonaland West, the respective Administrative Officers for Kadoma and Chegutu Districts, the Regional Rural Development Officer and a Senior Resettlement Officer I toured the following resettlements: (1) Jondale/Bumbe, Muzveze and Jompani Model A Normal Intensive Schemes; (2) Ngezi, Chegutu 6 and Hamilton Hills Model A Accelerated Intensive Schemes and (3) Tashinga Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme (see Figure 4-1). This was another opportunity to learn more about various issues on development and their elaboration as viewed by national leaders such as the Governor. Among the many issues that resettled farmers brought to the attention of the Governor in the various places we visited were, for instance, poach grazing, squatting and the security situation.³

Again in the company of the United Kingdom-Zimbabwe Resettlement Review Team, I travelled through the Mashonaland Central Province. This was on April 22 when the Team inspected the Mount Darwin Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, Mount Darwin District, and the Batsiranayi Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme, Shamva District (see Figure 4-1). On this particular trip I observed, among other things, the following activities: (1) plowing competition among the Model A resettled farmers and the problems that they face in manually tilling their land; (2) immediate post-harvest storage techniques for maize; and (3) the additional responsibilities imposed on women's time in the production of vegetables for household consumption. In the Model B scheme I had the chance to ask questions and learn about the kinds of assistance that

Producer Cooperatives receive from the government and from the non-governmental organizations.

My other travels with DERUDE officers, respectively, were to the following resettlements: (1) Pote 2 Accelerated Intensive Scheme, Karoi District, Mashonaland West Province on May 13; (2) the Copper Queen Normal Intensive Scheme, Gokwe District, Midlands Province on May 17 and 18; (3) Muzvezve Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, Kadoma District, Mashonaland West Province on June 3; and (4) Kubudirira Model B Producer Cooperative Scheme, Shamva District, in the Mashonaland Central Province on July 10 (see Figure 4-1). The Pote 2 and the Copper Queen trips were undertaken in the midst of the evacuation of groups of squatters from the former scheme and their resettlement in Copper Queen. Being one of the most controversial issues in resettlement implementation the squatter issue presents serious and politically charged problems to the government. The two trips gave me the rare opportunity to follow up on my readings of various memoranda about squatting with field observations.⁴

In the course of these travels I took extensive notes and had the opportunity to deepen my interaction with resettled farmers and government officers. I gained broader perspectives on the resettlement and better insights into the problems, the achievements and the challenges within the individual schemes than would otherwise have been possible. I was able also to pretest some of my research questions with both the farmers and the officers. More importantly, these "official" trips gave me the recognition and the necessary contacts at the national, provincial, district and the scheme levels. This facilitated an easy establishment of rapport and the acceptance of my research by the numerous informants and respondents particularly during the critical phase of the survey research when I operated independently.

Apart from DERUDE and its Resettlement Section the other documentation used in the preparation of Chapters V and VI was obtained from the Evaluation and Monitoring Section of the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. Operating within these agencies from a distance I was able to examine and extract a wide range of information from the monthly, quarterly and annual reports that are routinely issued by DERUDE.

These reports provide summaries of the progress and problems relating to all resettlement schemes in each of the eight administrative Provinces in the country. The reports follow a standard format. They are divided into four main headings to cover Administration and Finance, Resettlement, Planning and Statistics, respectively. Under each heading brief but comprehensive summary accounts of relevant developments are given for various sub-headings or study items and variables. Among these, for instance, are those which cover staffing, agricultural developments and social and community development.

The section reporting various statistics provide aggregate data for each Province. This is broken down into the following categories: (1) resettlement model; (2) scheme name; (3) district of location; (4) total area of the scheme and its extent within particular natural regions; (5) number of families that the scheme is planned for; (6) the month's allocation of families for resettlement in the scheme; and (7) the total number of families that have taken up resettlement in the scheme.

In addition, figures about what are termed "primary" and "secondary" development, respectively, are also given. The former covers such specific infrastructures as boreholes, wells, cattle dips and roads. Secondary development refers to schools, classrooms, teachers houses, clinics and staff houses. The total number of such infrastructures planned for each scheme is given along with information about the state of their respective development

as to whether or not the particular service has been provided and is operational.

In June 1985, a set of three self-administered evaluation questionnaires was given to all the Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region. The officers were asked to rate various indicators or study items relating to the different resettlement models and schemes that they had managed.⁵

The study items, chosen to reflect the special characteristics of each of the three resettlement models, asked for the Resettlement Officers' perceptions about the following: (1) the attitudes and performance of the resettled farmers; (2) the input performance of various implementing agencies and service organizations; and (3) the current problems and the long-term prospects for the schemes. The questionnaire about the Model A Normal Intensive Schemes contained 38 items, that on the Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme had 19 items, while there was only 9 items on the Model B Producer Cooperatives (see Appendix B, Tables B-1 to B-3).

Finally, in October 1985, a 26 item questionnaire was also mailed to four selected Model B Producer Cooperatives in the Mashonaland East and three in the Mashonaland West Provinces to elicit the responses of the respective Management Committees about issues ranging, among others, from the number of existing committees to recommendations for solving the problems of the cooperatives (see Appendix C).

I personally interviewed the management of seven of the eight Model Bs in the Mashonaland Central Province during the same period. In all then, 15 of the 21 Model Bs in the Region were covered in this Management Survey. They are Batsiranayi,⁶ Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kuenda, Kurima Inhaka, Kushingirira and Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central; Kumhanya, Marowa, Tabudirira and Tamuka in Mashonaland East and Ganyangu, Mukuwapasi and Nyamakate in Mashonaland West

Provinces, respectively (see Figure 8-1). The data obtained for the first part of the research is presented in Chapter VIII below.

Ethnographic Survey and Observations

For the second part of the research, I decided to take a detailed regional look at the outcomes and the responses to resettlement as they are manifest at the grassroots, that is, at the level of farm households and villages. The proposal was to do this within the context of the general agricultural and rural development processes going on in one of the Provinces. It became clear to me from the very beginning that a case study approach was the best methodology for looking at the micro-level issues of farmer responses, attitudes, perceptions and problems.

Consequently, I decided to select the Mashonaland Central Province for a regional case study. The choice of this Province was a purposive decision which was influenced by at least three important considerations.

The Province is certainly the primary agricultural area in the country (see Chapter II). It offers a unique and contrasting distribution of all the major farming systems available within close proximity of each other. Secondly, peasant families from some of its former Tribal Trust Lands are among the most politically conscious in the country. Areas such as Dande (Lan 1985), on the northern border with Mozambique as well as Chiweshe and Maziwa (Wienrich 1975) were actively involved in one way or another with the land question.

Many of the so-called strategic villages or "keeps" were set up in these areas by the Rhodesian regime. The spirit mediums and the young men and women in various parts of the Province were among the early converts who committed

and Lury strongly argue. In their view

case studies may be the evaluator's most appropriate medium for investigating causality. They are certainly simpler to organize than the longitudinal data series with its demands for an appropriately timed baseline and a continuation beyond the implementation period. (Casley and Lury 1982:28)

For the case study I felt that its central focus of organization should be the Model A Normal Intensive variant, obviously the most widespread and currently the most important of all the resettlement models (see Chapter V below). There were two Model A Normal Intensive Schemes in the Province in 1985. These are (1) Mufurudzi in the Shamva District and (2) Mount Darwin in the Mount Darwin District (Figure 8-1). At the time, the Mutungagore Accelerated Intensive Scheme and the recently acquired adjoining farms, all in the Centenary District, were in the process of being consolidated and planned to resettle 298 families. The scheme was also being upgraded to form the third Normal Intensive Scheme in the Province to be called Karuyana.

Thus, having decided to focus the case study primarily around the Model A project, Mufurudzi became the obvious choice. The scheme has been in operation since 1980 and thus is much older than the others. It also has the largest number of resettled farmers, 566 in all. Moreover, Mufurudzi has proceeded beyond the "uncertain" to a more "assured" developmental stage. In terms of Thayer Scudder's (1984) typology of resettlement evolution, the Mufurudzi scheme has moved from the "conservative, risk averse, closed and transitional stage" into one of "economic and social development, handing over and incorporation." I thus found Mufurudzi more amenable than the other schemes to a systematic study and observation of the policy impacts and responses to resettlement.

their resources to the politico-religious and military aspects of the liberation war during the 1970s. Through the close collaboration of people in these areas the African nationalist or guerrilla forces inflicted a lot of casualties, sabotage and destruction on European farms and property in the region. These acts led to the abandonment or underutilization of many farms. As a result some of the early acquisitions of land for resettlement by the government occurred in the province.

Indeed and finally, one of the oldest Model A schemes, Mufurudzi, and the very first Model B scheme to be opened in the country, the Simba Youth Cooperative, are all located in the Province (see Figure 8-1).

The decision to use a regional case study approach was also influenced by various reasons. Coming into anthropology from geography with a regional development background, I found it much more insightful to see cultural expressions through spatial perspectives. Moreover, it is common knowledge that the non-randomness of the empirical populations that anthropologists often select for study introduces major methodological problems.

The most serious of these are in the area of validity (Carmines and Zeller 1981; Kirk and Miller 1986). A regional approach to the study of anthropological problems is one solution that has the potential to mitigate some of the confounding validity problems in field research. Indeed, Allen Johnson (1979:55) writing about anthropological quantification in research design rightly suggests that a "practical solution to this problem [of non-randomness] is to include a regional survey as a preliminary part of any research project."

Similarly, a case study methodology also facilitates the effective execution of ethnographic or anthropological research particularly in applied, needs assessment or policy evaluation settings. This is a point that Casley

In order to place the case study in context and make it much more meaningful than would otherwise be the case, I decided to compare and contrast Mufurudzi with the other farming systems in the Province. Thus, in addition to the Model A Normal Intensive Scheme, the following sectors were also studied: (1) the Model A Accelerated Intensive Resettlement; (2) the Model B Producer Cooperative; (3) the Communal Area (Peasant); (4) the Small-Scale (African) Commercial; and (5) the Large-Scale (European) Commercial. A sample of farmers representing various units within each of these six farming systems or sectors was therefore selected and interviewed.

For the Model A Accelerated Schemes two out of a provincial total of seven were chosen for their close proximity to Mufurudzi. The two schemes are Shamva and Bindura located in the Shamva and Bindura Districts, respectively.

Of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes in the Province five were studied. These are (1) Batsiranayi; (2) Kubudirira; and (3) Simba Youth, all in the Shamva District; (4) Chakoma; and (5) Kushingirira both in the Mount Darwin District.

There are three Communal Areas that are adjacent to Mufurudzi. They comprise (1) Bushu in the Shamva District; (2) Madziwa in the Madziwa District and (3) Kandeya in the Mount Darwin District. Eleven subdivisions were studied all drawn from the three Communal Areas.

Two Small-Scale Commercial Areas are also located in the Province and to the north of Mufurudzi. These are Karuyana and Chesa within the two respective Intensive Cultivation Areas. The survey covered farmers drawn from the two areas to represent that sector. Finally, for the study of the Large-Scale Commercial farmers the Bindura Intensive Conservation Area (ICA) was chosen (see Figure 4-1 and Figure 7-1).

These case study areas are all spatially distributed within a maximum distance of 70 kilometers from our operational base in the Mufurudzi scheme where I stayed initially at Chindunduma. For the duration of the interviews, the research team, made up of one senior investigator, four assistants and myself, lived at Chiruma Secondary School situated in a block of land in the northern part of Mufurudzi (see Figure 7-2). In all cases, except for the Large-Scale Commercial farmers, the research team commuted from Chiruma travelling from one research site to the other and interviewing farmers individually in their homes within the villages, or the homestead. On a few occasions, towards the end of the survey when farmers started their land preparation and planting, some of them were only reached and interviewed in their respective farms.

Data Collection Techniques

Given the research problem and the evaluative nature of this study it was thought appropriate to use survey techniques within our case study methodology. This is what Alan Rufus Waters, writing about understanding smallholder agriculture, recommends. In his view the "sample survey . . . is the best available tool for collecting information in rural Africa" (Waters 1974: 56).

But in order to be able to use a sample survey effectively to benefit the needs and the goals of any research certain guiding principles have to be accepted and followed. This is even more so under the "African conditions," as Spencer (1972:19-22) elaborates, where special strategies are called for if (1) farmer cooperation, (2) enumerators commitment and (3) the ability to collect "sensitive" information are to be assured.

In soliciting for the cooperation of farmers it was found useful to emphasise two important points always at the initial or introductory meetings with farmers. The first is that I had read about the efforts underway by the government of Zimbabwe to distribute lands and improve the country's agriculture. I was therefore in the country as a research student to learn more about agricultural programs from the perspective of the farmers themselves. This was to enable me to write a book which my university required as a condition for granting me a doctoral certificate. With the second point, I related an old African maxim to the farmers. This is to the effect that "since he who is cutting the path through a thicket never turns to observe if he is charting a straight line, it is always useful for leaders, such as in government, to be informed about the impacts of and the responses to their implemented policies." Consequently, the book that I was researching to write would be of help to the government in its planning and policy formulation about farmers and the rural areas where they live.

Though some farmers, out of mere curiosity perhaps, often seemed to wonder about the wisdom in my travelling away all the way from home in Ghana to ask of them the kinds of simple questions contained in the survey instrument, they always appeared pleasantly amazed, proud and elated to be the focus of a book, very friendly and extremely helpful.

Thus, except in the rather surprising case of the Large-Scale Commercial or European farmers, the research did not encounter any of the out of the ordinary problems of fieldwork. It generally received the maximum cooperation from all the respondents, both farmers and government field officers that we came into contact with.⁷ The major problem experienced in this research was logistics, mainly prohibitive expenses with typing, xeroxing, printing and, more seriously, travel and excessive fuel costs.⁸

Study Variables

A set of different questionnaires embodying issues that characteristically reflect matters of interest to each farming system was prepared and administered to the farmers from each system. In the main, the questions or study variables broadly covered the following categories of research interests: (1) farmers perceptions about on-going developments in the areas of resettlement and agriculture; (2) ratings of and attitudes or responses towards specific services available to farmers; (3) access to and control over particular resources such as production assets and consumption items; (4) farm-level needs and farmer constraints; and (5) agricultural performance. In addition, each such questionnaire, except in the case of the Large-Scale Commercial or European farmers, also contained a section which addressed socio-demographic and household composition variables.

The number of study variables that the survey covered ranged from a low of 35 in the case of the Large-Scale Commercial farmers to a maximum of 96 for both the Model A and the Small-Scale Commercial farmers (see Appendix D, Tables D-1 to D-5).

Sampling Techniques

The nature of the residence characteristics of the farm households in the various farming systems covered by the survey necessitated the application of different sampling techniques to select farmers for the interviews.

Our central case study unit, Mufurudzi Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Scheme, contains a total of 566 resettled families or households.

These reside in 18 nucleated villages. Being essentially an exploratory and baseline study I was prepared to take a complete census by interviewing all households in Mufurudzi. But given the time constraint and the limited financial resources at my disposal this was obviously not practicable. Nevertheless, my objective was to achieve a credible and adequate representation by taking a cue from the evaluation recommendation given by Fitz-Gibbon and Morris (1984:158-159) to work with a large sample size.

The villages rather than the list of resettled heads of households formed the basis of the sample frame. I calculated a productivity index for all the 18 villages. This was done using the 1983-84 aggregate output data for maize, the most important subsistence and the most widely cultivated cash crop in the scheme (Zimbabwe 1984c).

On the basis of this index all the villages were ranked and assigned to three strata. Four villages, namely, Magadzi, Gwetera, Takawira and Nehanda with 27 percent of all households in the scheme, were the most productive for that particular year recording from 1.6 to 2.0 tons of maize per hectare. The majority of households, that is, 65 percent of them spread across eleven villages, obtained a range of 1.1 to 1.3 tons per hectare. These are Tongogara 2, Denda, Mudzinge, Chitepo, Mukwari, Banana, Gatu, Zvomanyanga, Chimburukwa, Zvataida and Tongogara 1 (see Figure 7-2). The remaining three villages, namely, Muringamombe, Mutoramhepo and Mupedzanhamo with 10 percent of the households, each produced less than 1 ton of maize per hectare (Table 4-1).

The villages are characterized by such spatial and structural variations as differential proximity to the main tarred road and differences in population size. Given these differences, the variations in productivity and the available research resources, a decision was made to cover 12 out of the 18 villages to provide an adequate sample size for the Mufurudzi survey.

TABLE 4 - 1
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: LIST OF VILLAGES, MAIZE
PRODUCTIVITY, AND THE VILLAGES SELECTED FOR CASE STUDY

LIST OF VILLAGES	MAIZE YIELD 1983-84 (KGS/HECTARE)	VILLAGE SELECTED FOR STUDY
<u>STRATUM I</u>		
1. Magadzi	1960.6	Yes
2. Gwetera	1942.3	Yes
3. Takawira	1709.2	Yes
4. Nehanda	1626.9	Yes
<u>STRATUM II</u>		
5. Tongogara 2	1319.5	No
6. Denda	1209.8	No
7. Mudzinge	1183.0	Yes
8. Chitepo	1173.3	Yes
9. Mukwari	1157.4	No
10. Banana	1149.8	Yes
11. Gatu	1113.4	Yes
12. Zvomanyanga	1107.8	Yes
13. Chimburukwa	1105.5	No
14. Zvataida	1065.8	Yes
15. Tongogara 1	1059.8	No
<u>STRATUM III</u>		
16. Muringamonbe	942.5	Yes
17. Mutoramhepo	899.4	Yes
18. Mupedzanhamo	623.5	Yes

The four villages from Stratum I and the three from Stratum III, being the extreme cases, were purposely selected for the study. Using a table of random numbers, an additional five out of the remaining eleven from stratum II were also chosen.

The distribution and some characteristics of all the villages in Mufurudzi, including those which were selected for study, are given in Table 8-14 in Chapter VIII below. These are Banana, Chitepo, Gatu, Gwetera, Magadzi, Mudzinge, Mupedzanhano, Muringamombe, Mutoramhepo, Nehanda, Takawira and Zvataida (see Figure 7-2). For methodological reasons it was decided, once the sample villages were selected, to cover every resettled household head present.⁹ Of the total of 361 households in the 12 selected villages, 349 or 96.7 percent were interviewed (Table 4-2).

Following the same lines one village each was selected among the respective total of three each in the Shamva and Bindura Model A Accelerated Intensive Schemes. In Shamva, Sanye 1 was chosen and 22 of the 24 households were interviewed. Likewise, for Bindura, 17 out of the 20 households in Chidumbwi 1 were interviewed (Figure 7-1). In all, 39 households amongst the 44 selected for the Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme were reached, thus giving an effective coverage rate of 88.6 percent (Table 4-3).

Five of the eight Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes were also selected for the case study. These are Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira and Simba Youth. All the members, numbering 151, actually present in the schemes during the survey period in October 1985 were interviewed. This represents 65.9 percent of the members reported to be registered with the Cooperatives during that month (see Table 4-4).

TABLE 4 - 2
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: VILLAGES, HOUSEHOLDS,
AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR CASE STUDY

VILLAGES IN THE SCHEME	TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	VILLAGE SELECTED FOR STUDY (TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
1. Banana	13	Yes	12
2. Chitepo	30	Yes	30
3. Chimburukwa	25	No	0
4. Denda	38	No	0
5. Gatu	50	Yes	48
6. Gwetera	32	Yes	32
7. Magadzi	51	Yes	49
8. Mudzinge	33	Yes	30
9. Mukwari	38	No	0
10. Mupedzanhamo	13	Yes	13
11. Muringamombe	28	Yes	28
12. Mutoramhepo	14	Yes	14
13. Nehanda	39	Yes	38
14. Takawira	31	Yes	29
15. Tongogara 1	51	No	0
16. Tongogara 2	14	No	0
17. Zvataida	27	Yes	26
18. Zvomanyanga	40	No	0
	566	(361)	349

TABLE 4 - 3
 SHAMVA-BINDURA MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEMES: VILLAGES,
 HOUSEHOLDS AND THE NUMBER SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED FOR
 CASE STUDY

VILLAGES IN THE SCHEME		TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	VILLAGE SELECTED FOR STUDY (TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS)	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
<u>SHAMVA</u>				
1. Sanye	1	24	Yes	22
2. Sanye	2	33	No	0
3. Sanye	3	28	No	0
<u>BINDURA</u>				
4. Chidumbwi	1	33	No	0
5. Chidumbwi	2	20	Yes	17
6. Chavakadzi		34	No	0
		172	(44)	39

TABLE 4 - 4
 MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: REPORTED
 MEMBERSHIP AND THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS/HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED

COOP SCHEME	REPORTED MEMBERSHIP (OCT 1985)	SCHEME SELECTED FOR STUDY	MEMBERS/ HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
1. Batsiranayi	69	Yes	39
2. Chakoma	79	Yes	47
3. Kubudirira	26	Yes	19
4. Kuenda	32	No	0
5. Kurima Inhaka	34	No	0
6. Kushingirira	33	Yes	27
7. Nyakudya	88	No	0
8. Simba Youth	22	Yes	19
	(383)	(229)	151

Note: Because of the high turnover in many of the Model B Schemes there is an apparent discrepancy between the membership figures that are reported every month to the Resettlement Section of DERUDE and the actual members present in the particular scheme. The tendency for overreporting is significant. In October 1985 the 5 Schemes selected for the case study in the Mashonaland Central Province reported a total membership of 229. A complete census that the Research Team carried out around the same period showed only 151 members present.

The sample selection for the three Communal Areas, namely, Shamva, Bindura and Kandeya was done in consultation with the officers of AGRITEX in Shamva, Bindura and Mount Darwin, respectively. The technique used here was cluster or area sampling. First, the subdivisions surveyed were identified on airphoto mosaics.

Given the size and the settlement density of the area I decided on the number of farmers to interview. The names of farmers were then provided by the Extension Worker in charge of the particular subdivision. Each list supplied was already divided equally into three strata corresponding to the "more progressive," the "averagely progressive," and the "less progressive" farmers. In all, 62 out of a target of 75 households from 11 subdivisions in the three Communal Areas were surveyed. These are distributed as follows: (1) 31 from Goora, Makubvu, Nyamaropa and Svesve in Madziwa; (2) 16 from the three Bushu subdivisions of Chishapa, Gono and Jiti; and (3) the remaining 15 from Mandeve, Mashanga, Mungando and Matope/Kapfudza in Kandeya (Table 4-5). (See Figure 7-1.)

The samples from Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Areas were similarly drawn with the assistance of the AGRITEX field officers in Mount Darwin. For its size Chesa, with 623 farms, is made up of six subdivisions. Nyajenje, the subdivision closest to Mufurudzi was selected and added to Karuyana for the study (see Figure 7-1). I decided to cover a total of only 9 farmers in Nyajenje and 12 in the more accessible Karuyana. This was because of transportation and accessibility problems and the fact that the research team had not previously visited to get acquainted with farmers in the two areas as it was the case with most of the other research sites.

Similar to what was done in the case of the Communal Area farmers AGRITEX supplied me with the list of the names of the 21 Small-Scale Commercial

TABLE 4 - 5
COMMUNAL AREA (PEASANT) SECTOR: AREAS,
SUBDIVISIONS, HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED

AREAS	SUBDIVISIONS	SAMPLE HOUSEHODS SELECTED	HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
1. Madziwa	Goora	12	10
	Mukubvu	6	4
	Nyamaropa	6	5
	Svesve	12	12
2. Bushu	Chishapa	6	5
	Gono	6	5
	Jiti	6	6
3. Kandeya	Mandeve	6	4
	Mashanga	3	3
	Mungando	6	4
	Matope/Kapfudza	6	4
(75)			62

farmers divided up equally into the "more progressive," the "averagely progressive," and the "less progressive." All the selected farmers except one from the more progressive stratum in Karuyana were interviewed (Table 4-6).

Finally, using the 1984 Telephone Directory of Rural District Councils, towns and municipalities and a 1:100,000 land use map supplied to me by the AGRITEX office in Bindura, a list of 78 Large-Scale Commercial Farmers was prepared for the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area (ICA). Out of this list a total of 41 farmers were selected using a table of random numbers. These farmers were mailed an introductory letter about the study. This was followed by a self-administered questionnaire, complete with a return address and stamped envelope. Only 10 of the sample farmers responded, one of them requesting to be excused from participation for personal reasons thus leaving nine (Table 4-7).

In all the survey obtained interview responses from a total of 630 farmers distributed across the six sectors or farming systems. These are as follows: (1) 349 farmers in the Model A Normal Intensive Scheme; (2) 39 in the Model A Accelerated Intensive Scheme; (3) 151 in the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes; (4) 62 in the Communal or Peasant sector; (5) 20 in the Small-Scale Commercial sector; and (6) 9 in the Large-Scale Commercial sector.

Data Handling and Analysis

The post-fieldwork handling and analysis of the data turned out to be an overwhelming chore mainly because of the division of the research into two parts, that is, the macro or policy and implementation aspect on one hand and the micro or farmers' responses on the other.

TABLE 4 - 6
 SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS SECTOR:
 AREAS, HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED AND INTERVIEWED

INTENSIVE CULTIVATION AREA	TOTAL HOUSEHOLDS	SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS SELECTED	HOUSEHOLDS INTERVIEWED
1. Chesa Nyajenje	96	15	9
2. Karuyana	68	15	11
	(164)	30	20

TABLE 4 - 7
 LARGE-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS SECTOR:
 AREA, FARMERS IDENTIFIED, SAMPLED AND SURVEYED

INTENSIVE CULTIVATION AREA	FARMERS IDENTIFIED	FARMERS SAMPLED/ MAILED QUESTIONNAIRE	FARMERS RESPONDING TO QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Bindura	78	41	9

Within each part, additional handling problems came up. This was the result of the subdivisions into provincial, model type and other geographic units which the comparative nature of the study imposed on the data. The breadth of the study items also compounded rather than minimized the analytical workload. For instance, over 37,300 responses to mostly open-ended questions were generated by the 388 Model A resettled farmers alone, not mentioning the other remaining 242 farmers.

Content analysis was applied to study the macro and essentially aggregate information collected from the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. This necessitated the organization and coordination of the data and its indexing into categories of study items and substantive themes.

The primary survey data, involving the questionnaire in respect of (1) the individual resettlement schemes evaluated during the first part of the research and (2) the subsequent responses of farmers, required extensive scrutiny. First, each specific response to all study item in every individual questionnaires was examined carefully and tabulated to derive patterns of responses. These were then used in the construction of coding frames and instructions. Once this was completed, the answers in each questionnaire were coded into appropriate categories of responses. The codes so tabulated were put on floppy disks and then analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) computer program at the University of Florida North Eastern Regional Data Center.

Where necessary, simple frequencies of the study items have been generated and are presented in various tables. The purpose of this is to establish possible patterns of relationships and variations upon which further empirical studies can be based and more rigorous statistical analysis derived.

Notes

1.) Organization and participation are of major interest to most analysts of development be they anthropologists, public choice economists or political scientists. Indeed, writers such as Cernea (1983) and Garcia-Zamor (1985) discuss this issue in much detail. Bratton (1986) also looks at farmer organizations and agricultural production in Zimbabwe. Currently, both development aid donors and recipients alike advocate participation of local residents in projects as a management technique to increase effectiveness.

In Zimbabwe the encouragement of grassroots organization of farmers is part of the resettlement and rural development policy. In the thinking of the government the participation of the povo or the so-called masses in decisions is in line with its commitment to socialist ideals. Raising the political consciousness of the povo is a responsibility that the ruling ZANU-PF party has taken upon itself and is pursuing vigorously. The objective is to promote effective and beneficial development and implementation of national policy agendas. It is accepted also that by so doing the constituency and support base of the party and the government will be enhanced as the country moves towards the institutionalization of a one party state.

In 1984, the Office of the Prime Minister directed that village-level organizational structures be set up in all African rural areas. Consequently, Resettlement Officers together with their teams of extension, cooperative and community development assistants are charged with the responsibility to organize farmers in the various schemes. For instance, in Mufurudzi like in all the other Model A Schemes farmers are organized into a three-tier system as follows: (1) each of the 18 villages constitutes a Village Development Committee (VIDCO) under a popularly elected chairman; (2) representatives of the nearby VIDCOs are also organized at the next level into the Ward Development Committee (WARDCO) of which there are 4 in the scheme; and (3) at the highest scheme level of organization is the Area Board of WARDCO representatives (see Figure 5-1). The Area Board is under an elected chairman. The Board is the farmers' institution which directly liaises with the "government." The Area Board representatives in Mufurudzi serve on the Chaminuka District Council, Madziwa Township, thus linking the scheme with the local government system.

It must be mentioned also that in Mashonaland Central, a Province that is claimed to be "100 percent ZANU-PF," the influence of the ruling party in the organization of these local-level farmer institutions is quite significant. It is customary for every speaker at a musangano or important meeting to precede any speech or contribution by first raising a clinched fist and reciting important party or national slogans. Some common slogans include, for example, Pamberi ne . . . (Prime Minister Comrade Robert Mugabe, /Jongwe/, /Minda Mirefu/, /Vuremende/, /Kurima/, etc.). (Forward with . . . the Prime Minister, /the Cockerel--the party emblem--/, /the Government/, /Resettlement/, /Agriculture/, etc.). All such slogans always end with a denunciation of the "enemies," Pasi ne . . . (dissidents, /Muzorewa/, /ZAPU/, /mbava/, etc.). (Down with . . . the dissidents [in Matabeleland], [former Prime Minister of Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Bishop] /Muzorewa/, [the opposition party] /ZAPU/, /thieves/, etc.).

At the village level the responsibility of the youth in the VIDCOs is to constitute a vigilant brigade in charge of security.

2.) During the stay of the research team at Chiruma School and in the course of our daily field trips we depended on the nearby retail shops for most of our provisions. These shops are located in the Madziwa Mine, the Rural Service Center, Chitepo Village, Ponesai Vanhu Institute and Simba Youth Cooperative. Three of these are licensed also to operate beer halls. Simba Youth is one such hall which serves soft drinks and the locally popular chibuku sorghum beer. Indeed, after our interviews of the members of Simba Youth we came to know them well. It became a customary routine for us to stop at the Cooperative every evening when time permitted to either buy personal needs, refresh ourselves, eat sadza or just fraternize with friends. Through this close interaction I gained more insights into the backgrounds of most of the members and developments within the scheme than were possible otherwise.

3.) All the resettlement schemes around the country encounter certain kinds of problems. These are reported to DERUDE every month by the Resettlement Officers. Nationally the most common of these is "poach grazing." The schemes adjoin Communal Areas. Consequently, farmers in those areas lacking adequate grazing or pastures allow their cattle and other livestock to stray into the schemes. In most cases these farmers steal the barb-wire boundary fencing which physically separates the schemes from the Communal Areas.

In addition to these some of the schemes in the Mashonaland West Province had problems which may be termed special. During our tour in 1985 the most serious of these problems was the security situation. Bands of so-called "South African sponsored ZAPU-PF dissidents," claimed to be operating from bases within South Africa, Botswana and the Matabeleland Provinces, were reportedly sighted now and then in or near such schemes as Jompani, Muzvezve 1, Hamilton Hills and Chegutu 6. Other schemes in the Karoi area particularly Pote 2 was also plagued by "squatters" or illegal occupants of state land.

4.) The problem of illegal occupation of some European farms and state lands by so-called squatters is particularly acute in such Provinces as Manicaland and Mashonaland West. As of July 1984, it is estimated that there were about 4,961 squatter family members in the Karoi area, Hurungwe District and about 1,400 in the Chinoyi District all in Mashonaland West. The problem has necessitated the promulgation by the government of guidelines on ways and means of controlling it. In every affected area a District Squatter Control Committee has been formed with the following organizations represented: (1) the District Administrative Officer as the Chairman; (2) Resettlement Officer; (3) Resettlement Inspector; (4) the Chairman of the District Council; (5) the Natural Resources Board's Lands Inspector; (6) officers of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Criminal Investigation Department and the Central Intelligence Organization; and (7) an official of the ruling ZANU-PF party.

The work of the Committee is hampered in many places by the politically over-sensitive nature of this issue. Even in official circles the squatting is viewed with ambivalence. Opinion is divided between some high party officials and members of the government on one hand and many in the ZANU-PF on the other as to how to effectively resolve the problem. The former group advocates the strict adherence to policy. It therefore calls for the forceful removal of squatters who refuse to follow government's instructions in respect of how to get registered for resettlement. Squatters are believed to be destroying the natural resources through their indiscriminate cutting of trees and grass for houses and fences. They are also accused of cultivating stream banks, an act which is deemed illegal. In the Mashonaland West Province a meeting of the squatter committees held in June 21, 1984 at Chinoyi resolved that the

provincial governor should visit and address squatters in the affected areas for "destroying the natural resources, harbouring dissidents, demoralising morale of commercial farmers, and not being supportive of the government."

The principal proponent of the view that the government be hard on squatters is the former cabinet member and old-time party leader from the Manicaland Province, Edgar Tekere. In some cases this view has prevailed and some squatter settlements have been destroyed. This has been on the orders of the government often arising from court actions initiated by affected European farmers. In almost all cases the squatters return and set up again. This is what perhaps prompts opponents of this line of tough action to question in the first place how any rational person can say that poor and landless rural Zimbabweans are "illegally occupying" their own ancestral lands. They argue that the so-called European farms were forcefully taken away and since many individuals and families sacrificed themselves in a bloody war to regain the lands they have the right now to use them for their subsistence.

The squatters also have problems which are unique. A significant proportion of them are old laborers and aliens who worked on farms that were later abandoned or purchased by the government from Europeans. These elderly squatters may need more than resettlement, perhaps social welfare rehabilitation. For instance, in a survey at the former Kassimure farm within Pote 2 a total of 67 of the heads of the squatter households did not apparently qualify for resettlement. This is because of old age or physical disability. Of this group 22.4 percent were Zimbabweans, 35.8 percent were Mozambicans, 23.9 percent were Malawians, 16.4 percent were Zambians and the remaining 1.5 percent were South Africans. Their mean age was 62.8 years with a mean household size of 4.6 persons.

5.) In June 1985, as part of the government's reorganization of the Ministries, DERUDE was transferred from the new Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to that of Local Government, Rural Development and Urban Development. Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region were also rescheduled to different schemes and in some cases to different Provinces in the Region. The evaluation survey was so timed to enable the officers to respond to the questionnaires immediately after their detachment from the respective schemes that they previously managed.

6.) During the course of the Model B Cooperative management survey I visited Batsiranayi on three occasions but never got hold of the Chairman. I left written and verbal messages with the Vice Chairman and the Secretary but to no avail. I had previously visited the scheme in the company of the Zimbabwe-United Kingdom Evaluation Team. I had also met the Chairman and the Management Committee on various occasions at DERUDE, Harare. The Chairman was quite aware of my research. At one point I realized that he did not want to cooperate in the research. I therefore personally interviewed the Committee for the management survey in his absence during a scheduled visit to the scheme.

About a month later on November 21 1985, the research team interviewed members of the Cooperative for the Model B farmers survey, also during the absence of the Chairman who had previously been notified of our schedule. The following day I passed through Kushingirira Cooperative on my way to Mount Darwin. There, the Batsiranayi Chairman who also happened to be visiting confronted me in obvious anger warning that I did not have his permission to interview his members and that he would have prevented them from answering the questionnaire. In his view all researchers were biased against cooperatives

and that we should leave them alone. I tried, perhaps successfully, to impress upon him that I had the permission of the government to do the research and since Batsiranayi was a public institution it was perfectly alright to do my work without his input or sanction. Later that day the Chairman apologized to my senior investigator and subsequently tried to interact more with us on occasions when we met him at the Madziwa Mine Club House.

7.) Among the Model A resettled farmers there were only three problem instances that I can recall. The first occurred during the initial public introduction of the research team subsequent to the interviews of individual household heads. As it was the case we had visited this particular village the previous two days to consult with the VIDCO Chairman and his Vice-Chairman about our impending research. On the morning of the public meeting involving all the farmers three of them, whom we learned had been brewing and drinking the illicit kachasu gin all night, apparently did not understand the need for the research. Matters got worse when my senior investigator in reciting his slogans mentioned, "Pamberi ne Mushandira Pamwe !" (Forward with the cooperatives!). Taking that perhaps to mean we were in the village to promote cooperatives obviously did not sit well with them. It took nearly an hour for the other farmers to get the situation under control. For the two days that we visited and interviewed all the farmers in that village no other problems arose.

The second incident involved a farmer whose questionnaire was incomplete. The night after our interviews in one village I detected that a page was originally left out in a filled questionnaire. Our schedule did not allow an immediate follow up for about a week. Meanwhile, I sent a message to the Chairman in the village notifying him that we would be back there to complete the missing section with the farmer. We drove into that village one afternoon, and in accordance with custom first went to greet the Chairman. Later, we were told that the farmer in question had left the village that morning and "gone into hiding to avoid" our meeting him. This was because he did not understand why he alone of all the people in that village should be interviewed twice.

The third problem was in respect of one of the farmers who is also an important public servant in the area. Indeed, we became friends in the course of my visits to the scheme. On two occasions he provided me with accommodation. During the interview he took a questionnaire which he decided to fill himself. He kept it for a couple of weeks before filling and leaving many of the questions unanswered. My senior investigator and I impressed upon him the need to obtain complete answers. He steadfastly refused to respond to those questions the answers to which he felt were "obvious" and perhaps too personal. Among these were those in respect of (1) ownership of household items and capital assets and (2) about socio-demographic characteristics.

8.) Apart from the major direct expenses such as subsistence and the development and printing of questionnaire, field transportation was unbearably expensive. The regional nature of the case study involving interviews in differently located research sites meant that the team had to move from place to place. In many instances, some research sites had to be visited three or more times in order to obtain complete coverage. From our base at Chiruma school the nearest gas stations were at Mount Darwin 37 kilometers to the northwest or Shamva 53 kilometers to the south.

Depending upon which village in the scheme that the team was working in we had to cover distances of at least 50-80 kilometers return trip just to obtain gas. We could not purchase and store extra quantities for later use. This is

because it was illegal to transport gas in any container in a passenger or public vehicle and not more than 4 liters in a private vehicle. During the course of the research in 1985 one liter of gas in Harare, Bindura, Shamva and Mt. Darwin averaged between a low of Z\$1.01 to a high of Z\$1.07 or around Z\$3.93 (US\$2.45) per gallon.

9.) I originally planned to cover only randomly selected farmers in the survey. In early June 1985, I visited Mufurudzi to pre-test aspects of my questionnaire. I decided to do this in Tongogara 1. I therefore drew a random sample of 10 from a list of 50 farmers in the village. On June 6, 1985, I was accompanied by the Resettlement Assistant to meet the VIDCO Chairman and farmers. Many of them had already been notified of my research. All the same I explained it to them and requested to do a pre-test of my questionnaire with the selected 10 farmers prior to the main survey which was to begin in about 3 months. When I arrived the following morning with a research assistant we could not obtain farmers' cooperation and participation. Some of the selected farmers insisted on the coverage of all their neighbors as a condition for their own participation. Many of those not originally selected also questioned how "fair" my so-called random sampling was. Though I never understood the basis of the "suspensions" I was compelled to change the original strategy.

Since these resettlement programs started the government has permitted only a few field studies in them. The only individuals who have been so lucky all did their research from the University of Zimbabwe. These are (1) Bill Kinsey's (1982, 1983) controversial work which generated hysteria by questioning the wisdom in the government's resettlement policy and (2) Mumbegwegwi's (1984b) study of the Model B Cooperative resettlements.

The other studies are monitoring activities such as the (1) farm management studies done by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and (2) the routine annual census of farm output conducted by the Resettlement Officers on behalf of the Central Statistical Office. The latter covers all individual resettled farmers. This fact coupled with the organizational ideals of the VIDCOs which encourage the participation of everybody rather than a chosen few militates against partial coverage that random selection entails. Consequently, I modified the research design to cover selected villages and the total households in them. Even then, a few individual farmers in some of the nearby villages which were not selected presented themselves to be interviewed. Though these were interviewed their questionnaires were never analyzed for this study.

The foregoing problem which necessitated the use of total rather than selective coverage of farmers in particular villages is unique to the resettlement schemes with their nucleated settlements. In the Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial Areas with dispersed homesteads no such problems were encountered.

CHAPTER V
AGRICULTURAL RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Introduction

According to Mayer and Greenwood (1980:17) policy is a decision of intent made on behalf of a collective to influence the behavior of its members through the use of positive and negative sanctions. Since the attainment of political independence in 1980 the government of Zimbabwe has formulated an elaborate agricultural resettlement policy that is now in various stages of its implementation. In this, the government is collaborating with several external donor countries, principally the United Kingdom and Kuwait and with international aid and lending institutions, such as the African Development Bank and the European Economic Community. Other so-called non-governmental organizations are also participating in the resettlement program. Among these are Africare, Redd Barna, Lutheran World Federation and Christian Care.

The major responsibility for the resettlement is in the hands of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement which, in addition to coordinating the participation of the external governments and agencies, also actively oversees the involvement of numerous Ministries and Departments in various aspects of the planning and implementation of the program.

The policy dimensions of the entire resettlement program are explicitly expressed in official publications and pronouncements. These include the speeches of government members, party leaders and policy makers, official memoranda and circulars, development plans, budget statements and estimates of expenditures. The policy blueprint is the Intensive Resettlement Policies and Procedures (Zimbabwe 1985c).

At the macro-level this document provides the major source of statements of intent concerning the objectives, organization, regulations and procedures that relate to the resettlement. This chapter draws extensively from this revised document as well as from its previous editions (see Zimbabwe 1981e, 1983c). Project Reports of some of the individual resettlement schemes discussed in this chapter also provide additional insights, particularly in terms of the economic and technical dimensions of resettlement policy at the micro-level. The reports are important for these vital background information against which specific outputs or program performance may be measured.

Resettlement Policy Objectives

In 1980, a joint Government of Zimbabwe-Government of the United Kingdom three-year agreement proposed to resettle 18,000 farm families on 1.1 million hectares of land at the cost of \$60 million (Zimbabwe 1981e:1). These proposals were revised upward two years later in the Three Year Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85 (Zimbabwe 1982b, 1983a). The Zimbabwe government envisaged then to resettle a total of 162,000 families on 9 million hectares at an estimated cost of \$500 million in constant prices (Zimbabwe 1985c:1).

By January 1983, a total of 32 resettlement schemes had been established. These covered 1.2 million hectares and were planned for 22,000 families. Of this number, 18,400 were already resettled in the schemes (Zimbabwe 1983c:2). At the end of June 1984, a little over 1.8 million hectares had been purchased for resettlement at the cost of \$50.7 million. As of that time the estimated number of families that had been resettled was 30,122 representing some 255,000 people (Zimbabwe 1985c:3).

In September 1985, of the revised target population of 162,000 families about 35,000 or 22 percent were already resettled. A total of 171 schemes had been established for them throughout the country (see Appendix E). Of these, 56 are Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Projects, 66 are Model A Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Projects; 48 are Model B Producer Cooperatives and one is a Model C Resettlement Project (see Table 5-1). (See below for a description of the Resettlement Scheme Models.)

Currently, the government has no specific time frame as to when resettlement will be completed. Thus, much as it is proceeding in all earnest the approach to the program remains flexible. Consequently, all necessary modifications in policy as well as in implementation will be incorporated into the program if and when new information and experience warrant such changes. With the Five Year Development Plan, launched in 1986, a target of 15,000 households is set to be resettled every year (see Zimbabwe 1986d).

The resettlement is meant to achieve eight specific objectives. These are (1) to alleviate population pressure in Communal Areas; (2) extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector; through individual households and cooperatives; (3) improve the standard of living of the largest and poorest segment of the population; (4) ameliorate the plight of people who have been adversely affected by war and to rehabilitate them; (5) provide opportunities for people who have no land and who are without employment and may therefore be classed as destitute; (6) bring abandoned or underutilized land into full production as one facet of implementing an equitable policy of land redistribution; (7) expand or improve services and infrastructures needed to promote the well-being of people and of economic production; and (8) achieve national stability and progress in a country that has only recently emerged from the turmoil of war (Zimbabwe 1985c:4).

TABLE 5 - 1
ZIMBABWE: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES,
SEPTEMBER 1985

	MODEL A NORMAL INTENSIVE	MODEL A ACCELERATED INTENSIVE	MODEL B PRODUCER COOP	MODEL C	Total
Mashonaland East	8	4	7	0	19
Mashonaland Central	2	7	9	0	18
Mashonaland West	6	6	8	0	20
Midlands	10	13	15	0	38
Manicaland	14	6	7	1	28
Masvingo	9	16	0	0	25
Matabeleland North	2	2	0	0	4
Matabeleland South	5	12	2	0	19
Total	56	66	48	1	171

Source: Department of Rural Development (DERUDE), Harare.

Note: Some Schemes, especially in Matabeleland South, are still at the planning stages and therefore are not fully operational as at this time. The security situation in most of the Matabele Schemes are terribly serious because of so-called dissidents who operate in the region. For instance, as early as 1982 the government admitted that it was compelled to withdraw Development Teams from certain schemes in the area because of the disruptive activities of armed bandits (see The Herald, May 4, 1982). After this news, bandits attacked one resettlement near Plumtree leaving scores of families homeless (The Herald, June 17, 1983). DERUDE's Monthly Reports for Matabeleland also show that (1) in August 1985 bandits attacked a public bus, burned an elementary school and the entire Village 4 and part of Village 3 at Hollins Block, Gwanda District, (2) on three separate occasions they harassed farmers at Pioneer and Spring Blocks, Mbembesi Scheme, (3) one officer based at Shashi Irrigation Scheme was murdered in October 1985 and (4) In November 1987 a group of foreign missionaries and their families were also massacred in a mission farm in Matabeleland South for allegedly causing the removal of squatters from the farm.

These objectives express a strong equity bias in policy. This is because the overriding aim of the resettlement policy is to use redistribution to achieve social justice. In addition, it seeks to create opportunities and to establish the necessary conditions for a broader based agricultural growth. The government envisages the full participation and the incorporation of the hitherto neglected majority African smallholders in the market economy as a major goal of its development effort (Zimbabwe 1981a, 1981c, 1982b, 1983a, 1985c).

The Pivotal Role of Cooperatives in the Government's Development Policy

At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that the essential thrust of the agricultural resettlement policy of the government is the collectivization of the mode of production and the means of capital accumulation. The central place that the government would want cooperatives to assume in its development policy is quite apparent. Both in words and in action the government's commitment to agrarian socialism based largely on the collective system of production is unequivocal. In June 1985 for example, the Prime Minister created a special coordination Ministry in his office to oversee the development of cooperatives, a task previously performed by the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development.

Secondly, the country's development policy statement document, Growth With Equity, spells out quite clearly the government's stand about the issue

of cooperatives. The document makes it clear that

[The] Government will promote the establishment of communal and cooperative farms in agriculture, and provide general assistance to ensure their economic viability. . . . In this area Government will be building upon the traditional cooperative approach in Zimbabwean culture in facing up to the technological challenges of tomorrow. (Zimbabwe 1981a:5)

In an undated paper titled Rural Land Policies in Zimbabwe prepared by the Honorable Moven Mahachi, until January 1988 the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, he argues the rationale behind the government's commitment to agrarian socialism stating thus:

It must be stressed that Zimbabwe today has a capitalistically organised commercial farming sector and the government faces the task of converting it to a socialist system of agriculture. It must convert the land ownership and tenure system from private ownership and uncontrolled land use, permitting a high degree of exploitation of man by man, to either producer cooperatives or state farms.

Elsewhere, at an agricultural field day held on April 15, 1985, at the Kwaedza Model B Producer Cooperative, Mashonaland East Province the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry read an address on behalf of the Honorable Minister Moven Mahachi. He argues in the address:

Our government has adopted a policy on Cooperatives which aims at: Eliminating the exploitation of man by man. . . . My Ministry and indeed the Government of Zimbabwe see. . . the Cooperative movement as the most desirable production system that must substitute the individual production enterprise pattern that has dominated the agricultural economy of this country over the past century or so. While the resettlement program in general seeks to extend the land resources to and open up new opportunities for the hitherto disadvantaged, neglected and landless majority of our African population in the rural areas, Agricultural Cooperatives as implemented under Model B of the programme specifically represent a move by Government to define the mode and direction production should take in the agricultural endeavours of our people.

These statements give ample policy recognition to the cooperatives as the means to extend "socialist and popular democratic participation in the ownership and management of the nation's resources" (Zimbabwe 1981a:5).

So far also these Model B Producer Cooperatives have received more government funding and voluntary donor assistance per capita than any other resettlement model under implementation. Given this background, which is discussed fully in Chapter VIII below, it is very difficult to understand how some observers of the Zimbabwe scene can dismiss the policy thrust of the cooperatives as "only an aspect of government's overall approach" to agriculture (Mumbengegwi 1984b:2; 1984a) or as merely rhetorical (see for instance Sylvester 1985:35; Astrow 1983).

The Structure and Organization of Resettlement

The organizational structure for resettlement is three-tier. At the top is the Cabinet Committee on Resettlement which is chaired by the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. At the next level are the various implementing and servicing agencies. The third level embraces the recipient or resettled farmer units (Figure 5-1).

All matters relating to policy about resettlement ultimately reside with the Cabinet Committee. However, resettlement is more than policy formulation. It involves planning, implementation and administration. Thus, in order to carry on with these activities and, even more so, to achieve the stated policy objectives various Ministries and agencies have been brought together.

This coordination is at the inter Ministry level where the following are represented: The Ministries of (1) Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement; (2) Natural Resources and Tourism; (3) Energy and Water Resources and




FIGURE: 5 - 1
ZIMBABWE: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF RESETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Development; (4) Local Government, Rural and Urban Development; (5) Education; (6) Transport; (7) Health; (8) Public Construction and National Housing; (9) Community Development and Women's Affairs; and (10) Cooperative Development. In addition, representatives of donor countries and agencies which fund various aspects of the resettlement program participate in the deliberations of this Inter Ministry Committee for Resettlement.

The organizational emphasis at this level is to ensure that the resources which otherwise are compartmentalized and controlled by each Ministry are coordinated at the highest echelon of national administration. This coordination is meant to make these resources readily available for the integrated development of both the resettlement areas and their neighboring communal, small-scale farming and the large-scale farming areas.

Specifically, the Inter Ministry Committee is mandated to carry out functions which include (1) program projects appraisal and recommendations of amendments, (2) recommendation of projects to donors for funding, (3) monitoring of program performance and the expenditures incurred on individual schemes and (4) recommendations on specific aspects of policy. In performing these functions the Committee is assisted by a Technical Sub-Committee which undertakes preliminary appraisal of all resettlement projects before submission to the Inter Ministry Committee.

Two major ministries are much more involved with both the macro and micro issues of resettlement policy and processes. These are the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and that of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development. The specific involvement in the resettlement process of each of the two primary ministries, their respective agencies and also of the supporting ministries is set out below in detail.

The Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement

The entire resettlement program is the overall responsibility of this Ministry¹ in terms of (1) specific policy matters, (2) inter-agency coordination, (3) designation and acquisition of land required for resettlement, (4) financial control, (5) promotion of appropriate technology and (6) monitoring and evaluation of the program.

Various organs of the Ministry carry out specialized tasks that directly relate to different aspects of the program. For instance, the Planning Section in conjunction with AGRITEX and the Land Identification Advisory Committee² conducts preliminary assessment of land suitability for resettlement. It also undertakes technical appraisal of all project reports as well as the actual physical planning and layouts of various resettlement schemes including their Administrative or Rural Service Centers. In this, the Planning Section works closely also with its counterpart in the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.

AGRITEX, the technical and extension arm of the Ministry has responsibility in whole or in part for several major aspects of resettlement. Specifically, these include the (1) preliminary assessment of the suitability of land for resettlement, (2) preparation of resettlement plans upon the request of the Ministry, (3) demarcation of village sites, arable, grazing and residential plots, (4) planning and pegging of conservation works such as ridge contours and (5) the provision of group and individual extension service to resettled farmers.

Likewise, the Department of Veterinary Services provides dipping services and extension on animal health on the resettlement schemes. The newly created

Irrigation Section of the Ministry undertakes the technical appraisal and participates in the planning of all irrigation projects under the resettlement program.

In addition, there are four parastatals of the Ministry whose statutory responsibilities bring them in contact with resettlement. These are the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) and the Cold Storage Commission (CSC). ARDA is tasked with the provision of accounting service, the preparation of monthly financial reports and reimbursement claims and the disbursement of the program funds. It is also charged with the direct implementation of the resettlement Model D pilot project and the management of the resettlement Model C in the case of specialized crops, except in the Zunde variant.³

Operating through the Resettlement Credit Scheme the AFC provides both short, or seasonal and medium term credit to resettled farmers. It also manages the Small Farm Credit Scheme. The scheme covers successful and enterprising smallholders in all rural areas including resettlement areas. Under its mandate the Corporation has the responsibility to educate farmers in resettlement schemes on credit management.

Two subsidiaries of AMA, namely, the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), by virtue of their statutory mandates, respectively have to purchase all controlled produce harvested by farmers except tobacco which is traded by the privately-organized Tobacco Marketing Association.⁴ Maize and cotton, being the most important crops in resettlement schemes, therefore make the two Boards quite important to resettled farmers.

Finally, the Cold Storage Commission which handles livestock products has started to expand its activities into the resettlement areas with the operation of Grazier Schemes. Under the system resettled farmers are encouraged to establish paddocks or enclosures after which they are assisted to purchase cattle for fattening and sale to the Commission. As of now the system is mostly confined to a few Model B producer cooperatives schemes which have the necessary infrastructure for such a venture still intact.

The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development

The Ministry⁵ is consulted and it fully participates in the planning, approval and implementation of the resettlement program. This is so because the resettlement plans have to be incorporated into the overall plans of the Rural District Council and the Administrative Province within which the scheme is located. The incorporation occurs after a final decision on the implementation of a particular scheme has been taken by the Inter Ministry Committee on Resettlement.

As from the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year, the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) became part of this Ministry. DERUDE is the implementation arm for the resettlement program. Two of its sections, namely, Development and Resettlement, play specific roles that are crucial to the establishment and micro-management of the schemes.

The Development Section either directly or through contracting undertakes the provision of the physical infrastructures that serve resettlement schemes. These include the demarcation of the scheme boundaries, initial clearing and plowing of portions of farmers' arable lands. It constructs and maintains cattle dips, access roads, elementary schools, the Rural Service Centers and

their administrative, residential and other facilities such as the clinic, inputs and marketing depots. The budget for these services is also controlled by the Ministry.

The Resettlement Section performs the important task of selection and allocation of individual families for resettlement. This is done with the participation of the respective District Councils to which the prospective families originally apply to be resettled. The day-to-day administration of the schemes is in the hands of the Resettlement Section through the resident Resettlement Officer and his team of other services personnel.

Since 1984, in compliance with directives from the Office of the Prime Minister, the Ministry has undertaken the formation of Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WARDCOs) in all resettlement schemes and rural areas. This is to facilitate the grassroots participation of rural dwellers in rural and national issues, particularly in the area of development planning and implementation.

Other Ministries

The remaining Ministries which deal with various aspects of resettlement are charged with the following appropriate responsibilities. The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources and Development is responsible for the provision and maintenance of domestic water supply to all villages, schools and Rural Service Centers in the resettlement schemes. It also provides water for livestock and irrigation purposes.

The Ministry of Education undertakes the construction of secondary schools in all schemes, where appropriate and takes care of the staffing and payment of salaries of both elementary and secondary school teachers. As it is

pointed out above the construction of elementary schools is the responsibility of the Development Section of DERUDE within the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.

The Ministry of Transport maintains all major or national roads that run through resettlement schemes. Maintenance of feeder roads, however, lies with the Development Section of DERUDE. The responsibility for the provision of health services, the equipping, staffing and operation of clinics lies with the Ministry of Health. It also undertakes the training of Village Health Workers and offers technical advice on the siting and construction of "Blair privies" or latrines in all villages and schools. The maintenance of all government housing in resettlement schemes is carried out by the Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing. It is also responsible for the introduction, promotion and loan financing of improved rural housing for resettled farm families.

The Natural Resources Board of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism educates farmers in all resettlement schemes on matters relating to conservation and proper ecological practices. It also encourages them to establish woodlots. Resettled farmers are organized and trained to initiate and participate in community development activities or self-help projects by the Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs.

Finally, since the beginning of the 1985-86 fiscal year responsibility for the promotion of cooperative enterprises has been vested in a newly created Ministry of Cooperative Development. The Department of Cooperatives is the operational arm of the Ministry. Its responsibilities include the development of cooperative movement among individually resettled farm families in the Model A schemes and the training of members of such resettlement schemes as the Model B Producer Cooperatives (see Table 5-2).

TABLE 5 - 2
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES IN THE
AREA OF RESETTLEMENT

COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY	SPECIFIC DUTIES
INTER CABINET COMMITTEE	Policy formulation and approval of recommendations about resettlement
INTER MINISTRY COMMITTEE	Project appraisal Recommendation of projects for funding Monitoring of program performance and expenditures Resettlement policy recommendations
TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE	Assists Inter Ministry Committee Undertakes preliminary project appraisal
MIN. OF LANDS, AGRIC. & RURAL RESETTLEMENT	Policy matters Inter Agency coordination Acquisition of land Financial Control Appropriate technology Monitoring and evaluation
LAND IDENTIFICATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE	Makes initial selection of land on block basis and advices on its acquisition
PLANNING SECTION	Preliminary assessment of suitability of land for resettlement Technical appraisal of all project reports Planning and appraisal of layout of Rural Service Center
IRRIGATION SECTION	Technical appraisal and participation in planning of all irrigation projects

TABLE 5 - 2--continued

COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY	SPECIFIC DUTIES
AGRITEX	Preliminary assessment of suitability of land for resettlement Preparation of resettlement plans Demarcation of arable lands and village sites Provision of extension to resettled farmers Conservation works on resettlement schemes
VETERINARY SERVICES	Provision of dipping services Ensures animal health
AGRICULTURAL & RURAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (ARDA)	Provision of accounting services for resettlement program Disbursement of program funds Preparation of monthly financial statement on the program Preparation of reimbursement claims Management of central estates of the Model C schemes in the case of specialized crops Implementation of the Model D pilot project
AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION (AFC)	Operation of the Resettlement Credit and the Small Farm Credit Schemes Provision of short-term (seasonal) and medium-term credit to resettled farmers Education of resettled farmers on credit management.
MIN. OF LOCAL GOVT, RURAL DEVELOPMENT & URBAN DEVELOPMENT	Participates in the approval, planning and implementation of specific resettlement schemes Administers schemes handed over by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement

TABLE 5 - 2--continued

COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY	SPECIFIC DUTIES
PLANNING SECTION	Confirms the location of Rural Service Centers and approves their layouts
DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT (DERUDE)	Implements resettlement and micro-manages individual schemes
DEVELOPMENT SECTION	Constructs, implements and maintains all physical infrastructure in resettlement schemes, eg. demarcation, clearing, plowing, dips, access roads, elementary schools, marketing and supply depots, clinics and Rural Service Center
RESETTLEMENT SECTION	Controls the budget for various aspects of the resettlement program Selection and allocation of farmers for resettlement Administration and coordination at the scheme level Enforcement of resettlement permits Squatter control Promotion of VIDCOs and WARDCOs Undertakes the collection of data about scheme progress and problems
MIN. OF ENERGY, WATER RESOURCES & DEVELOPMENT.	Provision of domestic water to all resettlement villages and schools Provision, operation and maintenance of water supplies at the Rural Service Center Provision of irrigation water and dams in resettlement schemes where appropriate
MIN. OF EDUCATION	Holds ultimate responsibility for education in resettlement schools Provision of secondary schools in resettlement schemes Staffing and payment of salaries for both elementary and secondary school teachers

TABLE 5 - 2--continued

COMMITTEE/MINISTRY/AGENCY	SPECIFIC DUTIES
MIN. OF HEALTH	Responsibility for the provision of health services in all schemes Responsible for equipping, staffing and managing all clinics Training of Village Health Workers Provision of technical advice on the siting and construction of "Blair" toilets by resettled farmers in the villages and schools
MIN. OF CONSTRUCTION & NATIONAL HOUSING	Maintenance of government housing in the schemes Introduction, promotion and financing of improved housing for resettled farmers
MIN. OF COMMUNITY DEV. & WOMEN'S AFFAIRS	Organizing and training of farmers in schemes in self-help and community development activities Promotion of pre-cooperative self-help economic groups
MIN. OF COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT	Processing and registration of cooperative groups for the program Identification, selection and recommendation of suitable registered cooperative societies for resettlement Provision of organizational and managerial skills necessary for effective cooperative performance Coordination of the Management Advisory Teams that services the cooperatives
MIN. OF TRANSPORT	Responsible for the major road works in and the maintenance of national roads running through resettlement schemes
NATURAL RESOURCES BOARD	Education of resettled farmers on matters relating to the conservation of natural resources

Land Acquisition and Tenure

A major wish of many landless and near-landless Zimbabweans is the appropriation of the so-called European lands and their distribution to Africans. This is particularly so in the Communal Areas now as it was before independence. Indeed, the support of the "masses" for the liberation war was built on this wish. Many nationalist leaders, either implicitly or explicitly, alluded to equitable land reform programs in postindependent Zimbabwe. Most European settlers and adversaries of the nationalist cause in the western world also entertained the fear that land seizures were going to be the order of the day if and when African majority rule was achieved.

It is no wonder that the end of the war and the period immediately after independence in 1980 precipitated the massive and spontaneous squatting or occupation of some European and state lands. Such a development should have been anticipated because it happened earlier on in the 1960s in the similar case of Kenya (see Mbithi and Barnes 1975). The squatter situation is still particularly serious in Manicaland and to some extent in Mashonaland West. In these Provinces some returning refugees and landless Communal Area residents did not wait for official resettlement. The "squatter problem," as this development is officially known in Zimbabwe, poses a major dilemma to both the government and affected European farmers.⁶

It was to allay the concern of European land owners over possible forced appropriations that the independence constitution, worked out at the Lancaster House Conference, stipulated guarantees for the sanctity of privately owned lands. It was decided and accepted there and then that any land acquisition by the government of Zimbabwe "has to be on the basis of willing seller-willing buyer, at the prevailing market prices."

So far this requirement has been scrupulously honored by the government, though much to the chagrin and the disappointment of many landless Zimbabweans and radical intellectuals alike (see Chapter II above). There is no doubt, however, that the government's resettlement effort is frustrated to some extent by the operation of this mode of land acquisition. The government points out that the system

has proved unsatisfactory because, on the one hand the majority of offers have been of poor quality land and, on the other hand such offers have been fragmented and scattered across the country. (Zimbabwe 1985c:11)

In November 1985, as a consequence of and in response to this frustration, the government introduced a new Land Acquisition Bill in the National Assembly. The Bill sought to encourage land owners to sell to the government first. It also sought to empower the President to acquire land that had been declared underutilized or derelict by the Derelict Lands Board. As expected the Bill was emotionally debated along racial lines. For instance, the acting Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the Honorable Herbert Ushewokunze who tabled the Bill charged the European members of the Assembly who opposed it to be "digging in their heels against change." (The Herald, November 20, 1985:1).

Also contributing to the debate the ZANU-PF Member of Parliament for Mufakose, the Honorable John Zhakata, argued that the Bill was meant to get back the lands "which [the whites] grabbed away from us." (The Herald, November 27, 1985:8). From the perspective of the European members the controversy about the Bill centered on the definition of two crucial words. These were "underutilized," and "derelict" as they applied to land. For example, the Honorable Mark Patridge, the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe member for Mazowe-Mutoko and the Honorable Bill Irvine, an Independent

representing Marlborough, persistently requested for a definition of those words.

The Bill which passed as the Land Acquisition Act (1986) took effect on March 1, 1986. It now provides for a system of designation of certain areas, in the country, for various public needs purposes such as resettlement and state farms. It defines properly utilized land as that which has been "substantially and continuously used for the past three years." According to Linda van Buren (1986:1123), writing on the Economy of Zimbabwe, the passage of the Bill is based on the fact that prior to independence the colonial administration did not invariably grant European farmers a freehold title to commercial land, reserving to itself the right to repossess land for "public purposes."

Under the new system an inter ministry Land Identification Advisory Committee has been set up to make the initial selection of blocks of land on the basis of such criteria as the availability of water and suitable soils and then give advice to the Land Selection Committee.

Analysts of land tenure systems, particularly in Africa, often cite insecurity of tenure as a major constraint on investment in improved technologies, management and husbandry of resources (Feder and Noronha 1987). An important issue in land tenure is therefore the question of whoever controls access to the resources of the land and the benefits accruing from its use (Cohen 1980). This becomes even more significant where productive resources such as irrigation are involved (Lipton 1985).

In Zimbabwe the government is yet to come out with the desirable system of tenure for resettlement agriculture. As of now resettled farmers operate their holdings under temporary leases issued in accordance with Section 6 of the Rural Land Act. In the Model A schemes with their individual family

operated farms, for instance, the conditions of occupancy or tenure held by the farmers are in the form of three different permits. These are (1) the permit to reside, which covers a 2,500 square meter residential plot within the village; (2) the permit to cultivate a net arable land of 5 hectares and (3) the permit to destock, covering a right to graze a stated number of livestock units in the communal grazing area set aside for each village.⁷ These permits, enforced by the Resettlement Officers of DERUDE, are issued by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on the strict conditions that a resettled farmer relinquishes all traditional rights, if any, that were held in the Communal Area (see Appendix F; and Appendix G, Tables 1 to 3).

Resettlement Planning

Each resettlement scheme is planned before the necessary infrastructures are constructed or farmers resettled. The scheme's project report embodies the plan. The report describes the natural environment, the intended agricultural program, staff requirement, the scheme costs and an economic analysis. In the planning process physical details and suitable sites for locating proposed villages and infrastructures are identified on 1:12,500 air photo mosaics. However, final decisions about the location of these development structures are made in the field during implementation.

The total number of farm families to be resettled in each scheme is a crucial planning decision. The determination of this is based on the agro-ecological resources, the land capability and the livestock carrying capacity of the land surveyed for the scheme. The arable potential of the land is calculated from a standard land capability classification of the country.

This classification is derived from detailed stereoscopic analysis of 1:25,000 blanket airphotographs cross-checked by ground verification and soil coding. The livestock carrying capacity or stocking rate of the non-arable land is also similarly assessed.

The scheme's project report is prepared in consultation with the relevant District Council which has to approve it. After this the report is submitted for the consideration of the Inter Ministry Committee for Resettlement and approval by the Inter Cabinet Committee. This provides authority for ARDA to open a development expenditure account. Once such an account is set up the Development Section of DERUDE begins the construction of various infrastructures.

Resettlement Scheme Models

Currently, there are 4 Models in use in the planning and implementation of resettlement projects in Zimbabwe. These are Models A, B, C and D. Each of these has its own structure and internal dynamics as are described below. So far and in terms of land area, number of resettled families and expenditure of resources the Model A schemes are the most important (see Table 5-1). However, in line with its commitment to socialism the government's intention is "to settle a major proportion [of individual farmers and farm families] under Model B" schemes (Zimbabwe 1981, 1985c:14).

Model A Resettlement Program

This Model involves the resettlement of individual farm families on individual residential plots within nucleated villages. It also provides

individual arable holdings demarcated as close as is practicable to the village but usually within 3 kilometer radius. Tied to the arable holding is a grazing right which varies with the availability of grazing land and the ecological imperatives of the prevailing natural region.

Consequently, in the better arable zones such as Natural Regions I and II each resettled family has a permit to keep up to 5 Livestock Units. The corresponding maximum unit for Natural Region III is 8; Natural Region IV is 10; and 20 for Natural Region V which is only suited for grazing. These allocations are based on minimum viable herd size, draft requirement and cropping reliability worked out for each region.

The village sites are carefully selected and the layout planned before farmers are permitted to build their homes. The ideal size preferred by the planners ranges between 25 and 50 families depending upon such factors as water supply and distance to the arable plots. In a few situations farmers have been resettled in villages with a minimum of 13 families.

From the start, the government through the resident Resettlement Team and Community Development personnel has encouraged the formation of VIDCOs and the participation of resettled families in communal and self help activities. Indeed, it is the expectation of the government that with time and as the communities develop the individual families will start pooling their production activities together in line with the traditional Zunde concept and ultimately consolidate their resources into group or cooperative enterprises.

There are two variants of the Model A schemes. These are the Normal Intensive Resettlement Project (NIRP) and the Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Project (AIRP). Throughout this study the former is referred to as the Model A Normal and the latter as the Model A Accelerated. The Model A

Accelerated is a stop gap program which is launched on emergency basis to get as many desperately needy people, such as "qualified" squatters, resettled with the minimum planning. There is no provision of basic infrastructures such as clinics, schools and dip tanks. Domestic water from boreholes, however, are provided to the villages. Over the years an Accelerated Project is gradually upgraded and turned into a Normal Intensive Resettlement Project.

Model B Resettlement Program

The Model B schemes are always set up within the Model A projects where two or three farm units with well developed infrastructure still intact are planned for them. The kinds of infrastructure on a farm property that is usually selected for a Model B scheme include, for instance, irrigation systems, storage and workshop facilities and specialized enterprises for crops such as coffee or animal production that can be managed as a unit by cooperative groups. Thus, the model involves group resettlement with formal cooperative organization and management operating as a legal entity registered with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies who is the Director of Cooperative Development.

In these schemes all adult residents including wives and dependents 16 years or older are required to be registered as full members. A typical Model B scheme in a cropping resettlement has a target size of between 50 and 200 members. This is determined by the Planning Section of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in consultation with relevant agencies such as AGRITEX. The size is consequently based upon the physical and infrastructural resources available on the scheme. Like their Model A counterparts the Model B schemes also have two variants, namely, the Normal

Intensive Resettlement Project (NIRP) and the Accelerated Intensive Resettlement Project (AIRP).

The day-to-day management, purchasing of inputs, production and marketing of output is controlled by committees of the members. The property, resources, equipment and livestock on the scheme are held cooperatively. Work arrangements and the distribution of earnings are also done according to a formula agreed to by the members. The initial production target is self-sufficiency, followed by full agricultural production after the build-up period of four to five years.

Given the newness of the producer cooperatives in Zimbabwe and even more so because of the special problems that some of the schemes have encountered,⁸ the government has recently modified a few aspects of the policy arrangements governing assets and resource use. Since 1985, individual members or families are allowed to own a small proportion of livestock for domestic purposes separate from the cooperatively owned and commercially oriented stock. Members are now allowed also to cultivate private plots of up to 0.5 hectares for subsistence during their own free time.

The government does not directly manage these Model B schemes. However, it arranges and coordinates for them support services in the fields of organization, farm management, crop and veterinary extension, credit and administration. This is done through such agencies as the Department of Cooperative Development (DECODE), DERUDE and AGRITEX. In the case of the Normal Intensive Resettlement Projects the government also commits major resources to them. These are in the form of Establishment Grant (see Table 6-3 below) and medium term credit facilities from the AFC. These provisions assist in the initial acquisition of capital goods and to cover operating costs. They are in addition to existing assets and the acquisition of livestock,

stock watering facilities and domestic water supplies which the government also provides.

Model C Resettlement Program

In many respects this Model is built upon a synthesis of both the Models A and the B schemes. The rationale for setting up the Model C is to promote cooperative effort on a gradual and demonstrable basis. The Model incorporates a commercial central core estate which is separate from individually allocated and operated arable entities. The core estate is run by either the committee of the cooperative with labor provided by cooperative members or hired from elsewhere during peak operational periods. Alternatively, it may initially be run by ARDA employing its own labor force.

The cooperative farm or core estate is planned and operated as a single production unit with access to all essential equipment and inputs. Acting also as a service provider the estate supplies essential services to the individual resettled farmers and farm families. These are in the form of mechanical draft, bulk transportation of inputs and produce, the production of seedlings for specialized crops and the processing and marketing of specialized crops. These services are made available to the farmers by the estate at prevailing economic rates. Proceeds from the cooperatively-run farm are distributed among the members according to their work contribution after deducting all investment requirements. In the case of livestock there is individual ownership and communal grazing facilities in the Model C scheme as it obtains in the Model A program.

In promoting the Model C resettlement it is the hope of the government that

the small privately-run individual plots would initially serve to foster individual effort while the cooperative estate would serve to demonstrate the benefits of cooperative effort. . . . As the settlers get knowledgeable and gain experience and expertise in the major enterprise produced by the scheme's . . . central estate they [would] take over the central estate and run it collectively. (Zimbabwe 1985c:17)

Model D Resettlement Program

The Model D scheme has been formulated as a special response to the particularly fragile ecology of Natural Regions IV and V and the predominant role of livestock production in the socioeconomic life of the rural communities in southern Zimbabwe, particularly Matabeleland. However, it is not the intention of the government to restrict the application of this Model to only the marginal agro-ecological zones. In 1985 the government launched the pilot scheme of the Model at Doddieburn-Manyoli in Matabeleland South.

The essential features of the Model D scheme are the establishment of large ranches within which individual farm families paddock or enclose their own grazing areas and control their stock numbers. Once every three or four years each community is given access to the ranch. During this time period the community's own grazing area reverts to fallow to get a chance to rejuvenate.

An important aspect of the operation of this Model is the expectation that communities participating in it will "undertake an internal resettlement and reorganization of their arable blocks and villages so that they free as much of the land for grazing as is possible" (Zimbabwe 1985c:18).

Selection Criteria and Procedures and Allocation
of Holdings to Farmers: The Case of Model A Schemes

The responsibility for the selection of individual families for resettlement and the allocation of residential and arable holdings to them is vested in DERUDE. For an individual to qualify for resettlement he must meet any of the following conditions: (1) being effectively landless, that is, he has no land or has land which is too little to support himself and his dependents; (2) neither he nor the spouse be gainfully employed; (3) being poor; (4) married or widowed with dependants; and (5) aged 18 to 55 years and physically fit and potentially able to make productive use of the allocated holdings.⁹

Other than these basic requirements Zimbabweans returning home as refugees are given special consideration. Widowed and unmarried women with dependents are also allocated land in resettlement schemes in their own right. Since about 1984, wage employees, experienced farmers and peasants who possess "master farmer" certificates of recognition from AGRITEX are also accepted for resettlement. Like everybody else, however, their allocation of holdings is predicated on the condition that the particular individual gives up all land rights in the Communal Area.

The resettlement procedure is initiated through the filling of application form (see Appendix F) at the office of the Rural District Council which serves the Communal Area of the applicant. When a particular area is designated for resettlement a Resettlement Officer from DERUDE travels through the adjoining Communal Areas and holds meetings to explain resettlement policy and to assist individuals in filling such forms. A complete application is then submitted to the Rural District Council through the applicant's Ward Councillor. In the case of farm-laborers on newly acquired European property

the Resettlement Officer registers them directly for processing. This is also true of illegal occupants or squatters provided they have been so prior to July 1981.

Once the resettlement scheme is implemented in the area and it is ready for allocation the Resettlement Officer and the Rural District Council drawing, on a previously prepared list of qualified applicants compose a final list of the farmers to be resettled. In doing so they are required to pay regard to drawing equally from different parts of the District or Communal Areas and also to consider local problems and land pressures.

After this is done the Resettlement Officer arranges a meeting of the selected farmers in the resettlement scheme. At the meeting the allocation of residential and arable holdings is done by a random drawing of numbers. The Resettlement Officer then takes each farmer and physically shows him or her the (1) village site, (2) residential plot, (3) arable holding and (4) communal grazing area.

Finally, the Resettlement Officer decides a suitable date by which the farmer and his or her family of dependents are expected to have moved on to their new land to commence resettlement. This time period is supposed to be reasonable enough to ensure that the farmers can wind up their affairs in their old Communal Areas to enable them to resettle permanently in their new homes. During the initial period of resettlement, the Officer is required by DERUDE to carry out a thorough check to verify that the resettled farmer is actually the very person who originally applied and was selected and that he or she in practice meets all the stipulated criteria required for resettlement.

Implementation Structures and Process: The
Case of a Model A Normal Intensive Scheme

Once farm households have settled in a Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Scheme the planned services as well as those for which infrastructures have been established already are made operational for their benefit. A typical scheme consists of 500 families in about 15 villages all linked by maintained feeder roads.

In addition the following facilities are provided: (1) three or four elementary schools and a secondary school, all with teachers housing; (2) diptanks, provided on the basis of 800 to 1,000 head of cattle or approximately 600 Livestock Units per dip and serving a maximum radius of 6 kilometers; (3) watering dams for cattle; (4) a centrally located Rural Service Center accomodating a Resettlement Officer and staff of one Clerical Officer and one Field Orderly; (5) an AGRITEX worker for every 200 families; (6) a Cooperative Development Worker; (7) an Animal Health Assistant; and (8) a Clinic and Staff to serve between 300 to 600 families (see Ivy 1983:153).

These service staff are provided with government housing erected at the Rural Service Center, where a telephone is installed at the resettlement office. Motor-pumped water supply, reservoir and reticulation are also provided. Cooperative depots, consisting of a storage shed and office within a security fenced yard, are built in the Service Center on the basis of 1 per every 500 resettled farmers.

Under the government's development planning structure, the Rural Service Center is envisaged to serve as a mini growth point for the outlying area. Provision is made therefore for the controlled establishment of permitted businesses such as small general dealers and grinding mills.

The Resettlement Officer is the primary representative of the government in the scheme. He is directly responsible to the Senior Resettlement Officer and through him to the Regional Rural Development Officer. The Regional Rural Development Officer in turn is accountable to the Director, DERUDE, through the Chief Resettlement Officer.

Apart from the additional responsibility for the routine administration of all Model B schemes within the project area, the Resettlement Officer performs the following functions: (1) registration and selection of applicants for resettlement and the allocation of holdings to them; (2) issue of permits to reside, cultivate and destock; (3) enforcement of the conditions of these permits; (4) the fostering of community spirit among resettled farmers and the promotion of community projects such as the establishment of woodlots, erection of scheme and village fencing, cooperatives, literacy clubs and schools; (5) ensuring the maintenance of the infrastructure in the resettlement scheme; (6) collecting and maintaining of detailed and up-to-date socio-economic records covering all resettled farmers in the scheme; (7) preparation and submission of reports relating to the scheme as directed by the Minister; (8) supervision of such communal activities as grazing; (9) liaison between resettled farmers and government agencies, particularly the District Development Committee and ensuring that these farmers have access to whatever advice and services they require; (10) promoting and supervising the formation of VIDCOs and WARDCOs; and (11) ensuring squatter control within the scheme area.

Resettled farmers on moving to a scheme have to rely on the team of Resettlement staff for directions and assistance to fully avail themselves of the government provided services. One major area, for instance, where such facilities are crucial to the survival of these farmers is in production.

By the time the farmer has completed moving to the village AGRITEX workers would have pegged all arable holdings and assisted each farmer with the construction of conservation works such as contours to check soil erosion. It is normal for the Tillage Team of the Development Section of DERUDE to undertake part of the land preparation free of charge for the newly resettled farmer. This consists usually of the clearing and plowing of 0.5 hectares of the farmer's 5 hectare holding which is done before the onset of first farming season. In addition the Resettlement Section of DERUDE supplies each farmer with a free crop package of seeds, fertilizers and pesticides for the 0.5 hectares. This is seen as a gesture to help the farmers to get established in their new environment during the initial year of resettlement.

From the very beginning resettled farmers are obligated to comply fully with all provisions in the permits to reside, cultivate and destock. For example, it is stipulated in the permit to cultivate that the holder shall

personally, actively and continuously carry on agricultural activities on the holding . . . comply in all respects with the provisions of, an regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act, the Animal Health Act, the Noxious Weeds Act and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock management.(See Appendix G, Table G-2)

The enforcement of these permits is the responsibility of the Resettlement Officer acting on behalf of DERUDE. In situations where a farmer does not abide by the stipulations DERUDE can recommend to the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to revoke permits and consequently evict a resettled household from any of the schemes.¹⁰

After the initial years of establishment farmers are expected to produce enough grain for subsistence, build up crop and livestock surpluses for sale and eventually achieve target household incomes of \$400 or more.

Towards the realization of this objective the Resettlement Credit Scheme a special unit of the AFC has been formed to assist farmers. The assistance is in the form of both short-term or one agricultural season and medium-term loans. The former is available to farmers in their second year of resettlement. During the third and subsequent years both medium and short-term loans are available to these farmers. The short-term loans pay directly for such services as contract plowing by the Tillage Team of DERUDE's Development Section. It also provides for the delivery of seeds, fertilizers and pesticide inputs through Cooperative suppliers.

The loan is repayable through a system of stop orders lodged by the AFC with the appropriate marketing organization, such as the Grains or Cotton Board, against crop delivery at the depot. The medium term loans on the other hand cater for the purchase of such items as scotch-carts, draft-oxen, fencing and other capital assets or implements. These loans are payable over a maximum period of five years. The loans are secured by the government and interest is charged at an economic rate.

Every February-March, about six months before the start of the agricultural season, Area Credit Officers of the AFC visit the resettlement schemes to hold meetings and explain the loan system to the farmers. From about May onwards farmers submit their applications to the AFC. Before the season commences the AFC issues buying orders for the items covered by the approved loans to registered cooperative suppliers. It then becomes the responsibility of the respective suppliers to physically arrange the delivery of those items to the farmers in the villages.

Another area where resettled farmers do benefit from loan facilities is in rural housing. The Ministry of Public Construction and National Housing has instituted a housing scheme in the resettlement areas. This scheme provides

for loans to build three to four roomed brick houses with steel-frame doors and windows and corrugated roofing. The scheme covers qualified farmers who have maintained resettlement for at least two years in the Model A schemes. The repayment plan is liberal and the loan is spread over a maximum of 30 years.

Conclusion

This Chapter has described how Zimbabwe is going about its agricultural resettlement program. Though the land question is essentially an economic issue it is nevertheless so emotional a development agenda that the measures being taken by the government to tackle it are rather political. This fact notwithstanding the relative smoothness with which the resettlement policy has been formulated, the planning executed and the implementation carried out so far is a major accomplishment in the African context.

In magnitude the Zimbabwe program is only surpassed by Tanzania's ujamaa or villagization program which is variously estimated to have affected anywhere between 5 to 10 million people. However, in terms of accomplishments to date the only comparable case might be Kenya in the 1960s. The Kenyan experiment was less involved as contrasted with Zimbabwe's. For instance, six years after its inception the Kenya program comprised only 123 resettlements embracing 31,081 families on 450,076 hectares (von Haugwitz 1972).

Even more importantly in comparative terms Zimbabwe has been able to avoid such costly policy flaws, planning inadequacies, implementation deficiencies, the terrible human sufferings and the disappointing results as those of Tanzania's ujamaa (see for instance, von Freyhold 1979; Hyden 1980; Hartmann 1981; Weaver and Kronemer 1981; Ergas 1982).¹¹

Notes

1.) In June 1985, the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was reorganized. It was expanded to incorporate the Ministry of Agriculture while its Rural Development section was taken away. It was therefore renamed the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. However, the primary responsibility for resettlement policy and implementation still resided in the Ministry.

2.) Under the Land Acquisition Bill (1986) the Inter Ministry Land Identification Advisory Committee (LIAC) makes the initial selection of prospective land for resettlement. This is done on block basis rather than by individual farms. LIAC then advises another body, namely, the Inter Ministry Land Selection Committee (LSC) about the suitability of the identified land. The LSC is not bound by the recommendations of the LIAC. Where it accepts LIAC's recommendations the LSC in turn recommends to the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to approve and accordingly designate such land for resettlement purposes.

Once such a designation is made the Government Valuation Office is instructed to negotiate with individual owners of farm properties within the block with a view to concluding conditional agreements of sale. When the price of a particular farm has been agreed upon and it is acceptable to the Ministry it acquires the farm. The status of the farm then changes from a privately owned freehold into state land managed by the Rural State Land Office of the Ministry.

Based on specific criteria laid down by the Ministry, AGRITEX evaluates each farm and makes recommendations about its suitability for a particular resettlement model. For instance, a fair sized farm with some developed infrastructure is usually planned for the Model B Producer Cooperative. To qualify for Model B such a farm, if it is in Agro-ecological or Natural Region II, has to have in addition 50 percent of its land area arable or potentially arable. Likewise, in Regions III, IV or V, where the proportion of arable land may be less, the farm has to have existing irrigation with water rights for about 50 hectares of supplementary irrigated summer crops. Any fair sized farm where the arable potential is high but would be very much reduced if developed as a Model B is planned into a Model C. This is usually the case where plantations such as coffee are involved, or where large irrigation systems for 200 hectares or more are present. Any farm property which does not meet the criteria for either a Model B or a Model C is developed into a Model A.

When a particular state land is ready for implementation as a resettlement scheme the Rural State Land Office instructs DERUDE to commence infrastructural developments on it.

3.) The Zunde is a traditional concept of production organization based on the voluntary cooperation of individual farm households to work specific tasks. In Zimbabwe's resettlement it is associated with the Model C scheme. In effect, it involves the cooperative management of the "core estate" by the would-be outgrowers who farm the scheme.

4.) Controlled products are agricultural produce so designated by the Grain Marketing Act (1966), which is still in force. The Act regulates the sale of

all such products. Currently, the products include the following: (1) peanuts (groundnuts)--shelled or unshelled, green, wet or dry; (2) coffee; (3) maize and maize-meal; (4) sorghum and sorghum-meal; (5) soya beans and soya-beans meal; (6) sunflower seed and sunflower seed-meal; (7) wheat and wheat-flour; (8) mhunga and mhunga -meal and (9) rapoko and rapoko -meal. Green maize on the cob for human consumption is not a controlled product.

Under the Act the country is divided into two classes known as Area 'A' and Area 'B'. The former comprises nearly all the large-scale commercial farming areas and a majority of the small-scale commercial farming areas. Area 'B' consists of all the Communal Areas, the Resettlement Schemes and certain Small-Scale Commercial Farm Areas which are wholly surrounded by communal lands, forest and game or wildlife reserves. Certain Large-Scale Commercial Farms in the Matabeleland Provinces which grow little or no maize also fall into Area 'B'.

The marketing of the listed products are controlled in Area 'A' and uncontrolled in Area 'B'. What this means in effect is that only the Grain Marketing Board or its approved contract buyers may purchase produce and transport them from Area 'A'. On the other hand, anybody is permitted to acquire, sell or re-sell controlled products in Area 'B' provided that those products do not leave the area or, if they do, avoid passing through Area 'A'. The only exception to the stipulations in this strictly enforced Act in respect of Area 'B' is when registered Cooperatives, Approved Buyers or farmers themselves transport the products directly for sale at the Board's depot. In this case they are allowed to pass through areas designated as 'A'.

5.) The Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development was so constituted in June 1985. Until then it was known as the Ministry of Local Government and Town Planning. The Rural Development section of the former Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was transferred to this Ministry. With this reorganization DERUDE became part of Local Government thus facilitating the integration of the established resettlement schemes into the District Councils. It is the ardent hope of the government that with the amalgamation of the schemes into the local government structures two things will happen. First, there would be a harmonious and integrated resource use between the schemes and the communal areas. Second, problem activities such as poach-grazing, indiscriminate tree felling and boundary fence stealing blamed on residents of Communal Areas would cease.

6.) In the Manicaland Province some of the squatter groups are well organized. Indeed, they maintain a network of Committees with elected officers. They are believed to even wield some influence over various political leaders. This was the case in Mutanda scheme. Schemes such as Romsley and Rusitu also have sizeable squatter populations. In his monthly report for February 1985, the Regional Rural Development Officer of Manicaland wrote: "The general squatter situation continues to deteriorate with increasing numbers of people reported to be moving onto land, especially, Nyamakawara, Odzani, Mpudzi II and Chipinge. . . . In the whole Province we are thinking in terms of thousands of families" (my emphasis). Eight months later, in October 1985, he wrote again: "We can't win here! At the moment there is pressure on us from both the pro-squatter and anti-squatter factions in the Province."

There were major problems also in the so-called European lands. Affected properties included Nyanga Downs, Eastern Highlands Tea Estates, farms in the Nyazura and Tsangwezi areas, Vergnoeg and Daisy Hill Farms in Chipinge and

Howth Farm in the Chigadora area, all in the Manicaland Province. One of these areas Nyanga Downs is the only quarantine area for potatoes within the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC) region. Consequently, the powerful Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) expressed concern to the government in regard to the pests and disease problems that the presence and uncontrolled activities of the squatters posed to the industry. In December 1984, these squatters were removed only to return in a matter of weeks. In May 1985, according to the Manicaland monthly report, "Squatters who were illegally occupying Nyanga Quarantine Area were [again] physically removed. All huts have been destroyed. This was a joint exercise by the Ministries of Home Affairs, Local Government. . . and Derude."

The official explicit thinking of the government about this problem is that squatting is an unlawful act liable for prosecution in the civil courts. Land owners therefore have the right to institute legal proceedings against illegal occupants of their land. It is also the responsibility of the Police to assist land owners and court officials to evict squatters ordered removed by the courts. In instances in the Manicaland Province farm owners have engaged the services of attorneys to get the courts to order the removal of squatters from their properties.

It needs to be mentioned that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement has laid down procedures for resettling "qualified" squatters who are willing to go through the process as every applicant does (see Selection Criteria above in this Chapter).

7.) AGRITEX calculates Livestock Units (LU) on the following basis:

1.5	Cattle = 1 LU	5	Goats = 1 LU
1.5	Donkeys = 1 LU	4	Sheep = 1 LU

The livestock carrying capacity of 1 LU is equivalent to 5.2 hectares

8.) Of the problems plaguing the Model B Producer Cooperatives high membership turnover is quite prevalent or almost universal. The problem that the policy modification tackles, however, relates to parcelization of cooperatively owned land and privatization of cultivation. These are against the cooperative principles and the Bye-Laws of the Model B Schemes. However, before and during 1985 this problem was occurring in such schemes as Tabudirira, Kumanhya and Mount Saint Mary in Mashonaland East Province and at Nyakudya in the Mashonaland Central Province.

Mount Saint Mary was established as a Model B scheme in 1983. Since then the members have parcelled the arable land among themselves setting aside only about 25 hectares during the 1985 season as the collectively-cultivated property. Each household keeps and maintains its own livestock. When it comes to the application for seasonal loans from the AFC, input procurement and the marketing of produce then they all come together. This is at variance with government policy on Model B resettlement. However, a lot of politics permeates this issue and it has not been easy for the bureaucrats in DERUDE and the Department of Cooperative Development (DECODE) to enforce the rules.

Nyakudya is another classic case. In 1982, the Chaona Estate was turned over to a group of residents from the nearby Chiweshe Communal Area. About 80 percent of them used to stay at Benjge Kraal. The farm was registered and initially operated as a Model B Producer Cooperative. In 1985, the members set aside about 60 hectares as the collective farm and parcelled out the rest among themselves. They claim that is exactly the original agreement which they

and their Sabuku (chief) entered into in 1982 with the government's District Administrative Officer, Concession District, Mashonaland Central Province.

There is an increasing tendency among some of these Model B Schemes to operate along Model C lines. Now that the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement has institutionalized a system of regulated individual holdings to cater for household subsistence needs it is the belief of the government that the problem of large-scale parcellization of plots and privatization of cultivation in some of these Model B Producer Cooperatives would cease.

9.) The selection criteria for the Model B schemes are different from the other schemes where specific qualifications have to be met (see above in this Chapter on Selection and Allocation Procedures). In the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes membership is open. Individuals, married or unmarried, have to apply to the Management Committee of the respective cooperative for membership. If an applicant agrees to subscribe to the cooperative principles, as laid down by the Registrar of Cooperatives and also abide by the existing Bye-Laws then he or she is automatically accepted. This acceptance is usually probational and it is confirmed or rejected within 60 days by the majority of the membership voting at the general assembly.

10.) In the initial years of resettlement, particularly in 1982 the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development was reported on many occasions of warning that loafers or lazy farmers will be evicted (see for instance, The Herald, October 17, 1982; November 2, 1982; December 2, 1982 and May 25, 1983).

However, the records both nationally and for the Mashonaland Region hardly show any evictions so far. In the drought years of 1982 and 1983, when there was widespread hunger in many parts of rural Zimbabwe, a few resettled farmers who could not cope with the relatively hard life in their new environment abandoned resettlement for the more socially secure and supportive life in the Communal Areas, European-owned farms or even the urban areas from where they originally moved into resettlement.

In Mufurudzi, with 563 resettled households, there were only three cases on record between 1980 and 1985 to evict farmers who allegedly were not complying with the terms of the resettlement permits.

In the first case involving a farmer in Banana village he was reported in 1982 of maintaining a permanent home in Harare while employing a laborer to take care of his home and farm in the resettlement scheme. Secondly, whenever he visited Banana he engaged in fights with everybody because he always insisted on using his motorized pump to draw water from the Mufurudzi stream to irrigate his crops at a time when water was very scarce because of the drought. As a result of these problems he was given the option to leave the resettlement program or stay and comply with the conditions in the permits. He opted out.

In the second case of a farmer in Gatu village it was alleged that he black-marketed all the inputs that were supplied him in 1982 under the AFC credit program. He was also accused by his colleagues in the village of being a drunk, lazy person and a bad example of a resettled farmer. Facing possible eviction he abandoned the resettlement.

The final case involved an incident in Chitepo village in 1985 when an attempt by the Resettlement Assistant, acting apparently on the orders of the Resettlement Officer, visited a farmer and demanded him to surrender his permits of resettlement for non-compliance. The father of this farmer was also resettled in the same village where they were viewed by the Resettlement Team

as lazy and problem farmers. They were accused of always organizing against the Team and leading their colleagues to oppose community programs. Indeed, the two were singled out to be the ring leaders in the Mukwari school incident. This was when many of the farmers in Chitepo village withdrew their children from Mukwari, one of the four elementary schools administered as part of Mufurudzi, and enrolled them at the nearby non-resettlement Chindunduma school.

However, the reason for wanting to evict this farmer was for his being effectively single though he always claimed that his wife was joining him. In the process of the officer's attempt to physically take the farmer's permits the latter assaulted him. The incident was reported to the police and the farmer was charged, convicted for assault and fined.

While DERUDE officials in the Mashonaland Regional office agreed that the farmer was evictable for non-compliance they chided the Resettlement Assistant for his methods which were completely outside the laid-down administrative procedures for eviction. The officer was transferred to another resettlement scheme and as at December 1985, over five months after the incident, the farmer had not been evicted from Chitepo village.

11.) Nowhere in Africa has any government attempted to resettle so many as in Tanzania's ujamaa. That fact perhaps explains the legion of problems and failure that almost every reviewer associates with the program.

Kenya's so-called Million Acre Settlement Scheme comprised the high and low density and the yeoman resettlements in the White Highlands. It should be noted though that the Kenya program did not involve the large-scale provision of such basic needs services and facilities ranging from health care centers, clean water, schools and better access roads to cattle dipping and veterinary services as it is the case in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER VI
CONTINUITY IN CHANGE: THE PRESERVATION OF THE OLD AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW FARMING SYSTEMS

Introduction

Writing about decision making processes among the so-called commercial farmers in Zimbabwe Douglas McClymont characterizes the country as having

two distinct kinds of farmer. There is the commercial farmer who produces the bulk of the saleable agricultural produce and the communal farmer, the tribesman, who basically farms to grow food for his own and his family's subsistence. (McClymont 1984:150)

Though the structure and organization of agriculture in Zimbabwe is essentially dualistic the kind of stereotypic portrait, which McClymont paints here, is too simplistic to reflect the realities of the diverse farming systems and farmers of a country that is certainly a leader in African agriculture.

Today, as in 1984 when McClymont reported, the farming systems of Zimbabwe embrace both the old and the new. The old system comprises the following: (1) Large-Scale Farms; (2) Small-Scale Farms; and (3) Communal Area Farms while the new is made up of the Resettlement program Farms and the State Farms.

These old and new farming systems are described below as a prelude to the review of the kinds of empirical responses that their respective farmers generate to aspects of policy on agricultural resettlement formulated and implemented by the government. The State Farms are left out of this review because that system does not have "farmers" as such. They are operated as firms and they employ farm laborers to produce for the State.¹

The Large-Scale (European Commercial) Farms Sector

In official parlance the large-scale farms are known as the Large-Scale Commercial Farms. They used to be called the European Commercial Farms and they date back to the 1890s (see Hunt 1971; Hodder-Williams 1983). By and large the great majority of these farms are still owned by Europeans under a system of freehold tenure. Almost invariably all farm owners in this sector are members of the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), a very powerful political and economic force in the country. McClymont presents us with what he calls a real picture of the Zimbabwean commercial farmer. According to him

the farmer tends to be a caucasian of around 45 years old, married, with three to four children. He has worked on a farm for most of his life and is either the son or grandson of a pioneer farmer or has entered farming because it is a profitable and challenging way of life. Typically, he served a farming apprenticeship with some well known senior farmer before borrowing the money from the 'Land Bank' to start on his own. (McClymont 1984:150)

Having given this background he continues with their work ethics arguing further that most of these farmers

have either had to open up their farms from virgin bush or develop established farms for intense commercial production. Thus, there is an element of pioneering spirit and basic personal motivation among all of them. (McClymont 1984:150)

The large farms are distributed throughout the country. However, the most productive of them in terms of crop output are confined to the better Natural Regions I, II and to some extent III. These cover mainly the Mashonaland and Manicaland Provinces (see Figure 1-1). In all there are currently about 5,000 large farms and they occupy nearly 15 million hectares (Billing 1985:20).

The modal farm size nationally is between 1,500 to 2,000 hectares (Whitsun 1983:33). Some farms or ranches in Natural Regions III and IV, mostly in the Midlands, Masvingo and Matabeleland Provinces (see Figure 1-1), are quite large. For instance, the average size of the 23 holdings European-owned farms making up the Limpopo Intensive Conservation Area is 35,800 hectares (Kay 1970:105). In fact, as far back as the late 1960s one particular farm, Liebigs ranch, in Matabeleland carried some 40,000 cattle on 52,000 hectares (Kay 1970:105).

The three Mashonaland Provinces are the primary cropping region in the country. In the region the modal cropped area for maize is about 250 hectares per farm and between 100 and 125 hectares per farm for tobacco or cotton or other crops.

There is a lot of regional diversity within Zimbabwe's large farm sector. But as it is expected these farms exhibit certain common characteristics, including (1) enterprise specialization, (2) intensive reliance on capitalization for some activities, (3) the use of scientific inputs and (4) dependence on African laborers. According to the Whitsun Foundation the cropping standards on these farms are generally high. The average maize yields are in the range of 4 - 6 tonnes per hectare and the value of crops produced per farm is typically in the range of \$125,000 to \$250,000 per year (Whitsun 1983:34). Indeed, between 1964 and 1982 the volume of output on these large farms grew at more than 3.6 percent annually (Hawkins 1984:4).

The Whitsun Foundation argues that

The profile which emerges of the large-scale commercial farmer in the main cropping regions of the country is one of a formidable agricultural entrepreneur. He has a large farm, he runs a big operation, and he sells large volumes of produce. Although he owns a large holding he is certainly not an idle landlord, for he is first and foremost a farmer and a very productive one at that. (Whitsun 1984:35)

The high productivity of the large farm sector generally is not a matter which is questioned. The sector is the backbone of the country's economy being a source of food self-sufficiency and security, foreign exchange, employment and raw materials for agro-manufacturing and other businesses. The government therefore has even explicitly committed itself to encouraging its survival and growth (Zimbabwe 1981d:55). However, the nature and intensity of land utilization within the sector is a controversial issue of much interest to many protagonists who study the political economy of land and race in Zimbabwe.

For instance, the Whitsun Foundation apparently sees a high land use intensity on these large farms. It (Whitsun 1983:34) cites a survey conducted in 1982 by the Hawkins Associates for the World Bank which states that in five of "six selected [Intensive Conservation Areas] in the main cropping regions of the country . . . the percentage utilization of arable land was over 75 %." Lacking any additional information on the total land availability and the proportion of the arable area covered by the ICAs in question it is impossible to evaluate the land use intensity index quoted here by Whitsun in any meaningful context.

Figures given by George Kay, though somewhat dated, indicate however that nowhere in the large farm areas does cropped land constitute a large proportion of the farm land. Taking intensity of land use to be the area under crops as a percentage of the total farm land Kay (1970:106-107) comes out with the following regional variations: (1) Mashonaland Region 8.0 - 8.6 percent; (2) Manicaland Province 3.4 percent; (3) Midlands Province 1.8 percent; (4) Masvingo (formerly Victoria) Province, excluding the high intensity Chiredzi District, 0.7 percent; and (5) Matabeleland Region 0.5 percent.

These are very low by any standards especially given the facts of land pressure, ecological degradation and poverty in many of the Communal Areas

around the country. As it was reviewed in Chapter II above Roger Riddell (1978a, 1978b, 1979b, 1980) provides ample evidence to support the thesis that the European settlers were not intensively using their available farm lands. This pattern of low intensity is reported to still characterize landuse in postindependence large-scale European-owned farms in the country. According to Weiner et al.

[Although the average size of the 2,626 large-scale commercial farms in Mashonaland was 1,640 hectares, the average area under crops during 1981-2 was only 168 hectares for each holding. Also, in that year, as many as 468 farms--or 17.8 per cent of the total number in Mashonaland--did not grow any crops at all. (Weiner et al. 1985:257)

Since independence in 1980 the government has acquired some of the mostly inefficient and underutilized farms including many that are apparently managed by absentee landlords (Whitsun 1983:35). Consequently, there is about 15 percent reduction in the number of the large farms throughout the country (Hawkins 1984:5). It needs to be borne in mind, however, that of the 1.7 million hectares of land purchased by the government up to July 1984 for all Model A Intensive resettlement schemes 81 percent were in the marginal Natural Regions III, IV and V where crop production is constrained (see Weiner et al. 1985:259, Table 2).

The passage of the Lands Acquisition Bill by the government in 1986 to facilitate the identification and speedy acquisition of "derelict" lands by the state for public use (see Chapter V above) very clearly reflects this concern and the frustrations about getting commercial farmers to put their lands to intensive use.

A number of both short and long term constraints confront the large farm sector. According to Hawkins (1984:5) there appears to be a "crisis of confidence [arising from] shortage of foreign exchange and the profitability

squeeze linked in turn to escalating input costs." There is no doubt that this problem is rather a general one which faces the entire agricultural and other economic sectors. Of specific interest, however, is the labor situation in most of the large farms. For instance, in 1974 these farms employed at their peak about 366,000 workers representing 35 percent of the total employment in the formal economy. However, by 1984 this had declined by almost 30 percent to about 260,000 workers.

The Small-Scale (African Commercial) Farms Sector

In the past the category of Small-Scale Commercial Farms were referred to as the Native Purchase Areas and, lately, as the African Purchase Areas. According to Billing (1985:20) these Areas presently comprise some 1.5 million hectares and are occupied by some 9,000 African farmers. These farmers were seen as constituting the cream of enterprising "natives," better motivated than their "tribal" area cultivators and who had the opportunity to replicate some of the high management and productivity "miracles" achieved by the country's white farmers.

Today, the political and other interests of these Small-Scale farmers are represented by one of the country's three farmers' organizations, namely, the Zimbabwe National Farmers' Union.

Distributed throughout the country the Small-Scale Commercial farming system and farmers have been the focus of numerous studies (see Powys-Jones 1955; Massell and Johnson 1968; Johnson 1970; Bembridge 1974; Cheater 1978, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984; Mungate 1983). The creation of these Small-Scale Commercial farms began in 1931 with the passage of the Land Apportionment Act (see Chapter II above).

George Kay states that the establishment of these farms in various areas of the country was a

compensation for the Africans' loss of the right to purchase land anywhere in Rhodesia on the same terms as members of other races. It was intended that holdings in these areas should be owned or leased by individuals and that they should be of such size as to be viable and profitable family farms in the hands of progressive, well trained Africans. (Kay 1970:93)

As Kay points out further the demand for these farms exceeded the availability of holdings. In 1946 there were over 2,000 outstanding applications. Of the Africans allocated farms at that time only 20 percent had freehold titles with the remaining farmers leasing their holdings. In 1953 "all applicants were required to have the Master Farmer's Certificate [issued by the Department of Agricultural Extension], and shortly afterwards they also had to have capital assets to the value of at least 300." (Kay 1970:93). Yet, in some cases "farms were allocated to ex-civil servants and others in reward for long service, and not necessarily in relation to farming ability" (Whitsun 1978:13).

In spite of the rather stringent conditions that were introduced to restrict access to these farms the waiting list for them continued to exceed allocations leading to the termination of applications in 1956. Consequently, many residents in the Reserves or Communal Areas never realized their dreams to benefit from access to relatively large hectares and other preferential facilities such as extension, guaranteed inputs and produce markets which were made available to these Small-Scale Commercial farmers throughout the country.

Given all these services at the disposal of these farmers it was thought that they would be successful commercial producers and role models for their peasant counterparts in the Communal Areas. In fact, that is the thesis that

the Whitsun Foundation presents. In its assessment

[I]n terms of tenure, in terms of productiveness and market orientation, the Purchase Lands represent a successful (if relatively small) experiment in the transformation of peasant farming. While many problems remain with the . . . farmer, and while his needs for extension, credit, marketing and other services are as great as that of the tribal farmer, he has demonstrated that freehold farming is often a viable option for the rural African and that the Purchase Land experiment holds important potential as a model for future expansion of African commercial farming. (Whitsun 1978: 14, emphasis added)

Angela Cheater, who perhaps has closely studied the social and political economy of these farms in Zimbabwe more than any researcher, agrees with this assessment (see Cheater 1984:9-13).

This rather glorious evaluation, however, is exceptional. Most studies of these farms show on the contrary that only a negligible percentage of the farmers have successfully made it. George Kay (1970:95-97) concludes that "the general picture that emerges of farming in these [African Purchase] areas is disappointing." Bembridge (1974:57), in a study of one such area in Matabeleland, has a similar view stating: "The original aim of creating prosperous middle-class families in the area . . . has not been successful." Roger Riddell elaborates these observations as follows:

The creation of the Purchase Areas has done very little to solve the basic problems of the African rural areas. A large proportion of the land is not used and the individual tenure system has not proved to be an adequate base for promoting agricultural development or for making an efficient use of the land within the present economic structure. Small farms, low levels of capitalisation, the minimal use made of credit facilities and a large number of family-dependants have all contributed to the maintenance of a subsistence-based system of farming for the majority of PA cultivators. . . . If one is looking for ways of solving the land and population problems of the TTLs through constructing a framework for a more efficient use of the land and an increase in agricultural production then the PA scheme does not provide the answer. (Riddell 1978c:55)

A more recent estimation by the Whitsun Foundation of these Small-Scale Commercial farms apparently reverses its (Whitsun 1978) earlier position and now supports the general observations about their poor performance. It (Whitsun 1983:46-47) contrasts the Small-Scale Commercial with the Large-Scale Commercial farms and sees little specialization in the former according to agro-ecological region. In its view the Small-Scale Commercial sector or "farming system is . . . not intensive or highly productive." Furthermore the sizes of the small farms are also much the same throughout the country, averaging in 1977 some 125 hectares. The mean area cultivated then was just 11 hectares and the mean cattle head per farmer was 22. On the average maize yields on these farms over the years were 1.5 tonnes per hectare (see Whitsun 1983:46-47).

Today, if there have been any change in the situation of these Small-Scale Commercial farmers it is perhaps in terms of tenancy. The majority of them now have freehold titles with only a few still leasing their farm land from the government.

The Communal Area (Peasant) Farms Sector

Farming in the Communal or the African peasant areas is what has been characterized by many observers as tribal, subsistence or quasi-subsistence economy. The African rural areas were designated as Communal Areas by a Legislative Act in 1982. Presently, there are a total of 174 separate Communal Areas dotted across the country. In all these cover some 16.4 million hectares. In what obviously is an underestimation Billings (1985:20) states that these provide homes for 700,000 farming families.

It needs to be stressed here that the concept of communalism in this context does not imply any collective living or production arrangements. Indeed, these areas are mostly characterized by dispersed homesteads of individual households. Households, including even urban residents, maintain usufructuary rights to arable plots which are de jure state property. However, these lands in the Communal Areas are under the effective control in many cases of respective individual lineage heads, sabuku or headmen and even VIDCO chairmen. Households or their individual members who have livestock enjoy uninterrupted access to community controlled grazing land. As Jordan (1974:71) sums it: "The producer in African areas is the individual farmer supported by his immediate family."

Before these areas became Communal Areas they were variously called the Native Reserves or the Tribal Trust Lands (see Chapter II above). But that was after the advent of European immigrant-settlers and the consequent forced removals of African groups from their original homes into territories created for their settlement.

Available evidence indicates that these indigenous peoples, mostly of Shona origin, were cultivators and pastoralists who supplemented their food requirements with resources obtained through hunting, gathering and fishing. At one point or the other some of them engaged in long-distance commerce as well as mining.

David Beach (1974) in a classic seminar paper about the various branches of production within the precapitalist phase of Shona economy reviews the primacy of the cropping system upon which these cultures depended. He states (Beach 1974:4-5) that the "Shona communities were all basically agricultural, in that the most important activity of the greatest number of their people was the production of food by growing crops."

Elaborating this fact further Beach (1974:6) points out that the crops available to these farmers were limited initially to rukweza or rapoko (finger millet), mhunga (balrush- or pearl-millet), mapfunde (sorghum). These were much later expanded to include chibagwe (maize), mupunga (rice), nzungu (groundnuts/peanuts), nyimo (bambara nuts) and nyemba (cowpeas). Other crops mentioned elsewhere in association with early indigenous farmers of Zimbabwe include mwiwa (watermelon), mbambaira (sweet potatoes), ipwa (sweet cane) and nhanga (pumpkin) (see Reid 1977:101-102). Today, these crops are traditionally grown by African farmers for subsistence. Most of them are also cultivated in addition to cotton and, to a minimal extent, tobacco for the market.

Some studies fault peasant agriculture by evaluating its poor performance through the myopic perspectives of European farming. For instance, George Kay characterizes the agricultural problems of the communal lands rather naively as

[S]imply . . . consist[ing], first, of pressure upon the land by primitive peoples and their livestock such as to constitute an immediate and increasing threat to the natural resources of the land in question and of adjacent areas; and, secondly, of the dire poverty and limiting ignorance of the tribesmen. (Kay 1970:83)

Given the general ecological degradation and problems of the Communal Areas, such as are extensively described in Chapter II above, the farming system associated with these areas has persistently been highly unproductive. Recent studies by Gobbins and Prankerd (1983:152) in the Mashonaland West Province, for example, showed the following variations in yield for maize during the 1981-82 season. For these respective Communal Areas, which happen to be in the same Natural Region II, the outputs were (1) Zwimba 28 bags (2,548 kilograms) per hectare; (2) Chirau 19 bags (1,729 kilograms);

(3) Magondi 14 bags (1,274 kilograms); and (4) Umfuli 9 bags (819 kilograms) per hectare.

The Whitsun Foundation discusses a joint survey in the Chibi District, Masvingo Province, carried out in 1981 by the Department of Land Management, University of Zimbabwe and the Department of Research and Specialist Services (R & SS) in the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.

The Chibi survey essentially replicated findings by other researchers who looked at the land and capital assets of communal land farmers around the country. On the average these farmers have about 11 hectares of which only 3 to 4 hectares are arable. The significant paradox of Communal Area farming system is the paradox is the simultaneous existence of a general lack of draft and other oxen, on the part of majority of farmers, and the devastatingly high stocking rates.

For example, the survey found the following crucial distinction among the Chibi farmers. Those with draft animals cultivated an average area of 3.23 hectares as compared to 2.40 hectares by those without. The grain harvested by the former averaged 25.7 (x 91 kg.) bags in contrast to only 9.4 (x 91 kg.) bags produced by the farmers without draft-oxen. Consequently, while the draft-constrained farmers made a mean cash income of \$105.00 those with draft power made \$240.00 (Whitsun 1983:39).

The contradictions which encapsulate the farming system and the farmers of the Communal Areas are summarized by the Whitsun Foundation thus

The picture which emerges is of an ecologically unsustainable system of farming and of over-crowded cultivators of whom only some 10-15% are productive farmers producing good or very good crops. The others are subsistence cultivators who are not putting enough into their crops to make them worthwhile, nor enough into the soil to maintain its fertility. They therefore face even lower crop yields in the future, with the continued degradation of the land. (Whitsun 1983:38)

At any rate, in evaluating the current performance of peasant or communal land agriculture one needs to be reminded of its antecedent evolution under European settler colonialism and also recognize the presently changed situation in the political economy of the country.

The fact is that these farmers were restrained by past government policies from fully participating in commercial production. This situation forced many able-bodied persons into wage employment in European agriculture, mining and the urban areas. What was left of farmers were mostly the women, children and the old. In the circumstance once the vicious cycle of selective rural outmigration, increasing household sizes and dependancy, overutilization of the limited resources and ecological degradation set in the consequent poverty and underdevelopment of Communal Area agriculture were inevitable (see Chapter II above).

Given this rather depressing perspective many rural dwellers appear to be taking farming more seriously in postindependent Zimbabwe. This development may be in response to the government's policy which ensures high producer prices as well as improved access and delivery of agricultural credits, services and inputs to this hitherto neglected peasant sector.

The agricultural wage increases which came into effect in mid-1985, the second since independence in 1980, placed a burden on the ability of European farmers to employ as many African laborers as they may need. Without the security of such employment there is virtually no alternative source of income for many rural households outside their own farm plots. Nevertheless, a number of Africans do not also even want to work anymore as laborers on European farms. They desire to be resettled by the government (see Chapter VII below). A few of them who cannot wait have spontaneously squatted on European and state lands (see Chapter V above).

These trends present a crisis to most people in the Communal Areas. They also demand a more serious commitment on the part of these people towards farming, a challenge which is being realized. There is mounting and impressive evidence which shows that the government's investment in peasant agriculture is paying dividends. Many of these so-called subsistence farmers are now increasingly producing a surplus for the market (see Chapter II above).

Felicity Wood, writing about the role of extension in the success story of Zimbabwe, alludes to the fact mentioned in Chapter II above that Communal Area farmers and their counterparts in the resettlement and the Small-Scale Commercial farms have responded remarkably to production incentives.

Before 1981 there was seldom more than 130,000 tonnes of surplus maize for sale from African producers. In 1981 the surplus generated by this sector was 324,000 tonnes rising to 400,000 the following year (Wood 1984:11). In 1985 Zimbabwe produced nearly 2.0 million tonnes of maize. The estimation by The Economist (1986:15) that 58 percent of this total production came from the African areas contrasts vividly with the situation ten years ago. In 1975-76 these farmers produced just 26.5 percent of the total of 1.64 million tonnes of the maize output (see Zimbabwe 1982c:40, Table 21).

It is only a little over a decade now that George Kay (1970:83) described Zimbabwean peasants as "primitive and ignorant" and even much later when the Whitsun Foundation (Whitsun 1983:38) asserted that these Communal Area farmers were not putting enough into their crops and land. Yet, there is perhaps no other country in Africa where smallholder farmers have so quickly and successfully turned their output and productivity around as in Zimbabwe today. There, smallholders including the newly resettled households which are mostly in the Model A Schemes are spearheading a revolution in food self-sufficiency and regional subsistence security.

Resettlement Program Farms

Farms in this new farming systems category fall into the various models described above in Chapter V. The two major ones of interest to this study are the Model A Resettlement and the Model B Producer Cooperative schemes. The former with its Normal and Accelerated variants consists of individual family holdings of 5 hectares arable plots. The latter is made up of collectively-organized and managed properties. These are on-going schemes and the oldest among them were set up in the latter part of 1980.

As was pointed out earlier in Chapter IV to date only a few papers have dealt with the resettlement issue and even fewer still have reported what is going on specifically in resettlement agriculture (see Kinsey 1982, 1985; Ivy 1983; AGRITEX 1984; Zimbabwe 1984c; Mumbengegwi 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Munslow 1985; Weiner et al. 1985; Geza 1986; Moyo 1986). The unpublished report by Mumbengegwi (1984b) on the Model B Producer Cooperatives is perhaps the only one of its kind that benefitted from extended survey interviews and therefore presents the responses of the farmers concerned. Indeed, virtually nothing comprehensive has been done thus far to systematically study the responses of the resettled farmers and more so to compare them across schemes and models.

Farms in the Model A Sector

Weiner et al. (1985), in their paper on land use and agricultural productivity, contrast developments within the resettlement and the alternate farming systems in the country. They argue strongly for resettlement and point out that peasants can and will respond by producing greater marketed surplus

with significantly less inputs when conditions are right. In their view (Weiner *et al.* 1985:284) there is a strong evidence that yields from the settlement schemes could become comparable to those achieved on Large-Scale Commercial Farms.

The Farm Management Research Section of the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Development also collaborated with the Department of Land Management, University of Zimbabwe, during the 1982-83 farming season to collate management records kept by some farmers in seven Model A Normal Schemes throughout the country. These schemes were (1) Mpudzi and Nyagundi in Manicaland Province, (2) Mukorsi, Soti Source and Chizvirizvi in Masvingo, (3) Sengezi in Mashonaland East and (4) Mufurudzi in the Mashonaland Central Province (Figure 1-1).

According to the report (Zimbabwe 1984c:7) "the very serious drought experienced during the season adversely affected the economic performance of small farm producers in the survey." Thus only Mukorsi showed an overall net farm profit. Even then this was well below the annual target income per farmer of \$400 plus subsistence set by the government for resettled farmers.

For these resettlement schemes most of the area cropped was for dryland maize which achieved very low yields. In fact, except for Mufurudzi and Sengezi the average total maize yields were well below households' subsistence requirements. This was in spite of the fact that a large proportion of the variable farm expenditure in all the schemes also went into maize. The expenditure was mainly for fertilizer, seed and land preparation (Zimbabwe 1984c:11).

The report also indicates that all the schemes received credit from the AFC. Thus, interest and arrears interest charges formed a large proportion of total overhead expenses. These arrears interest charges arose from the 1981-82

season when most schemes experienced severe drought conditions and farmers were unable to to fully redeem their AFC loans. In a summary conclusion the report had this to say about the performance and potential of Model A schemes:

[I]t is obvious that the whole farm economic performance of resettlement farms . . . would have been much better in conditions of normal rainfall. An increase in livestock holdings to optimum levels should also improve the economic viability of resettlement farms and counterbalance the risk of losses through crop failures by minimizing these in the drier parts of the country. (Zimbabwe 1984c:12)

Farmers' Characteristics in the Model B Sector

According to Mumbengegwi (1984b:4) at the official or governmental level the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes are regarded not only as instruments to promote rural development but as major experiments that will spearhead the transformation towards socialist agriculture. His (Mumbengegwi 1984b) research conducted during the 1982-83 farming season covered sample farmers drawn from (1) Batsiranayi and Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central and (2) Kwaedza, Shandisai Pfungwa and Mount Saint Mary's in the Mashonaland East Province (Figure 3-1). The following summary account of developments within the Model B Schemes draws from his report.

He indicates that the mean age of these pioneer members of the cooperatives was 38 and the modal age 23. There was a predominance of males who comprised 64 percent of the membership. In all 78 percent were married and the average family size was five. In terms of the membership composition 66 percent of all members were former Communal Area peasants followed by former commercial farm employees 16 percent, former urban unemployed 10 percent and demobilized guerrillas or former combatants in the liberation war who numbered only 9 percent. The level of education attained by these cooperative members

was low and that 28 percent did not have any formal schooling at all.

The areas and levels of skill were low. Although between 67 percent in Simba Youth and 100 percent in Mount Saint Mary's considered themselves to possess farming experience this was either as farm laborers, landless peasants or juvenile dependants of farm households in the Communal Areas. Consequently, most of the reported skills were "not central to agricultural production activities of the cooperatives" (Mumbengegwi 1984b:16).

There was a preponderance of the economic motive in joining the cooperative this being the reason offered by 98 percent of the members with the remaining 2 percent being motivated by socialist ideological reasons. To test the degree of commitment of these farmers to the cooperative endeavor they were asked to respond to three questions relating to the following alternative modes of gainful employment: (1) commercial farm laborer at the minimum agricultural wage of \$50 per month; (2) urban worker at the minimum industrial wage of \$105; and (3) Model A Normal Scheme or Communal Area farmer if enough farm land was provided. From the responses Mumbengegwi arrives at a conclusion which states:

[I]t would be fair to observe that the cooperative members degree of commitment to producer cooperatives is somewhat ambivalent in the sense that a substantial to a very high proportion would leave the cooperative for alternative employment at a "sufficient" but low rate of remuneration. Given that our suggested alternative modes of employment are not highly remunerative, this seems to suggest that members expectations of the performance of their cooperatives are also very low. (Mumbengegwi 1984b:29)

In terms of agricultural resources and productivity the five Model B Producer Cooperatives that Mumbengegwi (1984b) studied all lie in the better agro-ecologically endowed Natural Region II where, incidentally, many of the most productive Large-Scale Commercial farms are located. However, the

"average land productivity for all the cooperatives combined was 39% and labour productivity was 53% of that on the large scale commercial farming sector (Mumbengegwi 1984b:50).

This unimpressive performance coupled with general problems of financial mismanagement and embezzlements as well as indebtedness translated into generally low average annual incomes received by the cooperative members. This ranged from the low of \$75 in Simba Youth through \$81 in Kwaedza, \$118 in Shandisai Pfungwa, \$154 in Batsiranayi to a maximum of \$260 in Mount Saint Mary's. All these were well below the target annual income of \$400 per year set by the government for the resettled households (This issue is pursued in much more detail in Chapter VIII below).

Conclusion

The foregoing background notes about the major farming systems from which farmers were interviewed (see Chapter IV above) have been provided here to give a contextual framework for the presentation of the case study and evaluation findings. These are respectively set out below in Chapters VII and VIII.

Note

1.) In a way the State Farms are not a new farming system as such. In fact, the white settler-colonial administration operated state-controlled estates for the production of such major crops as cotton, maize, rice, wheat and sugar cane throughout the 1960s and 1970s. With independence in 1980 the government mandated the newly formed Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) to take over the management of these large, heavily mechanized and irrigated estates which now number about 18 (For a brief review of the State Farms sector see Moyo 1985).

CHAPTER VII
CASE STUDY OF FARMERS AND THEIR RESPONSES TO RESETTLEMENT POLICY AND PROGRAMS:
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE

Introduction

This chapter consists of a description of case study findings about the characteristics of farmers and their survey responses to various questions that relate to (1) current agricultural and resettlement policies and (2) farmers' self assessment of agricultural matters that are important to their lives, work performance and their community.

The presentation is organized essentially around the Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement program. As it was pointed out in Chapter IV above the Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme is the central focus of this study. Many aspects of the respective responses from farmers in the various farming systems are analyzed and evaluated from the comparative perspective of Mufurudzi farmers. The responses are presented in the form of a series of tables of frequencies, percentages and means. A rather descriptive analysis of these tables covering various study variables (see Appendix D, Table D-1 to D-5) is offered. Except where warranted the presentation is done without much attempt to give detailed explanations to the observed patterns. However, some aspects of the findings which need highlighting are elaborated upon in the summary.

The responses to what are considered to be issues of specific interest to particular farming systems are discussed separately as such under the relevant system. However, the responses to common questions are presented together as a way to draw on the comparative or contrasting patterns within and between the systems. The presentation is done under seven themes of as follows: (1) responses of commercial and communal farmers to some background issues

relating to their respective farming systems; (2) social and demographic characteristics; (3) evaluation of government policies and programs; (4) attitudes and perceptions about life situation; (5) material resources and capital assets; (6) farm-level constraints; and (7) household developmental cycle, micro-level agricultural characteristics and economic performance.

Farmers: Responses to Some Background Issues
From the Commercial and Communal Areas' Farmers

The Large-Scale Commercial Farmers of Bindura Intensive
Cultivation Area

For this study a total of nine large-scale commercial farmers, all of them Europeans, responded to a questionnaire (see Appendix D, Table D-5) mailed to them. These farmers owned lands in the Bindura Intensive Cultivation Area (see Figure 7-1). They were all male and ranged in ages from 39 to 63 years with a mean and median age of 49. The average or typical farmer in the area had a college education which he completed in about 1967. The farmer with the most years of farming connection to the area had been farming in Bindura since 1951 while the one with the least had been there since 1975. About half of these farmers took to farming straight from college while a third of them worked in agricultural-related jobs prior to their entry into farming.

All these farmers owned the properties that they farmed on freehold tenure basis having purchased them at one time or the other between 1964 and 1983. Their total farm sizes ranged from a low of 150 hectares to a high of 1,296 hectares with a mean size of 534. The monetary worth of the farms were also valued by the owners to be between \$65,000 and \$300,000 with a mean of \$154,167. Only one farmer reported that the size of his farm was inadequate




FIGURE 7 - 1
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: CASE STUDY AREAS

for his needs. He would buy more land to expand. The others found their land to be adequate and therefore did not contemplate any purchase or expansion. Fifty-five percent of the farmers intended to pass the property on to a family member eventually, but the rest had "other" unspecified plans towards the disposal of their farms.

Four of these farms shared a common boundary with the Madziwa Communal Area (Figure 7-1). Six out of the nine farmers had their farms trespassed upon by residents and livestock from the Communal Area. Seven farmers were approached before and they offered agricultural advice and other farm-related assistance to farmers in the Communal Area. However, only one was ever contacted and he gave assistance to a farmer in the government-sponsored resettlement scheme. The nearby schemes include Mufurudzi and Mount Darwin Model A Normal, the Shamva-Bindura Model A Accelerated and Model B Producer Cooperatives notably Kubudirira, Batsiranayi, and Kushingirira (Figure 7-1).

When asked about how, in their opinion, the smallholder African farmers in the region could become successful farmers the views of these Bindura ICA farmers were divided equally. Three of them suggested the increased adoption of extension advice by the peasants, three others recommended the proper use of credit facilities while the advice of the remaining three was simply to the effect that "there was no substitute for hard work."

The Small-Scale Commercial Farmers of Chesa Nyajenje and Karuyana

Chesa and Karuyana are bordered by the Kandeya Communal Area to the north and the east. Elsewhere, they respectively share boundaries with Mufurudzi, Mount Darwin and Karuyana Model A Normal Schemes (Figure 7-1).

Farm sizes in this sector ranged from 48 to 108 hectares with a mean of 74. Land ownership in the case of 95 percent of the farmers was freehold and only 5 percent carried a lease. Of the freehold owners 58 percent acquired full title to their lands between 1955 and 1965, 16 percent between 1966 and 1970 and the remaining 26 percent only as recent as 1979 to 1985. The majority of the farmers, that is, 58 percent of the original occupants were still present while the mode of acquisition on the part of the remaining 42 percent was through inheritance. When asked about how farmers intended to dispose of these properties eventually when they are unavailable to farm anymore 79 percent indicated that they planned to will them to their sons and another 16 percent to their brothers instead. Five percent preferred to sell the farms ultimately. Currently, 74 percent of all the farmers found their land sizes adequate for their cropping and grazing needs. However, every one in four expressed the intention to buy more land in the future.

Of the 20 farmers studied 16 percent had lands that were adjacent to the Communal Area. Like some of the Large-Scale farmers of Bindura, 20 percent of these Small-Scale Commercial farmers reported problems of trespassing from the Communal Area. Sixty percent of the farmers reported interacting and offering advice to their counterparts in the Communal Area. As to if these Small-Scale Commercial farmers had ever been approached or offered advice on good farming to farmers from the Model A Normal and the Accelerated resettlement schemes 30 percent of them responded to have done so. But this was even less so when it came to the Cooperatives. The closest Model B Producer Cooperatives in the area were Chakoma, Kushingirira, Kurima Inhaka and Nyakudya. Only 15 percent of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers stated that they had interacted with farmers from the cooperative sector.

The Communal Area Farmers of Bushu, Madziwa and Kandeya

The 62 farmers who were respectively interviewed in this farming system came from (1) Chishapa, Gono and Jiti subdivisions of Bushu, (2) Nyamaropa, Svesve, Mukubvu and Goora in Madziwa and (3) Mandeve, Mashanga, Mungando and Matope/Kapfudza in Kandeya (Figure 7-1). These had all lived in those areas from between 3 and 92 years. This meant that some of them might have returned home recently to live and farm permanently while others had spent all their lives there.

The number of years that these had been farming in their respective areas ranged from 1 to 50 years with a mean of 18. The size of arable lands controlled by these farmers also ranged from 0.8 to 6.4 hectares with a mean of 2.7 and median of 2.4 hectares. Only about a third of all these farmers considered their land size adequate. In all 68 percent felt that their land was not sufficient for their farm needs and as many as 82 percent of all farmers also stated that the grazing land for livestock in their Communal Area was inadequate.

All the Communal Area farmers had heard about the government's resettlement program. Seventy-three percent of them had either already applied or intended to apply for resettlement. Of these farmers, numbering 45, an overwhelming majority or 93 percent preferred to be resettled in the minda mirefu or the Model A individual family schemes. This was in contrast to the mushandira pamwe or the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes for which only 7 percent of those opting for resettlement indicated a preference.

Farmers: Their Social and Demographic Characteristics

This sub-section deals only briefly with background characteristics of the European or Large-Scale Commercial farmers after which aspects of the socio-demographic profiles of African farmers in the resettlement schemes, the Communal Area and the Small-Scale Commercial sectors are discussed. For the African farmers the major items presented include farmers' home or country of origin, province and communal area, age, gender, marital status, number of wives and children, level of school completed, non-agricultural skills, household size and developmental cycle type.

All farmers in the Communal Area, the Small-Scale Commercial sectors as well as the greatest majority of those in the remaining farming systems were Zimbabweans. However, with the government-introduced resettlement program some so-called alien from neighboring countries opted to become farmers in Zimbabwe (Table 7-1). Indeed, these aliens took advantage of the government's amnesty in early 1985 which offered citizenship to those of them who had lived continuously in the country over the previous five years. The majority of these resettled farmers of non-Zimbabwean origin were farm laborers on the farms which the government purchased for resettlement. They were mostly Mozambicans, Malawians and Zambians who reported to have worked in European farms in Zimbabwe for periods ranging from 14 to 53 years.

The Zimbabwean-born farmers in the Mashonaland Central Province or the study area came from all parts of the country. In terms of provincial distribution all the farmers in the Communal as well as 76 percent of those in the Model A Normal, 41 percent from the Model A Accelerated and 53 percent from the Cooperative sectors hailed from Mashonaland Central. Only 5 percent of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers were from that Province. This

distribution is shown in Table 7-2 which also indicates that 55 percent of the African elite farmers who purchased farms in Chesa and Karuyana Small-Scale Commercial Areas did so as farmers whose home province today is Mashonaland East. A similar situation exists now in the Model A Accelerated Schemes of Shamva and Bindura where many of the farmers were brought in from the Uzumba Communal Area in the Mashonaland East Province rather than from Mashonaland Central where the schemes were located.

Of all farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 41 percent listed their communal area to be in the Mashonaland Central Province. Of these, every one out of four came from the nearby Bushu Communal Area. On the other hand, every farmer out of three in the Model A Normal Scheme was from the adjacent Madziwa Communal Area while one out of five cooperative or Model B farmers was from Kandeya/Dotito Communal Area (Table 7-3).

The age distribution of the farmers provide interesting contrasts. That of the Model A Normal and Accelerated schemes' farmers look similar to that from the Communal Area in terms of the mean and median ages which respectively were around the mid-40s. In comparison the Cooperative Schemes' farmers were younger while the Small-Scale Commercial farmers were much older. An examination of Table 7-4 reveals that 55 percent of the farmers in the Small-Scale Commercial area were in the 26-60 year age group with 40 percent of the remaining being older than 60 years. In the case of the Cooperatives 63 percent were in the 26-60 year age group with 34 percent of the remaining being even younger than 26 years. However, in the Communal Area and in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes the number of farmers in the 26-60 year age group were 82 percent, 83 percent and 89 percent respectively (Table 7-4).

TABLE 7 - 1
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME COUNTRY

		ZIMBAB BWE	MOZAMB IQUE	MALAWI	ZAMBIA
	(N=)		%		
Model A Normal	(349)	96.3	2.0	1.4	0.3
Model A Accelerated	(39)	84.7	7.7	5.1	2.6
Model B Cooperative	(151)	83.4	11.3	4.6	0.7
Communal Area	(62)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale Commercial	(20)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 2
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME PROVINCE

		NON- ZIMBA BWE	EAST	MASHONALAND CENT RAL	WEST	MANICA LAND	MID LANDS	MASV INGO	MATABELELAND NORTH	SOUTH
	(N=)						%			
Model A Norm	(348)	3.7	10.4	75.9	2.6	2.0	1.4	4.0	0.0	0.0
Model A Accl	(38)	15.4	38.5	41.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0
Model B Coop	(151)	16.6	15.9	53.0	3.3	4.6	2.6	3.3	0.0	0.7
Communal Area	(62)	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Sc Commer	(20)	0.0	55.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	10.0	15.0	5.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 3
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOME COMMUNAL AREA

	NON- MASHONALAND CENTRAL	MADZI WA	BUSHU	CHIWE SHE	KANDEYA/ DOTITO	OTHER MASHONALAND CENTRAL
(N=)	%					
Model A Norm (349)	24.0	34.7	13.5	16.0	1.7	10.0
Model A Accl (39)	59.0	2.6	25.6	2.6	2.6	7.7
Model B Coop (151)	30.5	5.3	4.6	3.3	21.9	16.6
Communal Area (62)	0.0	50.0	25.8	0.0	24.2	0.0
Small-Scale C (20)	95.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0

TABLE 7 - 4
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' AGE

	AGE COHORTS										
	16- 20	21- 25	26- 30	31- 35	36- 40	41- 45	46- 50	51- 55	56- 60	61- 65	66 OR MORE
(N=)	%										
Model A											
Norm (344)	0.3	4.1	10.2	15.4	11.9	13.7	11.6	11.6	9.0	6.7	5.5
Model A											
Accl (38)	0.0	0.0	7.9	15.8	18.4	10.5	18.4	7.9	10.5	5.3	5.3
Model B											
Coop (151)	9.9	24.5	13.2	9.3	10.6	9.3	7.3	6.0	7.3	1.3	1.3
Communal											
Area (61)	0.0	3.3	8.2	8.2	14.8	18.0	8.2	18.0	6.6	6.6	8.2
Small-Sc											
Commer(20)	0.0	0.0	5.0	10.0	10.0	5.0	10.0	5.0	15.0	15.0	25.0

The headship of these rural households reflected the expected, that is, the predominance of males. This was even more so in the Small-Scale Commercial Area. A large proportion of the Cooperative farm families, making up 38 percent of the total, and about 23 percent of families in the Communal Area were female headed (Table 7-5).

All Small-Scale Commercial farmers were married. In the Communal, Model A Normal and Accelerated sectors every 9 of 10 farmers were married. In the Cooperative one out of every 4 farmers had never been married. Also within this latter sector the proportion of divorcees was higher. There were more widowed farmers in the Communal Area and none in the Small-Scale Commercial Area (Table 7-6). The norm among all the married men was monogamous unions. However, a few farmers had taken additional wives. One out of every 10 married men in the Cooperative had a second wife. The corresponding figures were higher elsewhere with 1 in 8 in the Model A Accelerated Scheme, 1 in 5 in the Small-Scale Commercial, 1 out of 4 in the Model A Normal Scheme as well as 1 in 3 in the Communal Area (Table 7-7).

Still among the married male farmers all those in the Small-Scale Commercial sector married their wives at one time or another before 1980. But that was not so among the others. In the Communal Area 12.5 percent of the married men either entered into their first marriage since 1980 or had taken another wife between then and 1985. This was true of 15 percent of the Cooperative farmers, 16 percent of the Model A Accelerated and 24 percent of Model A Normal Schemes' farmers. In the latter group two farmers had each married three and four women respectively since being resettled in 1980 (Table 7-8).

All farmers in the Small-Scale Commercial as well as the Communal Areas respectively had one or more living children. With a negligible exception this was the case also in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes. However, in

TABLE 7 - 5
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' GENDER

	(N=)	MALE	FEMALE
			%
Model A Normal	(349)	87.1	12.9
Model A Accelerated	(38)	84.2	15.8
Model B Cooperative	(151)	62.3	37.7
Communal Area	(62)	77.4	22.6
Small-Scale Commercial	(20)	95.0	5.0

TABLE 7 - 6
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' MARITAL STATUS

	(N=)	NEVER MARRIED	MARRIED	DIVORCED	WIDOWED
			%		
Model A Normal	(349)	0.3	93.1	1.1	5.4
Model A Accelerated	(38)	0.0	92.1	2.6	5.3
Model B Cooperative	(151)	24.5	66.9	5.3	3.3
Communal Area	(62)	0.0	91.9	0.0	8.1
Small-Scale Commercial	(20)	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 7
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: MARRIAGE STRUCTURES OF MALE FARMERS

		NEVER MARRIED	MONO GAMOUS	POLYGYNOUS			
(NUMBER OF WIVES	0	1	2	3	4	5)	
(N=)	%						
Model A Normal	(304)	0.3	61.8	25.3	10.2	1.3	1.0
Model A Accelerated	(32)	0.0	84.4	12.5	3.1	0.0	0.0
Model B Cooperative	(94)	39.4	51.1	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Communal Area	(48)	0.0	68.8	29.2	2.1	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale Commercial	(19)	0.0	78.9	21.1	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 8
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF WIVES MARRIED
BY MALE FARMERS SINCE 1980

(NUMBER OF WIVES	0	1	2	3	4)	
(N=)	%					
Model A Normal	(304)	72.0	24.0	3.3	0.3	0.3
Model A Accelerated	(32)	84.4	15.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Model B Cooperative	(94)	85.1	14.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Communal Area	(48)	87.5	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale Commercial	(19)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

the Cooperative sector 29 percent of all farmers did not have any children. Among the farmers with children the minimum was one child throughout except in the Small-Scale Commercial Area where it was two. The maximum number of children born to these farmers ranged between a low of 15 in the Model A Accelerated to 28 in the Model A Normal Schemes (Table 7-9). The mean number per farmer was 5 in the Cooperative, 6 each in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes and 7 each in the Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial Areas, respectively.

With regards to the number of children born to farmers between 1980 and 1985 the Model A Normal Scheme recorded the highest figures with 57 percent of all farmers getting two or more children. Correspondingly, within the five year period 39 percent of the Communal Area and the Model A Accelerated farmers, 32 percent of the Cooperative and 30 percent of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers respectively had two or more children. Infact, within the Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area around 3 percent of the farmers respectively had 5 or more children during the period (Table 7-10).

In relation to the level of education completed 95 percent of all Small-Scale Commercial farmers had being to school. In contrast, as high as 43.7 percent of the Cooperative farmers had never been to school (Table 7-11). In respect of non-agricultural skills the majority of Small-Scale Commercial farmers had an advantage in that 80 percent of them were skilled. Artisans such as bricklayers and carpenters as well as driver/mechanics formed the majority of the professionals in these farm communities (Table 7-12).

Household sizes ranged from single-constituted households, which numbered 39.3 percent in the Cooperatives, to multiple ones. The latter type was the norm throughout the remaining sectors. The largest households, two of them each with 21 or more people, were confined to the Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area, respectively. In both cases the households were male-headed

TABLE 7 - 9
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN OF FARMERS

	(NUMBER OF CHILDREN	0	1-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21 OR MORE)
	(N=)	%					
Model A Normal	(348)	1.1	44.8	39.1	11.4	2.7	0.9
Model A Accelerated	(38)	2.6	55.2	23.7	18.5	0.0	0.0
Model B Cooperative	(150)	29.3	49.3	19.4	1.3	0.7	0.0
Communal Area	(61)	0.0	36.1	50.8	8.2	3.3	1.6
Small-Scale Commercial	(19)	0.0	35.0	45.0	15.0	5.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 10
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN TO FARMERS
IN 1980 - 1985

	(NUMBER OF CHILDREN	0	1	2	3	4	5 OR MORE)
	(N=)	%					
Model A Normal	(349)	22.3	20.9	33.0	15.5	5.4	2.9
Model A Accelerated	(39)	38.5	23.1	30.8	5.1	2.6	0.0
Model B Cooperative	(151)	51.0	16.6	29.1	3.3	0.0	0.0
Communal Area	(62)	43.5	17.7	22.6	11.3	1.6	3.2
Small-Scale Commercial	(20)	45.0	25.0	15.0	15.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 11
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' LEVEL OF SCHOOL COMPLETED

		NONE	SOME	COMPLETED	POST
			E L E	M E N T	A R Y
	(N=)		%		
Model A Normal	(348)	21.6	46.3	14.7	17.5
Model A Accelerated	(38)	28.9	39.5	10.5	21.1
Model B Cooperative	(151)	43.7	25.2	12.6	18.5
Communal Area	(62)	11.3	67.7	14.5	6.5
Small-Scale Commercial	(20)	5.0	55.0	5.0	35.0

TABLE 7 - 12
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' NON-AGRICULTURAL SKILLS

		NONE	ARTISAN	DRIVER/ MECHANIC	SALES	TAILOR/ DRESS MAKER	OTHER
	(N=)			%			
Model A Normal	(348)	51.0	24.1	10.3	1.4	3.7	9.2
Model A Accelerated	(38)	53.8	15.4	10.3	5.1	5.1	7.7
Model B Cooperative	(151)	57.0	10.6	7.9	7.9	6.6	9.9
Communal Area	(62)	50.0	19.4	11.3	3.2	8.1	8.1
Small-Scale Commercial	(18)	20.0	15.0	20.0	5.0	10.0	20.0

and highly polygynous. Apart from the Cooperatives, where the large number of single households depressed the mean household size to 4 persons, the average size everywhere was around 7 persons (Table 7-13).

In order to assign the 621 African households interviewed for this case study I examined the respective ages, gender and conjugal situation of the de facto household head as well as other structural forms including the age characteristics of all household members in the light of the Household Developmental Cycle Typology that I formulated for this work (see Appendix A).

Very early in the analysis it became quite clear that the complex organizational and household structures in the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes were not amenable to the kinds of analytical concerns such as the socioeconomic performance of the farm households for which the typology was designed. Consequently, the 151 cooperative farmers were dropped leaving 470. Of these 458 or 97.4 percent representing the four respective farming systems possessed the complete and necessary data for them to be fit into the cycle.

The farmers were categorized into the following nine broad types of developmental cycle: (1) male-headed monogamous household in establishment phase, (2) male-headed monogamous household in expansion phase, (3) female-headed household in expansion phase with the spouse temporary away, (4) male-headed polygynous household in expansion phase, (5) male-headed monogamous household in consolidation phase, (6) female-headed household in consolidation phase with spouse temporary away, (7) female-headed household in consolidation phase without a spouse, (8) male-headed polygynous household in consolidation phase and (9) household in a decline phase (Table 7-14).¹

The agricultural characteristics and performance of each developmental type for the various farming systems are described below in this Chapter.

TABLE 7 - 13
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' HOUSEHOLD SIZE

	SING LE	COUP LE	3 - 5	6 - 10	11 - 15	16 - 20	21 OR MORE
(N=)	%						
Model A Norma(342)	0.3	2.9	25.4	52.6	17.0	1.5	0.3
Model A Accel (38)	0.0	5.3	34.2	42.1	13.2	5.3	0.0
Model B Coop (117)	39.3	4.3	26.5	29.1	0.8	0.0	0.0
Communal Area (62)	1.6	8.1	25.8	48.4	14.5	0.0	1.6
Small-Scale C (20)	0.0	0.0	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 14
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
Model A Norma	11	123	13	86	49	9	20	26	2	340
Model A Accel	1	14	1	4	11	2	3	1	0	37
Model B Coop	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal Area	2	14	5	9	16	5	4	5	1	61
Small-Scale C	0	7	0	2	8	1	0	2	0	20

Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
 B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
 C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
 D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
 E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
 F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
 G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
 H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
 I = Household in Decline Phase

The Model Bs have been left out of this presentation.

Farmers: Their General Responses and Evaluation of the
Government's Resettlement Policies and Programs

Some of the questions that farmers responded to in their evaluation of the resettlement and agricultural policies and programs of the government were specific to their respective farming systems. This was especially the case with farmers in the resettlement schemes, namely, the Model A Normal and Accelerated as well as the Model B Producer Cooperative sectors. Other general questions common to these farmers were also asked of their counterparts in the Large and Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Areas respectively. The specific issues are presented first.

The Farmers of Mufurudzi Model A Normal and the Shamva-Bindura
Model A Accelerated Schemes

These farmers first heard about the resettlement program through various sources (Table 7-15). The most common of these was the ruling ZANU-PF party. Its leaders and officials made the land redistribution issue an important one in the chimurenga or liberation war years and followed up on it after the attainment of independence in 1980. The majority of these farmers gave poor or inadequate lands as their reason for resettlement. This category was followed by those who were either landless or wanted a place to build a home and raise families and those who just desired to improve their lives (Table 7-16).

Among these farmers the response to resettlement was overwhelmingly positive. Infact 99 percent of the 388 Model A resettled farmers said that they were glad to be part of the program. Comments explaining this response included that of a farmer who was thrilled to be having, in his own words, "for the first time in my 'difficult life' such things as my own minda (farmland), musha (a home) for my family to live in, abundance of food, government services and, above all, a peace of mind." Another farmer

TABLE 7 - 15
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST SOURCE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

SOURCE	FREQUENCY	%
ZANU (PF) Comrades	125	32.2
District Councillors	86	22.2
Government Officers	46	11.9
News Media	44	11.3
Relatives	23	5.9
Friends	23	5.9
Chief/Headman/Farm Master	15	3.9
Other	24	6.2
Not Applicable	2	0.5
	388	100.0

TABLE 7 - 16
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' REASONS FOR RESETTLEMENT

REASON	FREQUENCY	%
Inadequate/Poor Land	215	55.4
Landless	98	25.3
Wanted Own Home	42	10.8
To Improve Life Situation	22	5.7
Unemployed	5	1.3
Other	4	1.0
Inherited Property	2	0.5
	388	100.0

emphatically boasted that resettlement had freed him from the serfdom conditions under which he lived as a laborer in the colonial days sojourning from one European-owned farm to another.

The farmers were also unanimous in voicing out that the government should continue with resettlement. Most farmers rather impatiently recommended the taking over of so-called "European farms" for resettlement (see Table 7-27 below) and the financing of the program from external donor sources. The majority of farmers, that is 60 percent of all of them, were willing to pay a resettlement tax, if at all necessary. Some of the remaining 40 percent argued that they were not yet firmly settled or financially secure enough to be burdened with such a tax. A few farmers held the opinion that as agricultural producers they were already taxed enough by the government. Yet another group just abhorred any form of taxation implying that it was a relic of the colonial past from which they were now permanently liberated.

The farmers complimented highly the assistance and the performance of the Resettlement Team of scheme-level government staff. They recommended that the officers found ways and means of solving and providing feedback on farmers' problems and also visiting them in the fields and villages more regularly (Table 7-17).

The Farmers of Batsiranayi, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kushingirira
and Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes

The questions and responses relating to background issues about the cooperatives dealt mostly with (1) membership and (2) members' attitudes and self-evaluation of organizational problems which were unique to this particular farming system.

Nearly 32 percent of the farmers originally worked as farm laborers on European or Large-Scale Commercial Farms. In fact, almost all of these

TABLE 7 - 17
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' RECOMMENDATION TO IMPROVE
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESETTLEMENT TEAM (GOVT. OFFICERS)

RECOMMENDATION	FREQUENCY	%
Solve Farmers' Problems	133	34.3
Provide Feedback on Complaints	100	25.8
Visit Farmers More Regularly	75	19.3
Other	28	7.2
Don't Know	10	2.6
Nothing/Officers Doing Fine	42	10.8
	388	100.0

former-laborers stayed on after the government purchased the respective farms and they were absorbed into the Model B program. The other major category of farmers in the cooperative were peasants, most of them formerly landless Communal Area residents (Table 7-18). One Model B Scheme Chakoma was originally formed by about 50 families from the Dotito sub-division of the Kandeya Communal Area (see Figure 7-1). These families teamed up and approached the government which assigned the 1,264 hectare Ruia Ranch located in Natural Region II in the Mount Darwin area to them in 1981.

Apart from the Communal Area and the commercial farms a number of these farmers previously lived in the towns working or unemployed. A few others were also either students or former combatants and war refugees in neighboring countries (Table 7-19).

As to how these farmers got to know about their cooperatives and became resettled in them a large proportion said that they were co-founders or original members. This group made up 48 percent of the members while 14 percent were recruited by friends or through political party and government channels (Table 7-20).

On why they decided to join the cooperatives and be resettled 60 percent of these farmers said they wanted a better life. The ideological factor, namely, the promotion of state policy of socialism was what also influenced 16 percent of the other farmers. Another 15 percent said that as farm laborers, ostensibly from outside Zimbabwe, they had "nowhere else to go other than staying on" these farms which had become their homes (Table 7-21).

Of the married members, who numbered 103 and constituted 62.8 percent of the total interviewed the overwhelming majority, that is, 88 percent also had their spouses as members of their cooperative. Fifty-nine percent of all the members also did not have any relative or kinsman as a cooperative member. In the opinion of 80 percent of the members everyone in their cooperative

TABLE 7 - 18
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' OCCUPATIONS
PRIOR TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE

OCCUPATION	FREQUENCY	%
Laborer in European/Commercial Farm	48	31.8
Peasant in Communal Area	33	21.9
Ex-Combatant/Refugee	5	3.3
Mine Worker	3	2.0
Unemployed	11	7.3
Domestic Servant	9	6.0
Other	17	11.3
Student	25	16.6
	151	100.0

TABLE 8 - 19
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' RESIDENCE PRIOR
TO JOINING THE COOPERATIVE

PLACE	FREQUENCY	%
Communal Area	50	33.1
Other European/Commercial Farm	33	21.9
This Cooperative/Ex-Commercial Farm	16	10.6
Harare City	14	9.3
Other Urban Area	14	9.3
Youth Training/School	13	8.6
Outside Zimbabwe/Refugee Camp	4	2.6
Other	3	2.0
	151	100.0

TABLE 7 - 20
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: FARMERS' FIRST
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE COOPERATIVE

SOURCE	FREQUENCY	%
Founding/Initial Member	72	47.7
Friends	21	13.9
ZANU-PF/Government Officials	15	9.9
Relatives/Kinsmen/Affines	13	8.6
News Media	8	5.3
Other	21	13.9
	151	100.0

TABLE 7 - 21
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS' REASONS
FOR JOINING THE COOPERATIVE

REASON	FREQUENCY	%
To obtain better life	90	59.6
To promote socialism (state ideology)	25	16.6
Lived on this farm/Nowhere to go	23	15.2
Other	13	8.6
	151	100.0

considered himself or herself as belonging to "one family." Even a greater portion of the members, that is, 87 percent of them asserted that they "got on well" with each other. Almost everybody joined the cooperative with no capital assets or agricultural equipment (Table 7-22).

On organizational issues though almost everyone of them had not been a cooperative member prior to joining these Model B resettlements as much as 48 percent claimed they knew the principles and objectives of the cooperative movement. A great majority of these farmers claimed also to be satisfied with the administration of the current Management Committee. The majority did not favor the idea of paying membership levy or annual fee to help to run their schemes. The majority also believed that their respective cooperatives had adequate membership to undertake the expected production activities and that everybody was working hard enough. (Table 7-22).

As much as 71 percent of these cooperative farmers preferred the existing collective tenure and work arrangement while 29 percent favored individual farms (Table 7-22). The latter or minority group argued that individual would promote harder work, end the exploitation of the "powerless majority by the privileged minority" and reward personal initiative. The majority who argued against parcelization of the collective property were of the opinion that such action would be inimical to socialism, reduce productivity and that it was even against the byelaws under which the Model B Schemes were registered.

This fact notwithstanding 69 percent of the members favored individual cooking and eating arrangements over collective ones (Table 7-22). They cited personal hygiene, different preferences and taste as justification. Their minority opponents on the other hand believed that individual arrangements were anti-collective and in principle and spirit contrary to cooperative living and work. Both protagonists of individual and communal cooking, to some extent, also mustered the same reasons to back their arguments. These were

TABLE 7 - 22
 MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: SOME GENERAL RESPONSES TO
 RESETTLEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO THEIR COOPERATIVE

QUESTION	RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
Were you a member of another Cooperative before joining this one?	YES	3	2.0
	NO	148	98.0
Were you familiar with Cooperative objectives and principles?	YES	73	48.3
	NO	78	51.7
Is your spouse a member of this Cooperative?	YES	91	60.3
	NO	12	7.9
	NO SPOUSE	48	31.8
Is any other relative (kinsman/affine) of yours a member of this Cooperative?	YES	62	41.1
	NO	89	58.9
Did you bring in any capital assets/farm implements when you joined this Cooperative?	YES	3	2.0
	NO	148	98.0
Are you satisfied with the administration of the Management Committee of this Cooperative?	YES	118	78.1
	NO	30	19.9
	NO RESPONSE	3	2.0
Are you willing to pay an annual levy/tax towards the running of this Cooperative's programs?	YES	121	80.1
	NO	28	18.5
	NO RESPONSE	2	1.3

TABLE 7 - 22--continued

QUESTION	RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
Does this Cooperative have adequate membership/workforce to carry out its programs?	YES	94	62.3
	NO	57	37.8
Are members of this Cooperative working hard enough to ensure its success?	YES	128	84.7
	NO	17	11.2
	DON'T KNOW	6	4.0
Do other members of this Cooperative appreciate the effort you put into your work assignment?	YES	133	88.1
	NO	11	7.3
	DON'T KNOW	7	4.6
Do you get on well with the other members of this Cooperative?	YES	128	84.8
	NO	6	4.0
	SOME/NOT ALL	13	8.8
	DON'T KNOW	4	2.6
Do members of this Cooperative regard themselves as one family?	YES	121	80.1
	NO	16	10.6
	DON'T KNOW	14	9.3
What cooking/eating arrangement would you recommend for this Cooperative?	INDIVIDUAL	104	68.9
	COLLECTIVE	47	31.2
What production arrangement do you prefer in this Cooperative?	COLLECTIVE FARM	107	70.9
	INDIVIDUAL FARMS	43	28.5
	BOTH	1	0.7

efficiency, cost-effectiveness, avoiding waste and being convenient.

Of all these cooperative farmers 38 percent had been in the scheme for between 4 and 5 years, 28 percent for as much as 2 to 3 years while 34 percent had been members for only a year or less (Table 7-23).

Finally, these Model B Producer Cooperative farmers were questioned about how much remuneration they thought they deserved for their respective work effort at the end of the 1984-85 agricultural season. About 20 percent said they expected nothing apparently because their cooperative did not generate any income. Nearly 9 percent also did not know how much they deserved to be paid (Table 7-24).

Communal Area Farmers' Responses

Two major questions about resettlement were asked of only the Communal Area farmers. These are the people closer to the practical issues and developments relating to the land question both in the past and now. They are also the immediate and direct beneficiaries of the resettlement program.

The first question was whether or not in their judgement the government's resettlement program was the solution to the land problem, meaning the racially segregated pattern of ownership, the denudation and overutilization of the communal resources and the landlessness. The response offered by 82 percent of these farmers was that resettlement was a solution. Those disagreeing made up 8 percent with the remaining 10 percent not knowing whether or not resettlement was the answer to the land hunger (Table 7-25).

These Communal Area farmers were then asked to choose between two options. These were either (1) leaving these traditional homes and being resettled in a new environment by the government as it was currently occurring or (2) staying and having access to adjacent new lands to be purchased by the

TABLE 7 - 23
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS' DURATION
OF STAY IN THEIR COOPERATIVES

NUMBER OF YEARS	FREQUENCY	%
1 or Less	51	33.8
Over 1 to 3	42	27.8
Over 3 to 5	58	38.4
	51	100.0

TABLE 7 - 24
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MEMBERS' EXPECTED
INCOMES FOR WORK DONE IN 1984-85 SEASON

AMOUNT EXPECTED (\$)	FREQUENCY	%
Nothing/Coop. Made no Profit	30	19.9
Less than 100	4	2.6
Between 100 and 200	17	11.3
Between 200 and 300	30	19.9
Between 300 and 1,000	29	19.2
Above 1,000	28	18.5
Don't Know	13	8.6
	151	100.0

government and added to expand the Communal Areas. Every three in four of these respondents preferred the second alternative of remaining to farm in an expanded Communal Area (Table 7-25).

Almost all the 75 percent opting for the expansion of the Communal Areas were of the opinion that such a development, compared to resettlement elsewhere, would be less socially disruptive and also ensure continuity of traditional communal life as well as links with their ancestors. In the case of the remaining 25 percent whose first preference was for resettlement they were attracted by the different nature of the program especially ownership of a new farm and home and being provided with all kinds of government facilities. Most of them appeared suspicious and doubted that these privileges would ever be part of any policy program that expanded Communal Areas (Table 7-25).

Finally, the farmers were questioned about one controversial issue germane to the country's communal lands policy which has been debated and formulated by the government. This had to do with traditional land rights in these areas held by urban residents and workers. In the view of 73 percent of these Communal Area farmers Africans now residing in the cities and towns should continue to enjoy access to lands in their respective Communal Areas. The remaining 27 percent disagreed (Table 7-25).

The argument put up by the majority of those who would want their kinsmen and others working in the urban areas to be allowed to maintain rights was that those people were sojourners and therefore had to have a "home to return to." Others pointed out that many urban residents maintained and supported their respective immediate and extended families in the Communal Areas. Thus their links by way of land rights were of mutual benefit and crucial to the prosperity of these Areas especially. The three main misgivings about the situation offered by the opposing school were (1) the problem of communal

TABLE 7 - 25
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMER'S RESPONSES TO ISSUES RELATING TO
THE COMMUNAL LAND PROBLEM AND RESETTLEMENT

QUESTION	RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
Is the Government's resettlement program the solution to the problem of land hunger here?	YES	51	82.3
	NO	5	8.1
	DON'T KNOW	6	9.7
Would you prefer the Government (1) to resettle more people from here or (2) to add more new land to this Communal Area?	RESETTLEMENT	16	24.6
	EXPANSION	46	75.4
Should urban residents continue to enjoy traditional rights in lands in the Communal Areas?	YES	45	72.6
	NO	17	27.4

landlessness, (2) land underutilization by "absentee farmers" who only came in during the planting and harvesting periods and (3) the inequities entailed in the "townsmen" enjoying the best of both worlds.

General Responses to Resettlement

In order to get a perspective about the wider dimensions of the impacts of the on-going resettlement program farmers were asked if any of their relatives or kinsmen had benefited from it and, specifically, under which model. Table 7-26 sums up the responses which indicate that while some farmers in all the five farming systems had kinsmen resettled the major beneficiaries were those related to farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes as well as in the Communal Area. Of those beneficiaries the majority selected the minda mirefu or Model A individual family farm rather than the mushandira pamwe or Model B Producer Cooperative.

The criticisms voiced so far by farmers about the wisdom of resettlement as an agricultural development policy had come from only the so-called commercial sector. These farmers were therefore asked to rate the performance of the government on a subjective trichotomized scale from low to high in regard to an array of policy issues.

The responses are presented in Table 7-27. Among the majority of the Small-Scale Commercial Farmers the government got high marks in areas of (1) national food self-sufficiency, (2) support for large-scale farm sector, (3) support for small-scale farm sector, (4) support for communal lands agriculture and (5) progress with the resettlement program. In terms of economic growth, resource conservation and the idea of socialist type of agriculture for Zimbabwe the majority ratings were only average.

TABLE 7 - 26
 MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' IF RELATIVES
 HAVE BEEN RESETTLED AND IN WHICH MODEL

(N=)	MODEL A (Minda Mirefu)		MODEL B (Mushandira Pamwe)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
	%	%	%	%
Model A Norm (349)	80.2	19.8	12.3	87.7
Model A Accel (39)	71.8	28.2	17.9	82.1
Model B Coop (151)	32.5	67.5	37.1	62.9
Communal Area (62)	78.7	21.3	19.1	80.9
Small-Scale C (20)	45.0	55.0	25.0	75.0

The majority of the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers highly applauded the government only for promoting and maintaining self-sufficiency in food. The majority also rated the policy impacts in the following areas as average (1) economic growth, (2) promotion of large-scale farm sector and (3) support for the small-scale farm sector. However, for (1) resource conservation, (2) progress on the resettlement front and (3) plans for socialist agriculture the majority responses were low or non-complimentary of the government (Table 7-27).

These farmers were asked if in their respective opinions and in the context of the country's agriculture the government's resettlement policy was realistic. Every four in five of the farmers in the Small-Scale sector said it was. The remaining 20 percent were divided equally between a "no" and "don't know" responses. On the other hand 78 percent of the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers thought the policy was not realistic. The remaining 22 percent were also divided equally between a "yes" and "don't know" answers (see Table 7-28).

Farmers from the Model A Schemes and the Small-Scale Commercial Area were asked if the government should continue with the resettlement of more people. The response was overwhelmingly positive with 100 percent of the farmers in both the Model A Normal and the Accelerated Schemes saying yes. The corresponding percentage was 95 for the Small-Scale Commercial sector.

On the issue of where to obtain land for further resettlement the majority of these farmers suggested European-owned lands and the state lands such as wild game reserves as the possible areas for the government to look (Table 7-29). In an apparent response to that suggestion 44.4 percent of the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers said that there were no lands available in that sector for government's purchase for resettlement while 33.3 percent thought there were (Table 7-28).

TABLE 7 - 27
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: COMMERCIAL FARMERS' RATINGS OF
ISSUES ABOUT GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL AND RESETTLEMENT POLICIES

	SMALL-SCALE FARMERS (N = 20)			LARGE-SCALE FARMERS (N = 9)		
	LOW	AVERAGE %	HIGH	LOW	AVERAGE %	HIGH
Food Self-Sufficiency	5.0	25.0	70.0	11.1	22.2	66.7
Economic Growth	15.0	45.0	40.0	33.3	44.4	22.2
Large-Scale Farm Sector	10.0	30.0	60.0	11.1	77.8	11.1
Small-Scale Farm Sector	15.0	30.0	55.0	11.1	55.6	33.3
Communal Area Sector	25.0	30.0	45.0	-	-	-
Resource Conservation	15.0	45.0	40.0	44.4	44.4	11.1
Resettlement Progress	0.0	45.0	55.0	44.4	33.3	22.2

TABLE 7 - 28
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: COMMERCIAL FARMERS' RESPONSES
TO OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

QUESTION	RESPONSE	SMALL-SCALE (N=20) FARMERS		LARGE-SCALE (N=9) FARMERS	
		FREQUENCY	%	FREQUENCY	%
Are the government's resettlement policy and programs realistic?	YES	16	80.0	1	11.1
	NO	2	10.0	7	77.8
	DON'T KNOW	2	10.0	1	11.1
Are Large-Scale (European-Owned) Farms available for purchase and resettlement?	YES	-	-	3	33.3
	NO	-	-	4	44.4
	DON'T KNOW	-	-	2	22.2

TABLE 7 - 29
 RESETTLEMENT AND SMALL SCALE COMMERCIAL FARMERS RESPONSES
 AS TO WHERE LANDS ARE AVAILABLE FOR RESETTLEMENT

	MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME	MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEME	SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL
	(N = 345)	(N = 39)	(N = 20)
European (Large-Scale) Commercial Farms	61.2	66.7	60.0
Safari/State Lands	16.2	10.3	10.0
Government Knows Where	6.7	-	20.0
Other Areas/Lands	5.2	5.2	5.0
Don't Know Where	10.7	17.9	5.0

About relations with Communal Area residents the resettled farmers were almost unanimous in their disagreement that the former have a right to graze their livestock or even to enjoy access to the exploitation of such "collective" resources as housing poles, firewood and thatching grass from the resettlement areas. Consequently, they agreed with the government's policy of erecting and maintaining a wired boundary fence to physically divide the two geographic entities (Table 7-30).

The reasons offered by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers in support of their view to keep away "trespassers" were that the resettlement schemes were private property which resources were for the exclusive benefit of the resettled members and their households. Some of them also labelled such Communal Area residents as "poachers" and accused them of often stealing from the Cooperatives. Given the fact that almost all these resettled farmers not long ago were Communal Area residents their new attitude towards their kinsmen and former colleagues in the area of the use of state-controlled resources is interesting.

While over 60 percent majority of the farmers in the Communal Area also accepted that they did not have rights as such in the resources of the resettlement areas 47 percent felt that a physical boundary erected to separate the two areas and thus communities was not justified (Table 7-30). This minority opinion argued that (1) both communities were made up of the same people, (2) such a measure was anti-socialism and (3) smacked of the old colonial policy of segregated development against which many of them fought in the liberation struggle. To most of the 53 percent who favored the boundary the feeling was that it would minimize any social conflicts between communities in the two different areas and also facilitate resource conservation in the new resettlements.

TABLE 7 - 30
 MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: RESETTLEMENT AND COMMUNAL AREA
 FARMERS' RESPONSES TOWARDS COMMON ACCESS TO RESETTLEMENT RESOURCES

		MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME (N=349)	MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEME (N=39)	MODEL B COOPERATIVE SCHEME (N=151)	COMMUNAL AREA (N=62)
Do Communal Area residents have the right to graze livestock in resettlement lands?	YES	4.3	5.1	0.7	32.3
	NO	95.7	94.9	99.3	67.7

Do Communal Area residents have the right to use common resources (poles, grass, etc. in resettlement lands?	YES	2.3	2.6	-	33.9
	NO	97.7	97.4	-	66.1

Is the Government justified in erecting a boundary fence between the resettlement lands and the Communal Areas?	YES	95.4	97.4	-	53.2
	NO	4.6	2.6	-	46.8

Finally, the responses of all the farmers about two pertinent issues were requested. The first was on the government's pronouncement to "socialize the country's agriculture" as a means of ending exploitation and to ensure equity. The second asked the farmers to suggest a recommendation to the government as to how a better agriculture can be fostered in Zimbabwe.

Except in the Small-Scale Commercial Sector the majority of farmers in the four farming systems who were questioned about socialist agriculture gave it a low rating. Infact all the European or Large-Scale Commercial Farmers were against the idea (Table 7-31).

The recommendations presented here in Table 7-32 reflected some of the major and diverse concerns within and between farmers in the different systems (see for instance farm-level constraints below in this Chapter). Thus while the most important interest expressed by the majority of African farmers was for the provision of more credits, inputs and equipment their European counterparts in the Large-Scale Commercial sector were bothered by the need to ensure efficient marketing and pricing policies as well as the promotion of private or individual farm enterprises. This concern for private farms was an apparent response to the pronouncements about socialist agriculture in Zimbabwe.

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TABLE 7 - 31
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' RATING OF GOVERNMENT'S
POLICY TO SOCIALIZE THE COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURE

(N=)	LOW	AVERAGE %	HIGH
Model A Norm (349)	63.3	28.4	8.3
Model A Accel (39)	53.8	25.6	20.5
Model B Coop (--)	-	-	-
Communal Area (--)	-	-	-
Small-Scale C (20)	45.0	50.0	5.0
Large-Scale C (9)	100.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 32
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS RECOMMENDATION
FOR BETTER AGRICULTURE FOR THE COUNTRY

(N=)	NONE	CREDIT/ INPUTS/ IMPLEM ENTS	MARKET ING/ PRICES	EXTEN SION	RESETT LEMENT	PRIVATE FARMS	OTHER
							%
Model A Norm (347)	0.9	49.3	2.6	14.7	13.3	11.8	7.5
Model A Accel (38)	0.0	63.2	0.0	13.2	2.6	10.5	10.6
Communal Area (62)	1.6	43.5	32.3	0.0	21.0	0.0	1.6
Small-Scale C (20)	5.0	50.0	0.0	10.0	20.0	0.0	15.0
Large-Scale C (9)	0.0	0.0	37.5	0.0	0.0	37.5	25.0

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Farmers: Their Attitudes and Perceptions About Life Situation

Farmers were asked general and specific questions seeking to elicit responses that reflected their perceptions and attitudes towards matters relating to the special circumstances of their lives.

For instance, to the African farmers in the resettlement schemes and other rural areas the government's development agenda was meaningless if it was not targeted to the attainment of what everybody talked about as the "good life" (*upenyu hwakanaka*). The farmers were therefore asked to define what each considered to be the major attribute of this so-called good life. Other questions relating to this very important concept were also put to the farmers. Their responses are presented below.

Farmers' conception of what constituted development can be inferred from their perceptions of what a "good life" was. Zimbabwe African farmers mentioned various major attributes of a satisfying and desirable life. The six major attributes mentioned were the ownership of the following: (1) musha, (home) a concept embracing a physical dwelling, residential plot and wives and children; (2) minda, (farm) which is also agricultural land and all the essential implements to make it productive; (3) mombe, (cattle) which symbolically and in all other respects shows a man's worth; (4) mari, (money); (5) off-farm business or non-agricultural source of income; and (6)

access to social infrastructure or modern facilities such as schools. These attributes defined what, in the Shona worldview, ensured upenyu hwakanaka that is sought by every person for himself and his family (mhuri).

In ranking these attributes of a good life the majority of farmers selected minda or having a farm as the most important. The only exception was the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers who, instead, chose money. The second most mentioned attribute was a home. However, it was ranked third by Model A Normal Scheme farmers who valued cattle as a second choice (Table 7-33).

The farmers were asked as to whether or not the good life they mentioned was attainable in the areas or farming systems that they currently farmed. Almost all Model A Normal and Accelerated Scheme farmers responded in the affirmative. However, this was not the case among the other farmers 15 percent of whom respectively said that their systems could not assure them of a good life (Table 7-34). When the farmers were asked a similar question about their children the majority still believed that it was possible in the long run for them to enjoy a good life at where the parents were farming now. Every two in five Communal Area farmers indicated otherwise (Table 7-34).

A hypothetical question was asked of farmers as to where they would rather work if wage employment was their only option to achieve a good life. Four places were suggested to them, namely, (1) Harare or other towns, (2) Small-Scale (African) Commercial Farms, (3) Large-Scale (European) Commercial Farms and (4) Mining Areas. Nevertheless, the majority of farmers everywhere insisted that they would prefer to do nothing at all rather than be employed in any of the four suggested situations. Of those willing to accommodate that option more of the Model A Normal Scheme farmers were prepared for an urban employment and the Model A Accelerated Scheme farmers for work on the Small-Scale Commercial Farms. The Communal Area farmers were divided between working in Harare or other towns and working in the Small-Scale Commercial

TABLE 7 - 33
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CONCEPTION OF
ATTRIBUTES OF A "GOOD LIFE" (UPENYU HWAKANAKA)

		FARM/ CAPITAL ASSETS	CATTLE	HOME/ MATERIAL ITEMS	MONEY	OFF-FARM BUSINESS	ACCESS TO SOCIAL INFRAST	OTHER
	(N=)							
Model A								
Norm	(349)	34.1	30.1	24.9	4.9	2.9	1.7	1.4
Model A								
Accel	(39)	41.0	20.5	23.1	7.7	5.1	0.0	2.6
Model B								
Coop	(151)	26.5	11.3	27.2	28.5	2.0	3.3	1.3
Communal								
Area	(62)	41.9	14.5	25.8	11.3	1.6	3.2	1.6
Small-Sc								
Commer	(20)	50.0	10.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 34
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' RESPONSES AS TO WHETHER
OR NOT GOOD LIFE IS POSSIBLE IN THIS AREA/FARMING SYSTEM FOR FARMER
AND CHILDREN

		FARMER (SHORT/MEDIUM TERM)		FARMER'S CHILDREN (LONG-TERM)		
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Don't Know
	(N=)		%		%	
Model A Norm	(349)	98.9	1.1	65.0	22.1	12.8
Model A Accel	(39)	100.0	0.0	82.1	12.8	5.1
Model B Coop	(151)	84.8	15.4	76.2	9.3	14.6
Communal Area	(62)	85.5	14.5	53.2	40.3	6.5
Small-Scale C	(20)	85.0	15.0	70.0	25.0	5.0

Farms. Most of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers who were willing to engage in wage labor chose the Large-Scale Commercial Farms which, incidentally, was the least preferred by Communal Area farmers. For all the other farmers working in the Mines was an option that hardly anybody cared for (Table 7-35).

The responses to another similar hypothetical question showed very interesting pattern. The farmers were asked if their only option to attain a good life was remaining in agriculture the under which of the four farming systems associated with African agriculture would they choose. Every 7 in 10 farmers in the Model A Schemes preferred remaining in the resettlement program while a third opted for the Small-Scale Commercial sector where they would have access to more land and other resources. Nearly 60 percent of the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers liked the cooperatives and nearly 40 percent of the Communal Area farmers also chose to farm in the Communal Area. All the Small-Scale Commercial farmers also preferred their own farming system and did not consider any of the other systems as a viable option (Table 7-36).

The responses in Table 7-36 are striking for the fact that (1) every 6 in 10 Communal Area farmers wanted an upgrade into the Model A resettlement program or better still into the Small-Scale Commercial farming, (2) over 36 percent of the farmers in the Model B Schemes similarly wanted such an upgrade away from the cooperatives and (3) almost nobody outside the Communal Area or the Model B Producer Cooperative thought a good life was achievable for them if they were in any of the two respective farming systems.

The final hypothetical question to the farmers related to what they would invest in were they to be given \$1,000 each. The majority of all Model B Producer Cooperative farmers chose to use that to provide a home and other household essentials for themselves and/or their families. Elsewhere, other farmers would rather invest the money in their farms especially by purchasing capital or productive assets. Varying percentages of the farmers ranging from

TABLE 7 - 35
MASHONALAND CENTRAL: FARMERS' PREFERENCE FOR JOB
LOCATION IF WAGE EMPLOYMENT IS THE ONLY OPTION
FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A GOOD LIFE

	HARARE/ OTHER TOWNS	SMALL-SC COMMER FARM	LARGE-SC COMMER FARM	MINES	NO PLACE
(N=)	%				
Model A Norm (348)	10.0	8.0	4.3	1.4	76.2
Model A Accel (39)	2.6	12.8	5.1	2.6	76.9
Model B Coop (151)	13.2	23.2	4.6	2.6	56.3
Communal Area (62)	14.5	14.5	3.2	6.5	61.3
Small-Scale C (20)	5.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	75.0

TABLE 7 - 36
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' PREFERENCE FOR
FARMING SYSTEM IF AGRICULTURE IS THE ONLY OPTION
FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF A GOOD LIFE

	COMMUNAL AREA	MODEL B (Mushandira Pamwe)	MODEL A (Minda Mirefu)	SMALL- SCALE COMMERCIAL
(N=)	%			
Model A Norm (348)	0.6	0.3	72.1	27.0
Model A Accel (39)	0.0	0.0	74.4	25.6
Model B Coop (151)	3.3	58.9	29.8	7.9
Communal Area (62)	38.7	0.0	35.5	25.8
Small-Scale C (20)	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0

20 in the Small-Scale Commercial Area to 33 percent in the Model A Normal Scheme would buy cattle (Table 7-37).

Still dealing with good life farmers were requested to list the one profession that they would prefer for their children who completed school. Those mentioned were put into eight major professional categories as follows: (1) farming, (2) engineering, (3) teaching, (4) nursing, (5) medicine, (6) driving (7) clerk or office work and (8) the army/police forces. More farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes chose Nursing followed by teaching. For farmers in the remaining farming systems teaching was the most cited choice (Table 7-38).

Since almost all the major preferences entailed additional training it is likely that these farmers were prepared to invest more of their resources in the post-elementary education of their children. A rather interesting observation from the data relates to the comparative perspective offered by a sample of farmers' children about their own job preferences. Like their parents most of the students also chose teaching followed by nursing (see Table 7-38).

Finally, all the farmers both African and European were respectively asked about their life situation for the period before independence in 1980, currently in 1985 and as they perceive it would be like five years hence in 1990. Apart from the Europeans each farmer was shown a chart depicting a Good Life-Difficult Life Continuum simply as three levels on a stairway (Figure 7-2). These farmers were each requested to indicate where he or she stood on the steps during the three separate periods.

Around 9 in 10 resettled farmers in both the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes as well as the Model B Producer Cooperatives reported as having experienced hard or difficult life (upenyu hwakaoma) prior to 1980. In the Communal Area nearly 7 in every 10 also responded likewise. For both the

TABLE 7 - 37
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CHOICE OF LIKELY
ITEMS IN WHICH TO INVEST \$1,000

	INVEST IN FARM/ CAPITAL ASSETS	BUY CATTLE	PROVIDE HOME/ MATERIAL ITEMS	SAVE IN BANK	INVEST IN OFF-FARM BUSINESS	OTHER
(N=)	%					
Model A Norma(347)	41.8	32.6	8.9	8.4	4.0	4.3
Model A Accel (38)	33.3	30.8	12.8	10.3	5.1	7.7
Model B Coop (150)	8.7	23.3	34.7	13.3	5.3	14.7
Communal Area (62)	37.1	29.0	12.9	9.7	6.5	4.8
Small-Scale C (20)	65.0	20.0	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 38
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' CHOICE OF POST-SCHOOL
PROFESSION FOR THEIR CHILDREN COMPARED WITH SELF-CHOICE BY GRADUATING
STUDENTS FROM MUFURUDZI MODEL A SCHEME ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

	FARM ING	ENGI NEER ING	TEACH ING	NURS ING	MEDI CINE	DRIV ING	CLERK/ OFFICE WORK	ARMY/ POLICE	OTHER	
(N=)	%									
Model A Norma(325)	9.8	8.0	30.2	18.8	8.3	3.7	12.6	0.9	7.7	
Model A Accel (36)	5.6	8.3	19.4	25.0	5.6	8.3	5.6	5.6	16.7	
Model B Coop (90)	12.2	4.4	33.3	17.8	7.8	6.7	12.2	0.0	5.6	
Communal Area (54)	7.4	9.3	20.4	13.0	11.1	5.6	6.7	7.4	9.3	
Small-Scale C(16)	12.5	18.8	25.0	12.5	18.8	6.3	0.0	0.0	6.3	
Mufurudzi Students	(71)	5.6	15.5	28.2	23.9	8.5	5.6	0.0	7.0	5.6

Note: The 71 students represented the total population of graduating students in October 1985 and they were from the four elementary schools sponsored by the Mufurudzi Model A resettlement scheme. They were distributed as follows: (i) Magadzi (26), (ii) Mudzingo (20), (iii) Mukwari (15) and (iv) Muringamombe (10).


5 Years From Now (1990)
(Makore mashanu ari kuuya)



These Days (1985)
(Mazuva ano)



5 Years Before Now (1980)
(Makore mashanu apfuura)



Note: 1--Hard Life; 2--Some Progress; 3--Good Life.

FIGURE 7 - 2
GOOD LIFE-DIFFICULT LIFE CONTINUUM
(Upenyu hwakanaka-Upenyu hwakaoma/Madhanho okubudirira)

Small-Scale and the Large-Scale Commercial Farmers the responses were quite familiar. A third of them reported that they went through a hard life during the period up to 1980 (Table 7-39).

The majority of all farmers in the various farming systems said they were either making progress or enjoying a good life five years after independence in 1985. They also perceived that they were likely to enjoy a good life (upenyu hwakanaka) by 1990. A close examination of the Small-Scale Commercial farmers reveals that as much as a fifth of them reported to be going through hard times in 1985 and, worse still, a third believed that life was going to be a hard one for them in 1990. This pattern reflected the trend among the Large-Scale Commercial farmers also. Of these a little over 44 percent perceived difficult times ahead (Table 7-39).

Farmers: Their Material Resources and Capital Assets

The study sought information about aspects of the quality of life that these farmers were experiencing in their respective rural communities. Specifically, responses were elicited to infer if the changed socio-political and economic scenario brought about by independence in 1980 was altering their access to various selected household items as well as to farm capital.

The household or material items asked about were watches, radios, beds, sewing machines and bicycles. Such items might be seen as status symbols, items of comfort or necessities. Nevertheless, each of them ensured a kind of convenience to rural living that was not easily measurable in economic terms.

These items were regarded in this study as sources or indices of social differentiation. The most striking observation from the responses indicating the distribution of these items across the various farming systems was the fact that in all cases the greater majority of the Cooperative sector farmers

TABLE 7 - 39
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' PERCEPTIONS
OF LIFE SITUATIONS

	1 9 8 0			1 9 8 5			1 9 9 0		
(N=)	HARD LIFE	SOME PROG	GOOD LIFE	HARD LIFE	SOME PROG	GOOD LIFE	HARD LIFE	SOME PROG	GOOD LIFE
	%								
Model A Norm (348)	92.0	7.5	0.6	5.5	92.0	2.6	0.3	4.3	95.4
Model A Accel (38)	89.5	10.5	0.0	5.3	92.1	2.6	0.0	5.3	94.7
Model B Coop (148)	87.8	6.1	6.1	10.2	79.6	10.2	4.1	27.2	68.7
Communal Area (61)	68.9	31.1	0.0	6.6	88.5	4.9	0.0	13.1	86.9
Small-Scale C (20)	33.3	22.2	44.4	22.2	44.4	33.3	33.3	22.2	44.4
Large-Scale C (9)	44.4	22.2	33.3	33.3	44.4	22.2	44.4	22.2	33.3

did not own them. Watches were a common item that most farmers had. In all more Small-Scale Commercial farmers enjoyed the comfort or prestige of owning these household items than their counterparts in the other farming systems (Table 7-40).

The majority of all farmers with watches obtained them after 1980 while the more durable items, such as sewing machines and bicycles were acquired before 1980. The majority of the newer or resettlement area farmers had since 1980, that is, after they became resettled acquired in addition to watches such other items as radios and beds (Table 7-41). Infact, two farmers in Gatu village owned cars and another two in Magadzi also had acquired lorries.

In response to the question if farmers bought items of clothing for themselves, their spouses and children during 1985 most farmers said they did. The exceptional case was still the Cooperative farmers. Among them only 1 of every 3 managed to afford this "luxury" or to fulfil what might be deemed an important social obligation in rural Africa (Table 7-42).

Among African farmers in Zimbabwe the productive or capital assets that are important include scotch-carts, ox-plows, sprayers, wheelbarrows, cultivators, planters and tractors. In addition to these livestock ownership, especially monbe or cattle, is very important to these farmers not only for agricultural purposes but even more so for religious and other social reasons. Again the Cooperative farmers as individuals did not possess any of these assets. The majority of farmers from all the farming systems also did not own Scotch-Carts (Table 7-43).

All farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes as well as every 3 out of 4 in the Model A Normal Scheme who had scotch-carts acquired them since being resettled in 1980. The same pattern holds across the board for items such as sprayers, wheelbarrows, tractors and tractor implements (Table 7-44).

TABLE 7 - 40
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF
HOUSEHOLD ITEMS

	WATCH/CLOCK		RADIO		BED/MATRESS		SEWING MACHINE		BICYCLE	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
	(N=)	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Model A										
Norm (348)	57.5	42.5	32.5	67.5	48.0	52.0	10.9	89.1	30.2	69.8
Model A										
Accel (39)	64.1	35.9	30.8	69.2	48.7	51.3	10.3	89.7	17.9	82.1
Model B										
Coop (151)	23.8	76.2	11.3	88.7	11.9	88.1	4.6	95.4	3.3	96.7
Communal										
Area (62)	55.7	44.3	31.5	68.5	55.7	44.3	21.9	78.1	38.7	61.3
Small-Sc										
Commer (20)	75.0	25.0	60.0	40.0	80.0	20.0	15.0	85.0	60.0	40.0

TABLE 7 - 41
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN HOUSEHOLD MATERIAL
ITEMS ACQUIRED

	WATCH/CLOCK				RADIO				BED/MATRESS			
	Before		After		Before		After		Before		After	
	1980				1980				1980			
	(N=)			%	(N=)			%	(N=)			%
Model A												
Norm	(200)	5.0	95.0		(113)	35.4	64.6		(167)	48.5	51.5	
Model A												
Accel	(25)	4.0	96.0		(12)	50.0	50.0		(19)	42.1	57.9	
Model B												
Coop	(36)	5.6	94.4		(17)	17.6	82.4		(18)	38.9	61.1	
Communal												
Area	(34)	11.8	88.2		(19)	52.6	47.4		(34)	70.6	29.4	
Small-Scale												
Commmerc	(15)	40.0	60.0		(12)	66.7	33.3		(16)	68.8	31.2	

	SEWING MACHINE				BICYCLE			
	Before		After		Before		After	
	1980				1980			
	(N=)			%	(N=)			%
Model A Norm	(38)	68.4	31.6		(101)	56.4	42.6	
Model A Accel	(4)	75.0	25.0		(7)	57.1	42.9	
Model B Coop	(7)	57.1	42.9		(5)	60.0	40.0	
Communal Area	(13)	53.8	46.2		(24)	66.7	33.3	
Small-Scale C	(3)	66.7	33.3		(12)	58.3	41.7	

TABLE 7 - 42
 MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHETHER FARMERS' PURCHASED
 CLOTHING ITEMS IN 1985

	(N=)	MEN'S CLOTHES		WOMEN'S CLOTHES		CHILDREN'S CLOTHES	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
		%					
Model A Norm	(348)	91.1	8.9	95.4	4.6	95.7	4.3
Model A Accel	(39)	82.1	17.9	94.9	5.1	100.0	0.0
Model B Coop	(151)	35.1	64.9	31.1	68.9	35.1	64.9
Communal Area	(62)	80.6	19.4	91.9	8.1	85.5	14.5
Small-Scale C	(20)	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 43
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: FARMERS' OWNERSHIP OF
PRODUCTION/CAPITAL ASSETS

	SCOTCH-CART		OX-PLOW		SPRAYER		WHEEL-BARROW	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
Model A Norma (348)	39.4	60.6	84.8	15.2	81.3	18.7	24.9	75.1
Model A Accel (39)	20.5	79.5	71.8	28.2	69.2	30.8	20.5	79.5
Model B Coop (151)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal Area (62)	40.3	59.7	79.0	21.0	37.1	62.9	29.0	71.0
Small-Scale C (20)	75.0	25.0	90.0	10.0	80.0	20.0	65.0	35.0

	CULTIVATOR		PLANTER		TRACTOR		TRACTOR IMPLEMENTS	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
Model A Norma (348)	49.7	50.3	3.2	96.8	7.8	92.2	7.5	92.5
Model A Accel (39)	30.8	69.2	2.6	97.4	7.7	92.3	7.7	92.3
Model B Coop (151)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal Area (62)	50.0	50.0	8.1	91.9	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Small-Scale C (20)	80.0	20.0	55.0	45.0	45.0	55.0	45.0	55.0

TABLE 7 - 44
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: WHEN PRODUCTION/CAPITAL
ASSETS ACQUIRED

SCOTCH-CART			OX-FLOW			SPRAYER			WHEEL BARROW		
Before After			Before After			Before After			Before After		
1980			1980			1980			1980		
(N=)			(N=)			(N=)			(N=)		
	%			%			%			%	
Model A											
Norm (137)	25.5	74.5	(295)	31.9	68.1	(283)	7.8	92.2	(84)	29.8	70.2
Model A											
Accel (8)	0.0	100.0	(28)	25.0	75.0	(27)	3.7	96.3	(8)	12.5	87.5
Communal											
Area (25)	40.0	60.0	(49)	71.4	28.6	(23)	30.4	69.6	(18)	33.3	66.7
Small-Scale											
Com (15)	80.0	20.0	(18)	66.7	33.3	(16)	43.7	56.3	(13)	38.5	61.5

CULTIVATOR			PLANTER			TRACTOR			TRACTOR IMPLEMENTS		
Before After			Before After			Before After			Before After		
1980			1980			1980			1980		
(N=)			(N=)			(N=)			(N=)		
	%			%			%			%	
Model A											
Norm (173)	42.8	57.2	(11)	36.4	63.6	(27)	3.7	96.3	(27)	3.7	96.3
Model A											
Accel (12)	16.7	83.3	(1)	100.0	0.0	(3)	0.0	100.0	(3)	0.0	100.0
Communal											
Area (31)	64.5	35.5	(5)	40.0	60.0	(0)	0.0	0.0	(0)	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale											
Com (16)	68.7	31.3	(11)	90.1	0.9	(9)	45.5	55.5	(9)	45.5	55.5

Since independence the AFC has introduced medium and long-term loan programs to assist African farmers to acquire these items. These days farmers in the resettlement villages are being encouraged to team up and obtain tractor and equipment loans from the AFC for their collective use. In 1985, there were cases of such successful groups in Gwetera and Chitepo villages in Mufurudzi.²

In terms of livestock ownership it is only in the Communal Area that every farmer had at least one head of cattle. This, however, did not mean that he or she owned draft-oxen which are an important asset for land preparation and for farm and household haulage purposes. Unlike all other farmers none of those in the Communal Area had more than 10 cattle. Among the Small-Scale Commercial farmers 95 percent were cattle-owners. In this group every nine in ten farmers had between 11 to 21 or more head of cattle. This contrasted with the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Schemes 46 percent of whom did not have any cattle at all (Table 7-45). The modal number of cattle owned by farmers in the Model A Normal Scheme and the Communal Area was 3 head.

These days donkeys are becoming an important draft and haulage animals in rural Zimbabwe. There is an acute problem of trypanosomiasis-carrying tsetsefly *glossina sp.*, which infests most of the northern portions of the entire Mashonaland Region.³ Given this problem donkeys, which are not bothered by tsetse, can be of distinct advantage to farmers in the region. However, none in the Small-Scale Commercial and the Communal Area and only an insignificant percentage of farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes possessed any donkeys (Table 7-46). This may be explained in turn by the obvious utilities that cattle have over donkeys in respect of farmers' subsistence, cash flow and ceremonial or social needs.

Small ruminants, particularly goats and sheep are also important for meeting some of the more mundane needs of farmers such as ready cash and also

TABLE 7 - 45
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF CATTLE OWNED BY FARMERS

	NONE	1	2-4	5-10	11-15	16-20	21 OR MORE
(N=)	%						
Model A Norm (349)	19.8	8.6	35.5	26.9	7.8	0.9	0.6
Model A Accel (39)	46.2	5.0	23.0	20.6	2.6	2.6	0.0
Model B Coop (151)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal Area (62)	0.0	3.2	69.3	27.4	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale C (20)	5.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	35.0	20.0	35.0

TABLE 7 - 46
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF DONKEYS OWNED BY FARMERS

	NONE	1	2 - 5	6 OR MORE
(N=)	%			
Model A Norm (349)	96.6	0.9	2.5	0.0
Model A Accel (39)	97.4	0.0	0.0	2.6
Model B Coop (151)	-	-	-	-
Communal Area (62)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale C (20)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

food. Surprisingly, however, the majority of farmers did not have either goats (Table 7-47) or sheep (Table 7-48). This pattern was conspicuously more so in the resettlement schemes. There, unlike the dispersed settlements of the Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial Areas, the nucleated village system is not particularly conducive to the free ranging habits that both cattle and the small ruminants maintain.

Indeed, the very few in Mufurudzi were already a nuisance both in the homes and to the farms closest to the villages. Thus, the socioeconomic advantages of goats and sheep ownership were increasingly being overshadowed by the fact that as free rangers they had become a source of social conflicts among some of the farmers and their neighbors.⁴

Farmers: Their Farm-Level Constraints and Scheme Needs

Model A Scheme Farmers

Farmers in the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes were asked to identify what they saw as the problems and the needs associated with their resettlement. In addition, they were also requested to give what they perceived to be the cause of each such problem. Specifically, the farmers responded to three sets of questions relating to (1) the major constraint that faced them during the initial years of resettlement, (2) the one which was facing them in the 1985-86 farming season and (3) what they would describe as being the nature of the major problem encountered in their experiences dealing with the three parastatal agricultural service agencies. These agencies were the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB).

TABLE 7 - 47
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF GOATS OWNED BY FARMERS

		NONE	1-4	5-10	11-15	16-20	21 OR MORE
(N=)							
		%					
Model A Norm	(349)	84.0	8.9	6.3	0.0	0.6	0.3
Model A Accel	(39)	82.1	15.4	2.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Model B Coop	(151)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal Area	(62)	53.2	45.1	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale C	(20)	55.0	10.0	15.0	15.0	5.0	0.0

TABLE 7 - 48
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: HEAD OF SHEEP OWNED BY FARMERS

		NONE	1-4	5-10	11-15	16-20	21 OR MORE
(N=)							
		%					
Model A Norm	(349)	91.4	4.3	3.2	0.3	0.6	0.3
Model A Accel	(39)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Model B Coop	(151)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal Area	(62)	87.1	12.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Small-Scale C	(20)	80.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	0.0

In the second, third and fourth years of resettlement in Mufurudzi, that is, between 1981 and 1984 Zimbabwe experienced what was conceived by many farmers as the worst drought, shangwe, in living memory. Crop production was adversely affected, livestock died and most farmers at one point or another subsisted on food rations from the government and non-governmental organizations which they supplemented with items gathered from the wild. In some schemes a few households gave up, abandoned resettlement and left their new homes for the traditional security of the old Communal Areas.

Many who stayed on and continued to farm were even two years later still indebted to the AFC for the loans contracted in the drought years. Thus 52 percent of all the resettled farmers cited this environmental or climatic constraint. Among the farmers in the Model A Accelerated Scheme the lack of resettlement infrastructure was also seen as a major problem (Table 7-49).

The interviews were done over a period when the farmers were supposed to be in the final phases of preparing to begin the cropping programs. Yet, the greatest majority of them had not plowed their lands because the Tillage Team, then just transferred from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development, had not arrived in the schemes to tractor plow the lands. This delay, perhaps caused by the ministerial transfer and reorganization, was a matter of great concern throughout the resettlement schemes and the Communal Areas in the Mashonaland Central Province as well as other parts of the country. It appeared also that most farmers having gotten "used" to mechanical tillage were either complacent or not prepared to get their draft-oxen ready for the task.

The apparent crisis which faced these Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes was made worse by the non-arrival of the season's input packages consisting of seed maize, cotton and peanut and the top dressing and other

TABLE 7 - 49
 MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
 THEY FACED IN THE INITIAL YEARS OF RESETTLEMENT

	MODEL A NORMAL (N=346)	MODEL A ACCELERATED (N=39)
	%	%
Environmental	52.6	51.3
Resettlement Infrast	15.3	30.8
Credit/Inputs/Implem	16.8	10.3
Haulage/Crop Transport & Marketing	7.2	2.6
Service Businesses	6.1	-
Other	1.2	2.6
No Problem	9	2.6

fertilizers. The delay was reported to be due to transportation problems that faced the Bindura-Mount Darwin Cooperative Society which had been commissioned as the exclusive input delivery agency to Mufurudzi and other nearby farmers under the AFC's small farmer credit program.⁵

For the 1985-86 season the problems mentioned most by the farmers related to delayed land preparation, cited by 53 percent of them all, and delayed supply of inputs which was mentioned by another 40 percent (Table 7-50).

The delay in the delivery of these essential pre-season services by the agencies were variously blamed in most instances on the AFC, the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (MLARR) or the government, the cooperative supplier and even the Resettlement Team (Table 7-51). Talking to many farmers one could detect an apparent confusion in their minds in perceiving these rather distinct institutions as being the same establishment in terms of their respective abilities to solve the problems of delayed plowing and inputs delivery.

However, when the farmers were questioned specifically about the AFC 13 percent stated that they had not experienced any problems with the Corporation. Nevertheless, 52 percent of all the farmers complained bitterly about its insensitivity to their plight. Other complaints mentioned included its bad loan repayment and bad credit processing systems (Table 7-52).⁶

The greater majority of farmers did not complain about the respective dealings of the Grain and Cotton Marketing Boards with them. Those who had any problems cited either (1) the delay that they encountered in receiving checks for payments of produce sold or (2) the lack of haulage vehicles and the long distances that they had to cover in order to transport produce to the buying centers or storage depots in Shamva or Mount Darwin (Table 7-53 and Table 7-54).

TABLE 7 - 50
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
THEY FACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1985-86 SEASON

	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED
	(N=339)	(N=39)
	%	%
Delayed Land Preparation	52.2	46.2
Delayed Farm Inputs	38.1	46.2
AFC Rejected Loan/ No Cash	3.8	2.6
Other	2.7	2.6
No Problem	3.2	2.6

TABLE 7 - 51
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF SOURCES OF
PROBLEMS THEY FACED AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1985-86 SEASON

	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED
	(N=328)	(N=39)
	%	%
Agric. Finance Corp (AFC)	36.0	30.8
Govt./Ministry of Lands	16.8	7.7
Environmental/Climatic	16.8	7.7
Cooperative (Input) Supplier	7.0	20.5
Resettlement Team	2.4	-
Other	14.0	17.9
Don't Know	7.0	15.4

TABLE 7 - 52
 MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
 THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION

	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED
	(N=348)	(N=39)
	%	%
Insensitivity to Farmers' Plight (resulting from drought)	50.9	64.1
Bad Credit Processing	21.6	2.6
Bad Payment (Stop Order)	13.2	12.8
Other	2.0	-
No Problem	12.4	20.5

TABLE 7 - 53
 MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
 THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE GRAIN MARKETING BOARD

	MODEL A NORMAL (N=348)	MODEL A ACCELERATED (N=39)
	%	%
Delayed Issue of Checks	26.4	20.5
Poor Marketing/Depot Too Far/ Transportation	14.9	7.7
Other	0.6	-
No Problem	58.0	71.8

TABLE 7 - 54
 MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS
 THEY ENCOUNTER WITH THE COTTON MARKETING BOARD

	MODEL A NORMAL (N=348)	MODEL A ACCELERATED (N=39)
	%	%
Delayed Issue of Checks	23.0	30.8
Poor Marketing/Depot Too Far/ Transportation	18.9	12.8
No Problem	58.0	56.4

Finally these farmers identified the majority need of the schemes to be resettlement infrastructure particularly a health clinic (Table 7-55).⁷ In the medium to long-term projection of the planners these resettlement schemes were to develop or attract service businesses and industries as they matured and as their service centers evolved as growth points (see Zimbabwe 1983d).

The slow development of these essential services was a matter of great frustration for most farmers. In particular, local transportation was a problem. Some farmers, for instance, walk 17 kilometers one way from say Gatu to Chindunduma on the main Shamva-Mount Darwin road to wait for hours to catch a bus. One out of every three farmers in Mufurudzi therefore mentioned this transport, grinding mills for maize-meal and other grain, grocery stores and butcheries as their urgent needs.⁸

As to who should be responsible for the provision of these needs 42 percent looked up to the government or the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to do so. Another 34 percent suggested a joint effort of the government or the Ministry and the farmers (Table 7-56).

The Model B and Communal Area Farmers

The constraints mentioned by the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers are treated separately below in Chapter VIII where the general problems that were identified with these Schemes are reviewed.

For the Communal Area farmers each was asked to indicate what major concern faced him or her. The three major responses that were given comprised (1) lack of agricultural implements and services such as credit and inputs, which was the problem of 29 percent of the farmers, (2) poor or inadequate land and (3) lack of water (Table 7-57).

TABLE 7 - 55
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF THEIR
RESETTLEMENT SCHEME NEEDS

	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED
	(N=348)	(N=39)
	%	%
Health Clinic	34.5	25.6
Other Resettlement Infrastructure	10.6	61.5
Service Businesses	29.3	5.1
Livestock Service (for Tsetsefly Eradication)	12.1	-
Produce Depot/Transport	7.8	-
Other	5.2	5.1
Not Sure/Don't Know	0.6	2.6

TABLE 7 - 56
MODEL A SCHEMES: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF WHO TO
PROVIDE RESETTLEMENT SCHEME NEEDS

	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED
	(N=347)	(N=37)
	%	%
Govt./Ministry of Lands	43.2	29.7
Government & The Farmers	32.0	56.8
NGOs (Foreign Donors)	6.9	2.7
The Farmers Themselves	5.8	2.7
Other	6.6	-
Not Sure/ Don't Know	5.4	8.1

TABLE 7 - 57
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AFFECTING
THEIR AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE

PROBLEM	FREQUENCY	%
Credit/Inputs/Implements	18	29.0
Poor/Inadequate Land	16	25.8
Water/Environmental	14	22.6
Transport/Marketing	4	6.5
Clinic/Social Infrastructure	3	4.8
Other	3	4.8
No Problem	4	6.5

Having been asked to identify their problems these farmers were requested to propose solutions that they wanted the government to implement as well as those that they felt they themselves should carry out to improve the situation of Communal Area agriculture. Almost 44 percent of the farmers called upon the government to make available to them more credit, inputs and farm implements. This was followed by the provision of infrastructural services and more lands or resettlement (Table 7-58). On their part these Communal Area farmers thought that they would perform better if they utilized more extension advice and also worked harder (Table 7-58).

Farmers: Household Developmental Cycle, Micro-Level
Agricultural Characteristics and Economic Performance

The respective phases which characterize the developmental cycle of various households in the different farming systems (see Table 7-14 above in this Chapter) operating in the Mashonaland Central Province exhibit interesting associational patterns.⁹ A few of these discussed below are the respective producer and consumer units, the head of cattle owned, area of land cultivated, quantity of maize retained for household use and finally the net farm cash flow from maize and cotton sales.

Units which are capable and available for production were calculated for each individual household.¹⁰ For all the 458 farmers covered in this analysis these mean units ranged from a low of 1.5 to a high of 7.9. The household with the lowest mean unit belonged to one in a decline phase within the Model A Normal Scheme. The households with the most mean units were male-headed, polygynous and in expansion phase within the Model A Accelerated Scheme. However, for the Model A Normal Scheme, the Communal and the Small-Scale Commercial Areas it was rather the male-headed, polygynous households in the consolidation phase which commanded most producer units.

TABLE 7 - 58
COMMUNAL AREA: FARMERS' PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS
AFFECTING THEIR AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE

QUESTION	RESPONSE	FREQUENCY	%
What should the Government do to solve farmers' problems in this Area?	Provide more credit/inputs/implements	27	43.5
	Provide more social infrastructure and services	20	32.3
	Resettle more people	13	21.0
	Other	2	3.2
What should farmers in this Area do to solve their agricultural problems?	Utilize AGRITEX advice and services more fully	29	46.8
	Work harder	20	32.3
	Obtain more credit/input/implements	8	12.9
	Other	3	4.8
	Nothing/Situation is hopeless	2	3.2

Generally, the households with the most units were all male-headed and polygynous. Those with the least were either in decline or were female-headed or monogamous households headed by young men who were just beginning to establish themselves (Table 7-59).

Similarly, consumer units were calculated for all households.¹¹ The pattern in many ways replicates that of the producer units in that the male-headed polygynous households also had more mouths to feed. It is interesting to note in this regard that the polygynous households in the consolidation phase in the old farming systems, namely, the Communal and Small-Scale Commercial Areas, had the most consumer units. In the new farming systems or the Model A Schemes, however, the polygynous ones in the expansion phase had the most units (Table 7-60). (The significance of the relationship between the producer and consumer units for household performance is examined below in this Chapter).

If mombe or cattle owned was taken to be the tangible measure of socioeconomic status or the symbolic worth of the household then the evidence indicates that the male-headed polygynous households in the consolidation phase constituted the model class in rural Zimbabwe. Among our farmers the mean head of cattle owned ranged from the low of one beast for each of the male-headed monogamous households in the expansion phase within the Model A Accelerated Scheme to a high of 26 for the polygynists in the Model A Normal Schemes (Table 7-61). It may be mentioned in passing that the transfer of cattle plays the most crucial role of completing and legalizing traditional marriages in Zimbabwe. Polygynous households especially with more favorable ratio of married daughters to sons are in a better position to accumulate more cattle from in-laws.

When it comes to the size of area cultivated male-headed polygynous households in the expansion phase had more hectares. In the Communal Area

TABLE 7 - 59
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD PRODUCER UNITS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
(N=)									
Model A Norma(340)	2.2	3.7	2.5	6.0	4.1	3.1	3.6	6.5	1.5
Model A Accel (37)	2.0	3.6	2.0	7.9	3.9	3.0	2.1	7.5	-
Communal Area (61)	2.0	3.9	4.2	5.8	3.8	2.8	2.6	6.3	3.0
Small-Scale C (20)	-	3.8	-	4.8	4.4	2.0	-	5.3	-

TABLE 7 - 60
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD CONSUMER UNITS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
(N=)									
Model A Norma(340)	2.6	4.8	3.2	7.8	4.9	3.8	4.8	7.3	1.5
Model A Accel (37)	2.5	4.1	3.0	11.0	4.5	2.0	2.7	9.0	-
Communal Area (61)	2.3	5.3	5.1	6.9	4.4	3.4	3.4	7.8	3.0
Small-Scale C (20)	-	5.2	-	5.8	4.4	2.0	-	6.5	-

Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
 B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
 C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
 D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
 E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
 F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
 G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
 H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
 I = Household in Decline Phase
 - = Phase not represented

their counterparts in the consolidation phase rather cultivated more hectares. In the isolated case of the Small-Scale Commercial Area a consolidated female-headed household with the spouse away from the farm had the largest mean farm size of 18.4 hectares (Table 7-62). This particular farmer had a 26 year old son who assisted her to manage the farm and probably with her spouse earning off-farm income from another source she was able to put more land into cultivation. Within this farming system the individual household with the most area cultivated, that is, 24 hectares was male-headed, monogamous and expanding.

In terms of maize retained for household use the sole female-headed household in the Small-Scale Commercial Area was also the leader by keeping 76 X 91 kilograms of maize. The fact that this was far in excess of the households subsistence needs suggested that the spouse might be engaged in some piggery or poultry project elsewhere or most probably in a maize-meal milling project in the nearby Mount Darwin urban center (see Figure 7-1). Within the remaining farming systems the polygynous households on the whole retained more maize than other households did (Table 7-63).

In order to assess the economic performance of farm households in different phases of the developmental cycle it would have been ideal to use various costs and returns data that are traditionally generated by farm management studies. These rely on enterprise or whole farm records kept by farmers or enumerators over periods covering the agricultural season to calculate various measures of farm economic performance.

Costs are treated as variable or overhead expenditure. Variable expenditure is the costs that specifically relate to a particular crop or livestock enterprise. It may include, for instance, such purchased input items as seed, fertilizer and pesticide, hired labor for various farm activities, plowing and land preparation, produce packing, storage, transportation and

TABLE 7 - 61
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD HEAD OF CATTLE OWNED

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
(N=)									
Model A Norma(340)	7.9	17.3	13.2	25.1	17.1	12.6	17.8	25.5	4.0
Model A Accel (37)	-	1.4	5.0	3.0	4.8	1.5	0.7	5.0	-
Communal Area (61)	3.0	6.0	5.6	5.2	10.6	7.2	1.5	13.2	10.0
Small-Scale C (20)	-	16.6	-	14.5	20.3	11.0	-	24.5	-

TABLE 7 - 62
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD HECTARES CULTIVATED

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
(N=)									
Model A Norma(340)	3.5	3.1	3.0	3.7	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.4	1.4
Model A Accel (37)	2.0	2.4	2.0	3.7	2.6	2.6	2.7	3.6	-
Communal Area (61)	1.6	2.1	1.8	1.6	2.0	1.8	1.1	2.2	1.6
Small-Scale C (20)	-	11.3	-	6.6	9.4	18.4	-	12.2	-

Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
 B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
 C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
 D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
 E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
 F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
 G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
 H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
 I = Household in Decline Phase
 - = Phase not represented

marketing. Overhead expenses, on the other hand, are treated on whole farm basis as they refer to costs that cannot be directly assigned to a particular cropping or livestock enterprise.

Based on yields and commodity prices obtained by the farmer it is possible to calculate, for example, (1) gross income or income received from produce sale and in the case of cash-cum-subsistence crops the sales in addition to the value of retentions, (2) gross margins, that is, the gross income minus total variable cost, (3) net farm profit which is the whole farm gross margin less whole farm overhead expenditure and (4) return per dollar of variable cost which is obtained by dividing the gross income for each enterprise by the total variable expenditure for that enterprise. Similarly, the total variable cost per unit of area cultivated can be divided by a crop's gross income per unit of production to obtain the break even yield. This is a useful measure of a crop's yield that is required to cover total variable expenses. Other pertinent indices include farm cash surplus for household use which gives an idea about the working capital or the self-sustaining capacity of the farm; gross farm income which measures productivity of the resources used as an indication of the intensity of the farm operations and the household net cash income. The latter is the cash available to the household for non-farm payments. It is a partial but important index of the welfare of the household in terms of whether it is poor or successful (see Dillon and Hardaker 1980; Kay 1981).

Given the limited field resources and the broad regional nature of this study it was not possible to mount the necessary data collection activity to derive these rather useful farm management measures. The farmers' net cash incomes, which were calculated and are presented below as an index of their economic performance, was done by (1) relying on recall of their respective cotton and maize sales as well as maize retentions, which were cross-checked

with the Central Statistical Office (CSO) data collected by the Resettlement Team and ACRITEX, (2) using the prevailing Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) expenditure parameters set for these smallholder farmers and (3) the government producer prices for the 1984/85 season.

Maize and cotton are the chief crops in the African or smallholder farms throughout Mashonaland Central Province and, indeed, around other parts of the country where agro-ecological factors permit commercial agriculture by these smallholders.

In Mufurudzi for example, which is the central focus of this analysis, 78.2 percent of the total variable expenditure of \$850.10 incurred by the resettled farmers in 1982-83 season went into maize, 20.9 percent into cotton and the remaining 0.9 into livestock. Of the mean hectares cropped per sample household which was 3.99 the percentage devoted to maize was 31.5. In terms of the total gross income of \$479.62 maize contributed 46.4 percent, cotton 48.9 and livestock only 4.7 percent. There was no off-farm income (Zimbabwe 1984c:14, Tables 5 to 8).¹²

Consequently, for our measure of economic performance the farmers' net cash incomes were calculated exclusively from costs and returns to these two dominant crops, that is, maize and cotton. The production of these crops were financed with loans from the AFC.¹³ The produce was also sold to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB) respectively at government stipulated prices.¹⁴ All the 349 farmers in the Model A Normal and the 39 in the Model A Accelerated Schemes, the 62 in the Communal Area and the 20 in the Small-Scale Commercial sector grew maize in 1984-85 agricultural season. A total of 337 in the Model A Normal, the 39 in the Model A Accelerated, 50 in the Communal and 17 in the Small-Scale Commercial Areas also grew cotton in addition.

This cash income must not be misinterpreted to be the farm profit because if does include interest and arrears charges on loans that most of these farmers owe to the AFC. These costs are deducted at source by a stop order honored in its behalf by the marketing boards. In our case also income from livestock was not taken into account.

Table 7-64 indicates that in the resettlement Model A Schemes the male-headed polygynous households in the expansion phase commanded the highest net farm income grossing a mean of \$2,443 from maize and cotton sales with respect to the Model A Normal Schemes and \$1,810 in the case of the Model A Accelerated Scheme. For the Communal Area it was the male-headed polygynous households in the consolidation and then the expansion phases respectively which obtained the highest net cash incomes. The monogamous male-headed households which were also in the consolidation phase constituted the top net cash flow earner in the Small-Scale Commercial sector with a mean of \$3,204 (Table 7-64).

Generally, the households which did poorly in this regard were those in (1) the decline phase, (2) the male-headed monogamous ones which are trying to get established in both the Communal and the Model A Accelerated Scheme and (3) the female-headed households without supporting spouses anywhere.

In fact, households in the resettlement or new farming systems did remarkably better than those in the old Communal and Small-Scale Commercial sectors. In the latter only the male-headed households in the consolidation and the expansion phases respectively managed to record positive net cash flows (Table 7-64). At any rate one can conclude from this preliminary analysis that the resettlement Model A farms generate more cash. Consequently, their debt servicing capacities are much better than the Communal farms and surprisingly even more so than the so-called Small-Scale Commercial farms.

TABLE 7 - 63
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD (91 KILOGRAMS) BAGS OF MAIZE RETAINED FOR
CONSUMPTION

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
(N=)									
Model A Norma(340)	8	17	13	26	17	13	18	26	8
Model A Accel (37)	5	12	14	20	16	9	6	10	-
Communal Area (61)	13	12	13	19	13	10	10	24	15
Small-Scale C (20)	-	51	-	60	23	76	-	37	-

TABLE 7 - 64
MASHONALAND CENTRAL PROVINCE: DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPES
AND MEAN HOUSEHOLD NET FARM CASH FLOW (MAIZE AND COTTON)

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
(N=)									
					\$				
Model A Norma(340)	1,609	1,315	1,623	2,443	726	1,198	862	1,912	0
Model A Accel (37)	546	698	307	1,810	1,282	1,113	373	1,360	-
Communal Area (61)	462	253	330	505	442	300	-72	515	261
Small-Scale C (20)	-	770	-	-322	3,204	-2,095	-	-496	-

Note: A = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Establishment Phase
 B = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Expansion Phase
 C = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Expansion Phase
 D = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Expansion Phase
 E = Male-Headed Monogamous Household in Consolidation Phase
 F = Female-Headed (Spouse Away) Household in Consolidation Phase
 G = Female-Headed (No Spouse) Household in Consolidation Phase
 H = Male-Headed Polygynous Household in Consolidation Phase
 I = Household in Decline Phase
 - = Phase not represented

Conclusion

Anthropologists interested in rural economies have tried to make a very important conceptual and analytical contribution to development studies in the area of the application of households' producer and consumer structures to an understanding of productivity patterns. This is where Chayanov's rule (see Thorner et al. 1966) comes in.

Marshall Sahlins (1974:89) in his interpretation of the Russian economist Chayanov is of the view that households with relatively less producers to consumers would have to work more and those with more producers would work less to ensure domestic well being. In his (Sahlins 1974:102) view, therefore, the "intensity of labor . . . to provide an acceptable per capita output" is a function of the ratio of household producers to consumers. Diana Hunt (1979:265) similarly interpretes Chayanov to be saying that "households with many producers would achieve higher outputs per producer, due to exploitation of economies of scale in allocating labour time."

Both Hunt and Sahlins mention output which therefore may be taken as a valid measure of work. In the context of the realities of rural Africa particularly in regard to our case study at least two levels of output measures are appropriate. The first is the area cultivated which, given the prevailing extensive rather than the intensive land use system, primarily determines the volume of output harvested. The second is marketed value which is now accepted without question to be an important consideration in the decision making process of smallholder farmers.

Hunt's and Sahlins' interpretations of Chayanov's rule were examined in the "controlled" conditions of the resettlement Model A Schemes, where all respective households have access to equal amounts of cultivable land and to government credit, inputs, extension, marketing and other facilities. The

evidence generated in Table 7-65 shows that in the Zimbabwe situation households with more mouths to feed cultivated more hectares of land on the average, that is, between 3.4 and 3.7 hectares. Correspondingly, they obtained higher mean net cash flow from maize and cotton. They thus validate Sahlins (1974:89) interpretation that increasing consumer to producer ratios are associated with increased cultivated area and output. However, the evidence appears on the surface to disconfirm Chayanov's view of "more producers more output."

Infact, further analysis this time using the producer units instead of the producer/consumer ratios does not yield any consistent pattern to prove or disprove the validity of the assertion that higher per capita outputs are achieved by households with many producers (Table 7-66). In the Model A Normal Scheme there were 21 types of producer units. The highest per capita mean net cash income of \$719 was achieved by the second ranking household which had 11.0 units of producers. However, the household which ranked second in income ranked 19 in producer units with only 2.0. The same basic pattern also holds for the Model A Accelerated Scheme. In effect therefore merely having more producers in a household does not necessarily translate into more output and vice versa.

TABLE 7 - 65
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: PRODUCER AND CONSUMER UNITS
RATIO, MEAN HECTARES CULTIVATED AND MEAN NET FARM CASH
FLOW (MAIZE AND COTTON)

PRODUCER UNIT/ CONSUMER UNIT	(N=)	MEAN HECTARES CULTIVATED	RANKING	MEAN NET FARM CASH INCOMES (\$)	RANKING
1 : 1.00	28	2.9	7	1,077	7
1 : 1.01 - 1.10	19	3.0	6	1,399	6
1 : 1.11 - 1.20	78	3.3	4	1,901	4
1 : 1.21 - 1.30	83	3.3	4	1,765	5
1 : 1.31 - 1.40	78	3.4	2	2,029	3
1 : 1.41 - 1.50	35	3.7	1	2,547	1
1 : 1.51 - more	16	3.4	2	2,128	2

Note: Analysis of the comparative data from 37 households in the Model A Accelerated Scheme yielded similar results. There 13 households with the largest ratios (i.e 1:1.31-more) cultivated more mean hectares (i.e 2.9) and obtained the highest mean net margin from sales (i.e \$1,476). In contrast 3 households with the least ratio (i.e 1:1) cultivated the smallest mean hectares (i.e 2.1) and even more so made the minimum net margin of a mere \$139.

TABLE 7 - 66
 MODEL A SCHEMES: PRODUCER UNITS AND MEAN PER CAPITA
 NET CASH INCOME (MAIZE AND COTTON)

MODEL A NORMAL					MODEL A ACCELERATED				
PROD- UCER UNIT	RANK	(N=)	MEAN NET CASH FLOW PER CAPITA	RANK	PROD- UCER UNIT	RANK	(N=)	MEAN NET CASH FLOW PER CAPITA	RANK
			\$					\$	
1.0	21	2	18	20	-	-	-	-	-
1.5	20	3	-29	21	1.5	12	1	314	3
2.0	19	36	612	2	2.0	11	5	204	8
2.5	18	37	486	3	2.5	10	4	328	2
3.0	17	29	462	4	3.0	9	9	268	5
3.5	16	34	393	6	3.5	8	3	197	9
4.0	15	20	379	8	4.0	7	4	194	10
4.5	14	45	253	15	4.5	6	2	442	1
5.0	13	24	227	17	-	-	-	-	-
5.5	12	31	220	16	-	-	-	-	-
6.0	11	21	328	12	6.0	5	2	272	4
6.5	10	11	421	5	6.5	4	4	230	7
7.0	9	13	390	7	-	-	-	-	-
7.5	8	15	360	10	7.5	3	1	181	11
8.0	7	5	345	11	-	-	-	-	-
8.5	6	3	177	18	-	-	-	-	-
9.0	5	5	377	9	9.0	2	1	167	12
9.5	4	2	135	19	9.5	1	1	250	6
10.0	3	2	324	13	-	-	-	-	-
11.0	2	1	719	1	-	-	-	-	-
11.5	1	1	274	14	-	-	-	-	-

Notes

1.) These nine major categories can be subdivided or elaborated further by incorporating two other criteria specified in Appendix A. These are (1) the presence or absence of extended kin(s)/affine(s) and (2) the state of fission of the household structure. These additional categories would have been necessary if a much larger sample than this study covered was involved.

2.) With independence in 1980 the expansion in the coverage of the peasant farm sector by the Agricultural Finance Corporation has been extraordinary. From a mere trickle of \$0.6 million given to 2,500 farmers in 1979 the AFC provided a total of \$37.0 million short term or seasonal loans in 1984 to 91,000 Communal Area and Resettlement Scheme farmers (see AFC Annual Reports, Harare).

In the case of Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme the situation in 1985 with the AFC was as follows. Of the total 563 resettled farmers 546 or 97 percent applied for short term or seasonal loans. Nineteen or 3.5 percent of these applicants were refused. Of the 527 or 93.6 percent of the farmers who were approved a total of \$349,104 were granted. The mean per capita credit received by these farmers was therefore \$662.44. The total loan granted was distributed as follows: (1) \$223,590 for 870 hectares of cotton, (2) \$83,850 for 430 hectares of maize, (3) \$14,448 for 24 hectares of burley tobacco and (4) \$27,216 for the contract plowing of 432 hectares.

In terms of medium term loans 165 such loans in the total amount of \$21,800 were given to Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme farmers in 1985. These were to be spent on draft-oxen, scotch-carts, cultivators, plows, harrows, a planter and a rifle.

3.) During 1985 the European Economic Community (EEC) in conjunction with SADCC and the respective governments of Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe was carrying out pilot surveys to devise effective means of combating the tsetse flies and eradicating trypanosomiasis from the entire region through both ground and aerial spraying.

In the specific case of the Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme a team of inspectors from the Department of Veterinary Services had by February 1985 inspected 1,916 heads of cattle in the scheme. Of this a total of 395 or 21 percent were smeared. Ninety-two heads tested positive of trypanosomiasis infection. In October 1985 there were 15 teams of inspectors camping in the Scheme scouting the movements and studying the ecology and breeding habits of the flies.

In the nearby Mount Darwin Model A Normal Scheme similar teams were also at work. As at the end of January 1985 the inspectors had trapped 100 flies which indicates a fairly high concentration within an area the size of the Scheme.

4.) According to the records the combined total of goats and sheep in the 12 surveyed villages in Mufurudzi rose from 191 heads in 1982-83 to 275 in 1983-84. In 1985 the 349 farmers interviewed reported 439 such small livestock among themselves.

Though the trend in increasing numbers is commendable many women in the villages complained that the ruminants were a problem. These women were being encouraged by Women and Community Development officers to get involved in backyard and cooperative vegetable gardens to supplement household nutrition

and earn extra cash. However, based on their respective experiences many felt that the gardens were not worth the trouble of additional fencing expenses and the time required to constantly police them to ward off goats and sheep (see also Chapter VIII fn4 ii below).

5.) As Billings (1985:29-30) points out Zimbabwe generally has a good and accessible supply of most farming inputs. Major companies such as the Seed Coop Company of Zimbabwe, Farm Seeds Limited and Farmers' Coop Limited have contracts with various commercial seed growers to produce a number of hybrid maize varieties and other agricultural seeds. These seeds, particularly hybrid maize SR52, R200 and R201 are almost universally distributed throughout the country in a range of convenient package sizes.

Fertilizers are likewise produced in large quantities in the country by two major companies including Windmill (Pvt) Limited. These rely on local deposits of ammonia and phosphate. Zimbabwe also has an advanced agricultural manufacturing sector which caters for all basic farm implements needs of most farmers.

In spite of these many farmers in the Resettlement Schemes and the Communal Areas experience serious problems in receiving their inputs on time. Given the fact that these respective farming systems are now heavily supported by the government in the form of guaranteed credits these problems may be attributed to the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and Cooperative input deliverers. According to Billings (1985:24-25) about 85 percent of the over 400 registered cooperative movements in Zimbabwe are in the Communal Areas as agricultural marketing and input supply cooperatives. These Cooperatives have the responsibility to procure and deliver inputs for the Resettlement Schemes and the Communal Areas. They operate a network of about 300 input delivery centers most of which have been built with aid from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

Under the AFC operated Small Farms Credit and the Resettlement Credit Schemes all inputs approved for these smallholder farmers have to be channelled through a designated input delivery Cooperative. At the grassroots level such as Mufurudzi the Cooperatives have major delivery bottlenecks. These are mainly the result of their inability to procure haulage vehicles at the right time and also the poor state of some rural access roads.

6.) The phenomenal expansion of the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) into peasant agriculture through its Resettlement and the Small Farms Credit Schemes is perhaps the determinant factor in the accumulative revolution that is occurring within rural Zimbabwe today.

Notwithstanding this fact, however, the grassroots evaluation by most farmers of AFC's service delivery is quite abysmal. There are four main concerns expressed by these farmers, namely, (1) late deliveries or non-delivery of some input items it approves on farmers' buying orders, (2) subsequent invoicing and charges to farmers' accounts of such inputs not delivered, (3) the delivery of inputs at locations more convenient to the Cooperative agents but less so to the farmers and (4) the "seemingly" arbitrary procedures used by AFC field officers to reduce the sizes or even refuse farmers credit applications.

Anybody who understands the operation of the AFC's input credit package would blame the first 3 complaints on the Cooperatives. The fact that farmers hold the AFC accountable accusing it of insensitivity to their plight shows that the Corporation has serious public relations deficiencies in its dealings at the basic level of the peasant. The following illustrative case is quite

common. On May 30, 1985, the Commission Delegate of the European Communities in Zimbabwe after visiting the Jondale-Bumbe Model A Normal Scheme (see Figure 8-1 below) and hearing some of the above complaints from the resettled farmers conveyed them to the AFC. The General Manager of the AFC in his letter of June 21, 1985, explained in response that:

Our staff have stressed that farmers should take the initiative to demand delivery of goods or services from the Co-op officials concerned and not to leave this to the AFC. . . . On the issue of collection points distance, we advise clients to discuss the issue with Co-op officials who hire the transporters especially so because AFC provides money for the transport services. On granting, criteria programme viability, and credit worthiness which is mainly a reflection of the farmers' loan payment performance is taken into consideration. Poor payment record equals smaller loans in future and good record equals bigger loans on a gradual basis (sic.)

The Cooperatives in turn shift some of the blame to the AFC arguing that its delay in giving them all the approved buying orders in time does not facilitate effective procurement and delivery of farmers inputs. For instance, as late as October 10, 1984, exactly 35 days before farmers in Mufurudzi experienced 40 percent probability of planting rains AFCs regional office in Bindura had not released the full list of farmers who qualified or did not qualify for what amounts of loan. As the Resettlement Officer's letter to DERUDE, Harare, indicated the Cooperative had a valid point. The memo explained:

Bindura-Mt. Darwin Coops. would like to deliver the inputs for the few farmers whose buying orders were processed but they feel it would be uneconomical as they may have to do several trips with small loads because further bits of inputs would still be gradually released by AFC. . . . AFC has so far approved 245.5 ha to be contract ploughed in Mufurudzi which is equivalent to 102 farmers. . . . AFC promised to release more contract ploughing forms later. We now have 7 tractors to do contract ploughing for farmers in Mufurudzi. They arrived on Monday 8 October '84 and started ploughing at Gatu Village the following day. We wish AFC could release all the names of farmers accepted for contract ploughing before the tillage team moves off.

All these developments should be placed against the technical or ecological perspective in Zimbabwe. Because of the short rainy season early planting is required to ensure maximum yield. The fact is that for every one week delay in planting date there is on the average a 5 percent reduction in yield for major crops such as maize (Billings 1985:122).

Finally, the farmers also have a problem with the delay in receiving their checks for produce sold. As of the end of November 1985, over 3 months after many farmers sold their crops, most farmers in Mufurudzi had not been served with their payment notices. This is due to the complicated nature of the "stop order" system under which the Grain and the Cotton Marketing Boards have to monitor individual farmers' sales and deduct AFC's loan principal, arrears and interest charges before sending a check for whatever amount is left to the farmer's credit.

7.) The selection of a health clinic as the major need is quite interesting in that a total amount of \$24,000 was allocated for the erection of such a clinic in Mufurudzi. Infact, as at the end of July 1985 \$19,815 out of the total allocation had been spent (see Chapter VIII Table 8-15 below) in putting up the clinic which is located at the Rural Service Center (Figure 8-2). The physical construction of the clinic was completed in June 1983. Yet, two years after its completion Mufurudzi households did not still have access to this vital medical facility and had to travel to Shamva or Madziwa Township for treatment.

The problem was that when DERUDE formally notified the Ministry of Health to arrange to take over the building and operate the clinic as required under the resettlement policy (see Chapter V) the Mashonaland Central Provincial Medical Officer responded with complaints that (1) the location of the clinic was not central to the population it was built to serve, (2) the facility lacked such furniture as cupboards, (3) the Type B (government) accommodations constructed for the medical staff would not attract qualified personnel to live in Mufurudzi and that the Ministry of Health was not consulted in the planning of the clinic.

This apparent bureaucratic wrangling between the Ministry and DERUDE over these clinics was not peculiar to Mufurudzi. Indeed, the problem was universal and hardly any clinic built in the Model A Normal Schemes were operational at the beginning of 1985. In November 1985 certain modifications recommended by the Ministry were being carried out in preparation for the opening of the clinic. These included the erection of two "blair" toilets for use by outpatients.

8.) The relative isolation of most of the resettlement villages makes the unavailability of service industries such as grocery stores and grinding mills a seriously felt problem. In May 1985 a store was licensed to open at the Mufurudzi Rural Service Center (see Figure 8-2). The fact that this is some distance from all the villages except Zvomanyanga makes the utility of this store very limited.

Under the resettlement policy and planning service industries in these Schemes are controlled. For example, any individual wishing to establish a small business there can only do so by first applying formally through the Resettlement Officer to lease a trading site or business stand at the Rural Service Center. The Resettlement Officer in conjunction with the Area Board (see Chapter V Figure 5-1) reviews the application. If it is approved then a recommendation is forwarded to the State Land Officer who issues the lease accordingly (see Zimbabwe 1983d).

In considering such application for a lease preference is given to the small entrepreneur from the adjoining Communal Areas or urban center. In theory resettled farmers who have sufficient capital and have consolidated their land allocations into successful productive units also qualify.

As of 1985 there were plans to permit traders already well established in the Rural Service Centers to expand by opening grocery kiosks in some villages.

9.) These patterns between developmental cycle type and for instance the number of cattle owned, area of land cultivated, quantity of maize produced, retained and sold and net cash flows of farmers also exist with such variables as households ownership of items and capital assets and perceptions and attitudes about life situations. Given the limited scope of this study it has not been expedient for any correlational or

multivariate analysis to be carried out at this point to explore any causal relationships that may exist.

10.) The household producer units were calculated by assigning 1 point in weight to all household members above age 14 and working full time in the farm. All other members 5 years or older not defined by the household head as full time farmers but who contribute labor in some way (such as scaring birds, helping to pick cotton or baby sitting on the farm while adults are weeding the crop) were assigned a weight of 0.5.

11.) The household consumer units were similarly calculated by assigning household members age 15 or above 1 point and those below 15 years 0.5 points.

12.) Certain resettled farmers, numbering about 10 in all, are gainfully employed either within or outside the Scheme which is against their permits of resettlement. For the greatest majority of farmers, however, there are no viable sources of off-farm employment within the Scheme.

In the circumstance a successful livestock enterprise can facilitate the cash flow needs of farmers. This is especially so for small ruminants such as goats and sheep (see fn4 above). However, the calving and mortality rates of livestock in these resettlement schemes are generally poor. In 1982-83 the records indicate that for the 12 Mufurudzi villages cattle births were 248 against 36 deaths. In 1983-84 while births increased to 312 deaths also jumped significantly to 122. The statistics below show that (1) cattle sales, (2) out-transfers usually for social purposes and (3) household slaughter for consumption are rather few.

	Purchases	Births	In-Tran sfer	Sales	Deaths	Slaughter	Out- Transfer
1982-83	13	248	20	3	36	0	2
1983-84	253	312	108	47	122	27	12

A major problem with livestock accumulation in these Schemes is the fact that some farmers are going against the stipulations in their resettlement permits by exceeding the legal or assigned Livestock Units (see for instance, Chapter VIII fn 5 iii below). There was a large increase of "in-transfer" which in 1983-84 numbered 108 heads or 16 percent of all additions to Mufurudzi cattle herd. If this trend continues it may suggest that some resettled farmers are perhaps taking advantage of the better pastures that the resettlement areas provide by informally bringing in livestock owned by kin and friends in the land-hungry Communal Areas.

13.) For the 1984-85 season the AFC's estimation of variable costs for Mufurudzi Model A Scheme and nearby smallholder farmers were (1) Maize: \$195 plus \$63 for every hectare of contract plowing, (2) Cotton: \$257 plus \$63 for every hectare of contract plowing and (3) Tobacco: \$602 plus \$63 for every hectare of contract plowing.

14.) For the 1984-85 season the government approved producer prices

offered by the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) were (1) Maize: \$16.36 per 91 kilogram bag and (2) Cotton: \$99.00 per 180 kilogram bale. Tobacco is sold by auction and prices per kilogram fluctuate on the floors.

CHAPTER VIII
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESETTLEMENT

Evaluating Change and Development

The evaluation of development policy programs entails major responsibilities. These include (1) measuring attainment of process objectives or ends-goals, (2) determining achievement of means-goals and (3) describing program implementation (Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 1984a:7 fn1). However, evaluation goes beyond the mere quantification of observable indices. It is concerned with the critical assessment of the part that programs or projects play in generating particular outcomes.

Many analysts point out that research to measure ends-goals or means-goals is better conducted by studying policy inputs and program outputs and the establishment of a relation between them (Coleman 1975:36; Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 1983, 1984a, 1984b; Fitz-Gibbon and Morris 1984; Henerson et al. 1984).

Such a task demands that the development process be conceptualized as a set of linked hypotheses that embodies the concept of causality. The attainment of development goals then is attributed to the prior achievement of policy objectives or project purposes which in turn derives from an earlier production of outputs that is also caused initially by the provision of inputs (USAID 1980:52-53).

Evaluation therefore is nothing more or less than the systematic study of innovation and change. It calls for the analysis of variations that are observed to be occurring in the same units at different points in time and space and the relationship of such variations to interventions (Tuchfeld 1979:104).

The recent upsurge in policy evaluation studies within the field of anthropology as well as in the other social sciences is confounded by persistent measurement dilemmas that characterize the analysis of change (see Bereiter 1963; Barth 1967; Cronbach and Furby 1970). Casley and Lury (1982:7) indicate that the most difficult problem in evaluation is the establishment of causality between project inputs and their effects and impacts. A widely shared solution to this methodological problem among policy analysts is the "movement away from inductive statistics toward more building of deductive models whereby one can deduce policy effects from empirically validated premises" (Nagel 1975:10).

Michael Patton, however, criticizes the dominance of evaluation research by this

largely unquestioned, natural science paradigm of hypothetico-deductive methodology [which] assumes quantitative measurement, experimental design and multivariate, parametric statistical analysis to be the epitome of "good" science. (Patton 1983:19)

In his view this approach which comes from the tradition of experimentation in agriculture is no longer so ominous. Patton instead proposes an alternative paradigm that he derives from the tradition of anthropological field studies. This ethnographic approach uses

the techniques of in-depth, openended interviewing and personal observation . . . qualitative data, holistic analysis, and detailed description derived from close contact with the targets of study [and it] aims at understanding of social phenomena. (Patton 1983:19)

A similar view was suggested much earlier by Fredrik Barth. Barth (1967:661) is of the opinion that in the endeavor to understand change processes the contribution of anthropologists lies in two areas. These are (1) in providing such primary materials as concepts that allow for the

observation and description of the events of change and (2) in the researchers' powers of observation out there where change is happening. Barth is convinced that anthropology that primarily seeks to produce secondary data by deduction and extrapolation does not facilitate a better understanding of the dynamics of change.

Given the multifaceted dimensions and the nature of the questions that evaluation addresses no one method can ever be analytically adequate. For example, in any specific case of policy-induced developments evaluators are confronted by at least four basic issues.

The first is program effectiveness. Here the objectives are (1) to determine the substantive effects of a given policy by questioning whether or not implementation is delivering services according to design and (2), if it is doing so, whether the services are reaching the planned target clients or not (Levine 1967; Weiss 1972). The second facet of programs relates to efficiency. This involves the assessment of costs against policy effects, benefits and utility (Haveman and Margolis 1970; Merewitz and Sosnick 1971; Levin 1983a, 1983b). Feasibility is the third aspect that is of interest to program evaluation. It usually deals with political costs in terms of the constituency whose support is deemed necessary for the successful implementation and achievement of policy objectives (Lowi 1972). Finally, program ethics are an important consideration in evaluation research. Rather than emphasising outcomes program ethics concentrate more on policy goals and objectives in respect of the explicit normative values of the policy-making system or society (MacRae 1971).

In the circumstance, only a broad set of evaluation questions which are probed through a variety of approaches can yield detailed insights into these aspects of development programs. Different evaluation situations and research concerns will therefore demand different and appropriate methods. Any such

method, however, has to be tailored to fit a specific need or program concern. To be able to maximize the available options the evaluator must utilize a holistic methodological perspective. This is what Patton (1983:20) refers to as "a paradigm of choices."

The paradigm used in this Chapter is a combination of approaches that looks at the inputs that go into resettlement, the costs of these inputs, their projected benefits and effects vis-a-vis the observable trends in the socioeconomic developments occurring in selected schemes.

Macro-Level Costs, Development Inputs and Economic Projections

Project Budgets and Costs

In policy evaluation it is very common to use levels of expenditure and expenditures per capita as proxy indices of development output (Parks 1975:198). Resettlement as a development program has its fiscal costs. The direct and indirect costs incurred in respect of the resettlement in Zimbabwe comprise expenditures on (1) land acquisition and (2) general development. The latter item includes planning, implementation and physical contingencies.

These costs are allocated against the bureaucratic or administrative machinery that services the program. Primarily, this is the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement which, until mid-1985, was known as the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (see Chapter V above). The details of these direct and indirect costs are elaborated upon further below. Table 8-1, for instance, provides an indication of the overall expenditures that go into resettlement as well as the specific areas for which these costs are expended.

TABLE 8 - 1

ZIMBABWE: MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET EXPENDITURE 1981-82 / 1985-86
(\$ MILLION)

	1981-82	1982-83	1983-84	1984-85	1985-86
Administration & General					
Land Acquisition	14.0	25.1	6.5	3.0	6.3
Resettl. Grants	10.1	12.8	11.0	10.2	4.0
Other	16.8	10.4	11.4	19.3	13.3
Surveyor General	1.8	1.8	2.2	2.2	2.3
Rural Development	0.0	10.3	10.2	10.3	11.3
Coop Development	1.3	2.1	2.0	2.9	3.1
Total	44.0	62.5	43.3	47.9	40.3
Total as % of National Budget	2.1	2.2	1.4	1.3	1.1

Source: Based on Estimates of Expenditure issued by the
government for the respective financial years
(see Zimbabwe 1982e, 1983b, 1984b, 1985b, 1986b).

In 1981-82 financial year, resettlement accounted for 2.1 percent of the national budget of \$2,122.0 million. This share increased to 2.2 percent in 1982-83. From then to the fiscal year 1985-86 the relative share was on the decline. It dropped to 1.4 percent in 1983-84, then to 1.3 percent in 1984-85. By 1985-86, when the national budget was \$3,568.0 million, the proportion going into resettlement was down to 1.1 percent. In absolute terms also 1982-83 was the best year for the Ministry when it received \$62.5 million for its activities. In 1985-86 it operated with budgetary cuts that reduced its expenditure allocation to \$40.3 million, only 64.5 percent of what it received three years earlier.

The expenditures incurred by the Ministry are allocated into four specific areas or item headings. These are: (1) the development of cooperatives; (2) rural development, which essentially is the infrastructural development of the Model A Intensive Resettlement Schemes; (3) the Department of the Surveyor General; and (4) Administration and General. The major share of all the monies allocated to the Ministry is accounted for by the latter item heading, though it is declining slightly relative to the other three.

Under Administration and General are a number of sub-items many of which are categorised here into "others." These include salaries as well as the special grants administered by the parastatal Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA). ARDA, in addition to its statutory functions, undertakes the management of farms purchased by the government. It also disburses funds used by the Department of Rural Development (DERUDE) for the infrastructural development of the purchased farms pending the resettlement of farmers (see Table 5-2 above and Table 8-4 below).

In 1981-82, an estimated \$10.1 million in grant money in respect of resettlement was allocated to ARDA. The amount increased to \$12.8 million the following year decreasing to an estimated \$11.0 million in 1983-84. In

1984-85, there was a further cut to \$10.2 million which was drastically reduced to \$4.0 million in 1985-86.

The expenditure for Land Acquisition is controlled directly by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement (see Table 5-2 above and Table 8-4 below). Such expenditure is accounted for by the purchase of farms and compensation for other properties acquired for resettlement. Land Acquisition used to be the most significant sub-item under Administration and General. In 1981-82, this sub-item covered 31.8 percent of the total budget of the Ministry. The following year the proportion of the land acquisition expenditure was raised to 40.2 percent. In 1984-85, however, land purchases accounted for only 6.3 percent of the total expenditures. It appeared to be picking up though as the government approved 15.6 percent of the Ministry's allocation in 1985-86 for land acquisition alone. These fluctuating trends in the budgetary allocations going into land acquisition as well as into the grants used by ARDA to administer the purchased lands reflect the ups and downs in the resettlement process over the years (see Table 8-1).

In Table 8-2, the differential funding, costs and returns characteristics of 17 selected schemes representing a cross-section of the Model A individual family resettlements in the country are presented. Similarly, Table 8-3 shows corresponding features relating to a selection of 13 Model B cooperatives or collective resettlements.

A review of the tables shows that there are variations in funding, project costs, resettlement costs per individual households, the economic internal rates of return and in other areas. These peculiarities tend to make each of the over one hundred and seventy schemes distributed around the country somewhat unique by itself. Even at this rather macro or aggregate level of review the problems and implications that this fact of uniqueness holds for the systematic and comparative evaluation of schemes' performances

TABLE 8 - 2
ZIMBABWE: SOURCE OF FUNDING, COSTS, AND RATES OF RETURN
SELECTED MODEL A NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES

SCHEME	PROVINCE	FUNDING SOURCE	TOTAL COSTS (\$000)	AVERAGE COST PER FAMILY (\$)	EIRR %
Hoyuyu	Masho. East	Kuwait	4,656	2,162	22.0
Nyadire	Masho. East	Kuwait	1,619	2,196	25.8
Sengezi	Masho. East	Zim/UK	534	1,846	14.0
Mufurudzi	Masho. Central	Zim/UK	1,316	2,337	15.0
Mt. Darwin	Masho. Central	Zim/UK	1,635	3,162	19.0
Muzvezve	Masho. West	Zim/UK	5,179	4,574	11.8
Tokwe	Midlands	Zim/UK	2,754	2,521	9.0
Copper Queen	Midlands	Kuwait	4,930	3,296	10.4
Sessombi West	Midlands	Zim/UK	1,611	2,945	12.0
Chinyika	Manicaland	Zim/ADB	23,600	3,469	21.0
Mayo	Manicaland	Zim/UK	3,673	2,652	8.0
Nyajezi	Manicaland	Zim/UK	468	2,449	11.0
Soti Source	Masvingo	Zim/UK	1,627	2,732	14.4
Mukosi	Masvingo	Zim/UK	1,361	2,254	7.0
Chizvirizvi	Masvingo	Zim/UK	548	1,957	15.0
Mguza	Matabele North	Zim/UK	780	3,084	2.9
Dombodema	Matabele South	Zim/NE	2,028	2,898	11.4

Sources: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development,
Evaluation and Monitoring Section; DERUDE; ARDA; AGRITEX,
Harare.

Note: EIRR--Economic Internal Rate of Return; Zim--Government
of Zimbabwe; UK--Government of the United Kingdom; ADB--
African Development Bank; NE--Netherlands Government;
Masho--Mashonaland; Matabele--Matabeleland.

TABLE 8 - 3
ZIMBABWE: SOURCES OF FUNDING, COSTS, AND RATES OF RETURN
FOR SELECTED MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES

SCHEME	PROVINCE	FUNDING SOURCE	TOTAL COST (\$)	AVERAGE COST PER FAMILY (\$)	EIRR %
Kwaedza	Masho. East	Zim/UK	176,930	1,769	16.3
Tabudirira	Masho. East	Zim	380,626	1,903	9.0
Kumhanya	Masho. East	Zim	214,679	3,253	29.0
Simba Youth	Masho. Central	Zim	161,097	1,790	32.0
Batsiranayi	Masho. Centra	Zim	153,955	770	19.4
Kurima Inhaka	Masho. Central	Zim	208,879	5,022	32.7
Mukuwapasi	Masho. West	Zim	182,037	1,820	32.3
Gowe	Masho. West	Zim	265,552	4,918	26.8
Nyamakate	Masho. West	Zim	224,462	2,040	38.9
Gutsaruzhinji	Midlands	Zim	250,601	2,141	27.8
Ruponeso	Manicaland	Zim	243,830	3,997	13.3
Bethel	Manicaland	Zim	326,986	3,269	24.3
Magurabatanai	Manicaland	Zim	201,234	2,613	33.0

Source: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, Evaluation and Monitoring Section; ARDA; DERUDE; AGRITEX Harare.

Note: EIRR--Economic Internal Rate of Return; Zim--Government of Zimbabwe; UK--Government of the United Kingdom; Masho--Mashonaland. In 1985 there were no Model B schemes in the poorer agro-ecological provinces, namely, Matabeleland North and South and also in Masvingo.

are quite enormous. The variations give each scheme its own dynamism.

Sources of Project Funding

The initial funding for the resettlement program was made available jointly by the governments of Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom. This joint source continues to provide funding for the great majority of schemes throughout the country. However, in terms of the volume of funding, the African Development Bank and Arab sources, particularly Kuwait, have become important partners of Zimbabwe in securing aid monies for resettlement.

For instance, in 1982 the government of Zimbabwe teamed up with the African Development Bank to finance the \$23.6 million Chinyinka Scheme. The scheme which is located in the Makoni District, Manicaland Province, is certainly the biggest single resettlement in the country. It has an area of 112,600 hectares distributed across Natural Regions II, III and IV. There are a total of 3,841 farm families in Chinyinka and they are resettled in 108 villages.

Project Development Inputs

It is important to observe that expenditure levels or per capita costs per se do not provide all the insights about development inputs. The specifics of expenditure commitments such as they are presented in Table 8-4 make available to the evaluator a picture of what development monies are spent on. In this case a detailed summary of the various items budgeted for and progressively expended upon for the five year period covered between 1980-81 and 1985-86 is shown. It must be mentioned that these expenditures are only for the Normal Intensive Model A and Model B schemes. They do not include the

TABLE 8 - 4
ZIMBABWE: BUDGET ALLOCATION, SUMMARY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
AND BALANCE FOR MODEL A AND MODEL B NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES AS
AT JULY 31, 1985

ITEM/SUB-ITEM	BUDGETED COST	PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE	BALANCE
(\$ 000)			
<hr/> Indirect Costs (Ministry of Lands, Resettl. & Rural Dev.)			
Land Acquisition	35,385	31,193	4,192
Development Team	62	58	4
Suspense Account	5,142	5,148	0
Development Costs (Agricultural & Rural Dev. Authority)			
Demarcation and Survey	1,699	910	789
Land Preparation	3,390	2,279	1,112
Roads	4,449	1,503	2,945
Roads Maintenance	400	31	369
Water Supplies	9,722	4,305	5,417
Fencing	4,563	555	4,008
Dips	1,568	891	677
Staff Housing & Offices	4,897	1,541	3,356
Schools	15,658	9,109	6,549
Clinics	2,640	712	1,928
Other Buildings	1,338	106	1,233
Rural Service Centers	3,336	1,394	1,943
Telephones	98	0	98
Pit Latrines	13	0	13
Crop Packs	1,360	934	427
Transport	156	2	154
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>			

TABLE 8 - 4--continued

ITEM/SUB-ITEM	BUDGET	EXPENDITURE (\$ 000)	BALANCE
Wood Lots	200	6	194
Equipment	245	1	244
Establishment Grant (Model B Schemes)			
Housing & Farm Buildings	510	47	463
Tractors & Equipment	785	89	695
Other Equipment	126	4	121
Hand Tools & Prot' Clothes	34	28	6
Workshop Tools	17	8	9
Vegetable Garden Tools	7	4	3
Crop Packs	518	376	142
Oxen	61	27	34
Ox-Carts	12	2	10
Ox-Implements	25	6	19
Transport	120	13	108
Vehicles & Cycles	225	55	170
Tobacco Demonstration Unit	201	97	104
British Drilling Team	20	17	3
Planning & Implementation	4,880	1,346	3,534
Contingencies	7,292	0	7,292
Recurrent Cost	1,564	359	1,206
Total	112,727	63,156	49,571

Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), Harare.

Accelerated schemes (see Chapter V above for a description of the Resettlement Models).

As it is explained above the expenditure items range from indirect costs such as land acquisition to direct ones which include both primary and secondary development infrastructures like schools, crop packages for newly resettled Model A families and farm equipment for cooperative groups in the Model B schemes (Table 8-4). The funds which are accounted for in this expenditure summary are respectively managed by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in the case of land purchases and by ARDA in the area of development items.

The expenditure on land acquisition is the single most important cost item in resettlement. The total budgetary allocation for land acquisition for the period 1980-81 to 1985-86 amounts to a little over \$35.0 million. Of this about 89 percent or \$31.2 million was spent during the period under review. The funds for land purchase represent a third of the total amount of \$110.8 million allocated for the establishment and development of the schemes. However, in terms of the actual expenditure so far the commitment to the acquisition of lands makes up almost 50 percent.

Apart from land acquisition there are two major areas of development expenditure or indirect costs which are significant. These are expenditures on schools and water supplies construction respectively. Within the five year period a total of over \$9.1 million were used for schools while over \$4.3 million went into the provision of water supplies (Table 8-4).

Project Economic Returns/Benefits

The costs and benefits associated with development, as Gittinger (1972:4) points out, are a useful measure of the wealth creating capacity of a project.

The Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) is one such method among others used in investment analysis (see Kay 1981:230-245; Livingstone and Ord 1984:141-152). The EIRR uses discounted cash flow to measure a project's worth or the average earning power of the money expended over its life span (Gittinger 1972:71).

In Zimbabwe the calculated rates range widely between different resettlement schemes and models. In the Model A schemes, for instance, it varies from a low of 2.9 percent for Mguza in the Matabeleland North Province to a high of 25.8 percent for Nyadire in Mashonaland East (see Table 8-2). Likewise, for the Model B schemes Tabudirira Cooperative located in the Mashonaland East Province has the lowest rate of return amounting to 9 percent. The highest is for Nyamakate Cooperative in the Mashonaland West Province with a 39 percent EIRR (see Table 8-3).

It needs to be noted, however, as Gittinger argues that

Although the Internal Rates of Return of different projects will vary, projects cannot with confidence be ranked on the basis of the Internal Rate of Return. Only in a very general way will the Internal Rate of Return tell us that one project is better than another, in the sense that it contributes more to national income relative to the resources used. (Gittinger 1982:331)

Given the projections of the respective rates of return in the case of an overwhelming majority of the schemes the planners and policy makers are apparently optimistic generally that resettlement is economically viable. At the micro or grassroots level of the farmer viability of resettlement is, however, going to be determined by the ability of the resettled household to achieve adequate subsistence output and to produce enough crop and livestock surpluses for the market to realize a target cash income of \$400 or more per year (see Chapter V above).

A comparison of the mean resettlement costs per family and the rates of economic returns is quite illuminative in that the relatively expensive schemes such as Muzvezve or Mguza are not necessarily the potentially productive ones and vice versa (Table 8-2). This is also true of the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes (see Table 8-3). The fact of this matter underlies the ideological or political importance in terms of feasibility that governments' attach to such economic or rural development programs as resettlement.

Assessing the Socio-Economic and Political Performance of Resettlement Schemes

An important evaluation issue arises from the foregoing macro-level information about costs and expected returns. The issue has to do with whether or not the expended budget generates the expected responses. This crucial concern is brought out so vividly by Casley and Lury. They argue (Casley and Lury 1983:9) that many projects assume certain beneficiary responses which do not materialize due to a lack of insight into the attitudes and constraints affecting the likely beneficiaries.

In development programs the kinds of radical or even conservative responses that are expected of the affected or would-be-beneficiaries tend to be projected in the form of positive social, political and economic orientations. Nevertheless, the unanticipated responses or consequences of development, particularly the negative ones, are more often the most serious which also get reported. Evaluation therefore has to be concerned with identifying both the good and the bad that any implemented policy generates.

In order to follow up on various dimensions of this issue in respect of the performance of the resettlement schemes two sets of case studies are presented here. The first deals with the evaluation of aspects of development

TABLE 8 - 5
MASHONALAND REGION: LIST OF RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES
DECEMBER 1985

PROVINCE	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED	MODEL B COOPERATIVE
MASHONALAND EAST	1 Acton Reynold	9 Marondera	12 Kwaedza
	2 Sengezi 1	10 Wedza	13 Mt. St. Mary
	3 Sengezi 2	11 Wheleerdale	14 Shandisai Pfungwa
	4 Hoyuyu 3		15 Tamuka
	5 Hoyuyu 1		16 Kumhanya
	6 Hoyuyu 2		17 Marowa
	7 Nyamuzizi		18 Tabudirira
	8 Nyadire		
MASHONALAND CENTRAL	19 Mufurudzi	22 Shamva	28 Nyakudya
	20 Mt. Darwin	23 Bindura	29 Kuenda
	21 Karuyana	24 Alfa	30 Chakoma
		25 Nyamanji	31 Kurima Inhaka
		26 Elhandama	32 Kushingirira
		27 Gremlin Heights	33 Simba Youth
			34 Kubudirira
			35 Batsiranayi
MASHONALAND WEST	36 Nyama	42 Chegutu 6	48 Ganyangu
	37 Musengezi	43 Hamilton Hills	49 Gowe
	38 Jompani	44 Pote 2	50 Tashinga
	39 Muzveze 1	45 Torananga	51 Mukuwapasi
	40 Muzveze 2	46 Vuti A & B	52 Mauya
	41 Jondale/Bumbe	47 Ngezi	53 Nyamakate

achievements and problems within all the 53 resettlement schemes which are distributed between the three Models in operation in the Mashonaland Region (see Table 8-5 and Figure 8-1). This regional evaluation is based on the assessment of Resettlement Officers. The second consists of two detailed case studies which examine the dynamics of program performance using contrasting resettlement schemes and models. The Mufurudzi Model A Scheme and its immediate Model B neighbor the Simba Youth Cooperative Scheme are purposively chosen for this illustrative case study (see Figure 8-2).

Both schemes are in the Shamva District, Mashonaland Central Province. They have similar agro-ecological features and were established at about the same time in 1980 as the premier resettlement projects in the country. A general background to each scheme is provided as well as its costs, economic projections, aspects of its development problems and agricultural performance.

Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model A Schemes

Attitudinal, Participation and Activity Profiles of Farmers

In 1985, there were a total of 18 Resettlement Officers and their support staff in charge of the 16 Model A Normal Intensive and the 16 Model A Accelerated Intensive schemes in the Mashonaland Region comprising the three Provinces (see Table 8-5 and Figure 8-1). A major responsibility of these Officers is the close monitoring of the day-to-day developments within the schemes (see Chapter V above).

For this evaluation the Officers were asked to assess their respective schemes and rate the resettled farmers from low to high on various items grouped into four profiles as follows: (1) Attitude--(i) social harmony and (ii) motivation; (2) Participation--(i) VIDCO/WARDCO affairs, (ii) self help




FIGURE 8 - 1
MASHONALAND REGION: DISTRIBUTION OF
RESETTLEMENT MODELS AND SCHEMES

activities, (iii) youth affairs, (iv) women's affairs and (v) Area Board leadership; (3) Performance--(i) agriculture, (ii) loan repayment and (4) Activity--(i) cooperation with resettlement team, (ii) compliance with resettlement policy and (iii) long-term prospects for scheme success (see Appendix B, Tables 1 to 3 for the list of study variables).

In the evaluation of the Resettlement Officers the two variants of Model A schemes were generally doing quite well in all areas examined. Indeed, the Accelerated schemes, which do not enjoy some of the infrastructures and services provided the Normal schemes, were even rated highly on most items. All Model A Normal schemes rated average or high on all items. In particular, the long-term prospects for the success of 91.7 percent of these schemes were high, the agricultural performance of farmers in 91.6 percent of them was also high likewise the motivation, cooperation with the Resettlement Team and participation in VIDCO/WARDCO affairs (Table 8-6).

The organization and participation in resettlement matters and development among the youth in the Accelerated schemes are an item which was rated low. However, in other areas such as cooperation of the farmers with the Resettlement Team, agricultural performance, long-term prospects, motivation, participation in VIDCO/WARDCO issues, Area Board leadership, self help and social harmony among the resettled families these schemes rated consistently high (Table 8-6).

Performance of Service and Implementation Agencies

At the scheme level the Resettlement Officers coordinate the work of various service organizations and personnel to facilitate their utilization by resettled farmers and their households. These range from

TABLE 8 - 6
MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF
ATTITUDINAL AND ACTIVITY PROFILES IN MODEL A SCHEMES

	NORMAL SCHEMES (N=16)			ACCELERATED SCHEMES (N=16)		
	LOW	AVER AGE	HIGH	LOW	AVER AGE	HIGH
	%					
Social Harmony	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0	26.3	73.7
Motivation	0.0	16.7	83.4	0.0	15.8	84.2
Agricultural Performance	0.0	8.3	91.6	5.3	5.3	89.5
AFC Loan Repayment	0.0	50.0	50.0	6.3	37.5	56.3
Political Participation	0.0	25.0	75.0	0.0	21.1	78.9
Self Help	8.3	50.0	41.6	0.0	21.1	78.9
Youth Activities	8.3	41.7	50.0	10.5	47.4	42.1
Women's Affairs	16.7	25.0	58.3	5.3	52.6	42.1
Area Board's Leadership	0.0	41.7	58.3	0.0	15.8	84.2
Cooperation With Resettlement Team	0.0	16.7	83.3	0.0	0.0	100.0
Compliance With Resettlement Policy	8.3	33.3	58.4	0.0	36.9	63.1
Long Term Prospects for Scheme's Success	0.0	8.3	91.7	0.0	15.8	84.3

Note: The ratings cover all the 16 Model A Normal and the 16 Model A Accelerated Schemes in the Region. The Normal Schemes are distributed as follows: Mashonaland East 8; Mashonaland Central 2 and Mashonaland West 6. The Accelerated Schemes are also distributed as follows: Mashonaland East 3; Mashonaland Central 7 and Mashonaland West 6 (see Table 8-5 and Figure 8-1). The evaluation of these 32 schemes was done respectively by a total of 18 Resettlement Officers who manage them.

extension through the services of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to input delivery and produce marketing facilities.

The assistance given to farmers and the services provided by the Agricultural Finance Corporation to all the 16 Model A Normal Intensive Schemes were rated highly by the Officers. The services of the village health workers, the school principals and AGRITEX in most schemes were also commended. In over half the schemes, the work of adult literacy personnel and the services of input deliverers receive only average rating.

The relations between residents of Communal Areas and Resettlement Schemes which adjoin each other are crucial to the success of the latter. In the past, boundary fence stealing, "poach-grazing" and other acts of trespassing on resettlement land posed serious social problems. It is no surprise therefore that the nature of the cooperation of the residents of Communal Areas bordering a third of the schemes were rated low by the Officers (Table 8-7).

Officers' Identification of Schemes' Problems

From the perspective of the Officers the following are the problems that they encountered in the administration of the Model A Normal Schemes: (1) interference in their management duties by local-level ZANU-PF politicians which was cited for three of the schemes; (2) DERUDE's monthly kilometers allowed for the Officers' travel within the schemes which were considered to be inadequate and a limitation to close monitoring of the problems and the concerns of the resettled farmers; (3) problems of trespassing by Communal Area residents and their indiscriminate exploitation of the resources in the resettlement schemes; and (4) the tendency among some of the resettled farmers to ignore various conditions contained in the resettlement permits.

TABLE 8 - 7
 MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT OFFICERS EVALUATION OF
 IMPLEMENTATION AGENCIES AND RELATED SERVICES IN MODEL A
 NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEMES

	NUMBER OF SCHEMES WHERE SERVICE PRESENT	LOW	AVERAGE %	HIGH
AGRITEX	12	8.3	8.3	83.3
Veterinary	9	11.1	11.1	77.8
Cooperative Development	9	22.2	44.4	33.3
Water Development	9	0.0	22.2	50.0
Medical/Clinic	8	12.5	37.5	50.0
School Principals	12	0.0	16.7	83.4
Housing Development	7	0.0	42.9	57.2
Village Health Workers	12	8.3	0.0	91.6
Community Development	11	0.0	45.5	54.6
Adult Literacy Workers	12	0.0	58.3	41.7
Non-Governmental Org's	6	16.7	16.7	66.7
Tillage/Plow Team	11	9.1	18.2	72.8
Road Development	11	9.1	27.3	63.7
Agricultural Finance Corporation	12	0.0	0.0	100.0
Input Delivery	12	16.6	50.0	31.3
Marketing Boards	12	0.0	41.6	58.3
Communal Area Neighbors	12	33.3	41.7	25.0

Note: The ratings cover only 12 Model A Normal Intensive Schemes.

For the Model A Accelerated Schemes the Officers reported problems which emanated from the very nature of those schemes. The most mentioned constraint was the lack of resettlement infrastructure such as schools, clinics and good access roads which were available to the Normal Schemes. The problems of squatters, lack of farmer self-help organization and some farmers' lack of draft oxen were also cited.

Resettlement Officers' Assessment of Model B Cooperative Schemes

Attitudinal and Activity Profiles in the Cooperative Schemes

In all, eight of the 18 Resettlement Officers in the Mashonaland Region additionally supervise aspects of the activities of the 21 Model B Producer Cooperatives. These Officers were asked to rate each scheme in terms of the cooperative members (1) Attitudes--(i) cooperative spirit and (ii) motivation; (2) Performance--(i) agriculture, (ii) membership stability and (iii) management committee leadership and (3) Activity--(i) progress in achieving objectives and (ii) long-term prospects for the success of the scheme (see Appendix B Table 2 for the list of the study items).

The pattern which emerged from the evaluation is rather mixed. For example, over half of the schemes rated only average for the spirit of cooperativeness among the members and a third came out low. A third of the schemes were low in motivation. In agriculture only 42.8 percent of them rated high for their performance. The Management Committees in a third of the schemes were performing lowly.

Given the current prevailing circumstances and in terms of their long-run prospects ten cooperative schemes or 47.6 percent were given a high chance to succeed. These are Kumhanya, Shandisai Pfungwa and Tamuka in Mashonaland

East, Batsiranayi and Kurima Inhaka in Mashonaland Central and Gowe, Mauya, Mukuwapasi, Nyamakate and Tashinga in Mashonaland West. Eight other schemes were believed to face a bleak future. These are Kwaedza in Mashonaland East, Chakoma, Kubudirira, Kuenda, Kushingirira, Nyakudya and Simba Youth in Mashonaland Central and Ganyungu in Mashonaland West. Finally, the remaining three, namely, Marowa, Mount Saint Mary's and Tabudirira all in the Mashonaland East Province (see Figure 8-1) were seen as having an average prospect (Table 8-8).

Problems of the Model B Producer Cooperative
Schemes: An Identification

The Officers were asked to list the major constraint that confronts each of the 21 Model B schemes. The following problems were cited. In eight of the schemes the Officers mentioned lack of funds and implements at the disposal of the cooperatives. In four schemes the problem was identified to be inadequate membership. Similarly, another four schemes were perceived to be plagued by lack of cohesion and motivation or little interest in the philosophy of collective production. Poor management by the elected officers of the cooperatives was seen as the problem in the case of three schemes. Finally, lack of cooperative education and of agricultural knowhow, respectively, was cited for the remaining two.

Two other studies were carried out which among other things probed more into the problems of the Model B Producer Cooperatives. One study sought the perspectives of the respective Management Committees of a sample of 14 of the 21 schemes around the Mashonaland Region and the other among 151 individual members of 5 of these cooperatives in the Mashonaland Central Province (see Appendix C and Appendix D, Table D-2, respectively, for the list of the study items).

TABLE 8 - 8
 MASHONALAND REGION: RESETTLEMENT OFFICERS EVALUATION OF
 ATTITUDINAL AND ACTIVITY PROFILES IN MODEL B SCHEMES

	LOW	AVERAGE %	HIGH
Cooperative Spirit	33.3	52.4	14.3
Motivation	33.3	28.6	38.1
Agricultural Performance	28.6	28.6	42.8
Stability	29.1	38.1	32.8
Progress With Resettlement Objective	28.6	33.3	38.1
Management Committee Leadership	33.4	38.1	28.6
Long-Term Prospects For Success	38.1	14.3	47.6

Note: There are 21 Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes in the Region distributed as follows: Mashonaland East 7, Mashonaland Central 8 and Mashonaland West 6. (See Table 8-5 and Figure 8-1). The 21 schemes were evaluated by 8 Resettlement Officers who respectively supervise aspects of the administration of these 21 schemes.

Four of the questions that specifically related to the problems of the Model B Cooperatives as well as solutions to them as seen by the Management Committees are summarized below (Table 8-9). The first asked the Committee to identify the major problem(s) of its cooperative. Of the total of 30 problems identified the source of only 8 were internally generated. These were where the cooperatives blamed their lack of skills and cohesion or the cooperative spirit, poor management and low membership for their low performance. The majority of the cooperatives mention also the lack of farming implements and equipment, tractors in particular as being the constraint. Other problems listed include lack of transport and markets for their produce, apparently vegetables or poultry.

The second question sought to find out what members of these Model B schemes might do to solve the identified problems. In all 18 responses were provided. Though the majority of these alluded to the need for self reliance it is significant to observe the strong belief among some of them that the solution to their problems was not themselves but rather some other source from elsewhere (Table 8-9). In the respective responses to the questions of what they expect the government and also the non-governmental agencies (NGOs) to do to solve the problems the overwhelming views favor more grants or increased aid and to the lesser extent training of the members (Table 8-9).

Finally, the individual members of the cooperatives provided the following responses when they were asked to list the major problem facing the schemes to which they respectively belonged (see Appendix D, Table D-2). Lack of farm equipments and implements were mentioned by 43.0 percent of the 151 farmers. This was followed by non-availability of cash income and of basic personal needs such as toilet soap and the like which was cited by 23.8 percent of them. Financial indebtedness was indicated in 12.6 percent of the cases followed by charges of mismanagement on the part of the respective

TABLE 8 - 9
MASHONALAND REGION: MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES'
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AND THEIR SUGGESTED
SOLUTIONS

Q. What are the main problems facing this Cooperative?

<u>RESPONSES</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>%</u>
Lack of Farming Implements (especially Tractors)	9	30.0
Management/Membership Problems	8	26.7
Lack of Finance	6	20.0
Marketing/Transportation Problems	4	13.3
Accomodation/Subsistence Problems	3	10.0

Q. What Must Members Of This Cooperative Do To Solve These Problems?

<u>RESPONSES</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>%</u>
Work Hard/Increase Productivity	11	61.1
Seek Donor Assistance/AFC Loan	5	27.8
Nothing/Have Done All We Can	2	11.1

Q. What Must The Government Do To Solve These Problems?

<u>RESPONSES</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>%</u>
Provide More Grants/Assistance	12	75.0
Provide More Training/Education	4	25.0

Q. What Must NGOs (Donor Agencies) Do To Solve These Problems?

<u>RESPONSES</u>	<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>%</u>
Provide More Aid	13	76.5
Provide More Training/Education	4	23.5

Management Committees which accounted for 6.6 percent of the problems. Then, social conflicts among the individual members and households 3.3 percent, lack of transport and markets 2.6 percent and other miscellaneous problems which took up the remaining 7.9 percent.

Schemes' Problems: A Discussion

The lack of funds and implements that was given as a major constraint to the performance of the Model B schemes by the Officers and also by the Cooperatives' Management as well as the majority of the individual members is an opinion which is shared by some observers of postindependence development efforts of Zimbabwe. For instance, Christine Sylvester (1985:35) argues that collective cooperatives in the country are constrained by the start-up costs of large-scale farming and that public policy, so far, has been clearly supportive of private producers and silent on socialist producers.

This view is not supported by any evidence. Infact, every available statistics indicate that the government had and continues to back its commitment to producer cooperatives by the infusion of large amounts of grants and public resources towards their running. These are in addition to all kinds of assistance that various non-governmental organizations now operating in Zimbabwe offer these Model B Producer Cooperatives.

As Table 8-10 shows the government's budget allocation from 1980 to mid-1985 for 18 of the 21 cooperative schemes in the Mashonaland Region alone amounted to nearly \$4.6 million. By the end of July 1985 about 47 percent of this grant had been expended on these cooperatives. This was in addition to various forms of both short and medium-term loans advanced by the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) as well as the assistance and donations in cash and kind that most of them receive from the non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

TABLE 8 - 10
MASHONALAND REGION: GOVERNMENT'S GRANTS, EXPENDITURES AND BALANCE
ON MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES FROM 1980 TO JULY 31,
1985

	YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT	BUDGET	EXPENDITURE (\$)	BALANCE
Kumhanya	1982	200,414	67,813	132,601
Kwaedza	1981	194,930	124,667	70,263
Mt. St. Mary's	1981	188,323	95,390	92,933
Shandisai Pfungwa	1982	543,192	262,961	280,231
Tabudirira	1982	394,004	296,475	97,529
Batsiranayi	1981	154,695	105,580	49,115
Chakoma	1981	312,820	144,157	168,663
Kubudirira	1981	323,761	70,422	253,339
Kuenda	1982	304,227	96,084	208,143
Kurima Inhaka	1982	275,365	113,368	161,997
Kushingirira	1982	352,007	185,339	166,668
Nyakudya	1982	281,983	114,701	167,282
Simba Youth	1980	161,097	105,678	55,419
Gowe	1983	265,552	116,327	149,225
Mauya	1982	224,462	64,191	160,271
Mukuwapasi	1982	186,537	87,019	99,518
Nyamakate	1983	218,997	97,757	121,240
Total		4,582,366	2,147,929	2,434,437

Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, Harare.

Note: As of 1985 Marowa, Tamuka, Ganyungu and Tashinga were Model B Accelerated Schemes with no Establishment Grants or government subsidies.

In the case of the AFC loans most of them consist of monies granted for the purchase of tractors and related equipment (Table 8-11).

In 1984, DERUDE reported a national survey (Zimbabwe 1984d) into the achievements and problems of all resettlement schemes. According to its report at the time of the survey the various NGOs had donated amounts to the tune of \$535,363.80 to individual Model B schemes. In addition to such aid some of the cooperatives were also given farm equipments. For example, Ruponeso in the Manicaland Province received 3 tractors valued at about \$75,000. Batsiranayi and Simba Youth both in the Mashonaland Central Province also received donations of tractors and tractor implements as well as irrigation equipment. A Swedish NGO even provided \$38,000 to Batsiranayi to construct an elementary school to cater for the children of its members. Table 8-12, based on figures extracted from the monthly reports of these schemes, shows some of the sources and the nature of the donations which had gone to assist particular cooperatives in the Mashonaland Region.

The significant lesson to be drawn from these forms of assistance coming from both the government as well as the NGOs is the "dependency syndrome" that they tend to foster. A very forceful summary of this impression is provided in the report of the survey conducted by the Evaluation and Monitoring Section of DERUDE. The unpublished report argues that

It is now the habit of almost all the (Model B) groups to depend on handouts so much that without them, they would not survive. . . . There is hardly any group that purchased assets or carried out any development project out of the funds generated from their agricultural activities. There has been a lot of input into these groups without significant output if any at all. (Zimbabwe 1984d:18)

The foregoing facts indicate unequivocally that the Model B Producer Cooperatives had so far benefited from all kinds of assistance. If their problems was one of lack of equipment and finance these grants and aid should

TABLE 8 - 11
 MASHONALAND REGION: AGRICULTURAL FINANCE CORPORATION (AFC)
 LOANS TO SELECTED MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES

	YEAR OF LOAN	AMOUNT OF LOAN \$	PURPOSE OF LOAN
Shandisai Pfungwa	1983	17,000	Tractor and implements
Tabudirira	1983	65,000	Tractor and agricultural inputs
	1985	6,000	Tractor trailer
Kwaedza	1983	(?)	Tractor, implements and fuel
	1984	26,302	Electricity, fuel and repair bills and children's school fees
Marowa	1984	21,830	Tractor and implements
	1984	22,000	Agricultural inputs
	1985	3,000	Sunflower cultivation
Mt. St. Mary's	1984	2,000	Fuel
Kumhanya	1984	(?)	Tractor
Kushingirira	1983	(?)	Tractor
Simba Youth	1983	54,000	Tractor, implements and inputs
Kubudirira	1984	22,717	(?)
Kurima Inhaka	1984	10,500	Tractor and implements
	1985	2,256	Electricity bills
Nyakudya	1984	35,973	Tractor, implements and fuel
Nyamakate	1984	13,000	Plowing and agricultural inputs
Mukuwapasi	1985	(?)	Tractor and implements
Ganyungu	1985	(?)	Tractor and implements

Source: Monthly and Quarterly Reports, DERUDE, Harare.

Note: (?) Information not available.

TABLE 8 - 12
 MASHONALAND REGION: NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) AID AND
 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SELECTED MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES

YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND EAST</u>		
Shandisai Pfungwa 1983	ZIMFEB	(\$50,000) Planned to set up Industrial Development /Training Center for bakery, tanning, vegetable oil processing, welding and building construction. Supplied irrigation equipment and agricultural inputs -----
1983	OCCZIM	Supplied the following inputs for 1984-85 season: 100 x 10 kg bags seed maize 100 x 10 kg bags peanut seed 10 x 100 kg bags sunflower seed 120 x 50 kg bags Compound D 100 x 50 kg bags Ammonium Nitrate 50 x 50 kg bags Gypsum -----
1983	ZIMBABWE PROJECT	\$29,000 Hired a tractor to construct irrigation layout. Provided irrigation pipes
1984		Paid bills, provided material aid and personnel as follows: Irrigation \$19,500 Poultry feed 1,500 Electricity bills 4,500 Food aid 5,000 Pesticides 2,000 Wheat seed 500 Sprayers & Vegetable seed 1,000 Agricultural Adviser/Coordinator (from 3/82 to 10/82) \$1,200 -----
1984	ZIMFEB	Built a health clinic. Sponsored adult literacy course

TABLE 8 - 12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND EAST</u>			
Kwaedza	1983	OCIM	Donated 1,000 kgs seed maize
	1983	CHRISTIAN CARE	Supplied asbestos roofing sheets
	1985		Provided funds for electricity extension to the homestead and paid children's school fees
	1984	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Donated \$900
Tabudirira	1983	WORLD VISION	A five year agreement to undertake various projects. Donated \$12,139 to purchase 61 head of cattle
	1984		Provided approximately \$3,000 a month towards running costs and \$18,510 to purchase 63 head of cattle
	1984	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Supplied 100 day-old chicks for poultry project. Sponsored 7 members in a skills training course
	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	Supplied 20 bags of maize-meal per month for subsistence
	1984	OXFAM (AMERICA)	Donated \$17,000 towards wheat production
Tamuka	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	Plowed 25 hectares and supplied agricultural inputs for them

TABLE 8 - 12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND EAST</u>			
Marowa	1985	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Provided diesel engine for water supplies
Mt. St. Mary's	1983	ZIMBABWE FREEDOM FROM HUNGER CAMPAIGN	Provided inputs (Kohwa Pakura) crop package for 100 hectares of maize
<u>MASHONALAND CENTRAL</u>			
Batsiranayi	1984	ZIMBABWE PROJECT	Donated 150 bags of maize-meal
	1984	EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY	Donated 40 bags beans and provided assistance to the elementary school
	1984	LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION	Provided a resident Agricultural Adviser/Coordinator
	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	Provided agricultural inputs for two farming seasons
Kurima Inhaka	1984	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Paid electricity bills and sponsored the chairman to attend a 3 weeks course on cotton production
	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	Plowed 20 hectares, donated food aid and provided 140 x 50 bags Compound D fertilizer
	1985		Undertook to pay off outstanding loan owed to the AFC and to pay the monthly running costs

TABLE 8 - 12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND CENTRAL</u>			
Kurima Inhaka	1985	REDD BARNA	Sponsored chairman to attend a course in administration/management
	1985	WORLD VISION	Donated \$4,005.81 and farm implements worth \$994.19 including 2 Cultivators and 3 Ox-plows
Kushingirira	1982	CHRISTIAN CARE	Supplied the following inputs and aid: 355 bags maize seed 38 x 50 kg bags maize-meal 3 x 25 kg bags beans 30 Blankets
	1983	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Supplied the following items and food aid: 600 day-old chicks and poultry feed 20 x 50 kg bag maize-meal 3 x 20 liters cooking oil 1 x 50 kg bag salt
	1984	CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES SERVICE ORGANIZATION	Donated the following items: 1 Tractor Irrigation equipment for 10 hectares 1 Grinding mill 4 Sewing machines
Chakoma	1981	CHRISTIAN CARE	Donated \$26, 653 for borehole to supply clean drinking water
	1982	ZIMBABWE PROJECT	Donated \$13,762
	1983	OCCZIM	Donated \$ 3,011

TABLE 8-12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND CENTRAL</u>			
Chakoma	1983	A Jewish woman	donated \$20,000

	1983	WORLD VISION	Donated \$52,458

	1985	COOPERBAL	Donated a tractor.
Kubudirira	1984	OXFAM	Donated a tractor and implements

	1984	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Donated \$5,318

	1984	(NETHERLANDS ?)	Donated \$1,369

	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	Donated \$137

	1984	OCCZIM	Donated \$109
Kuenda	1982	CHRISTIAN CARE	Provided food aid, garden tools and 1,400 bags of fertilizer

	1982	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Paid children's school fees and telephone bills

	1983	REDD BARNA	Financial sponsorship. Payment of all bills and other running costs. Donated agricultural implements

TABLE 8 - 12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND CENTRAL</u>			
Kuenda	1984	REDD BARNA	Payment of monthly running costs
	1985		Provided resident Agricultural Adviser /Coordinator and a new 4 wheel-drive vehicle. Donated \$5,000 towards all running costs incurred by the cooperative
Nyakudya	1983	CHRISTIAN CARE	Provided food aid.
	1983	ZIMBABWE PROJECTS	Supplied 200 day-old chicks.
Simba Youth	1983	NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATION	Sponsored a poultry project
	1983	LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION	Provided resident Agricultural Adviser/ Coordinator
	1984		Loaned \$30,000 for the purchase of agricultural inputs and fuel
	1985		Payment of monthly running costs and provision of tractor/plowing service
<u>MASHONALAND WEST</u>			
Mauya	1983	CHRISTIAN CARE	Plowed 20 hectares
	1983	NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATION	Plowed 10 hectares

TABLE 8 - 12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<hr/>			
<u>MASHONALAND WEST</u>			
Mauya	1984	NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S RELIEF ASSOCIATION	Donated a tractor and \$11,867 as follows:
			Transportation \$ 30
			2 Sewing machines 399
			Sewing materials 160
			Blankets (148) 1,043
			Petrol 36
			Agricultural implement 1,116
			School books 295
			Refresher course 309
			Plowing (10 hectares) 700
			Discing (100 hectares) 6,146
			Fertilizer/seed maize 1,634
	1985		Donated a tractor and a grinding mill
			Paid electricity bills
	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	-----
			Donated \$14,436 as follows:
			Plowing (12 hectares) \$ 775
			Fertilizer 3,982
			Seed maize/cotton 137
			Sprayers (5) and pesticides 4,543
Mukuwapasi	1983	CHRISTIAN CARE	-----
			Plowed 28 hectares.
	1984		Provided 2 Agricultural Advisers/ Coordinators
<hr/>			

TABLE 8 - 12--continued

	YEAR	NGO	NATURE/AMOUNT OF AID
<u>MASHONALAND WEST</u>			
Nyamakate	1983	CHRISTIAN CARE	Plowed 30 hectares and supplied the following food aid and agricultural inputs all valued at \$4,996:
			30 bags maize-meal 8 x 50 kg bags beans 4 x 20 liters cooking oil 90 x 50 kg bags Compound D 99 x 50 kg bags Ammonium Nitrate 60 x 50 kg bags Compound D 10 x 50 kg bags seed maize
Tashinga	1984	CHRISTIAN CARE	Donated \$9,000
	1985		Donated the following cash amount and materials: \$2,400 towards the purchase of cattle Scotch-cart Electric grinding mill Maize sheller Petrol (10 liters) Compound D fertilizer (120 bags) Empty sacks/bags (400) Miscellaneous tools
Gowe	1983	REDD BARNA (Sponsor)	

Source: Compiled from the Monthly and Quarterly Reports, DERUDE, Harare.

have by now made a lot of difference in their respective performances.

This study found that the inability of these cooperatives to live up to the performance and the production targets projected by the policy makers and the planners has very little to do with lack of equipment or funding. In many of the individual cases one or the other or a combination of some of the following problems are to blame. These are (1) lack of the technical skills to run and maintain such equipment as tractors, (2) wanton sabotage of collectively-owned property usually arising from petty personal and factional conflicts among members and the management, (3) stealing and embezzlement, (4) reckless misuse of property and (5) general mismanagement.

These are problems which apparently were not anticipated by policy makers and the development planners in organizing and implementing the Model B variants of the resettlement program. Their solutions lie in continuous education over the long-term in both the areas of technical knowhow, cooperative principles and socialist ideology as well as inter-personal relations and organizational behavior rather than the infusion of more funds and other capital items such as tractors.

While these management and social organizational problems are the Achilles' heels of the Model B Producer Cooperatives in Zimbabwe the more fundamental and immediate constraint to their successful agricultural performance is one of membership. The greater majority of these schemes are underutilizing their resources because of the grossly inadequate membership that is far below their respective projected targets.

For instance, as at September 1985 the 21 cooperatives in the Mashonaland Region, comprising the three Provinces, were together operating with only 40 percent of the target or ideal membership capacity. In Mashonaland West the 7 schemes had achieved 50 percent of their full membership. In Mashonaland Central only 41 percent of the target had been met while in the Mashonaland

East Province also only 34 percent of the number of workers or members needed to ensure full and productive performance were present. In fact, individual schemes such as Tabudirira, Batsiranayi and Kushingirira (see Figure 8-1), all of which are among the older cooperatives, are yet to achieve even 25 percent of their respective targets in membership (Table 8-13). The seriousness of this matter is underscored by the fact that the reported membership of these Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes was often times inflated and do not therefore reflect the actual membership present.

Another dimension of the membership problem is the high turnover in some of the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes. For example, between December 1983 and June 1985 the eight schemes in the Mashonaland Central Province lost a total of 150 members. That represented a cumulative loss of 30 percent in membership over the period.

The DERUDE survey (Zimbabwe 1984d) cited above also found serious underutilization of the farm lands occupied by the cooperatives. For instance, the land put under crops by the cooperatives during that agricultural season as a percentage of the total land cleared by the former European owners of the farms was as follows: (1) Mashonaland East 11.0 percent; (2) Mashonaland Central 14.5 percent; (3) Mashonaland West 20.6 percent; (4) Midlands 2.5 percent; and (5) Manicaland 5.2 percent. Worse still the land under crops as a percentage of the total potential arable land was also as follows: (1) Mashonaland East 9.5 percent; (2) Mashonaland Central 10.4; (3) Mashonaland West 6.4 percent; (4) Midlands 2.5 percent; and (5) Manicaland 3.3 percent. The survey reported (Zimbabwe 1984d:16) that the "under-utilisation of land is related to the issue of failure by the cooperators to recruit more members to achieve the optimum membership requirements."

The seriousness of this problem of land underutilization by the cooperatives is emphasized by the paradox of the location of most of the

TABLE 8 - 13
MASHONALAND REGION: TARGET MEMBERSHIP AND TRENDS IN MODEL B
PRODUCER COOPERATIVES 1983 - 1985

		1983	1984		1985	
		SEPT	MARCH	SEPT	MARCH	SEPT
(TARGET)						
MASHONALAND EAST						
Kwaedza	(100)	58	45	46	50	50
Mt. St. Mary	(150)	108	107	107	107	107
Shandisai Pfungwa	(330)	84	84	84	78	79
Tabudirira	(200)	75	75	74	63	40
Marowa	(64)			30	29	25
Tamuka	(50)			26	27	26
	(960)			(367)	(354)	(327)
MASHONALAND CENTRAL						
Batsiranayi	(300)	85	80	69	73	69
Simba Youth	(90)	40	31	31	30	29
Chakoma	(130)	119	86	84	83	79
Kushingirira	(150)	48	36	47	35	33
Kuenda	(89)	35	45	48	10	32
Kubudirira	(60)	25	29	15	17	26
Nyakudya	(100)	110	90	92	80	88
Kurima Inhaka	(40)	38	35	35	33	34
	(959)	(500)	(432)	(421)	(361)	(390)

TABLE 8 - 13--continued.

		1983	1984		1985	
		SEPT	MARCH	SEPT	MARCH	SEPT
(TARGET)						
<hr/>						
MASHONALAND WEST						
Mauya	(110)		55	50	53	54
Nyamakate	(200)		38	34	44	46
Mukuwapasi	(56)	53	52	48	51	49
Gowe	(108)			108	108	97
Ganyangu	(91)			32	33	36
Tashinga	(57)			29	29	29
	(622)			(301)	(318)	(311)
<hr/>						
Total All Schemes	2,541			1,089	1,033	1,028
<hr/>						

Source: Compiled from the Monthly Reports submitted by Resettlement Officers to DERUDE, Harare.

Schemes in the better agro-ecological zones. As Weiner et al. point out

[T]hese so-called model B programmes have generally been allocated good land, primarily since the Ministry concerned was anxious for them to maintain viable large-scale holdings. Because of their ability to utilise sophisticated machinery, the co-operative farms are better suited for natural region II, where the employment of tractors can open up large tracts of potentially arable land that small-scale producers might otherwise have used for grazing livestock.
(Weiner et al. 1985:258)

In their calculation (Weiner et al. 1985:259 Table 2) as of August 1983 the Model B Producer Cooperatives had been allocated 66,775 hectares. Of this area 70.6 percent were located in Natural Regions I and II where conditions were optimal for a variety of agricultural activities (see also Mumbengegwi 1984b:5). In contrast, the Model A schemes had 1,669,233 hectares of which only 18.9 percent were in such favored agro-ecological regions. Given this fact and the foregoing evidence about loans and other forms of assistance provided the cooperatives by the AFC, the government as well as the numerous non-governmental donor agencies one would expect the Model B schemes individually and collectively to perform well and achieve the production levels and economic returns envisaged in their respective project reports.

Mufurudzi Scheme as an Illustrative Case of Model A Resettlement Program

Mufurudzi: Background

The Mufurudzi Model A Normal Intensive Resettlement Scheme is located 120 kilometers north of Harare, on the Shamva-Mount Darwin road. It is bordered on the south by the Mufurudzi river and the Bushu Communal Area. In the east is the Mufurudzi Safari or Wildlife Reserve Area. To the north of the Scheme is the Chesa Small-Scale Commercial Farming Area as well as the Kandeya Communal

Area. The western boundary of Mufurudzi separates it from the Madziwa Communal Area (see Figure 8-2).

Originally planned in 1980 to cover 54,712 hectares of the Shamva Intensive Conservation Area the Scheme is a consolidation of 22 former Large-Scale European Commercial Farm blocks. These farms measured 35,823 hectares in area. To these were added 18,889 hectares of vacant State Lands. So far about 80 percent of the total land area is deemed suitable for resettlement. This has been demarcated, planned and developed into cultivation and grazing areas centered around 18 nucleated villages.¹ Table 8-14 provides a summary of some aspects of the general features of the villages which make up the resettlement Scheme.

Of the opened-up area, 14,658 hectares or 32 percent lie in the better agro-ecological zone to the west of the Scheme which is covered by Natural Region II. The remaining 31,176 hectares under Natural Region III constitute the middle and eastern portions of the Scheme. Only about 13.6 percent of the land covering the Scheme are suitable for cropping, while about 63.6 percent are good for grazing purposes. The rest which is made up of 22.8 percent of the land are considered marginal for current resettlement purposes. The marginal zone consists of blocks of steep and broken country one section of which lies north of Chirume and Gwetera and the other between Mukwari, Gatu and Zvataida (see Figure 8-2).

Precipitation and other related physiographical characteristics are important for successful agriculture in the area occupied by Mufurudzi as in all parts of Zimbabwe. The mean annual rainfall for the Scheme is around 700 millimeters with a 20 year mean of 784 millimeters and a 25 percent coefficient of variation. Severe dry spells are possible and mid-season dry spells are common. Whenever these occur, as it happened between 1981 and 1984, crop yields are seriously affected. The Scheme experiences a mean annual

TABLE 8 - 14
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME:
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS, ARABLE AND LIVESTOCK CAPACITIES

FORMER FARM	RESETTLEMENT VILLAGE	NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS	TOTAL AREA (HECTARES)	GROSS ARABLE	LIVESTOCK UNITS
Gwatera	Gwetera	32	3,100	325	520
Puck Ridge	Tongogara 1	51	2,290	680	344
Lions Lodge	Zvomanyanga	40	1,960	655	290
Mgadzi	Magadzi	51	2,830	680	340
Gatu	Gatu	50	2,438	580	401
Septem	Mukwari	38	1,850	265	234
Glendry	Chitepo	30	2,160	640	228
Kemphaven West	Tongogara 2	14	701	153	110
Denda	Denda	38	2,027	380	276
Odenferra	Nehanda	39	1,727	210	243
Darien	Mudzinge	33	2,250	331	261
Forest Down	Takawira	31	1,533	490	239
Drumossie	Chimburukwa	25	1,421	265	184
Wellaway & Persephone	Muringamombe	28	1,397	395	207
Aberfoil	Mutoramhepo	14	698	237	107
Polycrops	Mupedzanhamo	13	600	221	100
Thyrza	Banana	14	678	206	108
Rataplan	Zvataida	27	3,067	280	367

Sources: Based on Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX, (January 1981) and the Quarterly Reports prepared by DERUDE, Harare.




FIGURE 8 - 2
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME:
RESETTLEMENT VILLAGES AND ADJOINING FARMING SYSTEMS

temperature of 20°C, with a range fluctuating from 1°C to 32°C.

Frost rarely occurs and when it does it is confined to the low lying areas.

It is important to place these climatic imperatives in the context of the specific constraints that they pose to farmers. In Zimbabwe, like many other regions of Africa, farmers depend solely on nature for precipitation to facilitate crop growth. Farmers therefore have to time their plowing, land preparation, seeding and related activities closely to the rainfall regime. This is a critical demand on farming. Consequently, AGRITEX has published climatic data for various areas in the country. These charts show monthly rainfall in excess of 15 millimeters occurring within a pentad contrasted with the probability of a dry spell in excess of twenty days.² The charts for Mount Darwin and Bindura meteorological stations respectively to the north and south of Mufurudzi are shown in Figure 8-3. According to AGRITEX the probability of planting rains for the Scheme area is (1) 40 percent between November 15 and 20; (2) increasing to 60 percent by November 25 and (3) 80 percent from November 30 to December 5.

In terms of altitude the area lies between 825 meters and 1,500 meters above sea-level. The geological base is made up mainly of gneissic granites with dolerite intrusions which have given rise to fersiallitic soils that generally consist of moderately deep to moderately shallow sands. The resultant vegetation is predominantly brachystegia boehmii, locally known as "mfuti," with some julbernadia globiflora, or "munondo," in the woodland areas. The most common grasses found in the area belong to the andropogon and the pogonarthria species. In terms of topography the terrain is roughly rolling. This has created narrow ridges of arable land that falls away steeply to the waterways. Some large blocks of a more flat terrain are scattered throughout the Scheme. There are two drainage systems; one in the north formed by the Gwetera river and the other in the south formed by the Mufurudzi river.





FIGURE 8 - 3

MOUNT DARWIN AND BINDURA: PROBABILITY OF
RAINFALL IN EXCESS OF 15 MILLIMETERS OCCURING WITHIN
A PENTAD VERSUS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DRY SPELL IN
EXCESS OF TWENTY DAYS

At the time of the purchase of the 22 farms in 1980 there were homesteads and various building structures on 17 of them. Most of these were generally in adequate condition but needed urgent maintenance to prevent further deterioration which had set in as a result of abandonment during the liberation war. There were 13 dams with various storage capacities also distributed throughout the farms. Although most of the dams are still intact and a few need rehabilitative work, they are generally too small in capacities to supply sufficient water for cropping purposes. The irrigation potential in the Scheme is therefore limited to the farms in the riparian villages along the Mufurudzi river. The villages are Muringamombe, Mutoramhepo, Mupedzanhamo and Banana (see Figure 8-2). The river is fed by the Eben Dam from which rights for the supply of irrigation water downstream may be negotiated with the Ministry of Energy and Water Development.

The Madziwa Mine, located within the Scheme, is connected to the national electricity grid. Power lines from the grid, which served the homesteads, are still intact and can be made available to the resettlement villages should the need arise. Similarly, a network of telephone lines that used to link the homesteads can be restored to service. The perimeter and the internal paddock fencing on many of the farms were in place in early 1980. However, the entire section of the boundary with the Madziwa Communal Area and portions of other places had been stolen at the time of the establishment of the Scheme in October 1980.

Mufurudzi is served by a network consisting of a 30 kilometer section of tarred national road which originates from Harare passing through Shamva and then the Scheme. From there the road continues to Goora in the Madziwa Communal Area where it joins the Harare-Bindura-Mount Darwin road. In addition there are about 100 kilometers of feeder roads which were built to access the farms by the former European Rural Council that served the area (Figure 8-1).

The nearest major shopping center, hospital as well as the railhead are all located 60 kilometers from the southern boundary of the Scheme in Bindura, the provincial capital of Mashonaland Central. The District Administrative Office, Police, GMB and CMB depots are also at Shamva 23 kilometers away to the south from the southern edge of the Scheme.

For the villages in the northern half of the Scheme Mount Darwin, 38 kilometers from Tongogara 1 and 2 villages, is the closest service center. Madziwa Township about 18 kilometers west is a rural growth center where the Chaminuka District Council and a few other services such as a butchery shop, market and auto mechanic garages are opening.

The Madziwa Mine also provides services such as retail shops, occasional entertainment and a beer hall. The latter is heavily patronized by many resettled farmers from all the nearby villages in the Scheme. This is especially so of farmers from Mudzingo and Zvataida.

The Chindunduma elementary and Chirume secondary boarding schools are additional educational institutions located in the Scheme. These two were established at the time of independence by the ZANU-PF party but they are now managed by the Ministry of Education. Initially, Chindunduma catered for orphaned refugee children and other school-age "comrades" returning from Mozambique as well as the displaced from the near-by and war-torn communal lands. Though these schools do not form part of the Scheme's infrastructure their facilities and services are nevertheless available to resettled families in Mufurudzi. Finally, the Ponesai Vanhu vocational institute, sponsored by "People to People" a German non-governmental organization also operates from a piece of land within the Scheme.

Mufurudzi: Scheme Costs

The total project cost of Mufurudzi is a little over \$1.3 million which works out to nearly \$2,337 per every resettled farm family. Of the project cost approximately 39 percent are taken up by the acquisition of the 22 farm properties which comprise the major portion of the Scheme area. The single most important items in the expenditure of the Scheme, respectively, are those covering the planning and implementation, accomodation for government staff or the resettlement team, facilities and services for the education of farmers children and good drinking water. Up until the end of July 1985 the total expenditure incurred in the development of Mufurudzi stood at \$1.1 million or 81.5 percent of the project cost (see Table 8-15).

Mufurudzi: Farm-Level Agricultural Projections

Dry-land cropping and livestock are the enterprise mix available to resettled farmers in Mufurudzi. There is adequate grazing for 4,579 Livestock Units, equivalent to an estimated carrying capacity of 6,868 head of mixed cattle. Supplementary feeding is also anticipated. The livestock enterprise, recommended by the AGRITEX for the Scheme, is based on the breeding and production of slaughter cattle and draft or trek oxen.

The AGRITEX cropping recommendation consists of short season maize varieties and cotton with peanuts and ration beans as subsidiary crops. Flue-cured tobacco is another crop that is suited to the soils in the area. Each resettled family has access to 5 hectares of arable land all of which can be cropped in a given farming season if the farmer so disires. AGRITEX, however, does not recommend a full utilization of all the land. For good crop husbandry, it suggests crop rotation and the utilization of 3 hectares at a

TABLE 8 - 15
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: PROJECT COSTS,
EXPENDITURE AND BALANCE AS AT JULY 31 1985

ITEM/SUB-ITEM	BUDGET COST	PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE	BALANCE
		(\$)	
Land Acquisition	426,650	424,085	2,565
Development			
Demarcation & Survey	16,890	12,369	4,521
Land Preparation/Tillage	18,841	18,841	0
Roads (100 Kms)	28,000	5,266	22,734
Telephones	100	0	100
Diptanks (7)	35,000	26,165	8,835
Fencing (244 Kms)	37,600	26,786	10,814
Village Water Supplies (18 Boreholes)	54,000		
School Water Supplies	60,000	73,966	40,034
Storage Shed	10,000	0	10,000
Rural Service Center	55,000	53,193	1,807
Staff Housing	94,000	79,051	14,949
School (4) & Teacher Housing	313,100	302,966	10,134
Clinic	24,000	19,815	4,185
Planning/Imp/ & Consultancy	101,380	29,376	72,004
Contingencies	41,059	0	41,059
Total Cost	1,315,620	1,071,879	243,741
Cost Per Family	2,337		

Sources: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981)
and the Summary of Capital Expenditure, ARDA (July 1985),
Harare.

time. At the inception of the Scheme AGRITEX anticipated a three year build up to the full crop program. The assumption has been that the farmers will initially cultivate 2 hectares of maize, adding 0.5 hectares of cotton in the second year. In the third year they may either cultivate 0.5 hectares of a subsidiary crop in addition to the previous year's cropping program or they may expand the cotton enterprise from half to a full hectare (see Table 8-16).

The livestock budget assumes the farmer's ownership of 5 head of cattle in the first year and a 50 percent calving rate. This head is expected to build up through natural increase of 2 calves per year for nine years to realize the optimal herd composition of 11 head of cattle. Servicing of the cows is to be done by a communally owned or a hired bull. Every year two head of cattle is to be sold. The only exception is during the third year when, with the anticipated stock loss, one instead of two is to be sold (see Table 8-17).

Table 8-18 is a summary of the whole farm budget as it builds up to the target income level. Essentially, a mixed farming system is recommended for Mufurudzi. However, nearly two-thirds of farmers' incomes are projected to be derived from the arable or cropping enterprise. The achievement of the target income level of \$400 per annum for the resettled households is expected to occur within 3 to 5 years. The assumption is that the average family would make a total income of \$302 in the first year, progressively exceeding the target income and doubling the initial income within a ten year period.

Mufurudzi: The Foundations of a Successful Agricultural
Resettlement Scheme

Most of the resettled farm households in Mufurudzi appear to be happy and on the path of success and achievement of their development objectives. In the 1985-86 fiscal year the Scheme entered what may be conceived as the

TABLE 8 - 16
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: CROP BUILD-UP
TO TARGET INCOME LEVELS

YEAR	CROP	AREA PLANTED	YIELD	MAIZE RETAINED	VALUE OF YIELD	VARIABLE COST	NET VALUE CROP SALE
		(HECTARES)	(TONNES)	(KILOS)	(\$)	(\$)	(\$)
1	Maize	2.0	3.0	80	260	90	170
					260	90	170
2	Maize	2.0	3.0	80	260	90	170
	Cotton	0.5	0.4		140	48	92
					400	138	262
3	Maize	2.0	3.0	80	260	90	170
	Cotton	1.0	0.7		280	96	184
					540	186	354

Source: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 17
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: LIVESTOCK
BUILD-UP TO TARGET INCOME LEVELS

YEAR	NUMBER OF CATTLE	VALUE OF SALES (\$)	VARIABLE COSTS (\$)	NET VALUE (\$)
1	5	0	20	-20
2	5	0	20	-20
3	6	0	24	-24
4	6	0	24	-24
5	7	0	28	-28
6	8	0	32	-32
7	8	183	35	148
8	9	0	36	-36
9	10	0	40	-40
10	11	268	48	220

Source: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 18
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: SUMMARY OF CROP
AND LIVESTOCK BUILD-UP TO TARGET INCOME LEVELS

YEAR	CROP INCOME	CATTLE	LESS OVER HEADS	NET CASH INCOME (\$)	VALUE OF RETENTION (\$)	VALUE OF LIVESTOCK INCOME (\$)	TOTAL INCOME (\$)
1	170	-20	28	122	94	86	302
2	262	-20	62	180	94	86	360
3	354	-24	62	268	94	86	448
10	354	220	62	512	94	0	606

Source: Mufurudzi Scheme Project Report, AGRITEX (January 1981),

consolidation phase of its implementation. Major aspects of its administrative structures and facilities such as schools were formally transferred from the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development. This put Mufurudzi under the administrative ambit of the Chaminuka District Council, Madziwa.

In May 1985 at the time of this incorporation Mufurudzi had the following primary developments in place. Of the total of 22 hand-pumped boreholes planned to supply water to all villages in the Scheme 20 had been constructed and were operational. Only two villages, namely, Mukwari and Nehanda did not have access to good water. Four elementary schools and a secondary school were also built as part of the project. These are in addition to the Chindunduma and the Batsiranayi Model B Producer Cooperative primary schools and the Chiruma and Madziwa Mine high or secondary schools which are also located within the Scheme.

The Mufurudzi secondary school in 1985 had only forms one and two. Located at the rural service center the school had a student population of 120 and 5 teachers on the staff. The four Mufurudzi elementary schools are distributed in a pattern to cater for children from groups of neighboring villages within an 8 kilometer radius (see Figure 8-2). The schools are (1) Muringamombe with 7 teachers and 291 students from Chimburukwa, Mutoramhepo, Mupedzanhamo, Banana and Muringamombe, (2) Mudzinge which had 10 teachers and 419 students from Mudzinge, Takawira, Nehanda, Denda and the Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative, (3) Mukwari with 5 teachers and 197 students from Zvataida, Mukwari, Chitepo and Zvomanyanga and (4) Magadzi school where there were 11 teachers and 447 students. The latter serves students drawn from Magadzi 1 and 2, Gatu 1 and 2 and Gwetera villages.

In October 1985, there were a total 33 teachers in the four elementary schools of whom 15 percent were certified or professionals. The student

population was 1,354. Of this 48.4 percent were male and the remaining 51.6 percent female. The student population resident in the Scheme is higher in that all children in the two Tongogara villages as well as others from Chitepo attend Chindunduma school, which has boarding facilities but mainly for students from elsewhere outside the Scheme.

The Mufurudzi Scheme has a total of 4,579 Livestock Units the equivalent of a carrying capacity of 6,868 head of cattle. Originally, seven diptanks were planned of which 5 have been built. In May 1985 four of the five dips were in use. These were located as follows: (1) Gwetera which served 329 from Gwetera and Zvomanyanga, (2) Magadzi, 588 from Magadzi 1 and 2 and Gatu 1 and 2, (3) Chitepo which serviced a total 766 from Chitepo, Tongogara 1 and 2, Mukwari, Denda and the Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative and (4) Takawira where 942 head of cattle were dipped from Takawira, Mudzingo, Zvataida, Muringamombe, Mupedzanhamo, Mutoramhepo, Banana and Chimburukwa (see Figure 8-2). The 4 dips therefore served a total of 2,625 head of cattle.

In June 1985, Mufurudzi was evaluated with a standard questionnaire. This was part of the survey of Resettlement Officers' assessment of the attitudinal, performance and activity profiles of farmers in the 12 Model A Normal Intensive Schemes in the three Mashonaland Provinces (see Appendix B Table 1). In the evaluation of the Resettlement Officer who managed the Scheme during the previous five years Mufurudzi scored consistently high in the various items rated. These were in social harmony, motivation, agricultural performance, AFC loan repayment, political participation, self help, youth activities, women's affairs, Area Board leadership, cooperation with the Resettlement Team, compliance with resettlement policy and long-term prospects for the success of the Scheme.

The rating also commended highly the various agencies and services such as the AFC, school principals and Rural Housing that served Mufurudzi. In the

view of the Officer the majority of the farmers in the following villages were "more progressive" in that they were making serious efforts and performing well agriculturally. These were Denda, Gat 1 and 2, Gwetera, Magadzi 1 and 2, Mudzinga, Tongogara 1 and 2, Zvataida and Zvomanyanga. Farmers in Banana, Chimburukwa, Chitepo, Mukwari, Muringamombe, Mupedzanhamo and Mutoramhepo (Figure 8-2) were perceived to be only "averagely progressive" in making some but not the maximum effort to succeed. None of the villages was branded "less progressive" where farmers are not making enough attempts at realizing the goals of resettlement.

As it was pointed out in Chapter III above Mufurudzi is now in the final or resettlement phase of what Thayer Scudder (1984:19) calls the stage of "Handing Over and Incorporation." It needs to be said, however, that Mufurudzi's transition from the stage of "Social and Economic Development" into "Handing Over" was characterized less by the "development of nonfarm activities and hiring of laborers for an increasing number of agricultural tasks," as Scudder's (1984:18-19) model shows. Instead, the socio-economic development of the resettled families are manifesting itself, among others, in at least seven recognizable areas. These are reflected in their attitudes towards farm production as well as in their acquisition of material or consumption items and productive assets.

In the first place these households are becomingly increasingly risk-averse. In 1984-85 a total of 26 farmers in the 12 villages covered in the Mufurudzi case study diversified their enterprise mix by adding the agriculturally demanding and higher priced tobacco crop to the cultivation of the "traditional" crops, namely, maize and cotton. This number showed a declining trend among tobacco growers who in 1982-83 were 36 and then 51 in 1983-84. However, given the serious droughts of the three years preceding 1984-85, which wiped out most crops, there was not much expectation that any

farmer would take the risk of getting into tobacco again so soon.

There was also an increasing tendency among Mufurudzi farmers to fully utilize their arable lands by expanding the areas cultivated. For instance, the mean hectares cultivated by each household increased by 35 percent between 1982-83 and 1983-84, that is, from 2.3 to 3.1. Consequently, the mean area that every household left under fallow decreased by 0.8 hectares between 1982-83 and 1984-85 when the hectares cultivated apparently stabilized at 3.1 per household. If this stabilization is maintained it would be in conformity with the recommendations made in the Project Report by AGRITEX requiring that for agronomic and good husbandary reasons these smallholders only cultivate 60 percent of their total arable land each year (Table 8-19).

In 1984-85 slightly more land was devoted to cotton than to maize (Table 8-20). This appears to be the beginnings of a movement away from putting more resources into maize which is the staple source of subsistence. If this becomes the trend it would make much economic sense because of the higher returns to cotton. Infact, for 1984-85 the per hectare costs for maize and cotton as estimated in AFC figures for creditors in Mufurudzi were \$258 and \$320 respectively. At the 1984-85 market prices of \$179.78 for a tonne of maize and \$550.00 for cotton the break-even yield for maize was 1.44 tonnes and 0.58 tonnes for cotton. Given Mufurudzi's mean yield per hectare of 3.48 tonnes for maize and 1.89 tonnes for cotton in 1984-85 the net returns or incomes were \$367.65 for a hectare of maize and \$719.40 for a hectare of cotton.

The mean kilograms per hectare achieved on European-managed or the Large-Scale Commercial Farms in agro-ecological zone II is reported by AGRITEX to be 4,000. This means that the average productivity for maize on Mufurudzi farms, about 70 percent of which lie in the poorer Natural Region III, was generally very commendable. This is even more so given the fact that the

TABLE 8 - 19
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLDS
LAND USE INTENSITY, 1982-83 / 1984-85

	1982-83		1983-84		1984-85	
	LAND UNDER CULTIV ATION	FALLOW	LAND UNDER CULTIV ATION	FALLOW	LAND UNDER CULTIV ATION	FALLOW
(MEAN HECTARES)						
Banana	3.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	3.3	1.7
Chitepo	2.5	2.5	3.7	1.3	3.5	1.5
Gatu	3.7	1.3	3.3	1.7	2.9	2.1
Gwetera	1.3	3.7	2.6	2.4	3.4	1.6
Magadzi	2.6	2.4	3.1	1.9	3.5	1.5
Mudzinge	1.7	3.3	2.5	2.5	3.0	2.0
Mupedza nhamo	2.7	2.3	3.6	1.4	2.2	2.8
Muringa mombe	1.8	3.2	2.8	2.2	2.4	2.6
Mutora mhupo	2.0	3.0	3.2	1.8	3.3	1.7
Nehanda	1.5	3.5	2.5	2.5	2.9	2.1
Takawira	3.1	1.9	3.8	1.2	3.0	2.0
Zvataida	2.2	2.8	3.7	1.3	3.3	1.7
All Villages	2.3	2.7	3.1	1.9	3.1	1.9

Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 20
MUFURUDZI MODEL A SCHEME: HOUSEHOLDS LAND USE
CHARACTERISTICS, 1984-85 SEASON

	NUMBER OF HSEHOLDS	TOTAL AREA CULTIVATED IN VILLAGE (HECTARES)	CULTIVATED AREA FOR MAIZE	COTTON	TOBACCO	MEAN AREA CULTIVATED PER HSEHOLD (HECTARES)	MEAN HSEHOLD SIZE
			%	%	%		
Banana	12	39.2	41.8	56.1	2.0	3.3	7.2
Chitepo	30	104.8	45.4	54.6	0.0	3.5	7.1
Gatu	48	142.8	43.1	56.9	0.0	3.0	9.4
Gwetera	32	108.0	46.7	53.3	0.0	3.4	7.0
Magadzi	49	170.0	45.4	53.9	0.7	3.5	7.7
Mudzinge	30	90.8	34.4	65.6	0.0	3.0	6.9
Mupedza nhamo	13	28.0	53.0	47.0	0.0	2.2	7.9
Muringa mombe	28	67.6	49.7	46.7	3.6	2.4	7.9
Mutora mhapo	14	46.0	47.8	50.4	1.7	3.3	8.9
Nehanda	38	124.8	53.1	45.1	1.8	3.3	7.6
Takawira	29	88.0	59.5	35.0	5.5	3.0	6.4
Zvataida	26	85.6	44.4	55.6	0.0	3.3	7.1
All Villages	349	1,095.6	47.0	51.7	1.3	3.1	7.6

Mufurudzi farms are smallholdings with no economies of scale and the kinds of management expertise, capitalization and other facilities that are available to the commercial farmers. Infact, households in Gatu, Magadzi and Gwetera villages easily exceeded the target per hectare outputs for maize of commercial farms (Table 8-21). If for example 1982-83 is taken as a base year maize productivity in Mufurudzi increased by 167 percent in 1983-84 and by as much as 582 percent in 1984-85. In absolute terms, for the twelve villages studied, output rose from 277,550 kilograms in 1982-83 to 1,893,164 kilograms in 1984-85 (see Table 8-23)

The same productivity story for maize is replicated in the case of cotton the other major crop grown by Mufurudzi farmers (Table 8-22). For cotton the mean per hectare yield in 1984-85 was 412 percent over and above the 1982-83 yield. In 1984-85, the average farmer in Mufurudzi did not only achieve the target productivity of 1,370 kilograms per hectare for commercial farms in the area but even exceeded it by 38 percent. If these outputs are evaluated in terms of the targets projected by the planners as given in Table 8-16 above then the productivity of these Model A Normal Scheme farmers are even more impressive. For instance, it was envisaged that at year three and thereafter their mean yield for maize was going to be 1,500 kilograms per hectare and cotton 700 kilograms per hectare. For 1984-85 these targets were more than doubled in all but only 3 of the 12 villages (see Table 8-21 and Table 8-22)

The trends in maize productivity per household and the respective proportions either retained for domestic use or marketed also attest to the fact that many farmers are becoming more confident in resettlement and feeling more secure in their new environment. The data for 1983-84 indicates that farmers were retaining relatively less of their total output and selling more of the grain which constitutes the main staple. Thus, whereas Mufurudzi marketed only 14 percent of its maize output in 1982-83 the story was

TABLE 8 - 21
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN
HOUSEHOLDS MAIZE PRODUCTIVITY

	1982-83	1983-84	1984-85
(MEAN KILOGRAMS HARVESTED PER HECTARE)			
Banana	128	1,150	3,041
Chitepo	918	1,106	2,829
Gatu	276	1,113	5,176
Gwetera	163	1,972	4,749
Magadzi	172	1,961	5,136
Mudzinge	167	1,183	2,768
Mupedza nhamo	143	624	3,044
Muringa mombe	64	943	1,893
Mutora mhapo	307	899	3,073
Nehanda	867	1,627	3,433
Takawira	754	1,709	3,517
Zvataida	1,517	1,066	3,113
All Villages	456	1,279	3,481

Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 22
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLDS
COTTON PRODUCTIVITY

	1982-83	1983-84	1984-85
(MEAN KILOGRAMS HARVESTED PER HECTARE)			
Banana	156	1,265	1,293
Chitepo	359	699	1,501
Gatu	313	1,700	3,762
Gwetera	581	1,430	2,041
Magadzi	280	1,416	2,619
Mudzinge	296	1,289	1,694
Mupedza nhamo	290	1,075	2,659
Muringa mombe	85	465	775
Mutora mhupo	762	1,546	1,978
Nehanda	770	1,159	1,504
Takawira	246	758	1,140
Zvataida	285	1,164	1,720
All Villages	369	1,164	1,891

Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is derived from agricultural census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.

different in 1984-85 during which 61.6 percent of all the maize produced were sold. Indeed, households in all the twelve villages in this study produced maize for the market in 1984-85. In contrast only five villages did so in 1982-83 selling just 13.7 percent of the total harvest and nine in 1983-84 which sold only 18.1 percent (Table 8-23).

The significant fact about the increasing commercial disposal of Mufurudzi maize is that it has not occurred at the expense of household subsistence. These households, in fact, had more grain for consumption at a time when the proportion sold was more. In 1982-83, each household was only able to retain 591 kilograms on the average. However, in 1984-85 each retained over three times that much with a mean of 1,775 kilograms (Table 8-24).

In the latter half of 1985 the 349 farmers surveyed in 12 of the 18 villages reported possessing a total head of 1,454 cattle. While this was a modest increase over the 1982-83 stock figures it showed a 16 percent decline against the total head count for 1983-84 when the 12 villages reported 1,737 head of cattle (Table 8-25). This decline may not be explained so much by sales or slaughter for consumption or even by other out-transfers such as for roora or marriage transactions. The field evidence indicates the most probable explanation to be predators and pests. If not because of especially the widespread prevalence of the trypanosomiasis-carrying tsetsefly, Glossina sp., which was first spotted in the Scheme in 1983, most farmers would have successfully built-up their livestock heads.³

In terms of income for instance, the average household net cash flow from cotton and maize sales in 1985 was \$1,332 (Table 8-26). This represents an excess of 233 percent over the minimum target of \$400 per annum envisaged for these resettled households in the government policy. An assessment of the gross incomes in 1985 from crops, that is, the output retained and the surplus marketed shows a much higher average returns of \$2,128.26 per household.

TABLE 8 - 23
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL SCHEME: TRENDS IN MAIZE PRODUCTION,
HOUSEHOLD RETENTION AND SALE

1982 - 83					1983 - 84					1984 - 85				
		TOTAL MAIZE YIELD	MAIZE RETA INED	SOLD			TOTAL MAIZE YIELD	MAIZE RETA INED	SOLD			TOTAL MAIZE YIELD	MAIZE RETA INED	SOLD
(N=)		TONNES	%		(N=)		TONNES	%		(N=)		TONNES	%	
Banana	14	3.6	100.0	0.0	14	17.0	100.0	0.0	12	49.9	49.8	50.2		
Chitepo	30	50.9	64.4	35.6	30	53.5	74.8	25.2	30	134.7	29.9	70.1		
Gatu	50	29.3	74.8	25.2	46	65.2	94.7	5.3	48	308.5	33.9	66.1		
Gwetera	31	4.1	100.0	0.0	31	76.2	79.3	20.7	32	239.3	20.9	79.1		
Magadzi	51	13.6	100.0	0.0	49	142.1	78.0	22.0	49	396.5	28.0	72.0		
Mudzinge	33	6.8	100.0	0.0	33	37.9	94.0	6.0	30	86.4	56.1	43.9		
Mupedza nhamo	13	4.1	77.8	22.2	12	13.5	94.6	5.4	13	45.0	54.5	45.5		
Muringa mombe	24	2.4	100.0	0.0	28	29.0	100.0	0.0	28	63.6	60.8	39.2		
Mutora mhapo	14	4.5	100.0	0.0	14	15.4	100.0	0.0	14	67.6	36.6	63.4		
Nehanda	39	36.8	59.9	40.1	37	111.9	57.6	42.4	38	199.1	29.3	70.7		
Takawira	31	57.8	59.4	40.6	31	120.7	39.0	61.0	29	184.3	27.4	72.6		
Zvataida	27	63.7	100.0	0.0	26	58.5	70.5	29.5	26	118.3	34.5	66.5		
All Villages		277.6	86.3	13.7		740.9	81.9	18.1		1,893.2	38.4	61.6		

Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 24
MUFURUDZI MODEL A NORMAL INTENSIVE SCHEME: TRENDS IN MEAN
HOUSEHOLD MAIZE RETENTIONS FOR DOMESTIC USE

	1982 - 83		1983 - 84		1984 - 85	
	MEAN HSEHOLD SIZE	MAIZE RETAINED	MEAN HSEHOLD SIZE	MAIZE RETAINED	MEAN HSEHOLD SIZE	MAIZE RETAINED
		(KGS/ HSEHOLD)		(KGS/ HSEHOLD)		(KGS/ HSEHOLD)
Banana	7.1	260	7.0	1,216	7.2	2,258
Chitepo	7.6	1,092	5.2	1,335	7.1	1,344
Gatu	9.4	439	9.7	1,343	9.4	2,176
Gwetera	7.4	132	5.4	1,949	7.0	1,561
Magadzi	7.8	266	6.2	2,264	7.7	2,269
Mudzinge	7.4	207	7.7	1,078	6.9	1,614
Mupedza nhamo	6.7	245	6.3	1,062	7.9	1,890
Muringa mombe	7.6	99	6.7	1,037	7.9	1,432
Mutora mhapo	9.7	325	6.2	1,183	8.9	1,768
Nehanda	8.0	565	6.0	1,741	7.6	1,533
Takawira	7.2	1,107	4.3	1,518	6.4	1,742
Zvataida	6.9	2,359	5.6	1,586	7.1	1,568
All Villages	7.7	591	5.8	1,443	7.6	1,763

Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 is calculated from agricultural census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 25
MUFURUDZI SCHEME: TRENDS IN THE BUILD-UP OF CATTLE HEADS

	1982-83		1983-84		1984-85	
	HOUSE HOLDS	CATTLE HEAD	HOUSE HOLDS	CATTLE HEAD	HOUSE HOLDS	CATTLE HEAD
Banana	14	46	14	53	12	45
Chitepo	30	161	30	207	30	174
Gatu	50	179	46	245	48	170
Gwetera	31	94	31	127	32	86
Magadzi	51	185	49	290	49	197
Mudzinge	33	67	33	139	30	110
Mupedza nhamo	13	43	12	24	13	32
Muringa mombe	24	74	28	96	28	69
Mutora mhapo	14	83	13	113	14	93
Nehanda	39	104	37	159	38	185
Takawira	31	106	31	143	29	152
Zvataida	27	87	26	141	26	141
All Villages	357	1,229	350	1,737	349	1,454

Source: Data for 1982-83 and 1983-84 are calculated from agricultural census figures for the resettlement schemes collected by DERUDE for the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Harare.

TABLE 8 - 26
MUFURUDZI MODEL A SCHEME: CROP COSTS AND RETURNS,
1984-85 SEASON (MAIZE & COTTON)

	NUMBER OF HSEHOLDS	VARIABLE COST (\$)	GROSS RETURNS (\$)	NET CASH INCOME (\$)	MEAN HSEHOLD NET CASH FLOW (\$)
Banana	12	11,271.20	24,607.28	8,869.80	739.15
Chitepo	30	31,736.80	71,435.80	32,451.52	1,081.72
Gatu	48	54,193.60	218,513.40	145,519.96	3,031.67
Gwetera	32	32,364.00	107,673.80	66,324.96	2,072.66
Magadzi	49	53,614.40	203,247.52	129,641.20	2,645.74
Mudzinge	30	27,121.60	71,064.64	35,239.52	1,174.65
Mupedza nhamo	13	9,194.40	27,403.20	13,791.60	1,060.89
Muringa mombe	28	18,780.80	24,899.64	-834.16	-29.79
Mutora mhapo	14	13,100.00	37,400.48	19,319.56	1,379.97
Nehanda	38	30,708.00	76,484.68	35,306.28	929.11
Takawira	29	20,585.80	52,434.00	17,191.60	592.81
Zvataida	26	25,036.00	66,313.00	33,947.72	1,305.68
All Villages	349	327,706.60	981,477.44	536,769.56	1,332.02

Note: A total of 27 farmers from Banana, Magadzi, Muringamombe, Mutora-mhapo, Nehanda and Takawira cultivated tobacco in addition to the maize and cotton. These represented 8 percent of all farmers. However, just 1.3 percent of the total area of 1,096 hectares cropped was devoted to tobacco. For this reason and because of the complicated nature of tobacco marketing which is by auction and thus is not subject to government's producer prices I decided to drop the crop from these calculations. The costs, value and returns therefore relate only to maize and cotton. Consequently, these figures may not reflect the actual costs, returns and mean net agricultural cash flows in the six villages.

Since being resettled more farmers have purchased for the first time such household items as watches and radios (see Table 7-40 and Table 7-41, Chapter VII above) and such capital assets as Scotch-carts and ox-drawn implements to facilitate higher productivity (see Tables 7-43 and Table 7-44, Chapter VII above). In 1985, a total of 221 households or 64 percent of all farmers covered in the twelve villages studied in Mufurudzi had applied for and received government loans to construct new and permanent homes. Of this number the greater majority made up of 171 households had even completed and were residing in these houses.

The move away from traditional wattle and daub and grass thatched houses into permanent, well ventilated ones made with sandcrete, steel frames and wooden doors and windows, corrugated roofing sheets and cement floors and plastering is certainly an improvement. Increased farm productivity is also a commendable achievement so are increased incomes and consumption. The foundations for these have been the provision by the government of resettlement land, wide ranging opportunities and integrated developmental facilities such as roads, schools, water, extension, credit and marketing. There is every indication that these farm households are making the fullest use of available services and in the process improving their respective qualities of life.⁴

Simba Youth Scheme as an Illustrative Case of Model B Resettlement

Simba Youth: Background

The Simba Youth Model B Producer Cooperative was established at the beginning of the 1980-81 farming season by a group of volunteers who mostly then comprised ex-guerrilla combatants. They were allocated the block of land

that used to be the Paridon Farm measuring a total of 1,955 hectares. The land located in the western end of the Mufurudzi Scheme is in a better agro-ecological zone of Natural Region II. In terms of the topography, vegetation, soils and general climate Simba Youth shares similar characteristics with Mufurudzi. It also has the added advantage of being transcended by the tarred national road which originates in Harare, passing through Bindura the provincial capital and Shamva the district center, all in the south, northwards to Mount Darwin which is another district center (Figure 7-1).

At the time of the establishment of the cooperative the following developments and facilities were present on the property: (1) an old homestead which needed renovation; (2) a dam with $295 \times 10^3 \text{ m}^3$ capacity, which leaked badly and held no water; (3) water pump; (4) electricity connection to the national grid; (5) a tractor with plow, planter and trailer; (6) poultry unit and (7) old barns.

Of the total area 24 percent or 460 hectares is considered arable. About 71 percent of the farm consist of Class VI land an outcropped area which provides good grazing. The remaining 5 percent is hilly and contain rough grazing.

Simba Youth: Scheme Costs and Farm-Level Economic Projections

The government acquired the Paridon Farm at a cost of \$44,000. The development costs also totalled \$117,097. In all then, the entire Scheme cost \$161,097. At the projected target membership of 90 farmers the cost per member was calculated to be \$1,790 (Table 8-27). Based on this ideal membership figure and the high agro-potential of the area to produce dryland maize and cotton crops with integrated cattle and poultry enterprises Simba Youth was

TABLE 8 - 27
 SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEME:
 BUDGET ALLOCATION, SUMMARY OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND BALANCE
 AS AT JULY 31, 1985

ITEM/SUB-ITEM	BUDGETED COST	PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE	BALANCE
(\$ 000)			
<hr/>			
Indirect Costs: (Ministry of Lands, Resettl. & Rural Dev.)			
Land Acquisition	44,000	44,000	0
Development Costs: (Agricultural & Rural Dev. Authority)			
Demarcation and Survey	400	0	400
Land Preparation	15,000	10,240	4,760
Roads	250	0	250
Water Supplies	20,000	3,824	16,176
Fencing	3,840	3,520	320
Dip	3,700	3,643	57
Establishment Grant:			
Housing & Farm Buildings	20,500	20,458	42
Transport	4,420	4,420	0
Tractors & Equipment	25,000	5,007	19,993
Vehicles & Cycles	6,000	6,000	0
Hand Tools & Protective Clothes	1,825	1,825	0
Workshop Tools	500	0	500
Vegetable Garden Tools	100	0	100
Oxen	2,500	0	2,500
Ox-Carts	480	0	480
<hr/>			

TABLE 8 - 27--continued

ITEM/SUB-ITEM	BUDGETED COST	PROGRESSIVE EXPENDITURE	BALANCE
		(\$ 000)	
Ox-Implements	1,000	0	1,000
Planning & Implementation	5,498	2,741	2,757
Contingencies	6,084	0	6,084
Total	161,097	105,678	55,419
Cost Per Member	1,790		

Source: Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (July 1985), Harare.

projected to yield at its full capacity an Internal Financial Rate of Return amounting to 32 percent per annum. According to the project assessment report issued by AGRITEX this figure would even increase if the cooperators produce high-price crops such as groundnuts (peanuts) and tobacco all of which are suited to the sandy soils of the area coupled with its favored agro-ecology.

AGRITEX recommended that an average of 155 hectares of maize and 35 hectares of cotton be grown each year in 50 percent rotation. The rotation proposed was as follows: Maize/Cotton/Maize followed by a 3 year pasture. The ideal cropping program upon which the planners based their projections recommended that in the initial year of the Scheme 140 hectares of maize and 20 hectares of cotton were to be grown. This was to be followed in year two by 155 hectares of maize and 30 of cotton. In year three and thereafter the cooperators were to cultivate a total of 190 hectares 82 percent of which were to be devoted to maize and the remaining 35 hectares or 18 percent to cotton (Table 8-28). As Table 8-28 further indicates if the Simba Youth kept to this cropping viability projection the total gross margins were going to be \$42,980 for 1980-81, \$49,345 for 1981-82 and \$50,465 for 1982-83 and subsequent years.

Conceived as an integrated or mixed agricultural system the potential for livestock production in Simba Youth is quite promising. Infact, the farm has an estimated carrying capacity of 318 Livestock Units, the equivalent of 398 head of cattle. On full herd development, which usually is expected to take about 10 years, the livestock holding is projected to generate approximately \$8,000 gross margin per year.

Dealing with the cropping program it is very important to state here that all these projections are premised on the explicit policy assumption made by the planners to the effect that the membership of Simba Youth will increase from its 55 in 1981-82 to 90 by 1983-84. The project report states that by year four "the Co-operative must increase to 90 persons to handle this crop"

TABLE 8 - 28
SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEME:
CROPPING BUDGET

	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83 & AFTER
<hr/>			
MAIZE			
Area (Hectares)	140	155	155
Total Variable Cost (\$)	27,580	30,535	30,535
Total Income (\$)	66,080	73,160	73,160
Total Gross Margin (\$)	38,500	42,625	42,625
COTTON			
Area (Hectares)	20	30	35
Total Variable Cost (\$)	4,620	6,930	8,085
Total Income (\$)	9,100	13,650	15,925
Total Gross Margin (\$)	4,480	6,720	7,840
<hr/>			
(TOTAL)			
Area (Hectares)	160	185	190
Total Variable Cost (\$)	32,200	37,465	38,620
Total Income (\$)	75,180	86,810	89,085
Total Gross Margin (\$)	42,980	49,345	50,465
<hr/>			

Source: Simba Youth Cooperative (Paridon Farm) Project Report
(Revised November 1981), AGRITEX, Harare.

of 155 hectares maize and 35 hectares cotton.

Farming in Zimbabwe is highly rigid in terms of the demands on labor that is needed to perform specific operations at the right time. This is because of the agro-ecological constraints in the form of soils, precipitation and climate that nature imposes on farm production (see Chapter II above). For instance, it was the recommendation of the AGRITEX planners that Simba Youth dry-plants maize seed between the 15 and 25 of November to 43,000 plants per hectare to obtain an average yield of 4,000 kilograms per hectare. Likewise, cotton seed was also to be dry-planted during the same period to 53,320 plants per hectare to obtain average yield of 1,370 kilograms of gin-cotton per hectare.

The reality about the AGRITEX recommendation is that for dry-land agriculture under such a restrictive ecology any of the following constraints would definitely make the achievement of the projected yields unlikely. These are (1) a significant delay in the arrival of the rains, (2) a shortfall in the total amount of the rainfall received, (3) non-compliance with the planting time, (4) inability to follow the recommended planting density and (5) failure to ensure proper crop husbandary. Consequently, while appreciating the determinant role of nature for success in such a farming system the crucial place of labor especially its adequacy throughout the critical phases of land preparation, planting, weeding and harvesting can not be overemphasized.

According to the AGRITEX estimates 2.5 workers per hectare or a total of 88 workers are needed to pick 35 hectares of cotton during the 12 to 16 weeks harvesting period starting from about the month of May. Similarly, hand-harvesting of maize requires 3.25 worker-days per 1,000 kilograms. Thus for the expected yield of 4,000 kilograms per hectare the needs of Simba Youth are a workforce of 90 members to be able to harvest 155 hectares within 22

days. Thus the achievement and maintenance of the target membership throughout the entire farming season are crucially important for the cooperatives to realize the projected outputs and incomes.

For instance, in its third year of establishment, that is, at the beginning of the farming season in 1983 the total membership of Simba Youth was 40. The cooperative had planned to cultivate 80 hectares cotton and 40 hectares maize. It needs to be observed that this cropping program was unrealistic and contrary to the recommendations made by AGRITEX in Simba Youth's project report. Nevertheless, the cooperative managed to plant 54 hectares cotton and 63 hectares maize. In December 1983, two members of the cooperative were expelled while four resigned reducing membership to only 34. In the monthly report for December submitted to DERUDE, Harare, by the Resettlement Officer it was reported that the cooperative's "crops are very good but they are struggling with the weeds." In March 1984, at the peak of the farming season, the Officer's report again indicated:

Membership dropped from 34 to 31 this month. One of the most senior members Comrade [. . .] left. The remaining members alleged that members were leaving the cooperative because there was no income . . . They threatened to abandon the [cooperative] society if there will be no compromise on their \$54,000 AFC [indebtedness] . . . Of 57 ha cotton 30 ha were well weeded about 20 ha were weeded once and now don't look clean enough to give them the expected yield.

Other dimensions of this problem excerpted from various monthly reports are shown in Table 8-29. Such problems continue to plague Simba Youth and indeed the greater majority of the other Model B Schemes throughout the country.

TABLE 8 - 29
SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B COOPERATIVE SCHEME: MEMBERSHIP AND
CROPPING MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS, 1984-85 SEASON

<u>September 1984:</u>	Current Membership	31	
	Cooperative has no financier for seasonal inputs. AFC declined its loan application because of outstanding debt [of nearly \$60,000]. Coop negotiating with the Lutheran World Federation for sponsorship		
<u>October 1984:</u>	Current Membership	27	
	Two members were expelled for misconduct. Another refused punishment for stealing eggs and instead left the coop with his wife. The Lutheran World Federation is willing to loan \$30,000 to finance 35 hectares maize and 45 hectares cotton. Telephone disconnected for non-payment of bills.		
<u>November 1984:</u>	Current Membership	30	
	The Lutheran World Federation granted \$30,000 loan to enable coop to purchase inputs. 72 hectares already plowed.		
<u>December 1984:</u>	Current Membership	30	
	The members think they will meet a target of 35 hectares maize and 45 hectares cotton this year. They would like more equipment. eg. another tractor for their fields.		
<u>January 1985:</u>	Current Membership	28	
	Two members failed to return after the Christmas holidays. Of the original cropping target of 80 hectares [only] 30 hectares cotton and 20 hectares maize have been planted.		
<u>February 1985:</u>	Current Membership	30	
	Of the cotton crop 12 hectares not yet weeded. Maize crop was late and only 16 hectares planted.		

TABLE 8 - 29--continued

<u>March 1985:</u>	Current Membership	30
	Cooperative is hiring school children to provide supplementary labour to weed the fields. The cooperators change their figures from month to month. This month they said they have 31 hectares cotton and 16 hectares maize, while last month they gave 32 hectares for cotton. They say they did not weed the 1 hectare so they no more count it.	
<u>April 1985:</u>	Current Membership	30
	Maize crop needs weeding. But cooperators say they are too busy in cotton fields to have time for maize.	
<u>May 1985:</u>	Current Membership	30
	Cotton picking is on. Cooperators expecting about 400 bales.	
<u>June 1985:</u>	Current Membership	29
	A member was expelled for misconduct. He stole an overall (work clothe) and also fought with another member.	
<u>July 1985:</u>	Current Membership	29
	32 bales of cotton picked. 25 sent to the CMB. More still to be picked in the field.	
<u>August 1985:</u>	Current Membership	29
	Cotton picking still in progress.	
<u>September 1985:</u>	Current Membership	22
	A total of 103 bales of cotton picked and sent to the CMB. Total maize harvested was 250 (x 91 kg) bags.	

Source: Monthly Reports, Simba Youth Model B Scheme, DERUDE, Harare.


Simba Youth: Economic Performance and the Genesis
of a Problematic Agricultural Resettlement

At the end of the fifth year of Simba Youth's existence none of the economic viability projections made by the planners had come to pass. At the beginning of the 1985-86 financial year 66 percent of the project costs of the Scheme had already been expended. Yet the basic requirement of a workforce of 90 members had not been achieved. Indeed, from a membership of 55 in November 1981 the cooperative was down to only 22 members four years later in November 1985 (Figure 8-4).

Simba Youth was rated lowly by its Resettlement Officer for cooperative spirit, motivation, agricultural performance, stability and progress with the resettlement objectives. Its major problems were identified then as (1) low membership, (2) laziness and lack of seriousness with work, (3) indebtedness to the tune of nearly \$62,000 owed to the AFC and (4) lack of a tractor. In terms of its performance to date, the nature of its problems and its long-term prospects the Scheme, however, was not significantly different from the majority of Zimbabwe's producer cooperatives. It did not match the performance of apparently successful Schemes such as Gowe in the Mashonaland West Province neither did it exhibit the imminent near collapse atmosphere which characterized others such as Nyakudya or Kubudirira in Mashonaland Central Province.

Because of its low, unstable and decreasing membership the resources at the disposal of Simba Youth were woefully underutilized. The members appeared content and hopeful though. The paradox of this fact is that like the greater majority of the members of the five Model B Producer Cooperatives covered in the case study these resettled farmers were exposed to increasing material deprivation and poverty as compared to many of their counterparts in Mufurudzi. The cooperative members were even worse off than farmers in the

Membership



Note: Projected membership o o; Actual membership x x

FIGURE: 8 - 4
SIMBA YOUTH MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE: PROJECTED
BUILD-UP TO TARGET MEMBERSHIP COMPARED WITH TRENDS IN ACTUAL
MEMBERSHIP, 1981 - 1985

Communal Areas in terms of accumulation of assets and access to basic comforts of life (see Table 7-37, Table 7-39 and Table 7-40, Chapter VII above).

At the end of the season in August 1985, Simba Youth harvested and sold a total of 103 bales of cotton to the Cotton Marketing Board. This fetched \$10,197. The cooperative also harvested 250 bags of maize all of which were retained for subsistence. Thus, the income from sales grossed by the cooperative was only a third of the cost of \$30,000 loaned to Simba Youth in November 1984 by the non-governmental organization for its cropping program (see Table 8-29). In the circumstance none of the members received any cash remuneration for their work effort in 1984-85, as was the case in previous years, though they were projected by the development planners to be capable of generating target incomes of \$400 per member.

In terms of productivity the 103 bales of cotton, equivalent to 18,540 kilograms from the 30 hectares cultivated, worked out to only 618 kilograms per hectare. That represented just 45 percent of the average yield of 1,370 kilograms estimated for commercial producers in the area by AGRITEX. Similarly for maize, only 16 hectares were cultivated which was just 10.3 percent of the area that the planners expected the cooperative to put under maize in 1984-85. The yield of 250 bags or 22,750 kilograms also gave a per hectare productivity of just 1,422 kilograms. That also was only 36 percent of the estimated average commercial yield of 4,000 kilograms which the cooperative was deemed capable of producing.

With regards to livestock the herd development at Simba Youth was projected to reach at least half of the carrying capacity of the cooperative, which is 199 head of cattle, by 1985-86. However, as of March 1985 it had only 26, a reduction by 7 head since January 1984 when there was a total of 33 head of cattle.⁵ In October 1985, the government released an amount of \$2,415 out of the outstanding budget of \$2,500 against oxen from the Establishment

Grant (see Table 8-25) to the cooperative. This enabled Simba Youth to purchase 10 more head of cattle from Shiloh Development, a private Large-Scale Commercial farm in the area.

With the kind of performance that has characterized Simba Youth from its very establishment in 1980 until now there is no way that the cooperative can make it without increased and dedicated membership. Equally, there is no way that the economically sound projections that justified the government's commitment to invest public funds in that particular producer cooperative, as well as many others, can be realized in the present circumstance. As at the end of July 1985 an amount of \$105,678 had been spent by the government on the Scheme. That represented 66 percent of the total project cost (see Table 8-24). The fact is that two-thirds of all the project money had gone into the resettlement of less than one-fourth of the target membership. In effect, by the mid-1985 the actual project cost per member stood at \$3,774.21 rather than the \$1,790 (see Table 8-3) originally projected by the planners in the Scheme report which obviously is no more tenable.

Any further expenditures without corresponding increase in membership, or worse still with declining membership, will translate into increasing cost per member. Thus serious policy efforts need to be directed at breaking the vicious cycle of low membership, underutilization of resources, low productivity and no surplus output for the market, indebtedness and lack of personal income and rewards to labour which in turn precipitates high turnover and also keeps membership low.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the government of Zimbabwe as well as other foreign governments and donor agencies have been

very supportive in providing for the basic needs, essential services and the facilitative inputs for the success of the resettlement program. All the Schemes which are being implemented under the program appear to have at least the necessary economic resources to enable them to achieve the target productivities and generate the expected incomes projected for them in their respective planning reports. Various evaluations indicate variations in the actual performance within and between the Schemes. The human factor, essentially household initiative, capability and organization seems to be playing the determinant role in bringing about change and progress to some of the resettled and inertia and lack of progress to others.

Generally, the variations in the performance of the two major Resettlement Models in operation are striking. While the Model A Schemes appear to be building a sound foundation for the success of the greater majority of its farmers the Model B Schemes on the other hand are constrained by major human and other organizational problems which are serious enough to make them an eventual failure.

Specific implications of these developments substantively for Zimbabwe and also for the theory and practice of rural development are explored below in Chapter IX along with a set of recommendations.

Notes

1.) The actual number of separate villages in Mufurudzi is 20. These are distributed over 18 blocks of land. Gatu and Magadzi each has two villages which are combined here for purposes of analysis. This is also the case in the official records where the two units of each of the two respective villages are treated together. That, however, is not the case with Tongogara 1 and 2 which are considered as two distinct villages.

2.) A dry spell is a period of between eleven and twenty days without significant rain. According to AGRITEX (1982b; Section on Climatic Data:1) for a general usage, 15 millimeters of rain appears to be a suitable criterion for significant rainfall on light textured soils; enough to germinate the seed. Once germinated little further rainfall is required to emergence. At this stage plants are quite hardy and can take moderate stress without affecting the subsequent yield. In Zimbabwe farming circles a period of three weeks is generally accepted as being the maximum a farmer can go without replanting. If there are more than four pendats (see Chapter II above, fn2) after the previous significant rainfall the season is considered to have a false start. The growing season is then started at the next significant rainfall with the same conditions.

3.) As of May 1985 there were 2,625 head of cattle, 424 goats, 120 sheep and 54 donkeys in Mufurudzi. This represented 1,899 Livestock Units or only 41.5 percent of the total carrying capacity of the scheme.

During the survey in November 1985 a little over 80 percent of the Mufurudzi sample farm households had cattle. Possession of livestock, especially cattle, was cited by 30 percent of all the farmers as the important attribute of a "good life" (upenyu hwakanaka) while 32 percent of all the farmers would, if they were to be given \$1,000 in cash, rather invest such an amount in acquiring cattle (see Chapter VII above).

There are two major problems which face livestock production in Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme. The first problem has to do with the proximity of the Scheme to the Mufurudzi Safari (Wildlife) Area (Figure 8-2). The game reserve which is adjacent to the eastern half of the Scheme exposes the livestock not only to such predators as lions from the game reserve but also tsetse which thrive well in these reserves.

In February 1984 four cows and a goat were killed by lions in Magadzi, Gwetera and Zvomanyanga villages respectively. In May another 7 heads of cattle and a sheep were killed in the three villages. During the first week in June 1984 the lions attacked and killed 4 heads in Mukwari, 2 each in Chitepo and Zvataida and 1 each in Nehanda and Gwetera.

Perhaps, the main constraint to the successful build-up of cattle heads in Mufurudzi, like most other localities in the northern half of Zimbabwe, is trypanosomiasis. During the survey many farmers reported deaths among their stocks the symptoms of which were confirmed to be those of trypanosomiasis (see also Chapter VII fn3 above).

4.) It may require a lot of financial outlay and physical developments such as paddocking and watering points to enable Simba Youth to qualify for the grazer scheme under which the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) provides for cattle fattening projects on some Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes. Until

then efforts at increasing the stock numbers at Simba Youth may not yield the projected economic benefits. For instance, in February 1985 when there were only 30 members, that is, a third of the target membership the cooperators slaughtered a cow and 2 pigs from their stock for consumption. In September the same year another cow, which they claimed had fallen into a well, was also eaten by the 22 members remaining in the cooperative who constituted only one-fourth of the target membership. Without any serious and successful attempts at building-up the cattle heads an offtake of two beasts in a period of six months for subsistence may not be economically justified.

During my first visit to the Simba Youth in March 1985 they had a piggery with 13 animals, a rabbit project with 49 animals, a poultry project, a grocery shop and a beer hall which generated income for the day-to-day subsistence expenses of members. Only the grocery and beer shop were functioning at the time of my extended tour of the area with the research team during the last quarter of 1985.

5.) This seemingly rosy picture of the Model A Schemes does not mean that all of them are uniformly successful or none of them have any problems or even the respective households within them are all equally doing well. The variations in household social and agricultural characteristics as well as performance in Mufurudzi, for instance, were examined in Chapter VII above. For the Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme as a whole various problems involving both the resettled farmers, their non-resettlement neighbors as well as the officers have at one time or another been reported to DERUDE. The following four cases selected purposefully from the records for the first half of 1985 are illustrative:

(i) In March 1985 1,600 meters of boundary fencing materials erected between Tongogara 1 resettlement village and the Goora sub-division of the Madziwa Communal Area (see Figure 8-1 and Figure 8-2) were vandalized and stolen. Such is the contradictions in the nature of the relationships between the better resource-endowed resettlement areas and the adjacent ecologically-degraded communal lands.

(ii) In April 1985 a very nasty confrontation occurred between the farmers of Mudzingo resettlement village and their otherwise very cordial neighbors from the adjoining Madziwa Mine (Africa) compound. The Mine which is located within the Mufurudzi Scheme just across from Mudzingo (see Figure 8-2) is more of a social and economic center for many of the resettled households particularly in Mudzingo, Zvataida, Mutoramhepo, Mupedzanhamo and Takawira villages. These farmers sell vegetables there and buy groceries and meat from the Mine shops. More significantly, the beer hall is heavily patronized by these farmers.

The incident which precipitated the demonstration of the farmers on the Mine premises was the death of an Mudzingo ox on the compound apparently from poisoning and stab wounds. This was allegedly perpetrated by a disgruntled Mine worker whose vegetable garden had been eaten by the ox. In this case also the boundary fence between the resettlement area and the Mine compound had previously been stolen. DERUDE had asked the Mine authorities to provide another fence but the Mine Manager in a letter dated March 28, 1985 responded that "management is of the opinion that it is the Resettlement cattle straying into Mine property and therefore should be the responsibility of the Resettlement area to erect a fence."

(iii) The general issues of concern reported by the Resettlement Team to DERUDE in May 1985 included the following: (1) increasing tendency among the "Mapostori" (Apostolic Faith) members particularly in Gato village to indulge "in under-age marriages which had affected our school enrolment" for example in Magadzi elementary school; (2) withdrawal of non-Mukwari village students,

that is, those of Chitepo and Zvataida by their parents due to inter-village misunderstandings and lack of good drinking water at Mukwari elementary school; (3) illegal and secretly operated grocery shops managed by some resettled farmers in Tongogara 1, Chitepo and Gatu villages; (4) a government staff on the Mufurudzi Resettlement Team illegally operating a grocery shop and also assigning an arable plot to himself and cultivating crops; (5) the general uncleanness of some residential plots in Tongogara 1 and Zvomanyanga villages; (6) overstocking beyond the assigned Livestock Units by some farmers in Zvomanyanga, Takawira, Gwetera, Tongogara 1, Magadzi 2, Chitepo, Zvataida, Mudzingo and Nehanda villages respectively; and (7) illegal extension of the allotted 5 hectare arable plots up, in some instances, to 10 hectares by some farmers in Gato, Gwetera, Zvomanyanga, Magadzi 1 and 2, Tongogara 1 and 2, Chitepo and Mukwari villages (see Figure 8-2). (In the case of one of these villages a highly placed district-level dignitary of the ruling ZANU-PF party who was also a resettled farmer was reported to be cultivating up to 12 hectares thus "stretching his arable into the communal grazing area.")

(iv) Finally, in May 1985 a delegation made up of the Mufurudzi Area Board Chairman and the Chaminuka District Chairman of the ruling ZANU-PF party visited DERUDE's Mashonaland Regional Office in Harare and filed complaints against the Scheme's Resettlement Team. They alleged that: (1) the Resettlement officials did not show any respect in their dealings with the resettled farmers; (2) these officers were fond of threatening farmers with evictions thus "prohibiting settlers from making progress;" (3) there were cases of misuse of the government vehicle assigned to the Team; and (4) that the farmers no longer wanted those particular officers to be in-charge of the Scheme.

These allegations were duly investigated by DERUDE and found to be basically without foundation. However, changes were made by transferring one officer who had definitely incurred the displeasure of some of the farmers. The Resettlement Officer, who had been with the Mufurudzi Scheme since its inception, was also replaced and moved to another Province to head a newly opened Model A Scheme as part of a routine regional reshuffle of personnel.

CHAPTER IX CONCLUSION

Introduction

This dissertation has traced the evolution of the land question in colonial Zimbabwe. It emphasized how sensitive the problem is to the emotions of most Zimbabwean Africans and Europeans alike, be they peasants or the povo, bourgeoisie, academics, politicians and technocrats. It has also analyzed and described the central role of resettlement in the agricultural policy and the implementation of rural development programs in postindependence Zimbabwe. All these have been placed against the contextual background of both the theoretical and substantive issues which relate to the broader paradigms of the developmental problems and prospects for Africa. This final Chapter recapitulates the thrust of the preceding analysis and findings to bring into focus the few recommendations which are offered below.

Summary of Findings

After a decade of a bloody and protracted liberation war Zimbabwe attained political independence under a majority African rule in 1980. This ended a century of European settler colonialism in what was then known as Southern Rhodesia and later Rhodesia. The colonial history of the country was characterized by segregated land apportionment and separate development along racial lines. By the mid-1920s when Britain granted the colony a self-governing status the political economy of Rhodesia had crystallized essentially into a dualism.

The dominant sector was European-owned and managed. It depended upon extensive African labor force particularly in such critical areas of the

economy as export agriculture. The marginal or peripheral African sector, on the other hand, was predominantly peasant-managed and largely subsistence-oriented. While the European sector flourished and accumulated wealth through State patronage the African sector was less able to do so because of State paternalism and other inhibitive policies.

In Zimbabwe the best agricultural lands are very limited and they are confined to what are designated agro-ecologically as the Natural Regions I and II. It so happened that in the course of European immigration and settlement they identified and mapped out these favorable areas which they assigned to their exclusive use. This development involved the forceful removal of most African communities from these lands and their relocation in so-called Native Reserves mainly in the poor Natural Regions III, IV and V.

The net effects of decades of neglect of the development of these Reserves were excessive human and livestock pressure on the very limited resources available. At independence the Reserves or Tribal Trust Lands, now renamed Communal Areas, were characterized by massive ecological degradation and underdevelopment of the human capital. This situation was exacerbated by the war.

In 1980 the government launched its massive agricultural resettlement program which originally projected to resettle a target of 162,000 farm households by 1985. The program is being financed with domestic resources as well as international aid. The government set up the objectives of the program to include, among others, the rehabilitation of the rural poor and the destitute, the reduction of excessive population pressure in the Communal Areas, the productive utilization of abandoned and underutilized European-owned lands and the eventual intergration of the dichotomized European and African sub-sectors of the national economy.

The policy goal in this on-going resettlement program is to assist the resettled farm households to realize domestic food self-sufficiency and also generate a surplus market income of at least \$400 per year. This assistance is in the form of free land, the provision of a wide range of basic human needs, liberal credit facilities and extension. Both the public sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mainly foreign donor agencies, are actively involved in the funding of these forms of assistance.

The resettlement program is planned along various models the two most important of which are the Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes on the one hand and the Model B Schemes on the other. In the former individual households are resettled in nucleated villages where they are assigned 5 hectare plots of arable lands and access to communal grazing fields. In the latter the mode of organization and production follows cooperative or collective lines.

The Model A Schemes dominate the resettlement scene in terms of the numbers resettled, area covered and the total expenditure to date. However, it is the explicit intention of the government to eventually transform resettlement and indeed the country's agriculture into cooperative enterprises. This is in keeping with the socialist ideals of the country's only political party the ZANU-PF.

The resettlement program has now entered its eight year. As of now an estimated total of 50,000 households have been resettled. Up until 1986 when a new Lands Acquisition Bill was promulgated the government was legally bound to acquire resettlement land from European owners on a "willing seller-willing buyer" basis. This was part of the Lancaster House agreement which was internationally negotiated in London in 1979 between Zimbabwe-Rhodesia African and European leaders to end the liberation war and usher the country into independence. Now the government is at liberty to declare derelict lands as

needed for public use, purchase them and develop them into resettlement schemes. Consequently, the government envisages to resettle at least 15,000 families every year as lands become available.¹

Certain concerns have been raised by critics of the resettlement program. Of specific interest to this analysis are three issues articulated by them. These are that resettlement (1) as envisaged will be harmful to commercial agriculture, (2) adversely affect economic growth and (3) will lead to the creation of a more serious kind of class antagonism within the African communities which will be worse than what had existed between Africans and Europeans.

Some of the literature reviewed in various parts of this study have attempted to address the economic criticisms levelled by the adversaries of resettlement. This dissertation collected a wide range of empirical data both regionally and at the level of farm households from both official and non-official sources as well as case study interviews of a cross section of farmers in six major farming systems in Zimbabwe. The information gained have been analyzed and used to explicate various dimensions of the resettlement problem. This analysis has covered some of the issues at the national or macro-level and then focused on the micro or grassroots level. The presentation below deals with the specific findings from the relevant Chapters above as they relate to the impacts of resettlement.

Macro-Level Impacts of Resettlement

It is quite obvious from the information presented in Chapters II and VI above, in relation to the agricultural boom in Zimbabwe, that the fears expressed by critics such as Bill Kinsey (1982) that the implementation of

resettlement cause the collapse of the Large-Scale Commercial Farm sector was unnecessarily alarmist. It was not based on sound empirical projections.

Economic growth has also not suffered as a result of resettlement. If anything at all smallholder producers have responded remarkably to policy incentives which are part of the integrated agricultural resettlement and rural development program. The phenomenal contribution made by these farmers to the so-called "success story" in Zimbabwe's agricultural revolution is universally acknowledged (see van Buren 1986). Again Kinsey's (1982) concerns have not proved to be based on a correct judgement of what the potential impacts of resettlement were at the time of his prediction.

At the national level resettlement has at least consoled and assured the povo or the masses that the government is interested in promoting their welfare. This has cushioned off the government from any organized or spontaneous agitations and possible coup d'états which are the hallmark of the instability plaguing many African states. The pragmatic way by which the government has implemented resettlement so far has not adversely impacted on the organization and performance of the country's European farmers also. This does not mean that they fully support resettlement, or consider its projections to be realistic or even rate the government's progress on it any highly.

Equally, the government has not antagonized its African constituency by promising resettlement and failing to carry it out. The criticism in this regard has come only from the left among a section of the radical intellectuals who expect the government to do more than it is practicable in the current situation. The majority Communal Area residents who need resettlement are waiting, though anxiously, and they appear to understand the constraints that have not made it possible for most of them to benefit from

resettlement. The greatest majority of those who have been resettled are content and appear to be starting off well as the evidence from Mufurudzi shows (see Chapters VII and VIII above).

In terms of the government's own objectives it can be said that there are pluses as well as minuses in policy and in implementation. In reference to the positives the following may be mentioned.

So far over two million hectares of underutilized land have been negotiated for and bought for the resettlement of over 300,000 people. It is to be admitted that most of these lands are in the poorer agricultural regions of the country (see Figure 5-1). But barring the confiscation of the rich European-owned lands, which the government refrained from doing, there was no legal and democratic way outside the "willing seller-willing buyer" framework for acquiring these lands. More significantly, these rather marginal lands, which otherwise were not being used effectively, are now being farmed to produce food for household needs and also export crops. That certainly is a contribution to the national economy.

If conventional definition of development means anything like changes in structure and capacity as well as output (Baster 1972:1) or reducing poverty and inequality (Seers 1969:3) then at a general level the government has lived up to its developmental objectives. There is no question that the on-going resettlement, however modest it is, is (1) extending and improving the base for productive agriculture in the peasant farming sector, (2) providing, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people who had no land and (3) expanding and improving the infrastructure and services that are needed to promote the well-being of people and of agricultural production.

On the problem side the expectation of resettlement in alleviating population pressure in the Communal Areas, which is a major policy objective,

has not been realized. Clever Mumbengegwi (1985:212) see the impact of resettlement in that regard as marginal. He is right but only to the extent that given the high annual birth rate of around 3.5 percent in these Communal Areas (Zimbabwe 1982a) there is no way that resettlement of any magnitude can possibly solve the problem of overpopulation in the country. This fact should have dawned on the policy makers and planners. However, one cannot downplay the fact that if the 50,000 households resettled so far were still resident in these Communal Areas the already high levels of pressure and consequent crunch on the overused resources would have been excessively exacerbated than they are now.

A major area where the policy of the government on resettlement is not working at all as projected relates to the Model B Schemes. These production collectives are bewildered by problems which are not easily resolved. One such problem is inadequate membership and high turnover of members. The economic performance and success of these Model B Producer Cooperatives are predicated on the achievement of target membership of hardworking and dedicated cooperators.

The largest proportion of these Schemes, however, have not realized even 50 percent of their respective targets. Given the existing situation of increased impoverishment of the members of these Cooperatives it is not likely that they would be able to attract the right kinds of members and be able to turn themselves around. The continued governmental sponsorship of these apparent waste conduits is a major policy flaw in the area of resettlement.

Ibbo Mandaza (1985:17) criticizes the government's policies to the extent that there "is more continuity than change." That observation is essentially valid. However, it must be argued in defence of the government that this is the first time in the history of the country that policy guidelines have been

formulated, funded and are being implemented to equalize opportunity and access to existing socioeconomic and political systems. It is the impacts of and the projected repercussions of such a development at the grassroots level of the resettled farmers which are now examined.

Micro-Level Impacts of Resettlement

The case study revealed that as a group the resettled farmers in the Model A Normal Scheme are generally doing much better in agricultural performance, cash flow and accumulation of assets than farmers in the alternative farming systems. This includes the elite Small-Scale Commercial farmers who are not as productive as the average farmer in the Model A Normal Scheme such as Mufurudzi. On the opposite side of the scale the Model B Producer Cooperative farmers are worse off even more so than their counterparts in the overcrowded Communal Area farm sector.

Within the Model A Schemes, like anywhere else, success has not been uniform. In Mufurudzi for instance, farmers in such villages as Magadzi, Gatu and Gwetera are better performers on the average than their colleagues in Muringamombe (Figure 3-2).

Similarly, within the village level variations are also observed in the socio-demographic characteristics of households which reflect in their respective phases of the developmental cycle. These phases in turn show that different households have different levels of resource accumulation, exhibit different capabilities for agricultural performance and are consequently responding differently to resettlement.

It is quite obvious from the analysis that the micro-level impacts of resettlement that are expressed in such variables as the amounts of maize

retained for household consumption, the number of cattle owned, the cash value of marketed output and others follow a pattern. For example, (1) the male-headed polygynous households in expansion phase are the leaders in output, (2) households in the decline phase, as expected, are unable to make it, (3) male-headed households are in a better position to benefit from resettlement than female-headed households, and (4) even within the latter group females who head households because of the "temporary" absence of their spouses are responding better and benefitting more from resettlement than those who do not have any spouses at all, namely, divorcees and the widowed.

These variations in social formation have major implications for one of the government's policy concerns and also raise the third issue mentioned by Bill Kinsey (1982) to the fore. Is this index of increasing social differentiation an inevitable concomitant of rural development and social change as the literature suggests? Is such differentiation inherently evil as equity advocates say? Is this differentiation likely to be inimical to relations among rural Africans in Zimbabwe as Kinsey (1982) predicts? The substantive evidence about class in traditional and contemporary Africa may provide an inkling into the resolution of some of these issues.

Ronald Cohen (1985) views the evolution of traditional social formations as a process which follows greater "income and wealth." He argues that

[I]n traditional Africa greater income or wealth requires a concurrent increase in the number of dependants, which results in more prestige and feelings of achievement for the individual concerned. (Cohen 1985:137)

Cohen's (1985:143) further elaboration of this thesis that "power, success, labor, and status stem traditionally from large successful households," is a point that Angela Cheater argued earlier in her work among Small-Scale Commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. She (Cheater 1984:xv) found that

the elements of what she calls "the traditional idiom of accumulation" included "polygyny, large families and households, and labour co-operation among farmers."

Recent archival as well as field research in various rural settings in Zimbabwe conducted by Ian Phimister (1986) and Davis and Dopcke (1987) have all explored dimensions of the sources and relations which underly class formation. Similar works have also shed light about comparable experiences among the Buganda of Uganda (Mafeje 1973) and in places such as Zambia (Cliffe 1978) and Tanzania (Raikes 1978).

What all these studies show is that social differentiation has always characterized African societies. It is not development or modernization or culture change which fosters class formation. These merely alter or introduce additional sources of differentiation. For instance, as Garbett's (1967) seminal study among the Shona of valley Korekore chiefdom indicates prestige, status and power derived from a large following:

Traditionally, a man of renown (munhu mukuru: a "big" person) was one who had control over a large following, who had qualities of leadership, who could entertain lavishly, and who could put others under obligation to him by distributing gifts of grain and beer among them. (Garbett 1967:308).

While this traditional prerequisite still holds today, as Cheater (1984) and Cohen (1985) confirm, "the introduction of cattle, the acquisition of property, and the involvement in cash farming" (Garbett 1967:321) have resulted in important modifications to the norms. That is what changing commodity relations did in altering the sources of social formation in the Zimbabwean countryside during 1898-1920 (Phimister 1986). That is what the rise of the State in colonial Zimbabwe between 1900 and 1939 and the conflict between the "established" and the "separatist" churches did in the Gutu

District (Davis and Dopcke 1987). That is what happened in the case of the Small-Scale Commercial or the African Purchase Areas with the introduction of formalized or monetized land transactions, freehold tenure, extension and farm husbandary (Cheater 1984). Across the northwestern border in neighboring Zambia that is what male labor migration to the mines and urban centers did leaving women to assume new and additional roles in relation to property rights (Cliffe 1978).

Given these responses about social formation in rural Africa it is predictable that resettlement is going to reinforce existing traditional idoms of accumulation and differentiation. The significant fact, though, is that nowhere in the literature is it alluded that rural social differentiation is a source of mass societal confrontations. Any social conflicts that may arise in such situations often consist of domestic or kinship squabbles such as relating to witchcraft accusations or realignments in power structures.

Finally, the establishment of the prestigious and relatively large Purchase Area lands for the African farm elites in the colonial days did not precipitate any bloody conflicts among so-called "tribal" Africans. Given all these developments it is very hard to understand the basis, if any, of Kinsey's (1982) concern that the resettlement of the landless on 5 hectare plots in postindependence Zimbabwe will create classes which will be deleterious to relations among Africans. Such a conjecture is not informed by any serious analysis of the traditional and contemporary evidence both in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in other parts of Africa.

Policy Implications for Development

Resettlement in Zimbabwe is both an equity and an economic issue. Normatively, the question comes up as to what economic and other rights and benefits individuals or groups are entitled in their own States. As Charles Beitz (1981:321) puts it in his general paper about distributive justice: What is the distributive share to which everyone is entitled, regardless of the opportunity cost in future growth of output?

So far the discussions about Zimbabwe's agricultural resettlement policy, implementation and performance have thrown very little light on the dynamics of the program and the empirical responses of those individual households which are directly affected by it. Weiner et al (1985:284) have commented succinctly that "Much of th[is] agrarian debate has been conducted more at the level of ideology than from a reasoned assessment of the available data." Elsewhere, Barry Munslow (1985:48) also asserts that "The debate has undoubtedly been clouded by much exxageration of the negative economic impact of resettlement nationally."

It was Alain de Janvry (1983:233) who pointed out that there is no science without ideology. A response to Beitz (1981:321) question and for that matter any evaluation such as this study is necessarily a statement which reflects the ideological orientation of the evaluator. The test, however, is whether or not the evaluator's ideology is flexible enough to allow him or her to review all the available credible information about the issue of concern. The conceptual and methodological problems that this raises are matters with which all the social sciences have been grappling over the years (see Schutz 1954).

In this regard there is perhaps no single area of disciplinary research where there is so much confusion and disagreements as in the field of social change and development. The problems of conceptualizing development and identifying and measuring its indicators are immense (Drewnoski 1972). The semantics of development concepts and indicators (McGranahan 1972) are not value free. Indeed, Magubane's (1971) classic critique of the "received" indices that are used to study social change in Africa shows that how development is conceived and measured can be culturally biased.

Jean Due's (1980) studies on rural economic development in Kenya and also among rural women in Zambia (Due 1983) provide clear evidence that what constitutes development to most rural peoples in an African context are invariably different from "official" definitions with which policy makers and their development planners operate.

To illustrate this point the official definition of development in the Zimbabwe case with resettlement policy is rural household food self-sufficiency plus the achievement of an annual target income of \$400. This case study, however, found that resettled households as well as farmers in the other farming systems had their own definition of what development is all about. These farmers conceived of upenyu hwakanaka or the "good life" that they were striving for in terms of productive farm enterprise, more cattle and a contented family and home. These are broader interests which subsume target cash incomes or food self-sufficiency.

In pursuit of these interests these farm households were prepared to postpone short term concerns such as cash incomes and immediate gratification for increased accumulation of capital assets and investment in their children's education.

At least two messages come out clearly from this section of the analysis. The first is that in rural Zimbabwe the poor, the unemployed, the landless and the destitute who were resettled are now no more different from anybody else in terms of socio-demographic and other characteristics. Like farmers elsewhere, they now form households which range along various phases of the developmental cycle. These households are not a homogeneous or an undifferentiated entity. Consequently, their capabilities, expectations and needs for credit, for instance, may vary according to observed differences.

The second point is that these rural households know pretty well enough about what is good for them. It is imperative and necessary that they should be partners of whoever is in charge of the formulation of policies that are likely to concern them. The specifics of this are elaborated below in the closing discussion and recommendation.

The direction and focus of research efforts at a better understanding and explication of these seemingly or "officially" unimportant issues could immensely benefit development planning in Africa. The discussion and recommendations which are offered below to conclude this study are done in the light of the above challenge. Only four of the many areas of concern in the resettlement equation are selected for this illustrative presentation. These concerns are in respect of the (1) Model A Schemes, (2) Model B Schemes, (3) Non-Governmental Organizations and (4) Agricultural Finance Corporation. The problems relating to each of the above areas are serious enough to merit the immediate and considered attention of the government of Zimbabwe as well as its friends through whose mutual interests and joint contributions the rural equity, growth and development issues of the country are being addressed.

Recommendations and a Discussion

The Model A Normal and Accelerated Schemes

Most of the farmers in these Schemes are responding very well to resettlement. The government does not have many problems on its hands in this area of development. However, some pressing issues need to be tackled before they get out of hand. These relate to (1) enforcement of resettlement permits and (2) the need to encourage effective growth of farmers' own grassroots institutions, their unrestricted participation in the development process and their ultimate self-reliance.

In Mufurudzi a few settlers are openly doing things which, while not appearing to be widespread now, might ultimately degenerate into serious problems. The inaction of the government to strictly enforce the letter of the permits is likely to encourage or even compell other households to follow the breaches. There are cases where some settlers are now (1) in gainful or wage employment both within and outside the Scheme leaving their farms in the care of wives and other kin, (2) extending their arable holdings beyond their 5 hectares allocation and cultivating the common property which is reserved for communal grazing of livestock and (3) exceeding the numbers of livestock head that they are permitted to have in the Scheme.

These are the harbingers of the social contradictions which cumulatively destroyed the ecology and, consequently, the human resources of the former Native Reserves during the colonial days. The ecology of Zimbabwe, like other areas of Africa, is quite fragile. Keeping and grazing too many livestock beyond the carrying capacity of a given piece of land or cultivating an area which is designated as only suitable for grazing are a sure invitation for

ecological disaster both within the short and medium term. In many Communal Areas today the ecological base is so degraded through past uncontrolled overexploitation that the experts predict a permanent damage. If the new lands of the resettlement Schemes are to be saved the fate of the Communal Areas then action is required on this issue of concern.

The government must not deceive itself that it can singlehandedly police and check these problems of resource conservation. Neither is it even necessary for scarce public resources to be expended on such issues which accompany change and development. What is needed is creating the necessary conditions for the flourishing of traditional community institutions which are still deemed relevant and useful by the resettled households. In such a situation peer pressure and communally sanctioned norms become very powerful instruments of control than, for instance, threats of evictions.

The security consciousness in rural Zimbabwe is quite high and the alertness of the village youth brigades, whose responsibility it is to monitor and respond to any threats to communal security, is surprisingly well developed. If something like this, based on voluntary consent for the protection of mutual interest is proving workable then other such less expensive and participatory sources of community self-reliance need to be developed. In this regard the VIDCOs, WARDCOs and Area Board Committee have important responsibilities to guard. The government must emphasize these and utilize these institutions much more than it is doing at present for rural self-help and development.

The final area of recommendation for consideration is socio-economic and has to do with maize retention for household use. It appears that most households, no matter the number of consumer units within them, retain far in excess of what their reasonable subsistence needs are. This reduces their net

cash flow considerably. It can be hypothesized that these farmers retain large volumes of the staple food as an insurance against drought which is a persistent problem in Zimbabwe.

It is plausible to suggest also that such action is a response to the "stop order" system by which the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), through the Grain Marketing Board, deducts farmers loans and credit charges at source during sales (see below under AFC). By keeping more grain the household is at least assured of food for the year even if no payments are obtained from produce sale due to indebtedness to the AFC. Alternatively, if the farmer can manage to get any side-market buyer then he or she takes the risk and illegally dispose of the excess grain in exchange for cash.

Whatever the reason is the poor nature of traditional household storage facilities, which result in losses, and the fact that these farmers are locking up a potential income demand that the issue be looked into seriously. This problem needs immediate rectification before farmers are directly or indirectly "pushed" into side-marketing.

The Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes

If the Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes are allowed to flourish in their current parasitic state and left to operate as they are doing they will soon become a canker and eventually bleed the national economy to incapacitation.

As a group their overall economic performance is negligible and they waste more public and donor funds than they contribute by way of agricultural output. Their organization is characterized by inertia, mismanagement, lack of purpose, petty stealing and internal squabbles, dependency syndrome and a

cycle of low membership, underutilized and misused resources, failure to generate income and hence inability to attract serious, hardworking and skilled farm personnel. Mumbengegwi (1984c:18) aptly sums up the overall picture of these Producer Cooperatives by saying that the agricultural skills base of their farmers is very thin and inappropriate to the design of the Model B Schemes as large scale farming enterprises.

The government has two clear options to confront this problem. The less politically expedient but economically wise action would be to disband these Model B Schemes all together. Given the socialist leanings of the government this recommendation would smack of capitulation. It may thus be ruled out as unrealistic and unacceptable. The more ideologically palatable solution therefore would be to continue to sponsor them.

In the circumstance it is imperative that the government focuses its concerns more on ways and means of ensuring efficiency and productivity. The non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or donor agencies which prop these Model B Schemes with financial and material assistance have a role to play in formulating a workable strategy in this regard. As it is now these Cooperatives are administratively autonomous of public control which in itself is not a bad idea. Internal and participatory management of members should be preferred to State controls and coercion.

The anomaly, however, is that these Cooperatives are using or misusing a public resource in the form of some of the best agricultural lands in the country which are intact with all the existing and potentially productive assets. The worse part of this problem is that the abysmal economic performance, social disorganization and imminent failures of these Producer Cooperative Schemes are being financed heavily and exclusively with tax monies and scarce donor assistance.

One way that the government can keep these Cooperatives while transforming them into efficient and productive enterprises is to turn them over to selected groups of apparently successful farm households drawn from the Model A Schemes. Many such households now find their 5 hectares arable allocations and the 5 to 8 Livestock Units assigned to them under the resettlement permits grossly inadequate. They yearn for more land to prove their productive capabilities. Many would opt out of resettlement for the Small-Scale Commercial Farm system if any such farms were still available. Very soon the government would have a problem on its hands in the resettlement schemes if the aspirations of this group of hardworking households are not addressed.

Evidence from the Mufurudzi case study and many other Model A Schemes points to the existence of many such small groups of households in various villages. These have voluntarily and harmoniously come together to raise medium term loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) to accumulate or acquire assets, share and use resources without in any way jeopardizing their respective self interests as autonomous individual families. Both in theory and in practice that is what nhimbe or traditional work parties have always been all about.

The government can take advantage of such an opportunity by identifying and recruiting these households, maximizing and utilizing their agricultural potential, skills and assets. The Model B Schemes can be turned over to these households with their production obligations and rewards negotiated accordingly. Whatever the case is there should be less State patronage and paternalism so that more resources can be released to monitor and control any likely abuses that the new arrangements may generate.²

The current trends in agrarian socialism in China, parts of Eastern Europe and to some extent the Soviet Union is the responsibility system. This encourages collectivism in the pooling and use of resources. More importantly, it is based on the reward of individual initiative or ingenuity and effort.

If Zimbabwe wants to retain the Model B Schemes as the bedrock of socialist agriculture then it has to do more than merely providing access and opportunity to the poor. Its own record with the Cooperatives now validates what the literature and experiences elsewhere have shown, namely, that the Cooperatives per se do not ensure equity. Indeed, they are as open to "exploitation of man by man" perhaps even more so than the individually-owned or capitalistic farm systems.

The Non-Governmental Organizations

There are numerous donor agencies now operating in Zimbabwe. These have very important roles to play in the country's rural development efforts particularly in areas where the government lacks appropriate and effective resources. Hitherto most of them have not gone beyond their original implicit or de facto mandates as relief agencies.

Almost all these organizations registered to operate in Zimbabwe after independence in 1980. The task then was the rehabilitation of a war-torn country, particularly a demoralized people and a devastated countryside. During the second year of independence and into the fourth year a serious and persistent drought set in. The NGOs responded commendably by supplying the minimal basic needs of the people especially food and clothing.

Very supportive of the government's rural development programs these NGOs aided the implementation of many aspects of the resettlement program. In

particular, they supplemented government's grants by way of direct financial sponsorship of respective Model B Producer Cooperative Schemes throughout the country. At one time or another they supplied some of these Cooperatives with subsistence needs such as salt or cooking oil, offered services such as the payment of phone and electricity bills and provided such capital assets as tractors and grinding mills.

Given the relief orientation of these forms of assistance and particularly the lack of any monitoring controls instituted by the NGOs over impacts of their aid they have helped to create the kind of dependency syndromes in the Model B Producer Cooperative sector that is inimical to self-help and sustained development.

The problem with these NGOs is that they lack any inter-agency coordination and they appear to be overcompeting with each other in terms of what they can do for the respective Schemes. With the possible exception of a few Schemes such as Gowe, Mashonaland West Province (Figure 8-1), which has consistently been sponsored by only one agency the Redd Barna, there is too much duplication of aid by different agencies within the same Schemes.

There is the urgent need therefore for self monitoring on the part of these NGOs in terms of the nature of assistance that they provide and the likely consequences that such assistance would impact on the initiative, self-help and the sustained productivity of the Cooperatives. In terms of the specifics these Schemes would benefit more from training in agricultural and related skills, human relations, equipment servicing and maintainance and simple management and accounting skills. Such skills are initial preconditions for development.

Just supplying these Model B Producer Cooperatives with tractors, as it has been the case on many occasions, has not facilitated their economic

performance and productivity. In some documented instances the availability of these tractors and expensive farm equipment has rather encouraged a free-for-all mentality leading to widespread abuse and misuse.³

The Agricultural Finance Corporation

Institutional credit financing of smallholder agriculture is a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. Currently it is only the AFC which provides such an essential service to resettled farmers under the Resettlement Credit Scheme. This Scheme, established under Statutory Instrument 685 of 1982, replaced the Resettlement Loan Fund which was operational during 1981.

Under the Resettlement Credit Scheme all resettled farmers are eligible for credit from their second year for a period of three years. Beginning from their fifth year such farmers cease to be "automatically eligible." However, they qualify for loans under the the Small Farm Credit Scheme just like Communal Area and Small-Scale Commercial farmers on the basis of their track records.

Much as the extension of credit to resettled farmers by the AFC has facilitated their accumulation process there is every indication that all is not well with the operations of the Credit Schemes from the perspectives of both the AFC and the resettled farmers.

In May 1984 the General Manager of the AFC reviewed the progress of the Resettlement Credit Scheme. For the 1981-82 farming season 1,224 farmers were granted a total of \$420,000 in loans out of which \$305,000 was actually disbursed. The following year 4,170 Model A farmers throughout the country and 3 Model B Producer Cooperatives, namely, Simba Youth, Mount Saint Mary's and Kwaedza were together approved for \$1,916,800 of which \$1,451,000 was

disbursed. In 1983-84 Model A Scheme farmers numbering 17,010 together with 17 Model B Producer Cooperatives were granted a total of \$8,149,000. The recovery rates for these loans for the respective years were 42 percent for the 1981-82 credits, only 5 percent for 1982-83 and 30 percent for 1983-84.⁴

Complaining about the possibility of a cumulative loss of up to \$7.2 million excluding the interest receivable the AFC blamed this development mainly on the following "controllable factors:" (1) lack of selection process and criterion by the Corporation; (2) automatic right to credit facilities breeding an attitude which eroded discipline and self-management towards debt obligations; (3) financing maize production in ecologically unsuitable areas--in which most of the Resettlement Schemes were located; and (4) instability of some resettled farmers who once granted a loan to procure inputs sold those inputs for cash and deserted resettlement without trace.⁵

DERUDE's response to AFC's complaints was very critical of its operations and the attitude of its officials towards smallholder African farmers. It accused the Corporation of hypocrisy. It questioned how the AFC could bemoan the potential loss of \$7 million, advanced farmers who were in their initial years of resettlement in a completely new environment, while being silent about "a staggering amount of approximately \$200 million" owed by experienced and established large-scale farmers. Finally, DERUDE charged that the

AFC has forgotten, or wants to ignore the socio-political context in which it is supposed to administer credit to the [resettled farmers]. Agricultural credit . . . is politically determined and is not primarily a function of economic factors. Thus AFC is not being requested to grant credit . . . as a means to achieve explicit short and long term objectives of Government. Credit is being extended to [the resettled] to correct the socio-economic injustices of the past and as a way of making the peasant farmer more productive whilst reducing the country's structural dependence for food and industrial crops on the white farmers.

DERUDE took the opportunity also to mention many concerns which implied that the AFC had not changed its" settler-colonial structures and mentality to respond to the changed socio-political imperatives of a new Zimbabwe." Specifically, the following deficiencies were brought up: (1) while the Large-Scale (European) Commercial Farmer received a living allowance with his credit as an insurance against crops failure such facility was unavailable to the resettled farmer; (2) rather than canvassing the impression that the nonpayments had all been the fault of the resettled farmers the AFC should have recognized the failure on the part of service Ministries and Departments which had been charged with the responsibility to coordinate the credit package for the farmers; (3) the AFC had always delayed in processing the applications of resettled farmers in time for them to take advantage of early delivery input rebates; (4) resettled farmers more often than not received their inputs well into the growing season; (5) these farmers in Mashonaland East never received their peanut seed in 1983-84 and others elsewhere also did not receive their insecticides or sprayers for cotton or were given the wrong seed varieties or got inadequate quantities of certain inputs though they were billed; and (6) that the AFC was yet to design appropriate credit policies to cater for the specific needs of resettled farmers the greater majority of whom were in the poorer agro-ecological regions.

Elsewhere, the AFC had previously admitted that various reasons accounted for farmers non-payment. For instance, reporting upon the progress with the Small Farm Credit Scheme the AFC Advisory Committee in its meeting of June 10, 1982, minuted:

Investigations had shown that the main reasons for defaulting on repayment of last season's loans were transport and marketing delays, administrative and accounting errors and a degree of black marketing provoked by the slowness on the part of the Corporation in issuing refund cheques.

The records of the AFC show that the rate of recovery of credit to Mufurudzi Model A Scheme farmers in 1981-82 was 93 percent. Given this commendable feat by the generally productive Mufurudzi farmers there is no doubt that the overall ability to pay back these loans is a function of the output achieved by these farm households. It is quite certain therefore that the Model B Schemes and the Model A Schemes farmers who are unable to perform well economically will find it increasingly difficult to honor their obligations. In any lending situation, especially like the political context within which the AFC operates, there will always be borrowers who will default inspite of their financial abilities.

The non-repayment position can become serious if there are no controls or enforceable sanctions. It is equally true also that sanctions which are unenforceable or controls that are unrealistic in a given situation would encourage apathy and unwillingness to pay.

One such control, which creates problems for farmers and backfires on the AFC, is the way that its "buying orders" and the "stop order" systems operate. The former is executed on behalf of the AFC by Cooperative input deliverers. The buying order specifies the amount of loan approved by the AFC and hence the type and quantity of input that the Cooperative should purchase and transport to the farmer. The stop order is executed at the end of the season by the Marketing Boards on behalf of the AFC. The particular produce buying agency monitors the value of the farmer's sale and deducts whatever credit, interest and charges that the AFC had debited against the farmer for inputs which the Cooperative supposedly supplied.

In about May farmers' loan applications are taken by AFC's field officers. The period from June through September is when produce marketing takes place. Sometime from September to October or November or even December

farmers get to hear from the AFC as to the status of their application, receive their inputs, get their contract plowing done, and receive any possible check refunds from previous season's sales. Whatever developments which take place in the interim relating to these critical concerns of farmers remain a confusing mystery to most of them in the Resettlement Schemes as well as in the other smallholder systems.

Between the farmers, the AFC, the Cooperative deliverers and the Marketing Boards there are no coordinated networks to channel information flow. Other than the common knowledge that farmers had applied for credit or sold their crops nothing is done to fully explain to their understanding of what goes on in the confines of the AFC, the Marketing Boards, the Tillage Team and the Input Deliverers. Even their Resettlement and Extension Officers as well as their elected Area Board, which are supposed to represent their interest, are kept in the dark.

Waiting periods of three to six months to hear about a loan application or to receive payment for effort expended in producing crops are excessively oppressive, inefficient and constitute a great disincentive to farming. This development is becoming a common occurrence and a source of frustration and hardship for many farmers. It may impact negatively on production, create opportunities for black or side marketing and influence the farmers' willingness and abilities to repay loans.

There is the urgent need at both the regional and district levels for the AFC to vigorously encourage invited participation in its loan consideration proceedings. Farmer organizations and groups such as the Area Boards or WARDCOs or even VIDCOs, Resettlement and Extension personnel, input deliverers and the marketing agencies may all benefit mutually from such participation.

Of course the final decisions about enterprise viability and granting criteria should continue to rest in the Corporation. But merely telling the farmers, as the AFC does, that "good repayment equals more loan and bad repayment equals less loan" while keeping them in suspense and in the dark is never going to facilitate a successful and sustained agricultural productivity in Zimbabwe.

By seriously involving these farmers in particular aspects of its programs the AFC can help them to better understand how it operates, what its specific duties relating to the loans are, where its responsibilities end and other agencies take over. More importantly, it can by so doing solicit peer pressure to operate and encourage self-policing of loan utilization and repayment among these farmers. Encouraging the organization of these individual households into groups and educating them about the benefits of group loans, as opposed to individual households loans, the AFC would find it much easier to process, administer and collect such loans than the existing system allows.

Conclusion

The on-going agricultural resettlement experiences in Zimbabwe offered a unique and exciting opportunity to observe the implementation of development from both the macro and the micro perspectives. Given the obvious limitations of this study and the problems which attend field research many questions were not anticipated, explored or even understood. Nevertheless, an attempt has been made here to present the facts bearing in mind the expectations, possibly conflicting, of the variety of audiences who have a stake in the sharing of any knowledge gained by this study.

Notes

1.) This is the view conveyed on November 3, 1985, by the Honorable Moven Mahachi, then Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on Zimbabwe television in the interview program "Face the Nation."

2.) What the government will do with the current members of the existing Cooperatives needs to be studied. Most of them are not fit for agriculture and may have to find employment in the wage sector. Alternatively, since the major problem of the Model B Schemes now is inadequate membership those who seriously want to remain in farming can be banded together into viable work forces and resettled again in selected Schemes. The numbers involved here nationally are less than 3,500. It should therefore be possible to work out a satisfactory solution for their gainful employment.

3.) Mention can be made of the following instances drawn from the DERUDE monthly reports.

(i) Kubudirira Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province where some members of the Management Committee in July 1984 drove the Cooperative's tractor for beer drinking in the adjoining Madziwa Communal Area. In September 1985 the new Chairman of the Management Committee with no driving experience or license drove the Cooperative tractor involving it in an accident which totalled it.

(ii) Batsiranayi Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province where a Madza B 1600 Pick-Up truck donated by an NGO was involved in an accident on September 15, 1984, which cost \$1,568.16 in repairs. This was exactly two days after the truck was returned to the Cooperative from the workshop after undergoing earlier repairs costing \$1,612.53.

(iii) Kuenda Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province where a feud between the Chairman and the Treasurer of the Management Committee in October 1984 resulted in a near shooting by the Chairman who was accused among other things of exclusively (mis)using the Cooperative's Land Rover vehicle to pursue his family interests.

(iv) Tabudirira Scheme, Mashonaland East Province where in March 1985 an International 444 Super Tractor belonging to the Cooperative was sabotaged by one of the two feuding cliques. The motors of both the tractor and grinding mill were crippled when large amounts of granulated sugar were poured into them. Incidentally, about the same time irrigation equipment worth \$7,000 were stolen from the Cooperative. Later a former State senator, party dignitary and businessman, Mr. Aggripa Makunde, was charged with the theft and convicted in a Harare Court in August 1985. The prosecutor in the case pointed out that Senator Makunde was very instrumental in the formation of Tabudirira Cooperative that he stole from (see The Herald August 15, 1985).

There are many other documented abuses in these Cooperatives throughout the Provinces. The point here is that there appears to be a mentality among some of these members of the Cooperatives that as "owners" they are at liberty to do whatever they desired with these apparent public properties.

4.) Of the six Schemes granted loans in 1981-82 the recovery rate in the Mufurudzi Model A Normal Scheme, Mashonaland Central Province was the highest amounting to 93 percent as compared to Soti Source Model A Normal Scheme, Masvingo Province, which was only 20 percent.

5.) The AFC attached a schedule to this review showing the number of resettled farmers who had deserted or were evicted and the total amounts owed by each of them. A total of 65 farmers and the amount of \$31,454 were involved. An investigation by DERUDE in the affected resettlements turned out the following: (1) 22 farmers whose inputs worth \$10,707 were transferred by the AFC to other farmers; (2) 4 who had repaid their loans in full amounting to \$1,700; (3) 11 evicted farmers whose inputs worth \$3,934 were repossessed by the Cooperative deliverers on behalf of AFC; (4) 11 farmers who were still resident in the Resettlement Schemes and owed \$5,951; (5) 2 evicted farmers who made arrangement with the AFC to repay \$1,360; (6) 1 evicted farmer owing \$1,966 whose whereabouts were unknown; (7) 3 deserted farmers with known current address; (8) 3 deserted farmers whose current addresses were unknown and who owed between them \$1,361; and (9) 8 "ghost" farmers possibly squatters who apparently took \$3,280 from the AFC and absconded into the Communal Area.

In all then DERUDE estimated that \$26,813 of the amount had been paid or were recoverable leaving \$4,641 as the possible bad debt. Its point was that the AFC had not investigated the issue thoroughly before misinforming itself and everybody and crying wolf.

APPENDIX A
ZIMBABWE: HOUSEHOLD DEVELOPMENTAL CYCLE TYPOLOGY

CODE	PHASE	CONJUGAL FORM	HOUSEHOLD HEADSHIP	EXTENDED KIN/AFFINE	HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
A	Establishment	Monogamous	Male	Present	Pre-fission
	"	"	"	Absent	"
B	Expansion	Monogamous	Male	Present	"
	"	"	"	Absent	"
C	Expansion	Monogamous	Female (Spouse Away)	Present	Fissioning
	"	"	"	Absent	Pre-fission
D	Expansion	Polygynous	Male	Present	"
	"	"	"	Absent	"
E	Expansion	Polygynous	"	Present	Fissioning
	"	"	"	"	Post-fission
F	Consolidation	Monogamous	"	Absent	Pre-fission
	"	"	"	"	Fissioning
G	Consolidation	Monogamous	Female (Spouse Away)	Present	Pre-fission
	"	"	"	"	Fissioning
H	Consolidation	Monogamous	Female (No Spouse)	Present	Pre-fission
	"	"	"	"	Fissioning
I	Decline	Monogamous/No Spouse	Male/Female	Absent	"
	Other	-	-	-	-

APPENDIX B
OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES

TABLE B - 1
MODEL A NORMAL SCHEMES

EVALUATION VARIABLES

01. Rate resettled farmers' social harmony
02. Rate resettled farmers' work motivation
03. Rate resettled farmers' agricultural performance
04. Rate resettled farmers' political participation
05. Rate resettled farmers' self-help participation
06. Rate resettled farmers' youth activity participation
07. Rate resettled farmers' women affairs participation
08. Rate resettled farmers' Area Board meetings participation
09. Rate resettled farmers' Agricultural Finance Corporation loan repayment
10. Rate resettled farmers' cooperation with Resettlement Team
11. Rate resettled farmers' compliance with resettlement policy regulations
12. Rate resettled farmers' progress with resettlement objectives
13. Resettled farmers'/scheme problem
14. Problem solution
15. Differential village progress within scheme
16. List less progressive villages
17. List averagely progressive villages
18. List more progressive villages
19. Scheme administrative problem
20. Rate AGRITEX performance in scheme
21. Rate Department of Veterinary Services performance in scheme
22. Rate Department of Cooperatives performance in scheme
23. Rate water development department performance in scheme
24. Rate medical clinic unit performance in scheme
25. Rate school headmasters performance in scheme
26. Rate rural housing department performance in scheme
27. Rate village health personnel performance in scheme
28. Rate community development personnel performance in scheme
30. Rate adult literacy work in scheme
31. Rate Non-Governmental Organization work in scheme
32. Rate Tillage Team performance in scheme
33. Rate road Development Team performance in scheme
34. Rate Agricultural Finance Corporation service in scheme
35. Rate input delivery (Cooperative) service in scheme
36. Rate agricultural marketing authority service in scheme
37. Rate Zimbabwe Republic Police Service in scheme
38. Rate relations with neighboring Communal Area residents

APPENDIX B
OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES

TABLE B - 2
MODEL A ACCELERATED SCHEMES

EVALUATION VARIABLES

01. Rate resettled farmers' social harmony
02. Rate resettled farmers' work motivation
03. Rate resettled farmers' agricultural performance
04. Rate resettled farmers' political participation
05. Rate resettled farmers' self-help participation
06. Rate resettled farmers' youth activity participation
07. Rate resettled farmers' women affairs participation
08. Rate resettled farmers' Area Board meetings participation
09. Rate resettled farmers' Agricultural Finance Corporation loan repayment
10. Rate resettled farmers' cooperation with Resettlement Team
11. Rate resettled farmers' compliance with resettlement policy regulations
12. Rate resettled farmers' progress with resettlement objectives
13. Resettled farmers'/scheme problem
14. Problem solution
15. Differential village progress within scheme
16. List less progressive villages
17. List averagely progressive villages
18. List more progressive villages
19. Scheme administrative problem

APPENDIX B
OFFICERS' EVALUATION OF RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES

TABLE B - 3
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES

EVALUATION VARIABLES

01. Rate cooperative spirit
02. Rate members work motivation
03. Rate cooperative scheme's agricultural performance
04. Rate cooperative scheme's level of stability
05. Rate resettlement progress
06. Rate prospects for achieving resettlement objectives
07. Rate prospects for cooperative scheme long-term success
08. Cooperative scheme's problem
09. Problem solution

APPENDIX C
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES: MANAGEMENT SURVEY

STUDY VARIABLES

01. Total membership of cooperative
02. Number of male members
03. Number of female members
04. List of committees
05. Number of general meetings held in 1984-85
06. Bye-laws changed
07. Production arrangement
08. Reason for arrangement
09. Cooking/eating arrangement
10. Reason for arrangement
11. How earnings distributed
12. Maximum per capita remuneration, 1984-85
13. Minimum per capita remuneration, 1984-85
14. Rate assistance from Department of Cooperatives
15. Rate assistance from Department of Rural Development
16. Rate assistance from AGRITEX
17. Rate assistance from the Agricultural Finance Corporation
18. Rate assistance from Tillage Team
19. Rate assistance from inputs delivery (Cooperative)
20. Rate assistance from Agricultural Marketing Authority
21. Rate assistance from the mobile health clinic
22. Rate assistance from the Non-Governmental Organizations
23. Problem facing this cooperative
24. Recommended solution to problem on the part of members
25. Recommended solution to problem on the part of government
26. Recommended solution to problem on the part of NGOs

APPENDIX D
FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES

TABLE D - 1
MODEL A NORMAL & ACCELERATED RESETTLEMENT SCHEMES

STUDY VARIABLES

01. How first heard about resettlement
02. Reason for resettlement
03. Response to resettlement
04. Should resettlement continue
05. Where land for resettlement
06. Where money for resettlement
07. Should farmers pay resettlement tax
08. Why no to resettlement tax
09. Past resettlement problem (1980-81/1984-85)
10. Current resettlement problem (1985-86)
11. Source/cause of current problem
12. Rate resettlement team's performance
13. Suggestion to improve team's effectiveness
14. Resettlement scheme/settlers basic need
15. Who to provide basic need
16. Problem with the Agricultural Finance Corporation
17. Problem with the Grain Marketing Board
18. Problem with the Cotton Marketing Board
19. Communal Farmers rights to grazing in resettlement scheme
20. Communal Farmers rights to resources in resettlement scheme
21. Resettlement scheme/Communal Area boundary fence justified
22. Relative resettled in Model A (minda wirefu) scheme
23. Relative resettled in Model B (mushandira pamwe) scheme
24. Rate government's policy to socialize agriculture
25. Recommendation for successful agriculture
26. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka)
27. Good life possible here for farmer in short term
28. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term
29. Where if wage job is only option for good life
30. Where if farming elsewhere is only option for good life
31. Farmer's living condition by 1980
32. Farmer's living condition in 1985
33. Farmer's living condition at 1990
34. How farmer will use \$1,000
35. Farmer has watch/clock
36. When watch/clock acquired
37. Farmer has radio
38. When radio acquired
39. Farmer has bed/mattress
40. When bed/mattress acquired
41. Farmer has sewing machine
42. When sewing machine acquired
43. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985)
44. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985)
45. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985)

TABLE D - 1 continued

46. Farmer has bicycle
47. When bicycle acquired
48. Farmer has scotch-cart
49. When scotch-cart acquired
50. Farmer has ox-plow
51. When ox-plow acquired
52. Farmer has sprayer
53. When sprayer acquired
54. Farmer has wheel barrow
55. When wheel barrow acquired
56. Farmer has cultivator
57. When cultivator acquired
58. Farmer has planter
59. When planter acquired
60. Farmer has tractor
61. When tractor acquired
62. Farmer has tractor implements
63. When tractor implements acquired
64. Farmer obtained rural housing loan
65. Stage of house construction
66. Farmer's age
67. Farmer's gender
68. Farmer's marital status
69. Male farmer's number of wives
70. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980
71. Farmer's country of origin
72. Zimbabwe farmer's home province
73. Zimbabwe farmer's communal area
74. Non-zimbabwe farmer's years of residence
75. Farmer's years of school completed
76. Farmer's non-agricultural skill
77. Farmer's number of living children
78. Farmer's number of children born since 1980
79. Farmer's preferred profession for children
80. Farmer's household size
81. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender
82. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age
83. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status
84. Number of cattle owned
85. Number of donkeys owned
86. Number of goats owned
87. Number of sheep owned
88. Hectares of maize planted (1984-85)
89. Bags (91 kg) of maize harvested
90. Bags (91 kg) of maize sold
91. Hectares of cotton planted (1984-85)
92. Bales (200 kg) of cotton harvested
93. Bales (200 kg) of cotton sold
94. Hectares of tobacco planted (1984-85)
95. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco harvested
96. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco sold

APPENDIX D
FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES

TABLE D - 2
MODEL B PRODUCER COOPERATIVE SCHEMES

STUDY VARIABLES

01. Farmer cooperative member before resettlement
02. Farmer knew cooperative principles/objectives before joining
03. Years since farmer joined this cooperative
04. Job performed before joining this cooperative
05. Where farmer lived before joining this cooperative
06. Farmer's reason for joining this cooperative
07. How farmer heard about this cooperative
08. Farmer's spouse member of this cooperative
09. Farmer's relative member of this cooperative
10. Farmer joined this cooperative with any capital assets
11. Farmer member of any committee in this cooperative
12. Farmer satisfied with work of management committee
13. Farmer willing to pay membership fee/tax
14. Communal farmers rights to grazing in this cooperative
15. Explain your answer
16. Problem of this cooperative
17. Farmer's recommended solution to problem
18. Membership of this cooperative adequate to tasks
19. Members of this cooperative work hard enough
20. Members appreciate your work effort in this cooperative
21. Farmer prefers individual or collective farm plots
22. Explain your answer
23. Farmer prefers individual or collective cooking arrangement
24. Explain your answer
25. Farmer gets on well with other members of this cooperative
26. Members of this cooperative consider themselves as one family
27. Money farmer deserves for work contribution during 1984-85
28. Relative resettled in Model A (minda mirefu) scheme
29. Relative resettled in Model B (minda mirefu) scheme
30. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka)
31. Good life possible here for farmer in short term
32. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term
33. Where if wage job is only option for good life
34. Where if farming elsewhere is only option for good life
35. Farmer's living condition by 1980
36. Farmer's living condition in 1985
37. Farmer's living condition at 1990
38. How farmer will use \$1,000
39. Farmer has watch/clock
40. When watch/clock acquired
41. Farmer has radio
42. When radio acquired
43. Farmer has bed/mattress
44. When bed/mattress acquired
45. Farmer has sewing machine

TABLE D - 2 continued

46. When sewing machine acquired
47. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985)
48. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985)
49. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985)
50. Farmer has bicycle
51. Farmer's age
52. Farmer's gender
53. Farmer's marital status
54. Male farmer's number of wives
55. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980
56. Farmer's country of origin
57. Zimbabwe farmer's home province
58. Zimbabwe farmer's communal area
59. Non-zimbabwe farmer's years of residence
60. Farmer's years of school completed
61. Farmer's non-agricultural skill
62. Farmer's number of living children
63. Farmer's number of children born since 1980
64. Farmer's preferred profession for children
65. Farmer's household size
66. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender
67. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age
68. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status

APPENDIX D
FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES

TABLE D - 3
COMMUNAL AREAS

STUDY VARIABLES

01. Years farmer lived here in Communal Area
02. Years farming here in Communal Area
03. Size of farmer's arable land, hectares
04. Farmer's arable land adequate
05. Communal grazing land adequate
06. Farmer heard about Model A (minda mirefu) resettlement
07. Farmer heard about Model B (mushandira pamwe) resettlement
08. Farmer applied/intends to apply to be resettled
09. Resettlement model preference if farmer to be resettled
10. Relative resettled in Model A (minda mirefu) scheme
11. Relative resettled in Model B (minda mirefu) scheme
12. Resettlement the solution to Communal Area land problems
13. Communal farmers rights to grazing in resettlement scheme
14. Communal farmers rights to resources in resettlement scheme
15. Resettlement scheme/Communal Area boundary fence justified
16. Explain your answer
17. Communal area expansion or creation of resettlement scheme
18. Explain your answer
19. Communal area's urban residents land rights here
20. Explain your answer
21. Problem experienced by farmer here in Communal Area
22. Farmer's recommended solution to problem for government
23. Farmer's recommended solution to problem for other farmers
24. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka)
25. Good life possible here for farmer in short term
26. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term
27. Where if wage job is only option for good life
28. Where if farming elsewhere is only option for good life
29. Farmer's living condition by 1980
30. Farmer's living condition in 1985
31. Farmer's living condition at 1990
32. how farmer will use \$1,000
33. Farmer has watch/clock
34. When watch/clock acquired
35. Farmer has radio
36. When radio acquired
37. Farmer has bed/matress
38. When bed/matress acquired
39. Farmer has sewing machine
40. When sewing machine acquired
41. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985)
42. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985)
43. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985)
44. Farmer has bicycle
45. When bicycle acquired

TABLE D - 3 continued

46. Farmer has scotch-cart
47. When scotch-cart acquired
48. Farmer has ox-plow
49. When ox-plow acquired
50. Farmer has sprayer
51. When sprayer acquired
52. Farmer has wheel barrow
53. When wheel barrow acquired
54. Farmer has cultivator
55. When cultivator acquired
56. Farmer has planter
57. When planter acquired
58. Farmer has tractor
59. When tractor acquired
60. Farmer has tractor implements
61. When tractor implements acquired
62. Farmer's age
63. Farmer's gender
64. Farmer's marital status
65. Male farmer's number of wives
66. male farmer's number of wives married since 1980
67. Farmer's years of school completed
68. Farmer's non-agricultural skill
69. Farmer's number of living children
70. Farmer's number of children born since 1980
71. Farmer's preferred profession for children
72. Farmer's household size
73. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender
74. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age
75. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status
76. Number of cattle owned
77. Number of donkeys owned
78. Number of goats owned
79. Number of sheep owned
80. Hectares of maize planted (1984-85)
81. Bags (91 kg) of maize harvested
82. Bags (91 kg) of maize sold
83. Hectares of cotton planted (1984-85)
84. Bales (200 kg) of cotton harvested
85. Bales (200 kg) of cotton sold
86. Hectares of tobacco planted (1984-85)
87. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco harvested
88. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco sold

APPENDIX D
FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES

TABLE D - 4
SMALL-SCALE COMMERCIAL FARM AREAS

STUDY VARIABLES

01. Farmer owns property
02. How farm acquired
03. Years since acquisition
04. Tenancy arrangement
05. Farm size, hectares
06. Farm adequacy
07. Will farmer buy more land
08. How farmer will dispose of property
09. Farmer shares boundary with Communal Area
10. Any trespassing from Communal Area
11. Any approach for advice from Communal Area farmers
12. Any offer of advice to Communal Area farmers
13. Any offer of advice to Model B (mushandira pamwe) farmers
14. Any offer of advice to Model A (minda mirefu) farmers
15. Rate policy on food self sufficiency
16. Rate policy on economic growth
17. Rate policy on Large-Scale Farms
18. Rate policy on Small-Scale Farms
19. Rate policy on Communal Area/peasant Farms
20. Rate policy on resource conservation
21. Resettlement policy realistic
22. Rate resettlement progress
23. Rate policy to socialize agriculture
24. Recommendation for successful agriculture
25. Should resettlement continue
26. Where land for resettlement
27. Relative resettled in Model A (minda mirefu) scheme
28. Relative resettled in Model B (mushandira pamwe) scheme
29. Attribute of a good life (upenyu hwakanaka)
30. Good life possible here for farmer in short term
31. Good life possible here for farmer's children in long term
32. Where if wage job is only option for good life
33. Where if farming elsewhere is only option for good life
34. Farmer's living condition by 1980
35. Farmer's living condition in 1985
36. Farmer's living condition at 1990
37. How farmer will use \$1,000
38. Farmer has watch/clock
39. When watch/clock acquired
40. Farmer has radio
41. When radio acquired
42. Farmer has bed/matress
43. When bed/matress acquired
44. Farmer has sewing machine
45. When sewing machine acquired

TABLE D - 4 continued

46. Farmer purchased men's clothes (1985)
47. Farmer purchased women's clothes (1985)
48. Farmer purchased children's clothes (1985)
49. Farmer has bicycle
50. When bicycle acquired
51. Farmer has scotch-cart
52. When scotch-cart acquired
53. Farmer has ox-plow
54. When ox-plow acquired
55. Farmer has sprayer
56. When sprayer acquired
57. Farmer has wheel-barrow
58. When wheel-barrow acquired
59. Farmer has cultivator
60. When cultivator acquired
61. Farmer has planter
62. When planter acquired
63. Farmer has tractor
64. When tractor acquired
65. Farmer has tractor implements
66. When tractor implements acquired
67. Farmer's age
68. Farmer's gender
69. Farmer's marital status
70. Male farmer's number of wives
71. Male farmer's number of wives married since 1980
72. Farmer's country of origin
73. Farmer's home province
74. Farmer's Communal Area
75. Farmer's years of school completed
76. Farmer's non-agricultural skill
77. Farmer's number of living children
78. Farmer's number of children born since 1980
79. Farmer's preferred profession for children
80. Farmer's household size
81. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - gender
82. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - age
83. Farmer's resident children/household dependants - status
84. Number of cattle owned
85. Number of donkeys owned
86. Number of goats owned
87. Number of sheep owned
88. Hectares of maize planted (1984-85)
89. Bags (91 kg) of maize harvested
90. Bags (91 kg) of maize sold
91. Hectares of cotton planted (1984-85)
92. Bales (200 kg) of cotton harvested
93. Bales (200 kg) of cotton sold
94. Hectares of tobacco planted (1984-85)
95. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco harvested
96. Bales (180 kg) of tobacco sold

APPENDIX D
FARMERS' RESPONSES: CASE STUDY VARIABLES

TABLE D - 5
LARGE SCALE COMMERCIAL FARM AREA

STUDY VARIABLES

01. Farmer owns property
02. How farm acquired
03. Years since acquisition
04. Tenancy arrangement
05. Farm size, hectares
06. Value of property, dollars
07. Farm adequacy
08. Will farmer buy more land
09. How farmer will dispose of property
10. Farmer education level completed
11. Years since completion of education
12. Years since farming
13. Job before farming
14. Years since farming here
15. Farmer shares boundary with Communal Area
16. Any trespassing from Communal Area
17. Any approach for advice from Communal Area farmers
18. Any offer of advice to Communal Area farmers
19. Any offer of advice to Model B (mushandira pamwe) farmers
20. Any offer of advice to Model A (minda mirefu) farmers
21. Recommendation for smallholder farmers success
22. Rate policy on food self sufficiency
23. Rate policy on economic growth
24. Rate policy on Large-Scale Farms
25. Rate policy on Small-Scale Farms
26. Rate policy on Communal Area/peasant Farms
27. Rate policy on resource conservation
28. Resettlement policy realistic
29. Large-Scale Farms available for resettlement
30. Rate resettlement progress
31. Rate policy to socialize agriculture
32. Recommendation for successful agriculture
33. Farmer's living condition by 1980
34. Farmer's living condition in 1985
35. Farmer's living condition at 1990

APPENDIX E
ZIMBABWE: PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION AND LIST OF RESETTLEMENT
MODELS AND SCHEMES, DECEMBER 1985

PROVINCE	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED	MODEL B COOPERATIVE
MASHONALAND EAST	1 Acton Reynold 2 Sengezi 1 3 Sengezi 2 4 Hoyuyu 3 5 Hoyuyu 1 6 Hoyuyu 2 7 Nyamuzizi 8 Nyadire	1 Marondera 2 Wedza 3 Wheleerdale	1 Kwaedza 2 Mt. St. Mary 3 Shandisai Pfungwa 4 Tamuka 5 Kumhanya 6 Marowa 7 Tabudirira
MASHONALAND CENTRAL	1 Mufuruzi 2 Mt. Darwin 3 Karuyana	1 Shamva 2 Bindura 3 Alfa 4 Nyamanji 5 Elhandama 6 Gremlin Heights	1 Nyakudya 2 Kuenda 3 Chakoma 4 Kurima Inhaka 5 Kushingirira 6 Simba Youth 7 Kubudirira 8 Batsiranayi
MASHONALAND WEST	1 Nyama 2 Musengezi 3 Jompani 4 Muzvezve 1 5 Muzvezve 2 6 Jondale/Bumbe	1 Chegutu 6 2 Torananga 3 Vuti A & B 4 Ngezi	1 Ganyangu 2 Gowe 3 Tashinga 4 Mukuwapasi 5 Mauya 6 Nyamakate
MANICALAND	1 Mayo 2 Nyagadza 3 Chiyinka 4 Rusitu 5 Shinja 6 Mupudzi 7 Murare 8 Nyagundi 9 Mutanda 1 10 Mutanda 2 11 Mutanda 3 12 Nyamazura 13 Nyanga South 14 Nyajezi	1 Chizvirizvi 2 Nyahodi 3 Inyashuuti 4 Chirimutsitso 5 Shangwe 6 Gwindingwi	1 Rogogo 2 Airlie 3 Ruponeso 4 Ruwaka 5 Svinurai 6 Chitimbi 7 Tangenhamo 8 Rujeko 9 Zindoga 10 Kubatana 11 Nyagadzi 12 Kuenda Masimba 13 Magura Batanai 14 Tanhi 15 Bethel

APPENDIX E--continued

PROVINCE	MODEL A NORMAL	MODEL A ACCELERATED	MODEL B COOPERATIVE
MIDLANDS	1 Shurugwi/Tana 2 Shurugwi 3 Tokwe 3 4 Tokwe 4 5 Tokwe 6 Sessombi 3 7 Western Sessombi 8 Sessombi 9 Copper Queen	1 New Castel 2 Zvishavane 3 Takawira 4 Masvori 5 Lower Gweru 6 Ednovean 7 Riverbond 8 Barkly 9 Chikomba 10 Chivu 11 Hastings 12 Wheelerdale 13 Ngezi Poort 14 Ringa	1 Dangarendove 2 Vimbai Rufaro 3 Hatineti 4 Shungudzevhu 5 Gutsaruzhinji 6 Makwikwi 7 Zezayi
MASVINGO	1 Chizvirizvi 2 Mukorsi 3 Nyahombe 4 Mushandike 5 Chipinda 6 Dewure 7 Vimvi 8 Soti Source 9 Gutu South	1 Mwenezi 2 Nyangambe 3 Ngomahuru 4 Lake Kyle South 5 Lake Kyle East 6 Glen Livet 7 Townlands 8 Victoria 9 Marowa 10 Verlos 11 Thorngrove 12 Velgervonden 13 Thorns 14 Rippling Waters 15 Pastures 16 Good Hope/Shasha Fountains	
MATABELELAND NORTH	1 Umguza 2 Bembezi	1 Sedgewick Syndicate 2 Lortondale	
MATABELELAND SOUTH	1 Dombodema 2 Matopos South 3 Insiza 4 Shobi 5 Wanezi	1 Inyozane 2 Glen Grey 3 Hollins Block 4 Undza 5 Norwood Penge 6 The Range 7 Manyole 8 River Ranch 10 Wedza 12 Mbala Bala	1 Clarks Farm 2 Enchuca Nyamini
		9 Jopempi 11 Filabusi/Kentucky	

APPENDIX F
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT APPLICATION FORM

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

BASI REHURUMENDE REZVE MINDA, KUGADZIKWA PATSVA NEKUKWIDZIRIDZWA KWEMARUWA

UGATSHA LUKA HULUMENDE OLUBONA NGEZOMHLABA UKWABIWA KWAYO LEOQUBELO
PHAMBILI YEZABELO

RESETTLEMENT REGISTRATION FORM
GWARO REKUNYORWA KWEVANODA MINDA MIREFU
UKUGCWALISA IFOMU YOKUHLALISWA KUTSHA

Issued free of charge
Gwaro iri rinopiwa pasina muripo
Ifomu leli liphwiwa kungela mbadalo

This form must be completed and returned to your Ward Councillor by.....
Gwaro iri rinofanira kuzadziwa rodzorwa kuna Ward Councillor wako musi wa...
Ifomu kumele igcwaliswe ibiselwe kumeli wakho we khansili.....

-
1. Name and R/CI/D Number.....
Zita nenhamba dzechitupa chako
Ibizo lenombolo zesi thupa
- District.....
Dhuno rako
Isigaba sako
- Ward.....
Ward yako
I Ward yako
- Kraal.....
Sabhuku wako
Usabhuku wakho
2. Age.....Makore ekuberekwa.....Iminyaka yokuzalwa.....
3. Are you married?.....divorced?.....or widowed?.....
Wakaroorwa here? kana kurambwa? kana chirikadzi
Uthethe? selehlukana? ungumfelokazi?

APPENDIX F--continued.

4. Number of wives.....Uwandu hwe vakadzi vako.....Abafazi bahko bangaki.....

Number of your children under the age of 18.....

Uwandu hwe vana vari pasi pemakore gumi nematsere

Inani labantwana abaleminyika engaphasi kwetshumi lesitshiyangalombili....

Number of other dependants living with you.....

Uwandu hwe vamwe vaunochengeta

Labanye njalo obagcinileyo

5. Present occupation.....

Basa rauri kushanda ikozvino

Umsebenzi owenzayo khathesi

6. What is the size of your land in the Communal Area?.....

Unenzvimbo yakakura zvakadini mumaruwa?

Ulomhlaba onganani ezabelweni?

In which communal land?.....Muruwa rupi?.....Kusipi isabelo?.....

7. How many of these do you own?

Zvingani zveizvi zvipfuyo zvaunazvo?

Zingaki izifuyo olazo?

Cattle.....Goats.....Sheep.....Donkeys.....Pigs.....

Mombe

Mbudzi

Hwai

Mbongoro

Nguruve

Inkomo

Imbudzi

Izimvu

Obabheni

Ingulube

8. Indicate ownership of the following things:

Ndezvipi zvaunazvo pane zvinhu zvinotevera:

Tshengisa ukuthi ulako yini okulandelayo:

Plough.....Scotch-Cart.....Harrows.....Cultivator.....Other implements....

Gejo

Ngoro

Hara

Karutivheta

Ikhubu

Ingola

Ihala

Isikhofolo

I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I AM ALLOCATED A LAND HOLDING IN A RESETTLEMENT SCHEME IT MUST BE PERSONALLY OCCUPIED BY ME AND MY FAMILY AND THAT I WILL BE REQUIRED TO GIVE UP ALL RIGHTS TO LAND IN THE COMMUNAL LAND, AND THAT MERE COMPLETION OF THIS FORM DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAND ALLOCATION.

NDINOTSIDZA KUTI KANA NDIKAGOVERWA NZVIMBO KUMINDA MIREFU NDINOZOGARA PANZVIMBO IYI INI PACHEZVANGU NEMHURI YANGU UYE KUTI NDINBVUMA KUSIYA NZVIMBO YANGU YOKUMARUWA. NDINOVBVUMA ZVAKARE KUTI KUZADZISA GWARO RINO HAZVIREVI KUTI NDATOBVA NDAWANA MUNDA.

NGIYEZWISISA IKUTHI UMA SENGINIKWE INDAWO KULEZI ZINDAWO EZABELWA ABANTU NGIZAHALA KHONA MINA NGOKWAMI LEMWULI YAMI NJALO NGIZA TSHIYA LE INDAWO EBENGIKUYO EZABELWENI UKUGCWALISA LELI FOMU AKUTSHO UKUTHI INDAWO USULAYO

DATE.....SIGNED.....

APPENDIX F--continued.

I certify that the information I have given is true and correct.

Ndinodavira kuti zvole zvandataura ichokwadi chizere

Ngileqiniso elegcweleyo ukuthi lokhu engikulobe lapha kuliqiniso

DATE.....SIGNED.....

TO BE COMPLETED BY A PERSON OF STANDING WHO KNOWS THE APPLICANT

APA PANOZADZISWA NEMUNHU ANONYATSOKUZIVA MUNYORI

LAPHA KUFANELE KUGCWALISWE NGUMUNTU OWAZI LO UMUNTU OGCWALISE LELI FOMU

I certify that I know the applicant personally and that to the best of my knowledge and belief the information he has given is true and complete.

Ngiyamazi lo umuntu njalo ngokumazi kwami ngileqiniso ukuthi, lokhu akulobe lapha kuliqiniso.

SIGNED.....

ZITA NE HOFISI

IBIZO LEHOFISI

APPENDIX G
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS

TABLE G - 1
PERMIT TO RESIDE

Permit Number.....

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO RESIDE

Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to (hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to reside on the residential site

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may determine.
2. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the holder has failed to comply with any of its terms and conditions.
3. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.
4. The said site shall be used for residential purpose for the accomodation of the HOLDER and his immediate family only.
5. The HOLDER shall maintain the said site in a clean, sanitary and tidy condition and shall comply with any instructions that the MINISTER may issue for the upkeep of the said site and the prevention of nuisance and the maintenance of sanitary conditions.
6. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which may be levied on the said site by competent authority.
7. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any trading, commercial or industrial operations on the the said site.
8. The MINISTER, or any person authorized by him, shall have the right, free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain roads, boreholes, pipe-lines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and ancillary works upon or under the said site.

TABLE G - 1 continued

9. On the expiry or revocation of this permit no compensation shall be payable to the HOLDER for any improvements effected by him on the said site.

Provided that the HOLDER shall be entitled, within a period of three months after the expiry or revocation of the permit, to remove any buildings and improvements constructed or effected by him on the said site.

Any buildings or improvements that are not removed by the HOLDER within the said period of three months shall become the property of the MINISTER, who may deal with them as he thinks fit.

10. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public service as he may designate.
11. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER permitting the HOLDER to cultivate or depasture stock on State Land is revoked, the MINISTER may, in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit.

Issued at.this.day of.19.

(Designated Official).

for Director of the Department of Rural
Development on behalf of the Minister of
Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development,
in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of 1980.

APPENDIX G
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS

TABLE G - 2
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE

Permit Number.....

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO CULTIVATE

Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to (hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to cultivate on an area of State Land, approximately. . . . hectares in area, known as. and as indicated on the sketch plan attached hereto (hereinafter referred to as "HOLDING").

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. In the event of there arising any dispute as to the boundaries or location of the land which may be cultivated in terms of this permit the decision of the MINISTER shall be final.
2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may determine.
3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms and conditions.
4. The MINISTER may, for any public purpose, revoke this permit at any time and under such conditions as he thinks fit on payment to the HOLDER of such compensation as the MINISTER may determine.
5. The said HOLDING shall be used solely for agricultural purposes for the HOLDER's exclusive benefit.
6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall:-
 - i) personally, actively and continuously carry on agricultural activities on the holding to the satisfaction of the MINISTER;
 - ii) comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 150), the Animal Health Act (Chapter 121), the Noxious Weeds Act (Chapter 127), and all other laws relating to soils husbandry, farming practices and livestock management and shall further comply with all instructions which the MINISTER may issue for:-

TABLE G - 2 continued

- a) the prevention of damage to the sources and courses of streams;
 - b) the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases;
 - c) the control or eradication of any plants harmful to crops and livestock;
 - d) the protection of the said HOLDING against soil erosion;
 - e) the carrying out any other measure that the HOLDER complies with clause 6 (i) hereof.
7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the MINISTER.
 8. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall renounce and forgo all rights to cultivate any land or depasture livestock in any Communal Area.
 9. The HOLDER shall not construct or erect, nor permit nor cause to be constructed or erected, any building or other structure on the HOLDING.
 10. The HOLDER shall pay all rates, taxes or other charges which may be levied on the said HOLDING by competent authority.
 11. The Holder shall not, without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, engage in any other occupation or employment during the currency of this permit.
 12. The HOLDER shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any trading, commercial or industrial operations on the the said HOLDING.
 13. The HOLDER shall permit any rights of way necessary to give access to other holdings should he be required to do so by the MINISTER.
 14. The MINISTER, or any person authorized by him, shall have the right, free of charge and without compensation, to lay, construct and maintain roads, boreholes, pipe-lines, electric lines, sewerage, drains and ancillary works upon or under the said HOLDING.
 15. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public service as he may designate.
 16. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER permitting the HOLDER to cultivate or depasture stock on State Land is revoked, the MINISTER may, in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit.

Issued at.this.day of.19.

(Designated Official).
for Director of the Department of Rural
Development on behalf of the Minister of
Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development,
in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of 1980.

APPENDIX G
ZIMBABWE: RESETTLEMENT PERMITS

TABLE G - 3
PERMIT TO DEPASTURE LIVESTOCK

Permit Number.....

MINISTRY OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
PERMIT TO DEPASTURE LIVESTOCK

Issued by the MINISTER OF LANDS, RESETTLEMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (hereafter referred to as "the MINISTER"), in terms of section 6 of the Rural Land Act (Chapter 155) to (hereinafter referred to as "the HOLDER").

The MINISTER hereby permits the HOLDER to depasture stock, not exceeding in number the equivalent of.....livestock units on the area of State Land known as. (hereinafter referred to as "the said State Land").

For the purpose of this permit the categories of stock shown in the first column shall be equal to the number of livestock units shown in the second column:

<u>First Column</u>	<u>Second Column</u>
<u>Category of Stock</u>	<u>Livestock Units</u>
Cattle under the age of 2 years	0.5
Cattle over the age of 2 years	1.0
Sheep and goats under the age of 1 year	0.1
Sheep and goats over the age of 1 year	0.2

This permit is subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. In the event of there being any dispute as to the total number of livestock units equivalent to the stock being depastured in terms of this permit the decision of the MINISTER shall be final.
2. The MINISTER may renew this permit and, at any time during the currency thereof, including any renewal, may, without notice, replace it with some other form of agreement on such terms and conditions as he may determine.
3. This permit may be revoked if, at his sole discretion, the MINISTER decides that the HOLDER has failed to comply with any of its terms and conditions or has depastured stock in excess of the number permitted.

4. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall comply in all respects with the provisions of, and regulations made under, the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 150), the Animal Health Act (Chapter 121), and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock management and shall further comply with all instructions in respect of the said State Land which the MINISTER may issue for:-
 - a) the prevention of damage to the sources or courses of public streams
 - b) the prevention and control of animal pests and diseases;
 - c) the control or eradication of plants harmful to livestock;
 - d) the maintenance of livestock carrying capacity through grazing and livestock management;
 - e) the protection of the soil against erosion.
5. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall permanently and personally reside on the residential site allocated to him by the MINISTER
6. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall renounce and forgo all rights to cultivate land or depasture stock in any Communal Areas.
7. During the currency of this permit the HOLDER shall not, without the prior written consent of the MINISTER, engage in any other employment or occupation.
8. The HOLDER shall not without the written consent of the MINISTER, construct or erect any building or other structure on a Communal Area.
9. The HOLDER shall not carry on any trading, commercial or industrial operation on the said State Land.
10. The HOLDER shall not by any act prevent or attempt to prevent any other person from exercising any right to depasture stock on the said State Land
11. The HOLDER shall not, without the prior written permission of the MINISTER, cultivate, cut any trees on, or remove any timber, grass or other vegetation from, the said State Land.
12. Any act required or permitted to be performed by the MINISTER in terms of this permit may be performed on behalf of the MINISTER by such officer in the public service as he may designate.
13. If any permit issued to the HOLDER by the MINISTER permitting the HOLDER to cultivate or reside on State Land is revoked, the MINISTER may, in his sole discretion, immediately revoke this permit.

Issued at.this.day of.19.

(Designated Official).
for Director of the Department of Rural Development on
behalf of the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and Rural
Development, in terms of Statutory Instrument 247 of
1980.

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
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw was born on Friday, November 1, 1946, in Kumasi, the royal capital of the Kingdom of the Asantes, Ghana, West Africa, to Opanyin Kwadwo Awua (Emmanuel Francis Kojo Yinkah) an electrician and mechanic from Akrofuom-Adansi and Maame Akua Ampomaah (Manu) a farmer from Sawua.

He attended elementary and secondary schools in various parts of Ghana. He entered the University of Ghana, Legon, in October 1967 and graduated with a B. A. (Honors) degree in geography in June 1970. Thereafter he worked with the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research at the University until 1973. Between September 1973 and August 1974 Akwabi-Ameyaw taught English and geography at the Kaneshie Secondary-Technical College, Accra, Ghana, as Assistant Superintendent of Education. He entered the Ghana Civil Service in August 1974 when he was appointed to the position of Research Officer in the Chieftaincy Secretariat, Accra. He also served in various capacities at the National House of Chiefs, Kumasi, and briefly as the Acting Chief Research Officer at the Secretariat before leaving for further studies at the University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, in September 1979.


Having obtained an M. A. degree in anthropology from Cincinnati, Akwabi-Ameyaw enrolled in the Ph.D. program in anthropology at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, in August 1981. Kofi Akwabi-Ameyaw was elected a student member of the New York Academy of Sciences in 1982. His major interest is in working with smallholder farmers and in interacting with rural peoples studying their socio-economic organization and differentiation and the dynamic forces which shape their social formations.

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
Brian M. du Toit, Chairman
Professor of Anthropology

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
Paul L. Doughty
Professor of Anthropology

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
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
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This dissertation was submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Anthropology in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate School and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Dean, Graduate School

April 1988